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Note on Transliteration
Until January 1, 1979, all Chinese-English publications and
Western studies on China used the Wade-Giles system for transliterating Chinese names, places, and publications. Since then,
the People's Republic of China has converted to the Pinyin
(transcription) system.
Throughout this study, the reader will
note the use of both systems.
Since many names, places, and
events referred to in· this study cover the period before 1979,
they appear in the Wade-Giles system. This, I believe, is particularly important for the scholar who wishes to refer to my
sources and would be required to reconvert Pinyin to Wade-Giles.
But, with respect to recent sources, as well as recent laws
translated by the author, they will appear in their original
Pinyin transcriptions. Certain proper names, such as Mao Zedong
(Mao Tse-tung), and places such as Beijing (Peking) may be referenced in this study in both systems to facilitate understanding.
For the convenience of readers, I have included a table on the
Wade-Giles - Pinyin conversion.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Before arms control and disarmament! can make any significant contribution to the international legal order, it is necessary for the strategic studies community to be fully apprised not
only of provisions in disarmament agreements controlling the use,
manufacture, stockpiling, or testing of arms, but also of the
conceptual foundation of disarmament -- the receptiveness of each
of the major legal systems of the world to mandatory provisions
for verification of disarmament procedures.2
Direct monitoring of compliance with arms control and disarmament (ACD) measures is an essential ingredient in defusing
suspicion and instilling confidence in the parties to such agreements.
Currently, the procedures for direct monitoring take two
major forms:
human intelligence means, including covert operations and intelligence analysis of published materials, and national technical means, in which sophisticated electronic and
seismic equipment verifies compliance from outside the nation
being monitored.) Regardless of the means employed, the objective remains the same: insuring verification of arms control 3nd
disarmament agreements.
But verification techniques cannot be
decisive where the means are somehow inadequate.
In esse~ce, it
is this issue which upset SALT II and which squelched START
negotiations. 4 It also hampered recent U.S. -chinese talks on a
nuclear cooperation agreement.S
T~e refusal of the P~ople's
Republic of China ( PRC) to join the International Atcmic Energy
Agency or ratify the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty has
made the United States reluctant to sell nuclear technology to
the Chinese since there are no means to permit inspection to ensure non-military use of component parts.6
The numerous verification techniques are designed with
three purposes in mind:
( 1) insuring compliance; (2) det:ecting
violations in time to construct a comparable weapon; and ( 3)
detecting violations in
time
to permit defensive countermeasures.7 As indicated in the recent controversies regarding an
alleged detonation of a nuclear weapon by South Africa, 8 Soviet
use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan,9 and the suspected chemical warfare accident in Sverdlovsk in 1979,10 national technical
means of verification are often insufficient for detecting military violations.ll
To ferret out evidence of suspected noncompliance or to document proof of cooperation appears to require
a more reliable, albeit more intrusive, procedure, such as onsite verification.l2
The technique of on-site inspection is
designed to verify compliance through first-hand observation of
faci::. ities and weapons processes, revealed presumably through a
type of "military blueprint," voluntarily offered by a party to
an ACD agreement as part of its verification obligation or ascertained through sophisticated sate!lite reconnaissance.
That on-site inspection procedures have been a thorn in the
side of ACD negotiations comes as no surprise, particularly since
they so dramatically clash with the international legal principle
of sovereigntyl3 and threaten to disrupt the intricate processes
- 1 -

of control and discipline common to totalitarian bureaucracies.l4
Yet, mandatory provisions for on-site verification of disarmament
procedures are crucial to the execution of an effective ACD measure. By insuring verification, the parties are establishing and
sustaining a confidence factor, the degree of which will vary
directly with the ability to obtain and maintain direct and accurate information on compliance or non-cornpl iance as the case may
be.
Simply put, on-site inspection in most situations generates
the highest level of confidence.lS
The case for the efficacy of on-site inspection is best
articulated in the context of the receptiveness of the parties'
legal systems to verification provisions, for once within the
borders of a country, an inspectorate is subject to its jurisdiction.
Issues regarding the composition of an ACD inspectorate,
as well as its powers, safety, and physical limitations within
the territory of a party to an ar~s control agreement, are paramount to effective inspection and unquestionably subject to
sovereign juridical constraints.l6 Implementation of disarmament
provisions will invariably require the direct acquiescence, if
not direct participation, of each of the· domestic legal systems
involved.
The People's Republic of China, despite a reluctance to
engage in direct, genuine ACD negotiations, has gradually increased its influential capacity in the int<O!J:national community.
Its induction into the United States in 1971~7 has been followed
by n.ormalization of relations with the United States in 197918
and increased recognition as the soleo legal representati•;e of
China in the international community.l9
Recentl~b the PRC has
renewed normalization talks with the Soviet Union.
The PRC has
made technological advances in its military modernization program, including the very recent testing of a nuclear delivery
system and the development of space technology21 (albeit for ostensible peaceful use), that have brought the Chinese to the
forefront of military potency.
However, the obvious relevance to the PRC, at least in
theory, of ACD negotiations offers no justification for its participation in practice.
Despite its military advances, the PRC
has enforced a self-imposed exclusion from ACD negotiations for
three decades.22 It is only with the confirmation of recent PRC
overtures to the United States, Soviet Union, and the international community on ACD issues, developing Chinese military
potency, and a growing concern for multilateral, rather than
bilateral, ACD agreements, that the importance of studying the
Chinese system has emerged.
The PRC offered its first principled positions on the entire concept of disarmament in 1979.23 Realizing the necessity
of keeping abreast on ACD issues and of studying the positions of
other nations, Chinese officials participated in the work of the
UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva for the first time in 1980.24
The PRC has also kept abreast of, and condemned, the militarization of outer space by the superpowers.25 In truth, though, the
appearance of Chinese interest in ACD issues did not offer any

- 2 -

encouragement for PRC acceptance of verification arrangements to
ensure compliance, at least not until 1981.
It was in 1981 that the U.S. media announced that the Chinese had granted permission to American intelligence agents and
advisors to operate a joint U.S.-PRC electronic intelligence
gathering station in western China to monitor Soviet missile
tests.26 Additionally, not quite a year later, in June 1982, the
PRC modified its original 1979 disarmament program to include the
requirement of "effective verification techniques" to monitor
compliance with an ACD agreement,27 a suggestion alluded to earlier in a statement accompanying PRC ratification of the UN Conventional Weapons Convention.28
Such precedents in recent Chinese ACD pol icy suggest the
potential for future active PRC participation in ACD negotiations.
If that occurs, the question of on-site verification and
concomitant procedures will definitely become an important issue,
and will illustrate the necessity for familiarizing other nuclear
powers with the Chinese system.
It is the purpose of this study to address the mainland
Chinese legal system and the related legal problems that may
arise as a result of the presence of an arms inspectorate on Chinese territory, including the interplay of the PRC criminal system the Chinese penchant for secrecy, and the Chinese tre.:!t::tent
of official representatives of foreign states and international
organizations.
Arrangements for on-site inspection would undoubtedly require lengthy negotiations among the parties to an ACD agreement.
Although it is not inconceivable that the first true efforts in
effective verification would utilize more indirect surveillance
techniques, such as sensitive and sophisticated seiSillic and
photographic monitoring, an examination of relevant aspects of
the PRC legal system and Chinese perceptions of international law
will illuminate some of the issues that will arise in negotiating
an arms inspection arrangement of any kind with the PRC.
More
importantly, this study will analyze the major legal problems
that would confront third party negotiators in preparing a territorial inspection arrangement in China which, to many, constitutes the only effective verification method.29 By addressing
verification issues with a firm knowledge of the PRC policyimplementation process, negotiators can promote the kind of confidence and understanding that breeds cooperation and improves
considerably the chances for a continuing nuclear peace.

- 3 -

FOOTNOTES
1.

A number of authors have noted that certain nations have
drawn distinctions between the concepts of "disarmament"
and "arms control." To the Soviets, for example, the latter term has a perjorative connotation, associated with
such alleged Western purposes as .the attempt to legalize
nuclear war.
Only disarmament is said to constitute a
genuine step towards peace.
See, z. ZILE, R. SHARLET AND
J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM AND ARMS INSPECTION:
A
CASE STUDY IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (1972) (hereafter cited as ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE).
According to another author, the difference is definitional. Disarmament is said to refer to a "quantitative
reduction or elimination of armaments and military forces." Arms control denotes "measures designed to regulate
and restrict armaments so as to maintain a measure of
military power balance and to reduce the probability of
accidental war."
See Leng, Arms Control and Disarmament
in Chinese Global POlley in CHINA AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
164-96 (Hsiung and Kim ed. 1980).
Leng stated that the
PRC has called for nuclear disarmament but has treated
arms control measures with utter contempt. 1£·
Based on my research, recent Chinese pronouncements
on disarmament have included references to measures for
partial disarmament, which are conceptually close to arms
control measures.
As such, the difference has become
somewhat blurred.
Since this study in large part assumes
Chinese participation in an arrangement requiring ver ification procedures and examines inspection with respect to
PRC law, it is not crucial whether the arrangement contemplated is designated as "arms control" or "disarmament."
Therefore, the terms will be used interchangeably.
I
recognize, however, that nuances in meaning do exist and
that the PRC may be more likely to participate in one form
as opposed to the other.

2.

Some of the major arms control and disarmament agreements
include:
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, entered into force
Oct. 10, 1963, in 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43 and the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 683, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
Neither of these agreements provides for mandatory
on-site inspection.
The absence of such provisions has
caused U.S. reluctance to extend the substance of these
treaties to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty or the 1976
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.
See Miller, u.s.
Decision Near on Nuclear Tests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 191!"2";
at A15.
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3.

See Gelb, Keeping an Eye on Russia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29,
1981, Section 6 (Magazine), at 148.
See also Keeping
Everybody Honest, Newsweek, Jan. 31, 1983, at 20.
Note
also in this regard that 5-10 kiloton tests are about the
minimal blast force requirements for detection under current state of the art technology, although the October
1982 issue of Scientific American reported that new
developments in seismic equipment now make it possible to
detect 1 kiloton blasts.
See Sykes and Evernden, The
Verification of a ComprehensiVe Nuclear Test Ban, Scien=:tific American, Vol. 247, No. 4 (Oct. 1982), pp. 47-55.

4.

START is the acronym for the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks, bilateral arms control negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, which have been taking
place in Geneva since June 29, 1982.
See The Negotiating
Scorecard, Newsweek, Jan. 31, 1983, at 18.

5.

See Miller, U.S. Is Holding Up
Times, Sept. 19, 1982, at All.

6.

Id.

7.

See Gelb, supra note 3, at 148.

8.

In 1979, a U.S. Vela reconnaisance satellite picked up two
flashes of high intensity lightning off the South African
c cast.
Subsequent efforts to verify its source 1 ed some
U.S. officials to speculate on a South African A-bomb
test:.
See Gwertzman, U.S. Honitors Signs of Atomic Explosion Near South Africa, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at Al.

9.

Peking

Atom Talks,

N.Y.

See, ~· "Soviet Use of Toxic Gas in Afghanistan
Viewed," Foreign Broadcast Information Service on China
[hereafter cited as FBIS-CHI], No. 008, 1982 [hereafter
cited by year and number, e.g., 82-008], Jan. 13, 1982, at

Fl.
10.

See Gelb, supra note 3.

11.

See generally Keeping Everybody Honest, supra note 3.
National technical means appear to be particularly inadequate where verification measures do not place concomitant
restrictions on encryption (coding, for example, telemetry
information that makes verification difficult to determine), where mobile weapons systems, like the MX, are employed, and where non-detectable weaponry (laser, particle
beam weapons and the like) is used. See generally J. PRADOS, THE SOVIET ESTIMATE 269-90 (1982).

12.

Other

writers have reached the same conclusion.
See,
Safire, Site Unseen, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1983, at
Al9.
The current u.s. administration has also indicated
its desire to ratify two treaties with the Soviet Union,
contingent on mutual acceptance of on-site inspection procedures. See Miller, s~pSa-note 2.

~·

13.

Of paramount legal significance under the concept of
sovereignty is the absolute inviolability of a nation's
territorial intregrity.

14.

See generally ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 1; R.
BERNSTEIN, FROM THE CENTER OF THE EARTH (1982); F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA (1982).

15.

See generally Gelb, supra note 3; Safire, supra note 12.
Moreover, such confidence is not diluted by claims that
geographic irregularities or underground installation reduce the likelihood of effective on-site inspection, at
least where technical means are also employed to verify
the existence of facilities in remote locations or to report on militarily suspicious activities that require onsite verification.

16.

Chief among these constraints is the protection of national security interests.

17.

The PRC took its place in the General Assembly on Nov. 15,
1971. See Chiu, The United Nations in LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
215
(Leng
and
Chi u
ed.
1972).
[hereafter cited as Leng and Chiu].

18.

See JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS between THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the
PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA in Department of State Bulletin
79, no. 2022 (Jan. 1979), at 25.

19.

See generally, Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing
People's Republic of China, ll CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
LAW 389-419 (Spring 1979).

"'ti1e

No state officially recognizes both the· PRC and the
Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC).
Just prior to and
after U.S. PRC normalization, numerous other countries
extended formal diplomatic recognition to the PRC and derecognized the ROC.
See THE TAIWAN EXPERIENCE 1950-1980,
386-89 (Hsiung ed. 1981).
20.

See~· Wren, China and Soviet to Open New Talks, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 5, 1982, at A9.

21.

See ~· Peking Fires Its First Submarine-Launched Missile, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982 at Al5;
"SubmarineLaUnched Carrier Rocket Tested," FBIS-CHI-82-201 (Oct. 18,
1982), at Kl; "Wen Wei Po Editorial on Upcoming ICBM
Test," FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 12, 1980), at Ul; "Hua Goufeng
Meets China-Japan Friendship Delegation:
Kyodo Cites Hua
On ICBM," FBIS-cHI-80-096 (May 15, 1980), at D2; "Li Xiannian Discusses ICBM Test at Wellington Press Conference,"
'Successful'
Rocket Launch,"
FBIS-cHI-80-098
(May 19,
1980), at El; "Beijing Press Reports on Successful Missile
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Test:
Jiefangjun
27, 1980), at LB.

Bao

COmmentary,"

FBIS-cHI-80-103

(May

In 1975, the PRC became the third nation to launch a
reconnaisance satellite.
See New Rocket Now Being Developed- Scientists, China Daily, July 29, 1982, at 1.
Through March 13, 1978, the PRC had conducted 20
nuclear tests, the first of which was on Oct. 16, 1965.
See "Satellite Launches, Nuclear Tests Listed," FBIS-CHI79-186 (Sept. 24, 1979), at Ll2.
The PRC has also recently reported that it possesses nuclear-powered submarines.
See Journal of Commerce, Sept. 29, 1980, at 9.
After the 1980 ICBM test, a Wen Wei Po editorial reported that the ICBM test proved the Chinese could master
advanced technology and create a peaceful environment for
its four modernizations.
See "Wen Wei Po Editorial on
Upcoming ICBM Test," FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 11, 1980), at
Ul.
The PRC
sophisticated
ments Reported
2 0 9, (Oct. 2 9,

has recently announced the development of
remote-sensing technology.
See "Achievein Remote Sensing Technology," FBIS-CHI-8119 81 ) , at Kl8.

See generally Leng, Ar:ns Control, in Leng and Chi'J,
note 17, at 243-62.

~

On !1ay 15, 1979 at the first session of the UN Disar:nament
Commission (which the PRC attended as an observer), the
Chinese proposed their Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which has become the core of later PRC disarmament
proposals. See Speech by the Chairman of the Chinese Delegation of the First Substantive Session of the UN Disarmament Commission, PRC Press Release (May 15, 1979) (Annex), reprinted in Beijing Review, No. 22 (June 1, 1979),
at 17-19.
See "PRC to Participate in UN Geneva Disarmament Talks,"
FBIS-cHI-79-177 (Sept. 11, 1979), at A2: "PRC UN Official
Addresses Disarmament Committee,• FBIS-cHI-80-095 (May 14,
1980), at A6.
The Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, first held in 1968, was revamped in 1978 as the Committee on Disarmament, with a rotating chair and 39 member
states, including the PRC.
A new Disarmament Commission,
composed of all UN members, was also established by the
General Assembly to replace the previous commission, first
formed in 1952. See Leng, supra note 1, at 171. The task
of the Committee and the Commission was to study and discuss ACD matters and report to the General Assembly.
cial

For the text of the final document of the Tenth SpeSession of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament,
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held in 1978, which revamped the Committee on Disarmament
and established the UN Disarmament Commission, see 15 UN
CHRONICLE 1-12 (annexed) (July 1978).
-25.

"People's Daily Views US-USSR Contention in Space," FBISCHI-78-111 (June 8, 1978), at Al; "Renmin Ribao on U.S.,
Soviet Military Satellites," FBIS-cHI-82-158 (Aug. 16,
1982), at Al; "Delegate to UN Meeting Enunciates Space
Policy," FBIS-cHI-82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982), at Al.

26.

See U.S., China jointly run spy station, Baltimore Sun,
June 18, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
The establishment of the
station may date back as far as 1979, when the Washington
Post reported that the PRC was willing to monitor SALT
data. Mathew, China Offers to Monitor SALT Data, Washington Post, April 20, 1979, at Al;
"PRC Refuses Comment on
U.S. Radar Stations,"FBIS-cHI-81-118 (June 19, 1981), at
Kl.
Note that the location of the station seems to correspond to areas listed as U.S. support base structures in
the PRC in a 1979 Defense Department policy planning
guidance document known as CG8.
See Burt, Study Uraes
U.S. Aid to Chinese Military, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1979, at
Al.
See also "Renmin Riba.o Discusses Problem with SALT
Verification," FBIS-cHI-79-127 (July 1, 1982), at Al.

27.

·see The UN: China's Disarmament Prooosal, Beijing Review,
No. 28 (July 12, 1982), at 11; "Text of PRC Proposal at UN
Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-127 (July 1, 1982), at
Al.
According to Provision 5 of the proposal, "Disarmament agreements should provide for strict and effective
measures of international verification."
An international
organization under UN auspices was proposed by the Chinese
as the arm in charge of verification procedures.

28.

The PRC ratified the UN Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects in early 1982.
See "Further on NPC
Standing Committee Session:
Weapons Convention Resolution," FBIS-cHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at K8.
The Chinese ratified the Convention and included a statement
which noted, inter alia, that the "Convention fails to
provide for. supervision or verification of any violation
of its clauses, thus weakening its binding force."
See 6
UN DISARMAMENT Y.B. 404 (1981).

29.

The United States has recently announced conditions for
its approval of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the
1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty:
the Soviet Union
must permit on-site inspection.
See Miller, U.S. Decision
Near on Nuclear Tests, N.Y. Time~Nov. 28, 1982, p. Al5.
See also, Gelb, U.S. Tells Soviet Any Arms Pacts Must Include On-Site Verification, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1981, p.

AI.
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PART I:

ARMS INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHINESE SYSTEM

Chapter 1.

The People's Republic of China: The Legal Framework
for Participation in an Arms Control Agreement
A.

The PRC and the Concept of Sovereignty

The basic principles governing international relations as
perceived by the People's Republic of China [hereafter PRC or
China] have served both as political instruments for states to
utilize in adjusting their relations and implementing their policy objectives! and as legal justifications for subsequent actions.
Chinese jurists have long recognized and accepted the
existence of general principles of international law which are
binding on all countries. 2
This, however, is not to say that
Chinese perceptions of international law doctrines are wellgrounded in Chinese jurisprudence.
In fact, Chinese responses
have rarely been considered a model of consistency. 3 The PRC
government recognizes no contradiction in adhering to or denouncing international agreements4 to suit its own political objectives, nor has it hesitated to invoke basic international law
principles when convenient in order to condemn the policies of
other nations or to support its own.S
This is due, in part, to the Chinese view of the structure
of international politics and its perceived role in international
affairs.
Until 1974, China often resorted to use of the term
"upheaval" in describing the character of the international system.6 The trend most evident to the PRC in the mid-1970s was the
"relative decline of the United States and the emergence to the
front line of the Soviet Union as among the ,imperialist
powers•.•? Nevertheless, numerous events persuaded the PRC that
the international balance of power was not confined merely to an
equipoise of the two superpowers.
The Paris Agreements between
the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,S the
abrogation by Egypt of the Egyptian-Soviet Peace and Friendship
Treaty,9 the effectiveness of the OPEC cartel and the enlargement
of the European Economic Community to include Denmark, Greece and
IrelandlO convinced the Chinese that other nations -- particularly lesser developed ones
were exercising their sovereign
rights and resisting foreign control. This emerging structure of
the international system crystallized in April 1974 when VicePremier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p' ing) announced the Chinese
"Three Worlds Theory.•ll
This theory of the present state of international relations
was based on a division of the nations of the world into three
camps. Based on "traditional geopolitics and a revised international version of the old Marxist united front tactic in domestic
politics,•l2 the First World was comprised of the international
ruling
forces
of
imperialism
(United States)
and
socialimperialism (Soviet Union). The "national bourgeois elements" of
Canada, Western and Eastern European countries, Australia, and
Japan comprised the Second World.
The underdeveloped and exploited countries comprised the Third World:
these countries
- 9 -

could preserve their interests by uniting with the Second World
nations to oppose "superpower hegemony.•l3
By constantly decrying Soviet expansionism and relegating the Soviet Union to First
World membership, the PRC rejected the unity of the socialist
bloc.l4 Such a negation implied the belief that China's national
security ultimately depended on a united Third World bloc led by
Beijing.l5 As the vanguard of the Third World, China's objective
was to aid the underdeveloped countries in their struggle to
throw off the yoke of superpower "enslavement or control and [to
safeguard] their [Third World countries ,J national independence
and the integrity of their sovereignty.•lo
The concept of sovereignty [zhuquan]
is crucial to an
understanding of China's foreign policy and of China's interaction with the international community.
The PRC has always championed the principle of sovereignty, both in theory and in practice.l7 In the name of national sovereignty, the PRC has engaged
in limited self-defense measures,l8 resisted the concept of
third-party judgment in the settlement of disputes between nations;19 opposed the use of UN emergency forces;20 supported the
establishment of a new international economic order and a ne•11
regime of the law of the sea;21 opposed the use of force;22 justified economic aid to other countries;23 and objected to any
movement toward a supranational world government.24
As Chou
Keng-sheng argued in 1963, sovereignty had been the most basic
principle of international law and the most valuable characteristic of the state,25 and modern states were faced with the problem
of how to maintain, and not to relinquiish or diminish, their
sovereign rights.26
The Chinese obsession with the concept of sovereignty is
the residuum of China's past frustrations and grievances, most
notably as they related to China's technological inferiority visa-vis the Soviet Union and United States, to Chinese efforts to
gain legitimacy through recognition as a member of the United
Nations;27 and to China's pervasive antipathy toward unequal
treaties.28
The position of the PRC is, in large measure, an
extension of what some scholars term the "Westphalia conception
of international legal order" which stresses "the positivist notion of vesting national sovereignty with the highest authority
in matters of international law and [holds] that the state could
be legally bound only to the extent it had given its consent.•29
Though national sovereignty is probably the most salient feature
of the Chinese view of the international legal order, it is circumscribed by the practical necessities of foreign relations.
The Chinese were compelled to reject the principles of limited
and absolute sovereignty -- the two extremes of the principle of
state sovereignty -- on the basis that the exercise of absolute
sovereignty by one nation would infringe on the sovereignty of
another. 30
As the most logical consequence of this rejection,
the PRC instead supported the principle of mutual respect for
national sovereignty as the only proper interpretation of the
sovereignty doctrine
in modern international law.31
Mutual
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty formed the
basis of China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,32 which
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have, in turn, served
with other nations.33

as

the

cornerstone

of

Chinese

relations

These principles, particularly that of mutual respect for
state sovereiJlnty, are devoid of any "absolute or expansionist
imperative.")
As viewed by th PRC, sovereignty is to some extent, a defensive concept used as an instrument to protect China's own national interests.35 In this respect, China's advocacy
of the principle of mutual respect for national sovereignty is
"both self-serving and self-limiting, n36 but it is undoubtedly
designed to foster sovereign equality in the international community and preserve its rights under the maxim par in parem non
habet imperium (equals have no jurisdiction over one another).
B.

Chinese
The
Organizations

Attitude

Toward

International

When examining Chinese attitudes toward principles and
sources of international law, one ought not to attach great significance to resolutions of the United Nations or other international organizations, which merely "formulate, refine, and embellish amorphous appeals for peace, disarmament,
and amicable
cooperation. n37
The pronouncements of these international organizations, though often embraced by the Chinese and other communist countries when they serve contemporary communist and
socialist goals, are simply too broad, too generalized and too
easily ignored to be of probative or administrative value.
Though
recent
international
legal
writings
in
many
countries have recognized international organizations as subjects
of international law,38 the PRC has been hesitant to support the
expanded roles, functions and recognition of such entities.
Chinese hesitancy is probably the result of fear that these organizations may well encroach upon certain aspects of· state
sovereignty which have not been relinquished, either expressly or
impliedly, by the nation-state.
Chinese perceptions of international organizations, including the United Nations,39 are colored
somewhat by past PRC opposition to the formulation of a unified
world government.40 The result is that the PRC has historically
favored
a
restricted
role
for
international
organizations.
Within the past three years, however, the Chinese position has
shifted.
In late 1979, for example, the PRC acceded to the UN
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies, [hereafter UN Convention on Privileges] a move which
may have significant repercussions for the Chinese, who thereby
granted recognized juridical status -- albeit limited -- to the
representatives of
international
human
and
social
services
organizations.41
By and large, though, the Chinese view of international
organizations continues to be somewhat ambiguous.
For instance,
PRC accession to the UN Convention on Privileges is colored both
by its selectiveness (Chinese accession was with respect to only
eight specialized agencies) and the fact that it has not yet been
- 11 -

accompanied by accession to the Convention of the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations42 (and UN personnel], which
should, arguably, logically precede access ion to a convention
extending privileges and immunities to UN agencies and their personnel.
Moreover, one might expect that,
at least before
1979,the PRC would have denied the power of international organizations to issue pronouncements creating international legal
principles. Such principles would generally be viewed as binding
upon states and would thereby constitute implied acceptance of
world government principles, something the Chinese had theretofore considered incompatible with their views of the international legal order.
Yet, the Chinese often invoked General Assembly
and Security Council resolutions,43 as well as resolutions passed
by other international organizations, 44 in support of Chinese
positions or in condemnation of the policies of other nation
states.
Since the PRC has recognized international custom as a
source of international law,45 it is conceivable that UN resolutions unanimously adopted by diverse nation-states may acquire
the significance of principles of international law.46 The problem, of course, is with the precise Chinese definition of the
term "unanimity."
International conventions, multilateral treaties and international adjudicatory decisions not adhered to by
at least a significant majority of states will almost certainly
not gain Chinese recognition as general principles of international la~, though how close to absolute unanimity the PRC would
require the consensus to be is uncertain.
PRC publicists have rarely referred to judicial decisions
as evidence of international law.47 They have, in fact, resorted
to accusations that the decisions of international tribunals were
products of capitalist manipulation.48
The Chinese have also
been hy?eccr i tical of "suggestions smacking of an expansion or
even
a
liberal
interpretation
of
the
functions
of
the
I(nternational) C(ourt) [of] J(ustice)•49 [hereafter ICJ].
Chinese indifference toward international judicial procedure
is
evidenced
by
Chinese
avoidance
of,
and
nonparticipation in, any organs and activities of a purely legal
character within the United Nations system. 50
The PRC has refused to advance candidates for judgeships on the ICJ, despite
opportunities to do so in 1972 and 1975.5~ Furthermore, the PRC
has consistently refused to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of
the World Court.52
Chinese participation in affairs of the Sixth Commiteee of
the UN General Assembly -- the main legal organ of that UN body
-- has been limited to responses on such highly politicized legal
issues as the definition of aggression,53 the question of Charter
revision54 and international terrorism.55
The PRC has involved
itself in the International Law Commission56 but has avoided active participation in the UN Commission on International Trade
Law, though it appears to be interested in the result of such
proceedings.57 Chinese indifference to legal issues presented in
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the forum of the United Nations has also manifested itself in the
refusal of the PRC to attend five major UN conferences on international law.58 The paucity of recognition by official ~edia of
Chinese adherence to specifically defined international law principles, 59 the lack of any formal PRC pronouncement of Chinese
international law doctrine and the dearth of properly qualified
legal personnel in the ?Rc60 are the raison d 1 etre of China 1 s
calculated posture of noncommitment on international legal issues
in the United Nations.
c.

Individuals as Subjects of International Law

Because an acknowledgment of the principle that international organizations possess the totality of the rights accorded
to states tends to diminish the sovereign quality of a nation,
dispersal of national power to individuals should logically be
viewed as equally attenuating.
Recognition of individual responsibility for personal acts under international law would also
clash with Marxist principles regarding the class struggle in
international relations.
Moreover, the Chinese rejection of the
concept of individuals as subject of international law is an indisputable repudiation of the monist conception of law which, by
casting individuals in the role of international entities, attempted to circumvent the internal sovereign rule of the state.61
To the PRC, the only legitimate instrument to ensure the rights
o~ i~dividuals is t~e nation state.
Though such an assumption would seem to lead ineluctably to
the conclusion that individuals are protected by, and obligated
to, domestic laws only, the PRC does recognize and accept the
concept that certain individuals, in their capacity as state representatives, are subject to, and protected by, diplomatic and
consular privileges and immunities.
Any speculation that the
conferment of international legal rights on diplomatic personnel
constitutes an anomaly in Chinese jurisprudence would probably
prove to be unwarranted on closer examination.
In the Chinese view, such acts as genocide, slave and narcotic traffic -- despite proscription under international law -are prohibited only because of a multiplicity of bilateral and
multilateral treaties and accords.62 Thus, it is essentially the
act of the state which is responsible for the creation of such
proscribed categories.
In addition, within the context of treaties and accords, each signatory remains free to fashion a definition of what elements constitute a proscribed crime and each
viclator remains responsible for his actions, though not as a
subject of international law. Any effort on the part of international organizations to bypass state-granted rights in order to
confer or protect additional individual rights is likely to be
viewed as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty and intervention
in Chinese internal affairs.63

D.

Sources of International Law
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Innumerable conceptual
problems
exist
in
researching
Chinese law because of ( 1) gaps· and d i scon tinu i ty in both the
coverage and sources of the theory and practice of international
law64 in the PRC; (2) the paucity of official elaboration on
international legal issues; and, ( 3) the difficulty in distinguishing the real from the rhetorical in· available written
materials as a result of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control
over the press.65 For the researcher, there is still no methodological panacea for examining Chinese legal material. As recently as 1958, the Office for Teaching and Research of International Law in the Institute of Diplomacy of the PRC published an
anthology of selected reference materials.
In them, the PRC
listed three items as potential sources of international law:
(1) Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ; (2) the UN General Assembly Resolution on the Progressive Development of International
Law and its Codification of December 11, 1946; and, (3) the UN
General Assembly Resolution on the Principles of International
Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal of December 11, 1946.66
The problem with these sources is twofold. First, they are
almost twenty-four years old. Second, even at the time of their
issuance, the Chinese editor who published the sources stated
that the documents were for reference only (emphasis added). 67
Because the success or failure of the implementation of any arms
control inspection arrangement will depend in large measure on
the Chinese perception of international legal principles at the
time the arrangement is implemented, wariness surfaces over predicting Chinese behavior on the basis of pronouncements over two
decades old. From a methodological standpoint, the researcher is
thus presented with the problem of attempting to fill in the gap
in time.
In addition to the three sources of international law mentioned above, the PRC has occasionally advanced Chinese theories
of "general principles of law."
These principles have been
limited to a small number of instances of actual use in legal
treatises and arguments, however, including an occasion where the
sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan was defended by invoking from
municipal law the maxim ex injuria jus ~ oritur (a person cannot acquire a right through an illegal act).68
Hence, the Chinese perspective on international law and
general principles of law cannot readily be gleaned from a mere
examination of Chinese law and foreign policy. Rather, the fundamental consideration for the parties to an arms control agreement will be the consent, implicit or explicit, to international
legal rules by the PRC within the agreement itself. This hypothesis is violated by Chinese perceptions on the system of international law.
Marxist-Leninist dogma postulates that the state superstructure, including all laws, reflects the economic base of
society and serves the interests of the ruling class.69 International law, therefore,. possesses class character.
The literal
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application of "international law" to an international community
composed of states with diverse social systems is considered
impossible, since uniformity of legal principles in diverse
economic systems concedes the independence of law from the
economic base,70 an untenable position to Marxist-Leninists.
Disenchantment with the perceived inequality between the
PRC and its ideological adversaries in the West as well as Chinese understanding of its fundamental technological and economic
inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the United States
resulted in a dialectical analysis of the international system,
one that views that system as composed of at least two camps,
each of which holds diametrically opposed world views. The logical corollary of such analysis is a theoretical formulation of
more than one system of international law.
The three schools
of thought that have been fashioned around the question of the
universality of international law71 have contributed to the ambiguity of the current Chinese position.
The PRC, though, is quite aware of contradictions between
ideology and practical necessity.
The Chinese have asserted that
international law is a "political instrument" and, as such, may
be reformulated in terms of contemporary foreign policies and
public interests.72 Thus, it appears that the PRC would be willing, in proper instances, to further its national goals by adapting Marxist principles to international exigencies.
The Chinese position on custom as a source of international
law also illustr.ates the importance of procuring PRC consent in
an arms control inspection agreement.
Though the Soviets have
apparently acceded to the principle that custom is a basic source
of international law,73 the Chinese have devoted little attention
to it. Although a 1963 People's Daily article74 listed "international treaties and international custom" as sources of international law, the Chinese more often resort to the use of other
euphemisms for the term "custom. •75
Moreover, where custom is
applied, it is often used ad hoc to demonstrate the unreasonableness of actions by other -nations.
The PRC has, for example,
charged other nations with having deviated from established patterns of conduct which had created some degree of continuity and
consistency in foreign relations.76
In view of the foregoing factors and the relative brevity
of international law as an independent academic discipline in the
PRC, consent will constitute the clearest basis for legal obligation in the international community.
Though the PRC remains indifferent to many of the legal machinations of the international
community, it is rarely disputed that treaties are recognized by
the Chinese as an "important source of international law and an
important form of expressing international law.•77 The PRC tends
to focus on the consensual quality of the arrangement as the ultimate source of its binding force upon the parties and tends to
minimize differences which "accrue from the modality in which an
agreement is contracted. •78
Treaties are thus a major [zhuyao]
source of international law. 79
This, though, is not to imply
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that treaty law is viewed by the Chinese as sacrosanct.
As a
corollary to its policy-oriented approach to international law,
it would hardly be surprising for the Chinese to put treaty
obligations
in
a
position
subordinate
to
political
considerations.BO
The PRC relies on treaties to assert its power and to promote internal economic development.
The importance of treaties
to the PRC can be gleaned from a quantitative standpoint alone:
more than 1700 have been concluded bv the Chinese between 1968
and 19Bo.Bl
•
The position of importance the PRC ascribes to treaties
must be punctuated with a caveat:
only treaties regarded as
"equal" (i.e., fairly negotiated and concluded) •,o~ill be followed
in letter and spirit and will be accorded the status of a legitimate source of international law by the Chi:tese.
As such, Chinese international law scholars and jurists are probably destined
to play a continuing role in appraising the substance of treaties
concluded by the PRC.
With the exception of those treaties regarded by the Chinese as unequal, the PRC has, for the most part, been a proponent
of the principle of pacta sunt servanda82 (a treaty in force is
binding upon the parties and must be performed in good faith).
Treaty dis9utes between the PRC and other nations have been the
result, not of outright treaty violations, but rather of the
vagaries associated with treaty inter!Jretation.83
Moreover,
treaty inter!Jretation problems have been exacerbated by mutual
distrust and a failure by both sides to recognize and address the
disparities in their separate legal theories.84
The formal medium of treaties provides the PRC with a common ground of securityBS in dealing with other nations.
However,
the practical effect of Chinese assertions of unequal treaties is
to allow the PRC to accept and adhere to those principles of
international law -- as enunciated in treaty provisions --which
it considers politically expedient.
Such a practice inevitably
results in eclecticism and ambiguity.
Both the Soviet Union and the PRC subscribe to the concept
of unequal treaties, and both are in apparent agreement that unequal treaties can be unilaterally abrogated at any time without
contravening principles of international law.86 However, the PRC
has not followed a consistent pattern of treaty abrogation under
the unequal treaty concept.
This has resulted in a number of
claims against the PRC for treaty violations.B7
A Chinese determination that a treaty is unequal has been
based on one of two characteristics:
the inequality of the
negotiating states or the creation of dissimilar and nonreciprocal obligations.BB
The Chinese have elaborated on the
definition of inequality and have included within it the principles of coercion and exploitation.89 To this extent, the Chinese
view is similar to recognized Western practice, which condemns
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the threat or use of "pressure, whether military, political,
economic" as a coercive tactic in concluding treaties.90

or

Beyond the principle of coercion, however, additional
criteria for the determination of equality of sovereign power in
treaty negotiation have failed to crystallize.
In theory, the
PRC has been fairly firm on the need for reciprocal considerations on substantive treaty provisions.
In practice, though,
the PRC has not always applied the concept of "identical and
reciprocal obligations" as uniformly to multilateral conventions9l nor as consistently to its own bilateral treaties.92
The PRC has also denounced as unequal a number of treaties
to which it has not even been a party, including the 1963 Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Treaty cp the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.93 Chinese objections to the latter treaty serve
as the operative basis for PRC denunciation of present disarmament proposals and are illustrative of China,s prevailing concern
for reciprocal obligations:
non-nuclear states were deprived of
their rights to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes
while the United States and Soviet Union had undertaken no commitment to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
countries.94
Because treaties are considered to be an accurate measure
of Chinese international behavior and intentions, it is important
that the PRC, with the passage of time, has more consistently and
more emphatically demanded the incorporation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence into its treaties. 95
Even if one
disregards Chinese claims that these principles be considered new
and progressive international norms or even lex ferenda, their
implication for any arms control arrangemen~is significant.
Despite what some may view as favor able prior treaty practice,
the specific incorporation of at least the first three of chese
principles
to wit, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity,
mutual
non-aggression
and
mutual
noninterference in each other's affairs-- provides the Chinese with
a substantive framework for opposition to verification provisions
on the grounds that an arms inspectorate interferes with Chinese
internal affairs.
It is quite conceivable that the PRC would
posit a legal argument that inspection arrangements are outside
the scope of that which is properly recognized as treaty subject
matter, i.e., matters of international relations.
Because of
high
regard which
the Chinese hold
for
the principle
of
sovereignty, the protection of PRC national interests may prompt
the
Chinese
to
ignore
any
potential
counterargument
that
verification and inspection arrangements further the goal of
peaceful coexistence, which the PRC lists as its fifth principle.
The PRC has been reluctant to become a party to many multilateral agreements,96 which -- though it may not indicate direct
Chinese opposition to the substantive content of each -- does
"reflect an ambivalence in the contemporary Chinese image of legal order,"97 and may suggest a failure on te part of the PRC to
"[formulate] a principled stand that is applicable to every legal
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issue ar1s1ng in the conduct of her multilateral diplomacy. n98
Chinese involvement does, however, extend along a common conceptual thread:
the development of new rules, new values, and new
norms of international legal order, all of which the PRC considers essential to the struggle of Third World countries for
"redistributive justice."99
Such conceptual extrapolation, however, must yield in certain instances to more definitive declarations.
In this regard,
the import of PRC pronouncements on specific international law
principles regarding treaties cannot be under-estimated.
In addition to the principle of pacta sunt servanda previously mentioned, the Chinese have also endorsed the principle of pacta
tertiis ~ nocent nee prosuntlOO (treaties impose no burden nor
confer any benefits on third parties) in maintaining that the PRC
could not be bound by previous international arms control agreements nor by international conventions to which it was not a party.lOl
Indisputably, any working arrangement on arms inspection
with the PRC will involve a careful analysis of Chinese adherence
to international law principles, a sensitivity to the Chinese
political climate and the need to spell out bilateral or multilateral obligations in considerable detail.
E.

The Relationship of International Law and Municipal Law

Chinese legal literature until very recently was ess2ntially devoid of any discussion on the relationship between international law and municipal law.
The PRC had invoked "international
law standards and humanitarian principles" in sentencing Japanese
war cr iminalsl02 and included a number of treaties in a rather
dat:ed official publication, "Compilation of Laws and Regulations
of the People,s Republic of China."l03 Beyond these factors, PRC
legal doctrine on the relationship of international law and
municipal law was given scant attention.
Only recently, and only
to a limited degree, has this changed.
Certain in tern a tional law principles have been expressly
incorporated into PRC municipal legislation.
For example, Article 32 of the 1982 PRC Constitutionl04 expressly incorporates the
right of political "asylum" for foreign nationals. This right is
not limited to cases of persecution "for striving for the progress of humanity, for defending a peaceful cause or for engaging
in scientific" as was Article 59 of the 1978 PRC Constituton,
which, undoubtedly, was patterned after the Soviet constitutional
provision ,10 5
Furthermore, a recent report on the PRC' s Provisional Civil Procedure Code directly addressed the conflict
between Civil Procedure code provisions and international and
bilateral treaties to which the PRC was a party.l06
The express incorporation of the right of political asylum
into Chinese municipal legislation as well as the references to
international and bilateral treaties in the Civil Procedure Code
that decrees on the rights, privileges and immunities of foreign
nationals, diplomats, consular representatives and auxiliary personnel represents one of the more readily acceptable principles
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of international law to the PRC.
The Chinese response to the
Iranian seizure of American diplomatic personnel in Teheran in
1979, in fact, was terse and unequivocal:
the Iranian act violated recognized principles of international law.l07
Consistent with Chinese declarations on privileges and immunities of diplomatic personnel, the PRC also ratified the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,l08 the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relationsl09 and the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,llO though in
typically enigmatic fashion, the PRC has refused to ratify the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally
Protected
Persons,
including
Diplomatic
Agents.lll such apparent inconsistency detracts from the postulate that the PRC has fully incorporated fundamental international law principles into domestic legislation.
Given these discrepancies and ambiguities and recalling the
Chinese posture on
the
inviolability of the principle of
sovereignty, it seems almost axiomatic to conclude that the PRC
attaches little significance to the judicial decisions and
municipal legislation of individual nation-states.
It also
diminishes the possibility that individual nations could succeed
in influencing the PRC posture toward international law beyond a
point the Chinese consider economically and politically expedient
for their own purposes.
F.

The Scoee of Treaty Law in the PRC

An assessment of PRC treaty-making practice ought to begin
with a formal examination of Chinese agreements bearing different
designations.
Only a small number of agreements have been given the most
formal designation-- tiaoyue (treaty). This category designates
the "most important international documents, regulating politicali economic or other relations between contracting states • • •
. "1 2
More likely than not, the conclusion of an arms control
agreement with provisions for verification will be embodied in
tiaoyue.
Short-term problems of contracting states are handled in
the most frequently used form of Chinese contractual arrangement
-- xieding (agreement).ll3 Multinational arrangements regulating
special problems are called conventions -- gongyue or
zhuanyue .114
General principles of international law and international
relations are often embodied in xuanyan, or declarations.llS
International documents addressing more specific and individual
problems as well as providing for the amendment and interpretation of, or supplement to a treaty are known as yidingshu, or
protocols.ll6
An "exchange of notes (huanwen)" between two
states is used when it is necessary_ to define certain matters
already agreed upon by the parLies.li7
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The PRC also used the following designation for certain
agreements:
1) lianhe gongbao (joint communique);ll8 2) ~
tong banfa (joint measures); 3) beiwanglu (memorandum)i· 4) xinwen
gongbao (press communique); and, 5) hetona (contract). 19
The PRC belief that treaties and other international agreements constitute a major source of international law rema1ns
tainted somewhat by discrepancies between doctrine and practice.
The Chinese definition of treatyl20 is devoid of fundamental distinctions between those that may be viewed as equal and those
that may not.
Moreover, the definition ignores any explanation
of divergent patterns ir. PRC practice which negate the Chinese
assertion that only states may be parties to treaties .121
Furthermore, the PRC continues to claim its unabashedly eclectic
right to choose which of the pre-1949 treatiesl22 ratified before
the division of China (into Taiwan and the PRC) it will adhere
to.
Given such ambiguous and selective behavior, it would seem
that any predictable increase in Chinese participation in extensive, multilateral arrangements is at best speculative and may
lead ~ passu to a decrease in third party expectation and
acknowledgement of Chinese commitments.
The effect of such a
result on the extremely sensitive and delicate provisions for
arms inspection would be disastrous.
Though such concern may be
neither unwarranted not unjustified, there are a number of observations which indicat<'! that the Chinese posture O:'! f'.lturenegotiated treaties may be somewhat more consistent and less
problematic.
First, the exclusion of the PRC from the United Nations
until 1971 precluded participation in the development or signing
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties .12 3
As such,
China was unable to engage in the discussions and negotiations
which would have permitted and necessitated the formulation of a
more definitive and lucid PRC position.
The framework of norms
governing the machinations cf the treaty-making process were thus
erected without PRC participation, a process which, by precluding
adversary negotiations, prevented the Chinese from seeking the
kinds of concessions or making the types of tactical tradeoffs
that are so much a part of what the Chinese have perceived as a
"struggle with the enemy."
Second, the sheer volume of Chinese treatiesl24 indicates
the significant role which treaties play in PRC bilateral and
multilateral relations and enervates somewhat the concern expressed as to the lack of a concise, coherent and distinct Chinese position. More revealingly, the PRC has consistently called
for foreign assistance in its drive to realize the four modernizations.I25
The conclusion of agreements with multifarious,
individual nations and the PRC desire for dispatch in achieving
modernization mandates moderation of previously irreconciliable
differences, non-negotiable topics and immutable positions.
The
emergence of comity and equity and the dissolution of mistrust
- 20 -

and suspicion may combine to create accommodation and compromise
in PRC treaty negotiations.
Third, from a methodological perspective, treaties represent the most unequivocal source of severe ign consent.
The
Chinese ascribe far more significance to principles governing
in te rna t ional relations as they are embodied in treaties than
they do to international law principles.
Because of Chinese sensitivity to inequality in the treatymaking process, present political and economic expediency, and
the paucity of definitive statements on the meaning and applicability of international law principles and generally applicable rules governing international relations, no reliance
should be placed on Chinese readiness to render interpretations
of broad treaty provisions consistent with customary or generally-recognized international principles.
The conclusion of an
arms control agreement containing inspection provisions would be
regarded as a non-routine matter.
As such,
the procedures
governing its conclusion, application, interpretation, revision
and termination compare poorly with common practice in concluding
trade agreements or other less intrusive contractual arrangements.
It is of paramount importance, therefore, to spell out in
considerable detail Chinese rights and obligations relating to
verification procedures.
G.

The Relationship of Treaty Law and Municipal Law

For the most part, the PRC follows generally accepted norms
and procedures for the negotiation, conclusion and ratification
of international agreements.
Treaties, for example, are concluded through a series of steps, comprising the stages of
negotiation, signature, ratification and -- where ratification is
required -- the exchange of ratifications.l26
The treaty-making power of the PRC is vested in the permanent organ of the National People's Congress [hereafter NPC], the
Standing Committee.l27
Article 67 of the 1982 PRC Constitution
enumerates the specific functions of the Standing Committee,
which include, inter alia, the power "to decide on the ratification and abrogation ~treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states"l28 (Art. 67(14)) and the power "to
decide on the appointment and recall of plenipotentiary representatives abroad" (Art. 67(13)). The chairman of the Standing Committee is empowered to ratify treaties with foreign states in
accordance with the decisions of the PRC or its Standing Committee.
The State Council, as the highest executive organ of the
PRc,l29 is granted the power to submit proposals on laws and
other matters to the NPC or its Standing Committee and to conclude treaties and agreements with foreign countries.l30
The
President of the PRC is directly responsible for the signing of
treaties and for the appointment of the proper official to act as
plenipotentiary.l31 The PRC Constitution describes the duties of
the President as follows:
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The President of the People's Republic of
China receives foreign diplomatic representatives ..• and, in pursuance of decisions of the Standing Committee .•. appoints
and recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad, and ratifies and abrogates
treaties and important agreements con
eluded with foreign states.
(emphasis
added).
(Art. 81).
All appointments and removals of plenifotentiaries are subject to approval by the Standing Committee. 32 The official who
serves in the capacity of plenipotentiary may be the Chairman
himself, the foreign minister, the premier, or any other designated official.l33
Though the PRC has occasionally engaged in
the practice of concluding agreements by signatures alone,l34
although the sensitive nature and content of an inspection provision is not likely to lead to any circumvention of the most formal treaty-making procedure -- ratification.
Agreements which must be ratified are first passed by the
State Council, then submitted for approval to the Standing Committee of the NPC, and finally formally acted upon by the NPC as
a whole,l35 although the PRC Chairman or duly appointed representative may sign the agreement before actual ratification.
The PRC has acceded to a small number of multilateral conventions, the acceptance of which was promulgated by a resolution
of the NPC Standing Committee.l36
The foreign ministry of the
State Council then transmits the instrument of accession to the
depository.l37
Reservations may be attached at the time of accession,l38 though it is not clear what significance the PRC attaches to these reservations.l39
Both PRC practice and protection of sovereign principles seem to dictate, however, that the
Chinese would assert, at the proper time, that a state possesses
the sovereign right to make reservations to multilateral treaties
without the consent of other contracting parties.l40
The Chinese regard the settlement of disputes over treaty
provisions to be within the sole province of the contract inc:;
parties.l41 Though the PRC has included arbitration clauses in a
number of
recent trade
agreements,l42 Chinese support for
diplomatic negotiations as the only effective means to secure
resolution of treaty disputes has otherwise precluded any willingness to permit third party intervention and mediation.l~J
The formal constitutional criteria delimiting the PRC
treaty-making process seem to support the proposition that treaties have the status of domestic law.
Though there has been no
specific assertion by the PRC that treaties do not become binding
norms of Chinese municipal law, some scholars have argued that
there is no reason why the PRC could not accept the Soviet doctrinel44 that the rules of treaty law and those of domestic law
should have the same binding force on state institutions and
citizens.l45 One might also postulate that there is no need for
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formal incorporation of treaty law into municipal statutes because treaties are established as a result of the volition of
state organs [the NPC and its Standing Committee] which, by virtue of specific constitutional provisions, are entrusted with the
exercise of supreme legislative power.
As such, both treaties
and domestic legislation promulgated by the same authority should
have the same binding force.
Nevertheless, the lack of any formal PRC commitment to the
principle that treaties create binding norms of international law
preempts an unqualified assertion that PRC treaties directly create rules of Chinese municipal law.
However, PRC state practice
and an examination of the most recent principal normative enactments of the NPC indicate that Chinese municipal law has incorporated treaty rules and norms.
Some municipal law documents have
referred directly to particular
treaties.
The 1955 SinoIndonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, for example, was included in
an
official
Chinese
compilation
of
laws,
decrees
and
regulations.l46
Some statutory provisions have paraphrased treaty rules
without directly citing specific treaties.
In 1964, legislation
regulating the travel and residence of aliens in the PRC provided
that cases involving violations by foreign nationals enjoying
diplomatic immunity be handled through diplomatic channels.l47
The 1979 P~C Crimi~al Law Code, Article 8, provides that
"criminal responsibility of foreigners enjoying diplomatic immunity is dealt with according to diplomatic practice."
The
paucity of examples of incorporation of treaty provisions in to
municipal law suggests that the Chinese are perhaps unaccustomed
to any concept of general transformation in the absence of
specific legislative acts. The mere publication of treaties does
not ipso facto provide for the conversion of treaty rules into
municipal law.
11oreover, the Chinese have not acceded to t!'le
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.l48
Arguably, the PRC
may still invoke provisions of its municipal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty,l49 which supports an assertion that treaty law is not automatically incorporated into
domestic law and, in fact, may be subordinate to it.
Though Chinese treaties may provide a legal basis for the
issuance of municipal statutes, it would not be appropriate to
conclude that treaty rules necessarily give rise to municipal
law.
The Chinese might posit the argument that the sovereign
right of a state mandates that treaties be transformed into Chinese law only through the promulgation of special legislative
enactments.
Arguably, though, such a contention may be without
merit since the identical legislative bodies are responsible for
the promulgation of domestic and treaty law.
As such, there
would be no infringement on the exclusive jurisdiction of these
legislative bodies, nor would there seem to be any circumvention
of legislative procedure in the treaty-making process which would
provide extrinsic justification for declaring that treaties create rules of municipal law.
Chinese doctrinal developments
regarding the relation between treaty and municipal law are
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simply nonexistent, however, and one is inclined to believe that
the Chinese themselves may not be clear on their own position.
Moreover, regardless of any adherence by the Chinese government
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the NPC is not the -sole
decision-maker of rules of municipal law.
Local people's congresses and organs of self-government of national autonomous
areas exercise some degree of autonomylSO and it is quite conceivable that there may be some discrepancies between the laws
endorsed by each of the different organs.
For instance, the
recent introduction of the 1982 PRC Constitution and the promulgation of local organic lawslSl invites some degree of decentralized rule-making activity which leaves in doubt the extent to
which local participation is desired or required when the inspection provisions of an arms control agreement directly involve
a particular region or jurisdiction of the PRC.
The lack of official endorsement of the incorporation of treaty law into
municipal law gives rise to potential conflict where fulfillment
of treaty obligations clashes with rules laid down under municipal statutes.
To assert that the PRC, in seeking to maintain
the orderly and secure environment it believes necessary for the
development of its economy, would adhere strictly to treaty
obligations which are inconsistent with municipal statutes is to
casually dismiss a fundamental internal Chinese tenet -- absolute
and inviolable sovereign power.
The problem becomes somewhat
more complex '"'hen an attempt is made to assess the extent to
which the Chinese observe the maxim lex posterior derogat priori
when domestic and treaty laws are in consistent.
To a r sue, for
instance, that a subsequent legislative enactment overrides previous treaty obligations is to ignore Chinese adherence to the
principle of pacta sunt servanda unless, in fact, the treaty is
no longer viable or in force.
The possibility that periodical
PRC review of treaty provisions could result in an assertion by
the Chinese of unequal and nonreciprocal obligations implies an
even greater likelihood that the PRC would act in derogation of
certain treaties through enactment of subsequent inconsistent
municipal statutes.
However, there has been no state practice of
or adherence to the rule of lex posterior derogat priori. At the
same time, the PRC has displayed respect for and adherence to the
principle of pacta sunt servanda.l52 Despite concern and conjecture as to the consequences of the application of lex posterior
derogat priori, the most plausible response based on precedential
information is simply that the Chinese are not likely rely on it.
Chinese legal literature has not admitted to the possibility of self-executing treaties, nor does the plain meaning of the
1982 PRC Constitution.
The proposition that treaty law does not
ipso facto create municipal law and the absence of any Chinese
acknowledgement of criteria for distinguishing between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties suggest that arms control inspection provisions will become operative in the PRC only
through
specific and deliberate
incorporation
into Chinese
municipal law.
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The
1982
PRC Constitution
does,
however,
contain
a
"supremacy clause" similar to the one in the U.S. Constitution.l53
The American stance on self-executing treaties has
grown largely out of the ju~idical reading of the supremacy
clause and has led to an articulation of judicial standards not
present in the PRC:
In determining whether a treaty is selfexecuting, American courts look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested
by the language of the instrument; and if
the instrument is uncertain, recourse may
be had to the circumstances surrounding its
negotiation and execution and other extrinsic factors.
In order for a treaty provision to be operative without the aid of
implementing legislation and to have the
force and effect of a statute, it must appear that the framers of a treaty intended
to prescribe a rule that, standinq_alone,
would be enforceable in the courts.~~4
Because the PRC has not formally offered its own position,
whether the NPC or designated legislative body must execute the
terms of a treaty before it becomes operative Chinese law is uncertain. Generally speaking, international agreements signed and
ratified by the PRC will not have the force of law until their
provisions are implemented by domestic legislation or by administrative action.
Under ordinary circumstances, though, the
NPC would probably not hesitate to promulgate legislation designed to remove inconsistencies in municipal law provisions so that
they would accord with Chinese treaty obligations.lSS
Chapter 2:
A.

The Chinese System as a Potential Facilitator or
Obstructor of an Arms Inspection Arrangement
General Implications

The success of the implementation and execution of an inspection arrangement in the PRC is contingent upon the receptiveness of the Chinese system to verification procedures.
The apparently-decentralized quality of Chinese politics and law compels a closer examination of certain key variables relevant to
the formulation of a Chinese arms inspection policy.
These key
variables are:
the Chinese Communist Party [CCP], including its
control over, and conflict with quasi-legal organizations; Chinese Communist ideology; the Chinese governmental system; and,
Chinese perceptions of arms control and disarmament arrangements.
As the Preamble of the 1982 PRC Constitution indicates, the
CCP is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people.
The
unity of the political system, as embodied in CCP monopoly over
all political activities, presupposes plenary power in the hands
of CCP leadership to ensure full compliance with inspection
provisions.
Similarly, the omnipotence of the CCP suggests the
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possibility that CCP leadership may also possess the power to set
unobtrusively in motion a number of obstacles designed to effectively impede the execution of an inspection arrangement without
the need to resort
to official denunciation of
inspection
activities.
Thus, the requisite element for the successful implementation of an arms inspection arrangement is the unswerving support
of the CCP.
The Party is, unquestionably, the most pervasive
force in Chinese life.
Any commentary on factors influencing the
formulation of PRC inspection policy is reduced to an understanding of the proper hierarchical arrangement -- by order of importance -- of systematic variables, the preeminent position of
which is always occupied by the CCP.
An examination of Chinese
Communist ideology, the Chinese governmental sys tern and Chinese
perceptions of disarmament can only be made in the context of CCP
control over them.
Through manipulation of Chinese Communist ideology, for
example, the CCP can justify each and every one of its actions to
its own people.
Moreover, if Party leaders wished to implement
an inspection arrangement, they would encounter a minimum of formal legal impediments, any of which may be circumvented through
ostensible legal process or through more subtle CCP machinations.
The most serious legal obstacle, in fact, might be the requirement of a Constitutional amendment.
Yet, the approval of
the NPC, the body vested with the authority to amend the constitution, is hardly more than a rubber stamp for CCP mandates.
The NPC, in executing CCP commands, has not shown any reluctance
to exercise its authority:
for example, the 1978 PRC Constitution was expeditiously amended to exclude the ~reviously inalienable right to "write big-character posters.•l5
The Constitution
itself has hardly been an enduring document in the annals of PRC
history.
Since its official proclamation on October 1, 1949, the
PRC has promulgated constitutions in 1954, 1975, 1978 (all no
longer in force) and the most recent on December 4, 1982.
Such
legislative flexibility indicates that even Chinese constitutional law would not obstruct a system of inspection Jnder the guiding hand of the CCP i f CCP leadership determined that an arms
control inspection served the interests of the PRC.
Chinese perceptions of arms control and disarmament arrangements are also dictated by Party interests and exigencies.
These perceptions have shifted from hard-line opposition -- in
the twenty year period from the late-1950s to the late-1970s -to more flexible and mollified policies which are undoubtedly the
outcome of Party leadership position changes that resulted from
the transfer of power to Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao- ping) after
Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung's) death in 1976.
Despite the paramount importance of the Party, each of
these factors is separately relevant, because a wholesale assertion that the only variable meriting examination is the CCP
underestimates the more subtle interrelationships of the four
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factors suggested and ignores their aggregate effect on PRC participation in and formulation of verification procedures.
B.

Systemic Variables
1)

The Chinese Communist Party
a)

The Role
Process

of

the

Party

in

the

Policy-Making

The CCP is a highly-disciplined organ which functions under
the guiding principles of democratic centralism.
It is comprised
of over 35 million politically conscious activists who work in
government offices, factories, mines, 9nd other enterprises, people,s communes, schools, shops, neighborhoods and the armed forces (PLA).l57 The CCP machinery, because of its pervasive control of Chinese organizations, associations and federations, is
the prime motivational force in the faclitation or obstruction of
arms inspection.
The CCP requires its members, inter alia, to serve the oeople, uphold Party unity, observe Party discipline and guard P~rty
and state secrets .158
Failure to fulfill such obligatons could
result in such disciplinary action as expulsion from the Par~y,l59 ~~ extremely serious ?enalty in Chinese society.l60
Moreover, the CCP has the power to turn cadres over to criminal justice organs for criminal prosecution.l61
In short, the Party is
the center of an extremely efficient and extensive coet:cive apparatus in the PRC and controls the policy-execution and policymaking processes of the Chinese governmental infrastructure.
The unique position of the CCP as the central instrument
for policy-making in the PR:::: and as the potential su;:>ervisor of
all inspection activities compels an examination of the operation
of CCP leadership.
From a methodological standpoint, the covert
nature of much of the CCP policy-making process precludes any
direct study of the internal machinations of the Party and necessitates instead conclusions based on a significant degree of
speculation and circumstantial evidence.
Although the current political scene in the PRC has been
characterized by "greater stability at the top of the Party
hierarchy than at any time since the overthrow of the gang of
four in October 1976 1 •162 Party policies in various domains have
created resentment.lt>3
Furthermore, an issue as significant as
an arms inspection agreement might involve some degree of conflict and resistance at lower Party levels .164
Nevertheless,
final acceptance of an arms control agreement and its attendant
inspection provisions would probably be based on an ostensibly
unanimous CCP decision, although it would be wiser to assume some
unarticulated internal disagreement that could hamper full CCP
support of inspection operations.
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An arms inspectorate is at a distinct disadvantage in the
PRC where the absence of direct observations and the unavailabil ty of crucial information contribute to less accurate and
rel able political assessments.
These assessments are critical
in anticipating potential impediments to the fulfillment of inspection obligations, and want of them would make it difficult to
determine where the support for arms control lies within the CCP
infrastructure.
Another potential pitfall in the PRC policy-making process
is the element of experimentalism:
decisions on many important
issues have a tentative and experimental quality.l65 High-level
decisions are couched in general, sometimes vague, language that
is purposefully designed to establish the outermost parameters of
permissible behavior (or policy) and extend the flexibility of
the CCP to define exact procedures, forms and relationships as
experience dictates.
The obvious potential for alterations in
ini.tial policy objectives and guidelines illustrates the importance of obtaining firm Chinese commitments in order to minimize
the risk of sudden policy shifts and reduce the gap between the
expectancy generated by "trial" directives and the reality created by later revisions.
The result of the lack of first-hand knowledge of a firm
CCP arms control policy, the potential for tentative, mutable
policy decisions, and the subtleties of behavioral and positional
changes of upper-echelon PRC officials make it difficult to detect changes in Party interests, such as the "gradual erosion of
a consensus, the disintegration of a coalition, or the instability of a simple majority." 166
Moreover, PRC adherence to the
principle of the inviolability of its sovereignty and Chinese
sensitivity to equal and reciprocal treaty obligations presents
the kind of political environment that is most susceptible of
sudden shifts of position and, hence, most importunate for the
orderly and consonant activities of an arms inspectorate.
Thus, the most important goal for inspectorate members is
to determine the CCP commitment to the formulation and execution
of an inspection policy·. An arms inspectorate is best advised to
assess the CCP commitment by gauging the degree to which Chinese
leaders support the inspection policy in the public statements
they issue; by determining the existence of persuasive editorials
in behalf of an inspection policy in the Chinese press; and by
reviewing the responsiveness and cooperation of the CCP officials
most likely to have contact with the inspectorate.l67 By reviewing. such peripheral variables, the inspectorate could minimize
the inherent difficulties in determining the extent to which the
CCP, through its largely covert policy-making process, has decided to contribute to the execution of proper verification
operations.
Moreover, an assessment of such variables would provide a means by which the inspectorate could trace systematic
non-compliance or isolated instances of interference with inspection operations to either the CCP, participating governmental
-
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institutions, or particular individuals.
Of course, this previous statement must be punctuated with the caveat that inspectorate observations of systematic non-compliance by non-Party
organs will almost invariably occur with Party knowledge and
approval.
b)

The Role of the Party in the Policy-Execution
Process

The pervasive influence of the CCP in every major aspect of
Chinese life connotes active Party participation in the policyexecution processl68 of arms inspection.
The influence of the
CCP in this process is belied by the Preamble of the 1982 PRC
Constitution, which recognizes the sup.remacy of the constitution
as the fundamental norm for all state organs, state officers and
the PLA when, in fact, the Party -- and not the law -- is the
principal element of control.l69
The role of the CCP in the
policy-execution process of the PRC is nowhere more clearly manifested than in the dramatic and sometimes frightening aspects of
mass political campaigns.
These campaigns, which span issues
from the eradication of pests to the implementation of a new legal order,l70 are waged periodically by the CCP and command the
active participation of millions of Chinese.
The formidable
political apparatus of the CCP can, through such mobilization
campaigns, generate support for, or opposition to, an arms inspection policy.l71
In truth, the real power structure of CCP leadership probably differs from the formalistic constitutional one.
Thus, it
is uncertain which CCP command channels would directly supervise
the execution of inspection operations, though, indisputably, the
Central Committee,l72 its military commission,l73 and the more
select Politburol74 will play an integral role.
Because the
highly restricted group of participants who comprise these organs
conduct their policy-making deliberations and decisions in camera, one can only speculate as to the particular role various
other departments within the CCP infrastructure would play in
coordinating the policy-execution process.
Both the Central Secretariat and Advisory Commission of the
ccpl75 would most probably be responsible for transmitting the
commands of the CCP Central committee to Party members throughout
the PRC.
The most probable expressions of CCP commands are
public
statements
by
CCP
leadership,
Party
communiques,
editorials in Party publications like the official People's Daily, resolutions of the Central Committee and Party Congresses,
and directives of the CCP Politburo.
Propaganda and indoctrination at the provincial levels in the local press and in shools
would be supervised by regional party committees.l76
An arms
inspectorate should be aware that the extent to which each of
these channels is used and the intensity of the language used in
communicating the messages are good indices of the commitment of
the CCP to the execution of an arms inspection arrangement.
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c)

Party Control of Quasi-Legal Organizations

CCP supervision of state organs, administrative departments, army bureaucracies and peripheral agencies, such as the
secret police, may also provide a clue as to the willingness of
the PRC to furnish strong affirmative support for the policy of
arms inspection.
Presumably, the activities of the military,
procuracy, judiciary, and police all fall within the purview of
CCP Central Commit tee departments, which, as part of the highly
centralized CCP political apparatus of the PRC, would maintain
effective control over the policy-execution process, the agencies
and organizations most involved with it, and the communications
systems they control.
Since complete unanimity among variables of the governmental system in the formulation of an inspection policy is probably
unlikely, a c~rtain degree of factionalism within the government
must be anticipated and tolerated.
The most likely sources of
intragovernmental conflict are from those departments concerned
with defense and internal security.
The role of internal security forces in the execution of an
arms inspection arrangement is the critical component of the
quasi-legal factor involved in the policy-execution process.
Internal security in the PRC is distributed among a variety of
different organizations, each with independent and overlapping
functions.
The military organ of the PRC, the PLA, has played a substantial role both in inculcating in Chinese citizens a positive
attitude toward armed might and in civilian surveillance.
The
PLA is currently under the leadership of the CCP and the Central
Militarv Commission and under the direct command of the Chairman
of the -latter .177 The 1978 Constitution gave statutory expression to the expansive role of the PLA in the affairs of the PRC,
though it did not formalize the extent to which the PLA has exercised its power since the Cultural Revolution.l78 The PLA is now
recognized as an active participant in the work of national construction,l79 in the people,s congresses, and in the maintenance
of public security.l80 The perceived importance of unity of the
military, Party, mass organizations, and various governmental
departments in safeguarding public order is an important contemporary element of understanding and dealing with the modern Chinese political machinery.
Though local procuratorates are the
organs constitutionally designated to ensure observance of the
law,l8l the brief time that has elapsed since the promulgation of
the recent legal codes and the continuing call for further
codesl82 has resulted in CCP-controlled cooperative efforts among
various governmental organs that has effectively blurred the distinct roles expected to be played by each.
The role of the PLA in internal security is not confined to
its participation in public security functions.
It extends to
the potentially obstructive influence on arms inspection generated by a national emphasis and socialization on the value of
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armed might.l83 Military consciousness emanates from the provisions of the 1982 PRC Constitution. Article 55 notes that it is
"the honorable duty of citizens . . • to perform military service
and join the militia in accordance with the law."
Each Chinese
is required to "defend the motherland and resist aggression.•l84
Articles 91-94 and Article 97 of the PRC Criminal Codel85 indicate the heinousness with which the Chinese perceive treasonable
activities.
Mao Zedong's philosophy of fighting a "people's war•l86 has
imbued the average Chinese citizen with a sense of respect for
the military and has generated significant patriotic sentiment.
The intensive process of socializing the Chinese citizen on the
value of armed might runs counter to an arms inspection policy,
but is not necessarily inconsistent with it provided an arms control arrangement has CCP support.
Though it is conceivable that
the military could lead a large-sized factionalist force against
CCP commands for unobstructed verification procedures, Party control of the military would seem to preclude such potential
conflict.
In addition to the CCP and the PLA, another critical variable in the policy-execution process is the role of the Chinese
secret police.
Though much has been written about CIA and KGB
activities, very little has been published about Chinese intelligence and its domestic and international ramifications.
The
PRC press is constantly assailing the vast spy rings of the
superpowers,l87 but does not acknowledge the existence of a Chinese undercover network.
In fact, the existence of such a formal, covert intelligence network in the PRC is itself uncertain,l88 not merely because of the lack of actual recognition of
such a network, but because of its redundancy.
The recent reintroduction of regulations on local organizationsl89 illustrates the extensive conduit of information that
flows to official Party and governmental departments.
This entire arrangement is part and parcel to the ideological emphasis
in the PRC on the control of man, not his performance.l90 The
extent and effect of this overt, coercive apparatus is difficult
to gauge with precision, but it has been utilized on a scale that
tends to reduce the necessity for establishing additional -- and
largely superfluous -- covert operational networks.
Nevertheless, at least one author has asserted the alleged
existence of two critical security agencies in the PRC, the
General Office of the Central Committee and the so-called 8341
unit.l91 The General Office is reportedly in charge of security
for key Party personnel and for confidential Party materials
while the 8341 unit serves as a military detachment guarding Chinese leaders, though some sources report that the unit has a network of agents throughout the PRc.l92
Whether the Chinese secret police is a formidable component
of the Chinese system is diffi~ult to assess without hard
evidence.
Moreover, despite the apparent connection between the
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alleged security agencies and the CCP, through the Central Investigation Department of the Central Committee, little can be deduced about Party control of the secret pol ice.
It is, though
quite possible that these Chinese security agencies are capable
of conducting operations without the full knowledge or approval
of the responsible Party organ.
If so, the mere existence of a
Chinese secret security network may have adverse implications for
arms inspection.
Though no giant secret policy apparatus, as exists in the
Soviet Union, is apparent in the PRC, the relative xenophobia of
PRC leadership and the importance the the present leadership
ascribes to unity and order suggest that a strengthened security
apparatusl93 which maintains surveillance over the armed forces,
reports on provincial and local developments, and investigates
the loyalties of key CCP personnell94 is absolutely essential.
The gradual opening of Chinese society to increasing numbers of foreign contactsl95 is destind to result in more assiduous and zealous counterintelligence activities. The emphasis
in the. Chinese press on the obnoxious features of foreign intelligence operationsl96 and the potential efflorescence of counterintelligence operations directed towards foreign visitors signifies the very likely prospect that the CCP, PLA, local committees, public security organs, secret police (if it exists) and
individual Chinese citizen informants can become an obstructive
factor in arms inspection activities.
The role of the communications media is also vital in
facilitating or obstructing arms inspection in the PRC. Chinese
press, television, radio and cinema could be utilized to acquaint
the masses with an arms control agreement and the requisite inspection provisions, thus diminishing the surprise and intrusiveness of verification arrangements.
The responsiveness of the
Chinese communications system to the ccpl97 makes the media a
valuable and effective tool for propagandizing, publicizing, or
popularizing any agreement for which the Party requires the·
mobilization of broad public support or· opposition.
An arms inspectorate might be advised to measure the volume
and intensity of the media campaign as a good indicator of the
CCP's commitment to an arms inspection agreement.
However, the
examination of media reports as a gauge of PRC commitment must be
punctuated with a caveat:
the new socialist order envisaged by
Mao Zedong, that of "giving full play to democracy among the people•l98 may have had a somewhat enervating effect on Party control of the communications system.
The "quadruple weapon• of
Chinese democracy,l99 dafang darning (allow opinions to be freely
aired), dabienlun (hold debates in a big way), and dazibao (with
big character posters), permitted the public criticism of Chinese
authorities through the "audio-visual media available to the masses. • 200 The major thorn in the side of the Chinese government
was dazibao (big-character posters), which government officials
felt was being abused by certain Chinese individuals who made use
-
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of wall-posters to attack and publicize social and personal inequities in contravention of an official media blackout on certain social upheavals.201
Ironically, the initial government
crackdown on wall-posters was communicated through the press,
unquestionably the most effective and authoritative medium of
communication used by the PRC authorities.
In fulfilling its
pedagogic role, the press gave significant editorial coverage to
the nefarious effects of dazibao and emphasized the benefits of
abolishing the use of these posters.
The result was the rather
expeditious enactment of an amendment to Article 45 of the 1978
·PRC Constitution and the expur2ation from its text of the right
to write big-character posters. 02.
The role of the press in publicizing the 1979 Chinese legal
codes indicates CCP reliance on and control of this medium as the
most potent facilitator of the policy-execution process203 and
public acceptance of the press as the most authoritative source
of official policy •. Press coverage preceding the promulgation of
the legal codes included significant numbers of articles calling
for public order and for a collection of formal written statutes.
Followin~
the promulgation of the codes came special feature
stories, 04 official explanations of certain code provisions and
legal terms,-205 publicized court cases concerning legal violations, 206 published reports of coo~eration, 207 and the application of the new laws to offenders. 08 The press. also published
limited criminal statistics.209
Extrapolating from the role of the press in the execution
of domestic legal norms to the role of the press in the execution
of an arms inspection policy ~s not difficult or in·appropriate.
The press can serve as the forum for CCP pronouncements concerning the advantages of inspection and can· publicize examples of
compliance and incidents of noncompliance which can serve to
legitimize PRC participation in any arms control verification
agreement.
Raising the political consciousness of the average
Chinese citizen on the subject of arms control and indoctrinating
each on the importance of PRC participation in inspection arrangements is uniquely suited to the Chinese press. The volume,
diversity and type of reports should serve as an indicator of CCP
commitment to compliance with inspection provisions.
However, the press would not serve as the sole means used
by the PRC regime to legitimize the policy-execution process.210
The downward transmission of CCP policy directives would need to
be communicated through other forms of mass media as well as
through
quasi-public
mass
organizations2ll
such
as
trade
unions, 212 the Communist Youth League, 213 poor and lower-middle
peasant associations, women's federations21.4 and other revolutionary mass organizations and individual work units or danwei.
Each of these organizations is responsible for more direct contact with the average Chinese citizen and more direct control
over his daily activities.'
In the hierarchical pattern that
emerges as the dominant political structure in the PRC, the
utilization of these quasi-public organizations to effectuate
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Party policy is still another indication of the total CCP commitment to arms inspection.
2)

Chinese Communist Ideology

The second variable, Chinese Communist ideology, provides
the single, most definitive criterion for determination of the
attitudes and beliefs that govern political behavior in the PRC.
In essence, it serves as a code of communication by which the CCP
can encipher its pronouncements and legitimize its actions.
Fundamental Chinese Communist ideology is inscrutable.
Traditional Marxist-Leninist concepts, as embodied in the classical writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, are selectively
incorporated into Chinese ideology, to the extent that they serve
the interests of the PRC. 215
Of course, the interests of the
PRC are hardly immutable, and Chinese Communist ideology is sufficiently flexible (and amorphous) to permit changes in policy
which would not contravene ideological precepts or otherwise
threaten the foundation of Chinese society.
Major ideological concepts are reflections of Mao Zedong
thought,216 though the growing challenge to the Maoist image has
eroded, to some extent, the previously impregnable fortress of
Maoist dogma. 217
Nevertheless, Mao, s dominance of foreign and
domestic policy thinking for almost four decades has not entirely
dissolved.
His epistemological constructs continue to guide the
political culture of the masses and the more select CCP.
They
also provide the framework, if not the substance, of contemporary
Chinese cognitive
and evaluative
decision-making
functions.
Thus, to participate in the political process of the PRC, one
must possess an understanding of the more fundamental Maoist
ideological concepts.
The central theme in Mao Zedong thought is the law of contradiction. 218
At the heart of this apocalyptic vision of the
world is the struggle between two major forces, characterized as
"friends" and "enemies." Between these two forces exists a number of antagonistic contradictions, the resolution of which often
compels the use of armed force.
Within each group there exists
the possibility of nonantagonistic contradictions, which are
usually resolved through peaceful, non-coercive methods.
From the basic, perceived conflict between "friends" and
"enemies" has arisen the Maoist axiom that the enemy must be
despised strategically but respected tactically.219 This principle was designed to provide a means by which to assess the relative ratio of forces between a revolutionary challenger and the
defender of the status quo.220
More subtly, this principle was
used by the Chinese to develop strategies· for bridging the gap
between the PRC and the superpowers. The Chinese belief that the
PRC must move from a position of inferiority to one of parity
with major powers221 was a corollary of the belief that the PRC
could not command respect within the international community
-
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until it had become strong and powerful -- politically, economically and militarily.
This basic eschatological ideological construct is the language of Chinese politics.
Such facets of international political and legal conduct as negotiating tactics, concessions,
obligations, flexibility and recalcitrance, as applied to the
implementation and execution of an arms control agreement, are
all grounded in this fundamental Maoist tenet.
Mao Zedong's impact on Chinese legal development has conditioned PRC perception of the role of law in its revolutionary
scheme, though the force of law and legal institutions in postMao China has generally received greater acceptance than Mao himself might have envisioned.
The PRC's present approach to the
role of law is actually an amalgam of Maoist doctrine and practical necessity.
For example, the PRC's emphasis on flexibility
rather than rigidity in the application of law, on the politicization of the entire legal process, and on the use of law as an
instrument of social engineering to transform the PRc222 are
carryovers of traditional Mao Zedong policies and beliefs.
At
the same time, the swing toward institutionalization (as suggested by the 1979 legal codes) and economic development (particularly as it applies to foreign trade) has necessitated a subtle
yet discernible revision of the Maoist concepts of the class nature of peoole, s justice, 223 the societal model of law, 224 the
mass line,225 and the "uninterrupted revolution. "226
The consequence of these adustments is difficult to define with accuracy.
It does not appear that the Maoist influence on the role of
law has totally dissipated, but it would not be correct to assert
that r-taoist precepts have the same potency they once had.
In
truth, each "case" is handled according to its own set of facts.
Where traditional ideological concepts can be used to justify a
particular action, they will be. Where these concepts are deficient, or otherwise ill-fitting, they may be altered by the present leadership to reflect reality.
Deng Xiaoping has labelled
this policy
jingyan shi
jianyan zhenli de weiyi
biaozhun
[literally:
experience is the only criterion for examining
truth].227 Such a policy appears to inject greater flexibility
into Chinese ideology, but it has not yet been sufficiently timetested to warrant any presumption of consistency in its applicaton, particularly with respect to rather intrusive arms inspection operations.
Chinese Communist ideology -- in any form -- is ·an important variable of Chinese arms inspection policy, not only because
of its specific application in particular instances, but because
of its general effect on the CCP apparatus and the Chinese masses. The effective use of ideology to veil the content of external communications to the PRC has created an internal "atmosphere
of secrecy reinforced by pervasive suspiciousness and a fundamentally hostile attitude toward other (chiefly Western) political
and socioeconomic systems.•228
Though the recent rapprochement
with the United States has piqued the curiosity of the Chinese
- 35 -

and sparked their interests in the machinations of Western culture,. the historical distrust for foreign elements still percolates in official Chinese ratiocinations.229 Chinese ideological
inflexibility might therefore be expected to be more apparent in
response to more physically intrusive foreign ventures,' among
which one can readily expect to include arms inspection and
verification procedures.
Although

the

ideology is subject to the
of the leadership and therefore not inflexible, and although it has
supported world campaigns for the abolition
of.
• armed forces, its general set for
the past [thirty-four years] runs counter
to the idea of arms control, and especially
the idea of territorial inspection.
An
arms inspectorate should be aware that an
arms inspection policy may require some
remolding on the part of the leadership of
both the mass[es] and elite.
• to neutralize or alter potentially obstructive or
hostile attitudes.
This would essentially
involve a process of partial resocialization of the citizen [as to] the relationship [toward the West and Soviet Union], a
process which must start in the schools and
spread throughout the adult 3gencies of
political socialization.
Obviously, such
an effort would be a major ideological commitment to long-term peace, and it would
naturally require a period of time to inculcate the new attitude in the masses and
the elite. 230
inte~pretation

Unless and until the PRC undertakes such a process of partial resocialization and devotes the necessary time to diffuse
present political hostil.i ty towards foreigners, 231 an arms control agreement and its concomitant inspection provisions might
well remain ideologically unacceptable to the Chinese.
3.

The Governmental System of the PRC
a)

Organs of State Power

The emphasis of this section will be on the apparent power
of Chinese state organs.
Nominally, there are six basic components of the governmental system -- the legislative, administrative, judicial, procuratorial, military, and quasi-public organs.
Despite constitutional and statutory grants of exclusive and
overlapping ·powers to each of these different organs, essential
control always rests with the ccp.232
In many instances, the
actions of these different organs are directly authorized and
expressly approved by the Party.
In other instances, one might
expect no less than Party knowledge and tacit approval of
governmental· act·s.
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Nevertheless, the governmental system of the PRC is treated
as a separate variable of Chinese arms inspection policy. There
are two reasons. First, the 1982 PRC Constitution and subsequent
legal codes have, at least ostensibly, restructured the PRC 's
socialist
legal
system and
established
separate
lines
of
governmental authority.
Since then, there have been numerous
calls for the independent exercise of authority of the separate
organs, pursuant to the letter of the law as laid down in those
enactments.
There seems to be little doubt that the Party will
never relinquish total effective control of legal and extra-legal
governmental organs, though the extent to which the CCP may be
willing to share or transfer limited powers to domestic organs is
uncertain.
An examination of the apparent parameters of power
which significant governmental organs may possess will provide an
arms inspectorate with an understanding of the maximum limits of
permissible authority granted to such organs, and allow inspectorate personnel to discount from that point for CCP control.
Second, though the components of the PRC, s governmental system
apparently exercise only a marginal influence over CCP policymaking, they are important to study because of their instrumental
role
in
the
policy-execution
process
Party
control
notwithstanding -- vis-a-vis inspectorate operations.
The Chinese theory of a monolithic state, in which the
political and legal systems are unified, is embodied in a number
of principles of Chinese constitutional law.
The PRC is constitutionally organized as a "federal" system.
At the apex of
the state structure described in the 1982 PRC Constitution is the
NPC, the "highest organ of state power (Art. 57).233 The NPC is
comprised of· deputies elected by the people's congresses of the
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under
the central government, and by the People's Liberation Army (Art.
59).234
Pursuant to the 1982 PRC Constitution, the NPC exercises
numerous ostensible legislative, quasi-judicial and constituent
powers, including the power to amend the Constitution (Art.
62 ( 1); to make and revise crimina!, civil, state organizational
and other fundamental laws (Art. 62(3)); to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution (Art. 62(2); to decide on the State
Council Premier (Art. 62(5)); to elect the Supreme People's Court
President (Art. 62(7)) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate,s
chief procurator (Art. 62(8)); and to pass upon the major
economic measures of the state (Art. 62(9)).
A blanket clause
also gives the NPC the right to exercise such other functions as
it deems necessary (Art. 62(15).
Sometimes sharing NPC powers and sometimes exercising them
ad interim is the NPC Standing Committee.235 It also possesses a
number of exclusive powers, including the right to interpret the
Constitution and supervise its enforcement (Art. 67(1)); to enact
and amend laws other than those which should be made by the NPC
(Art. 67 ( 2)); to make partial revisions and supplements to fundamental laws enacted by the NPC when it is not in session (Art.
67(3)); to interpret statutes (Art. 67(4));236 to revise or annul
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inappropriate rules, regulations, decisions and decrees of both
the State Council and local government organs (Art. 67(7)-(8));
to decide on ratification and abrogation of treaties (Art.
67(14)); to decide on the proclamation of a state of war when the
NPC is, not in session (Art. 67(18)); to decide on the proclamation of martial law (Art. 67(20)); to supervise the work of the
State Council, the Central Military Council, the Supreme People's
Court and the Supreme Peoples'Procuratorate (Art. 67(6)) and, to
"exercise such other functions and powers are vested in it by the
[NPC)" (Art. 67(21)).
The State Council of the PRC is the executive organ of
state power and the highest organ of state administration (Art.
85).
Among the functions and powers of the State Council are:
to formulate administrative measures, provide and approve administrative laws and regulations and issue decisions and orders
in accordance with the Constitution and statutes (Art. 89(1)); to
formulate tasks and responsibilities of PRC ministries and commissions (Art. 89{3)); to exercise leadership over local organs
of state administration (Art. 89 ( 4)); to administer foreign affairs and conclude treaties with foreign countries (Art. 89(9));
to change or revoke inadequate decisions and orders of local administrative organs (Art. 89(13)); and, to exercise such other
powers as are granted to it by the NPC and NPC Standing Committee
(Art. 89(18)).
In essence, State Council decisions and orders
cover a wide range of topics and, to a large extent, serve as the
operative legislation of the PRC whereby the Chinese economy and
many of the daily activities of Chinese life are regulated.237
The 1982 PRC Constitution grants procuratorial authority to
the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Art. 132) and judicial authority to the Supreme People,s Court (Art. 127).
Although articles 95-122 of the 1982 PRC Constitution grant
limited powers to local governmental organs, the grant of powers
to the federal authority is so sweeping as to bring most
governmental concerns within its competence. The virtual omnipotence of the federal authority grants to constituent organs like
the NPC, the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, the
Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court
almost unlimited responsibility to execute policy and administer
all major aspects of Chinese economic, political and social life.
Moreover, the consolidatiqn of power in these major organs
simplifies CCP control over PRC governmental activities.
b)

Arms Inspection and the Legislative Process

After the ratification of a disarmament agreement, the
legislature, in the absence of self-executing treaty provisions,
would be called upon to implement the arms inspection provision.
Substantive policy-making and policy-execution processes will
undoubtedly originate within the upper echelons of the CCP, probably in the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee.
These
will be transmitted
through the Central Committee and the
-

38 -

Secretariat -- to the proper
rubber-stamp approval.

legislative institutions for

final

As the legislative process appears to evolve under the 1982
PRC Constitution, the ACD agreement will be signed by an official
plenipotentiary of the PRC, most likely the PRC chairman, at
which time reservations may be attached.
It will then be sent to
the NPC Standing Committee for formal ratification.238 Assuming
automatic incorporation of the agreement into PRC municipal law,
no further action need be taken.
However, since all fundamental
domestic legislation receives the approval of the NPC, it would
appear that arms inspection provisions may need to pass a majority vote of this body, as well as that of the Standing Committee,
although ratification by the former should make subsequent approval by the latter a mere formality.
Because of the international tenor of the ACD agreement, subsequent municipal legislation will probably not be handled along the lines of current NPC
national enactments, which are often first disseminated in draft
form to local ~overnmental units for discussion before official
promulgation.23
In essence, there are actually layers of legislatures in
the PRC.
The NPC is the highest legislative authority at the
federal level, and there are people's congresses and standing
committees in each of the smaller governmental units of the PRC
--provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under
the
central
government,
autonomous
prefectures,
autonomous
counties, counties, cities, villages, municipal districts and
towns.
Each of the-se congresses ensures observance of the laws
and is constitutionally granted the power to issue decisions
within the limits of its authority (Art. 102).
The text of the
1982 PRC Constitution thus reserves to these smaller governmental
units only a limited sphere of concurrent powers and reinforces
the political domination of the lower legislatures by the higher.
By indisputably creating lines of subordination between legislative layers, the Constitution assures the unchallenged existence
of federal supremacy over constituent units and guarantees the
CCP total domination of the legislative process.
Since the adoption of the 1979 organic laws, 240 there appears to have been no single instance where the decrees of the
NPC Standing Committee and the statutes and decisions of the local standing committees have not met with the approval of the
people's congresses.241 In spite of the fact that the volume of
normative enactments promulgated by the legislatures of the
various levels since mid-1979 has hardly been overwhelming, continuing CCP supervision of the various levels reduced any possibility for future clashes between different centers of power.
NPC and State Council laws, regulations, and decrees are often
implemented within the PRC through constituent legislative enactments known as circulars.
In essence, circulars are no more than
official notices of "federally-enacted" legislation, although
their formal, official promulgation by local party committees and
governmental units invites the supposition that they are akin to
regional implementing legislation.242
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Strict horizontal and vertical subordination -- giving superior party and legislative organs the right to modify or cancel
ultra vires decisions of lower-level departments
indicates
that Chinese participation in the adoption and execution of an
arms inspection policy is first and foremost a subject for the
attention of the CCP, and the NPC and its Standing Committee.
Since arms control legislation would be a ~ational responsibility, lower-level legislation would probably be minimal.
Because
of the requirement of compliance with the principles enacted by
the national legislature, the more important and relevant local
laws will probably exhibit complete homogeneity. The proceedings
and decisions of the NPC are carefully and extensively covered by
the various forms of Chinese news media, a process ensuring wide
dissemination of the contents of national laws and portraying the
proper official attitude toward the policies underlying them. As
such, it is hardly likely that lower-level legislative tiers,
despite some degree of· autonomy and discretion, will promulgate
and administer local arms control laws which do not strictly conform to those of the NPC.
Where non-conformities do exist, the
PRC system would appear to provide an arms inspectorate with the
opportunity to bring non-conforming lower-level legislation to
the attention of the Chinese institutions vested with the authority to modify or cancel such decisions.243
However, this is
not to assert that there would not be underlying difficulties
resulting from inspectorate requests for conforming legislation.
For instance, there is no evidence that the Chinese have ever
applied the concept of severability244 to statutes with invalid
provisions or applications.
Thus, it is uncertain whether Chinese authorities would be amenable to striking invalid portions
of an enactment or whether they might resist requests for
modification because of a perceived necessity for invalidating an
entire statute.
This particular problem, though, may well be
mooted by legislative and administrative processes at lowerlevels, which would most liKely be characterized by a minimization of· policy conflict and a maximization of expediency.
That
would ensure effective centralized CCP control of the policyexecution process.
Thus, the extent to which the legislative
process facilitates or obstructs an arms inspection arrangement
would serve as an important political weathervane of CCP commitment to effective inspection operations.
The shortage of published materials on Chinese law has the
potential for imposing significant limitations on the sources of
an arms inspectorate's legal information.
The relative paucity
of available published regulations outside the PRC is largely the
result of the 1979 legal codes; Chinese limitations on the distribution of legislative and administrative materials; 245 and,
the lack of interpretive precision occasioned by PRC mass media
translations of Chinese legal materials by non-legal journalists.
Though legal journals, which ceased publication during the
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, have reappeared,246 they often
contain only peripheral legal information of marginal utility to
inspectors.
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!1ore direct legal information was recently made available
in a 1980 collection of statutory material,247 though the volume
includes enactments which have subsequently been declared null
and void.
No systematic publication of judicial decisions exist.
At best, such decisions receive only selective and often cursory
treatment in the Chinese press.248
Chinese newspapers may, in fact, be the most significant
source of legal information for foreign perusal that exists in
the PRC today.
The 1979 legal codes and many 1979 and 1980 regulations appeared in Renmin ribao (People's Daily) and were
subsequently translated and distributed by foreign wire services,249 though the lack of legal training of many of the Chinese and foreign correspondents and journalists has resulted in
non-precise, often inaccurate translations, the consequences of
which could be most deleterious to an accurate assessment of Chinese law.
Moreover, CCP control of the press and the generally
limited accessibility of foreign media personnel to legal institutions can only raise suspicion and doubts as to the precision of distributed published legal material.
In addition, the
legislative power granted to local people's congresses and their
respective standing committees indicates that there is an effective body of Chinese legislation which is simply too voluminous
for dissemination through the PRC press.
Hence, inspectorate
personnel could find lower-level legislation difficult to obtain.
Finally, Harold Berman and Peter Maggs have suggested what
would appear to be a problem that might well be endemic to Partycontrolled totalitarian societies, that of secret legislation.250
In the first instance, of course, the possibility of secret
legislation and the existence of legal materials for internal
circulation only create problems for an arms inspectorate, inasmuch as the inspectorate would have difficulty in distinguishing
between a clear-cut violation of an inspection provision authorized by the CCP and a violation due merely to the mistakes or
inefficiency of local authorities.251
Moreover, the possibility of secret legislation creates
problems for Chinese officials who must obey secret orders to
sabotage activities which published Chinese legislation has seemingly sworn them to uphold.
In like fashion, Chinese judges,
lawyers and administrators may well find themselves uninformed of
secret legislation, a possibility which only adds to the confusion. Because of the shortage of published legal materials, the
slant of the CCP-controlled press, and the potential for secret
legislation, an arms inspection arrangement concluded with the
PRC faces a number of significant challenges and compels an arms
inspectorate, for the successful execution of inspection provisions, to seek and obtain the active cooperation of Chinese
officials.
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c)

Arms Inspection and the Procuratorates,
Judicial Organs and Public Security Departments

The procuratorates, judicial organs and public security
departments would play a significant role in the execution of an
arms inspection arrangement:
the procuratorates as an administrative and prosecuting organ, the judiciary as an organ for the
resolution of disputes and the public security departments as an
organ of law enforcement.
In theory, an arms inspectorate might desire to coordinate
its operations with the Ministry of Justice, which was restored
in 1979252 and which supervises the work of the courts, procuratorates, and judicial administrative organs.253 As the central organ in charge of judicial work, the Ministry would ordinarily be th~ proper organ to contact to alleviate the potential of local judicial and procuratorial interference with inspection operations.
However, it is not altogether clear :.>hat
authority the Ministry of Justice actually possesses, since its
assigned tasks appear to be largely ministerial in nature.254 As
a result, an inspectorate could not rule out the possibility -and potentially obstructive process -- of having to deal with
these organs individually.
Nevertheless, at the very least, the
Ministry may help to improve the quality of the judicial and
procuratorial processes and help to partially redefine procuratorial and judicial responsibilities and powers.
Judicial and procuratorial participation in an arms inspection arrangement would essentially be determined by the nature of
the particular situation, but would undoubtedly be influenced by
the internally communicated CCP position on arms inspection policy and by the professional guidelines acquired by ~udicial and
procuratorial personnel in the course of their work.2 5
The procurator's off ice was restored as a government institution as part of the state structure set up under the 1978
PRC Constitution.256
The 1979 Organic Procuratorate Law 257
calls on the procuracy to exercise its authority with regard to
cases of treason, attempts to split the country and other major
criminal cases disrupting uniform conduct (Arts. 4, 5).
It also
places
a
strong
emphasis
on
the
procuratorate's
punitive
power.258 Only passing reference is made of the procuratorate's
power to supervise the observance of citizen's rights by state
organs.
Article 2 of the Organic Procurator ate Law pe r:ni ts the
formation of special people's procuratorates, including military,
railway transport, water transport and "other special" procuratorates.
In this way, the procuratorial network has been
expanded to become •universal.•259
Under its general supervisory powers over the administration of justice, the procuracy exercises significant influence
over the manner in which the law is applied.
Pursuant to the
Organic Procuratorate Law, the procuratorates possess extensive
investigative powers, including the legal authority to issue an
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indictment (Art. 13) and to question the legality
decisions (Arts. 17-19) though, in practice, this
appears more illusory than real.260
Such sweeping
that the procuracy could be expected to intervene in
number.of multifarious legal predicaments between an
torate and the PRC.

of judicial
latter power
powers imply
any one of a
arms inspec-

The potential role of the procuracy in arms inspection is
further complicated by other provisions of the 1979 Organic Procuratorate Law.
In an effort to promote greater centralization
of procuratorial bodies, the 1979 Law provided that higher level
procuratorates shall exercise "leadership" over lower-lovel procuratorates (Art. 10), thus suggesting strict vertical subordination.
At the same time, lower-level procuratorates are also
responsible to corresponding level people's congresses and standing committees, the bodies to which they report.
Such "twin"
subordination "creates some difficulties for uniform application
of laws nationwide and in the final analysis reduces the role of
the procurator's office as a body supervising legality.•261
Revealingly, Chinese procuratorial offices have themselves disclosed that procuratorates are simply unclear on the scope of
their functions and powers.262
The uncertain position of the
procuratorates, in a society where law is often an instrument of
CCP policy, further erodes any sense of legal security or
stability and tends to undermine statutory assertions of independent procuratorial authority.263
Despite an incomplete cyrstallization of the process of
casting the procuratorates in the PRC's present state structure,
the relevance of the procuracy to arms inspection is not lost,
though procuratorial discretion may well be circumscribed by CCP
directives.
The vital role of the procuratorates in inspection
operations may rest largely on its assigned task of questioning
the validity of judicial decisions and judgments since judicial
review does not exist under PRC law.
The procuracy is thereby
granted
significant
responsibility
for
examing
the
constitutionality of various rulings and for ensuring compliance
with enabling legislation. However, the breadth of this power is
uncertain.
Can an arms inspectorate protect an administrative
ruling, local ordinance, or judicial decision inimical to arms
inspection to procuratorial authorities?
Pursuant to procurational powers,
procuratorial officials
presumably after
receiving CCP clearance
would be charged with the responsibility of pressing for the reversal of bad judicial decisions,
which has some established precedent in PRC law.
But, whether
this power extends to pressing for the repeal of an offensive
local statute is doubtful, although technically that would eliminate any form of statutory review and would require inspectors _to
resort to some form of grievance issued to local standing committees (or the NPC Standing Committee) to initiate new legislation.
The
procuracy works
closely with
another
politicaljuridical body, the people's courts.
Pursuant to the Organic
Court Law,264 the courts of the PRC are the judicial ogans of the
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state in charge of dispensing justice~ Despite granting independent authority to the people's courts, the Organic Court Law
fails to confer exclusive judicial power of them, an act of omission which preserves the dependence of the courts on local organs
of state power (and on the CCP). People's courts are subordinate
and accountable to local people's congresses and to their standing committees between LPC sessions (Art. 17). Moraover, Article
28 of the Organic Law for Local Congresses and Governments grants
to standing committees the power to supervise the activities of
the courts.
In practice, Chinese judicial authority has been
further diluted by the frequent interference of local Party and
administrative organs in the judicial process265 and by the dual
allegiance of many judges to the judicial system and the Party.
Such practices, combined with court accountability to LPCs and
their standing committees, create judicial dependence on the organs of local government and significantly attentuate the independent power of the court system.266
Pursuant to the Organic Court Law, the judiciary is composed of a broad stratum of district, intermediate, and higher
people's courts with jurisdiction over "both crimina! and civil
cases" (Art. 3).
In actuality, though, mass organizations handle
the task, under the Provisional General Rules Governing the Organization of the People's Mediation Committees of February 25,
1954 ·reintroduced by the Twelfth Session of the NPC Standing Committee in 1979,267 of "mediat[ing] civilian disputes and minor
criminal cases in general and • . . carry[ing] out propaganda and
education in policies and laws in the course of mediation" (Art.
III). 268 The committees are not empowered to use any sanctions
to compel reconciliation and their reintroduction as a judicial
appendage may only be "a temporary if incomplete answer to the
acute shortage of judicial personnel which is the result of the
deliberate Maoist policy of contempt for laws.•269
In the administration of justice, the people's courts of
the PRC under the Organic Court Law have adopted the system of
"rendering judgment after two trials. •270 The initial trial of
crimina! and some civil cases is conducted by the basic-level
people's court (Art. 21).
At the next level, the intermediate
courts exercise appellate review over basic-level people's courts
and, in addition, have original jurisdiction over cases prescribed to them by law (Art. 25(1)), or referred to them by local
courts (Art. 25 ( 2)).
The higher people's courts stand in like
relation to the intermediate courts.'271
Both intermediate and
higher-level people's courts have the right to review decisions
of lower-level people's courts which have taken legal effect pursuant to their powers of judicial supervision (Art. 14).
The highest judicial organ is the Supreme People's Court
(Art. 30),272 which has been granted powers identical to those
of intermediate· and lower-level courts, including the power of
original jurisdiction in important cases,273 (Art. 32), but which
is also entrusted with the power to exercise judicial supervision
over the decisions of local people's courts and special courts.
The Supreme People's court is empowered to provide judicial
- 44 -

interpretation concerning the specific application of laws and
decrees (Arts. 30, 33)27~ and approves or passes the death penalty in many cases of capital punishment (Art. 13).275
In addition, the Supreme People's Court is vested with the authority to
issue explanatory decrees (Art. 33) designed to publicize and
eliminate the more common errors made by lower-level courts.
To
date, few explanatory decrees have ever been publicly issued.
Moreover, the lack of trained judicial personnel in the PRC has
left the Supreme People's Court unable to handle the deluge of
lower-level cases appealed to it and to carry out its supervisory
legal functions as well.
The Supreme People's Court is not the
custodian of the PRC Constitution and has not questioned the
validity of any of the recently enacted legal codes and regulations.
Its role appears to be significantly more passive.
In
effect, this passive role cuts both ways.
An arms control inspectorate should have little or no concern about the possibility
of the Supreme People's Court's initiation of judicial review of
inspectorate provisions passed by the NPC.
Chinese law permits only one appeal by a defendant to the
next highest court as a matter of right.276 While appellate review in the West is concerned mostly with questions of law, such
review in the PRC does not seem to be so limited.
The factual
record may be reviewed or expanded by the introduction of new or
further evidence, and indications are that full-dress re-trials
are not beyond the scope of appellate authority.277
Appellate
review by way of judicial supervision of decisions which have
taken effect (usually by virtue of an adverse decision on appeal
or by the lapse of the 5-day requirement for filing an appeal)278
encompasses review of both facts and law.
If a higher-level
court or the procuracy feels that the appellate decision would
cause a miscarriage of justice, either body may then object to
the decision by filing· a protest. The paucity of actual judicial
or procuratorial protests notwithstanding, an arms inspectorate
might well gauge Chinese commitment to an arms control arrangement by the willingness of the superior courts or procuracy to
protest decisions inimical to arms inspection •.
In addition to the local people's courts and the Supreme
People's Court, the Organic Court Law has added a third type:
special people's courts (Art. 2).
The NPC Standing Committee is
vested with the power to determine the organization and jurisdiction of special people's courts,279 despite the constitutional
grant of judicial supervisory authority to the Supreme People's
Court.
Undoubtedly, "the fact that the special courts are under
the scrutiny of particular government departments goes a long way
to determine the nature of their activity.•280 The use of a special court and special procuratorate for the Gang of Four trial
suggests that special courts are most likely to be used in publici zed cases of significant importance and sens i ti vi ty.
Claims
brought against an arms inspectorate in cases where it was not
shielded by immunity would seem to be the most likely candidates
for the creation of special courts, which, by their very nature,
would not be entrusted with a flood of other cases, and which,
because of the legal machinations surrounding their creation,
- 45 -

would portray to the international community the Chinese commitment to judicial fairness.
On the other hand, claims brought on
behalf of an inspectorate for alleged acts of Chinese interference in inspection operations may or may not receive the attention of a special court, depending on the nature of the
obstruction and the reasons fo.r it. Moreover, trials in people's
courts on non-secret. or other non-special matters would give the
Chinese the option of conducting the trial publicly pursuant to
Article 125 of the 1982 PRC Constitution.281 In many instances,
that option could be exploited by the PRC to garner public support for Chinese policy, publicize the indiscretions of inspectorate personnel, or simply legitimize the judicial process.
Public security departments (gonganju) are the third division of political-juridical bodies in the PRC.
Prior· to the
adoption of the 1978 PRC Constitution the public security bodies
"performed secondary functions of the procurator's office in conducting inquiries and preliminary investigations, instituting
criminal proceedings and maintaining public accusations in court,
as
well
as
supervising
the
fulfillment
[sic]
of
court
sentences.•282
The public security organs functioned outside the scope of
any established legal norms and "enjoyed a higher status" than
the procuracy.283 Such functions and powers would indicate that
the participation of public security organs in the arms inspection process would have significant ramifications for an inspectorate, largely because of the public security departments' uncontrolled responsibility in the criminal process.
Although ostensible oower of public security organs has
since been circumscribed,2S4 this vast control apparatus still
retains impressive -- and disturbing -- authority.
For example,
the Regulations of the People's Republic of China Governing the
Arrest and Detention of Persons Accused of Crimes, adopted
February 23, 1979285 [hereafter Arrest Regulations], requires
procuratorial or 286 judicial approval in the form of an arrest
warrant before public security bodies were entitled to make arrests.
But, Article 6 of the Arrest Regulations permits public
security organs, in an "emergency,•287 to detain up to four days
a person who has committed a crime or one who is "suspected of
having committed a major crime.•288 Public security organs maintain visa inspection stations for foreign travellers and are
otherwise in charge of monitoring foreign activities in the
PRc.289
11oreover, public security organs allegedly have exclusive power to enforce fines through detention and to determine
fault at the site of an accident for purposes of compensation.290
Public security organs are apparently not accountable t9 the
courts or the procuracy.291 simply phrased, public security organs and the Public Security Ministry in charge of them, operate
a largely unfettered surveillance system in the PRC.
A 1978 report given by the chairman of the PRC Supreme People's Court, Jiang Hua (Chiang Hua), noted that "security bodies
widely practice extraction of 'confessions' from the accused
- 46 -

under duress."292 Although the Arrest Regulations grant the procuratorates the power to investigate "responsible personnel who
carried out arrests, detentions and searches of citizens in
violation of the law" (Art. 13),293 in reality, the zeal with
which any investigation will be conducted will depend largely on
the nature of the offense and the offender.
A genuine Chinese
commitment to an arms inspecti~n policy would probably result in
official disciplining of any public security organ for flagrant
misconduct displayed towards the inspectorate team.
Unpunished,
obstructive actions, such as gross provocations or dilatory
detention procedures294 carried out by public security organs,
may simply evince a lack of good faith on the part of the PRC.
The extent to which the political-juridical organs participate in an arms inspection arragnement undoubtedly remains a
function of CCP policy directives. The development of the procuratorial, judicial and public security bodies since 1979 is still
incomplete and their interaction within the governmental mechanism is still unsettled.
Nevertheless, the mass public campaign
to strengthen the PRC legal system295 has inculcated Chinese
citizens with a manifest respect for legal institutions and a
positive attitude toward Chinese justice. As a result, the procuracy, the courts, and the public security organs could significantly facilitate the policy-execution process of arms inspection.
The procuracy, the most active of the three politicaljuridical ~odies in the Chinese legal system, could offer a
strong indication of the overall Chinese commitment to arms inspection by its willingness to cooperate with an inspectorate in
removing local legal obstacles to inspection.
The courts, as
institutions empowered to settle disputes, often through public
procedures, could influence Chinese attitudes towards inspection
procedures by providing a forum for legal challenges to inspection functions. The public security departments, as the official
policing agency for the PRC, could be particularly assiduous in
removing threats to the inspectorate and the inspection process.
Consistent, unequivocal acts of cooperation from these three organs would substantially contribute to the creation of a climate
in the PRC which is conducive to the execution of an inspection
arrangement.
4)

The Chinese Attitude Toward Disarmament

The acquisition of strategic.nuclear weapons capability by
the PRC, shown most recently 1n the successful Chinese test
launching of an ICBM,296 has added a new dimension to the gobal
strategic balance; given the PRC a leading voice on pressing contemporary international issues; and, provided a stronger, more
stable domestic environment in which to embark on the program of
•four modernizations."297
The evolution of Chinese disarmament pol icy has been a
function of Chinese national security interests.
The PRC has
regarded possession of a limited nuclear arsenal as an absolutely
essential requisite for self-defense purposes and for world
security.298
Chinese perceptions of PRC military vulnerability
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have created a domestic political posture generally unswerving in
its rigid opposition to international agreements that would
hinder continued sophisticated weapons development.
With few
exceptions, the PRC has not acceded to or ratified any international agreement related to arms control and disarmament.299
Moreover, the Chinese have stated unequivocally that the PRC
would not be bound by any agreement without the formal participation and signature of her delegate.300
An understanding of Chinese attitudes toward arms control
and disarmament begins with an understanding of the characteristic
differences
between
the
terms
"arms
control":
and
"disarmament:"
Disarmament normally means a quantitative
reduction or elimination of armaments and
military
forces,
whereas
arms
control
refers to measures designed to regulate and
restrict armaments so as to maintain a measure of military power balance and to re-·
duce the probability of accidental war.301
Chinese policy implicitly differentiating between these two
forms of arrangements was largely the result of a defensive
political outlook borne by military inferiority.
From the
vantage point of national security interests, the PRC disapp~oved
of any measures which would neutralize China's man-power advantage vis-a-vis the technological superiority of the United
States and the Soviet Union~ or which would perpetuate the superpowers' nuclear monopoly.30~ AS a result, the ~hinese formulated
in the 1960s an independent policy grounded upon the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons,303
otherwise expressed as total and complete nuclear disarmament.
In effect, this policy has been the cornerstone of subsequent Chinese disarmament proposal modifications, although international disharmony has compelled the PRC to underscore more
limited measures as a means to eventually achieve complete
nuclear disramament.
Moreover, the PRC has added conventional
disarmament to its proposals, something it had heretofore been
reluctant to do.304 The result is that the current Chinese policy of disarmament is an amalgam of what are arguably the more
preferable (i.e., comprehensive) features of arms control and
general disarmament measures.
The basic premise continues to be
the reduction in number of weapons systems components. Hence the
terms -- arms control and disarmament -- are used interchangeably
with respect to inspection operations, because verification procedures may accompany either arrangement.
It is only in the last decade -- since China's entry into
the United Nations in 1971 -- that Chinese representatives have
articulated the PRC 's principled stand on disarmament issues.
Only nine days after being admitted to the United Nations, the
PRC, through UN representative Jiao Guanhua (Chiao Kuan-hua)
-

48 -

reiterated Chinese support for total nuclear disarmement and opposition to superpower arms control arrangements.305 Jiao reasserted that the proper condition precedent for genuine disarmament was a pledge by all the nuclear powers "to guarantee that
they will not use nuclear weapons against [non-nuclear] countries
and [non-nuclear] zones and will withdraw all their nuclear
forces and dismantle all nuclear bases and nuclear installations
from these zones.•306 This pledge came to be known as the "nofirst-use" pledge307 and remains one of the guiding principles of
subsequent Chinese disarmament proposals.308
Despite Jiao's cogent remarks during the introductory phase
of Chinese participation in the United Nations, the PRC voted
against a sid'nificant number of disarmament and arms control
resolutions,3 9 some of which were supported by a majority of
Third World countries.310
The Chinese justified their own
nuclear development program as well as their opposition to UN
arms control measures on the basis that nuclear deterrence among
a number of countries would break the superpower monopoly,311
eliminate the danger of a new world war,312 and contribute to the
maintenance of global stability.
During UN debates on arms control and disarmament issues,
Chinese representatives condemned both superpowers
though
their verbal attack on the Soviet Union was more vituperative -for increased arms expansion and denounced their negotiations.313
·. The Chinese envisaged the ns~ng powers of Third World
countries, often portrayed proverbially in the PRC press (~,
shanyu yulai fengmanlou314), as an effective counter.weight to
superpower imprudence. In the face of such united global opposition the United States and the Soviet Union were depicted as isolated and debilitated sovereign powers, "in the plight of wuke
naihe hualuo qu (flowers fall off, one is helpless) •"315 Nevertheless, the Chinese constantly admonished Second and Third World
countries to guard against superpower military pressure -qianmen ruhu houmen j inlang (repel the tiqer at the front gate
and the wolf sneaks in at the back door).3lo
The formulation of Chinese policy has resulted from deductive logic, syllogistically progressing from general Chinese perceptions of the state of the world to the more specific issues of
arms control and disarmament.317 For example, Chinese denunciations of disarmament negotiations in the 1960s and early 1970s
reflected both PRC disagreement with the Soviet Union and the
perceived military vulnerability of China. The PRC's censure of
the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty reflected the Chinese position
that nuclear status was regarded as the mark of a major military
power and could not be fairly limited to only the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The Chinese had not yet attained nuclear
capability; hence they labelled the treaty a "fraud" and accused
the superpowers, with their nuclear arsenals, of attempting to
consolidate their nuclear monopoly and prevent "peace-loving
countries" (including the PRC) from strengthening their own selfdefense techniques through nuclear weapons development.318 Since
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the PRC was regarded as having "more nations on its border, more
insecure frontiers and more controversies with neighboring states
than any other large or small powers,"319 military might in the
form of nuclear capability was considered a constituent national
power ingredient.
To enhance its global image and protect itself
from the superpower threat, the Chinese regarded their own unconstrained weapons development as essential.
At the same time the Chinese described the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty of 1963 as insufficiently comprehensive, they also sought
to avoid support for general and complete disarmament proposals,
since conventional force reductions embodied in those proposals
would remove China's only strategic advantage over the superpowers.
Moreover, China perceived that its large size made possible dispersion of industry and population so that a nuclear
attack would not compleely immobilize the PRc.320 Therefore, the
Chinese reasoned that they could, in a sense, afford to oppose
any international conclave which sought to maintain the military
status quo or prevent the PRC from acquiring its own nuclear
weapons.
This position was tempered by the realization that low
quality medical f:cilities dictated that germ, c~emi~al, or
radiological warfare against China would be very effective,321 a
fact that certainly justified PRC ratification of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol and indicated the extent to which Chinese policy was
both self-serving and politically practical.
As various
arms control
and disarmament
negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union continued, the PRC
accused the superpowers of "collusions in their arms control
plots"322 and observed that the purpose and. result of these
negotiations were meraly to set high ceilings for missile delivery systems, leaving plenty of elbow room for research and experimentation.323
The Chinese perceived no real disarmament
resulting from the SALT negotiations, noting often in UN speeches
and domestic news articles that the SALT agreements were ineffective and would eliminate quantitative competition and confine it
to
qualitative
in
the
development
of
strategic
nuclear
weapons.324
The Chinese historical portrayal of the superpowers as two
giant .forces locked in fierce contention for global hegemony has
given way, partly as a result of recent SALT negotiations, to an
increased regularity of Chinese press releases and official
statements characterizing the Soviet "hegemonists" as the pr incipal threat to other countries.325 Opposition to Soviet expansionism "remains the principal basis for accommodation between
the PRC and a broad spectrum of states.•326 Chinese behavior has
manifested itself in salutary gestures that seem almost uncharacteristic, including an alleged offer by Vice-Premier Deng
Xiaoping to the United States to allow the latter to install
American equipment on Chinese soil to monitor Soviet compliance
with the SALT II Treaty.327
The PRC continues to oppose the Partial Test Ban Treaty,
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the proposed comprehensive test
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ban treaty.328
The overriding reason for opposition to these
treaties has been the firm Chinese assertion that limited arms
control and disarmament measures "establish nothing•:329
superpower nuclear weapons were considered to be entirely offensive
and continually geared for war.
Each superpower was accused of
using arms control and disarmament negotiations as a method "to
attain nuclear superiority by limiting the strength of the
other.•330
Between 1963 and 1978, the United States was alleged
to have conducted 343 nuclear tests and the Soviet Union 234.331
The PRC asserted that such tests indicated that arms limitation
talks had sim~ln failed to halt the escalation and expansion of
nuclear arms.
The superpowers had military strength "far
beyond their defense needs•333 and their bilateral negotiatons
were designed to preserve the superpower nuclear monopoly and
foreclose the development of nuclear programs by developing
countries.334
The PRC has also refused to ratify the Outer Space Treaty,
the Seabed Treaty,
the convention on environmental warfare
(ENMOD), and the convention banning biological warfare.335 Much
of Chinese opposition to these arm 1 i:ni tat ion agreements stems
from the "deep rooted suspicion • . . about Russian and American
intentions [and)
a long history of Soviet intervention in
China and u.s. support for the rival government on Taiwan. •336
Though the PRC has not opposed the basic premise of these treaties and conve:1tions, it has object~d to the proc<:dur:~~ :~nd substantive control exerted by the superpowers which, the Chinese
have felt, precluded meaningful discussion and the adequate formulation of arms limitation policies which incorporate the reasonable proposals of Third World countries.337
China's arms control and disarmament policies are occasionally inconsistent.
On the question of chemical and biological warfare, for instance, the PRC has asserted its support
for the complete and thorough destruction of chemical and toxic
wea(?ons338 and denounced their use by other countries in warfare.339 The Chinese have not only ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol [on Chemical Weapons) but have also included a (?revision on
the (?rohibition and destruction of biological and chemical
weapons in their 1982 disarmament proposal and in their Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament.~40
Moreover, the PRC voted
for the 1973 resolution on na(?alm and other incendiary weapons341
and ratified the UN Convention restricting or prohibiting the
uses of certain conventional weapons (landmines, booby traps,
incendiary weapons and small calibre weapons systems).34~ Nevertheless, China has op(?osed the superpower-sponsored biological
warfare convention as a tool of the United States and the Soviet
Union for (?eddling their disarmament fraud.343
The PRC has not failed to attack the Soviet Union for the
latter's deployment of biological weapons on the grounds that
such wea(?ons are ecologically destructive. 344
Yet, the Chinese
themselves have ignored the environmental repercussions of their
own above-ground nuclear tests.345
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Despite the appar~nt inconsistencies in Chinese policy
regarding weapons testing and biological and chemical warfare,
the PRC has been most unequivocal in her support for the establishment of nuclear-free zones around the world, a concept
which the Chinese have offered as proof that they are committed
to the genuine disarmament demanded by Third world countries.346
By voting for UN resolutions on the establishment of a zone of
peace in the Indian Ocean, the nuclear weapon-free zones in the
Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America347 as well as
ratifying Additional Protocol II of the Tlateloco Treaty, the PRC
has established itself as the only major nuclear power which has
taken firm, consistent and unequivocal action on any issue involved in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Tlateloco
Treaty was not without a number of self-service political motives.
At one and· the same time, the PRC hoped further to isolat~ the Soviet Union by denouncing Soviet "acceptance" of Additional Protocol II as a fraud348 and more closely to align itself
with the "reasonable" position of Third World countries.349
The flexibility that the PRC has shown toward arms control
and disarmament negotiations in the recent past is further
evidence of the continuing Chinese predilection toward retaining
its position as the vanguard of the Third World.
The year 1978
marked the first instance in which the Chinese expressed an
interest
in directly participating
in disarmament negotiations.350
Huang Hua, who represented the PRC delegation at the
lOth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in
1978,351 noted that the convocation of the Session, at the insistence of the non-aligned countries, was the result of the increased dissatisfaction with the "intensified [superpower) arms
race.•352 Developing countries continued to struggle to protect
their sovereignty and national security. 353
In "reviewing the
past to know better the future," Hua noted that the key reason
for· the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations had been the
insincerity of the superpowers.354 The PRC representative asserted that the people of the world wanted genuine and not sham disarmament.
To the Chinese delegation, genuine disarmament could
only begin with the superpowers.355 To reduce the danger of war,
Hua called for the simultaneous reduction of both nuclear and
conventional armaments, 356 something the PRC had heretofore te="
jected.
He also called for the United States and the Soviet
Union to adopt the no-first-use pledge to withdraw their armed
forced from abroad, and to dismantle their foreign military installations.357 Moreover, the Chinese viewed as "understandable"
the proposal of small and medium-sized countries that the reduction of military expenditures under disarmament measures be channelled
toward
the
economic
development
of
the developing
countries.358
During the Tenth Special Session, the Chinese delegation
also announced its willingness to participate in future disarmament negotiations if and only if the superpower-dominated Geneva
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was reorganized under
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UN auspices "so as to bring the role of the Third World into full
play • . . !by adhering to] the principle of equality among all
countries." 359
Throughout the Session, the Chinese press continued to denounce the superpowers' obstruction of disarmament360
and to support the proposals of the developing countries.361 The
final document of the Session, approved by the General Assembly
on June 30, 1978, gave its "highest priority" to nuclear disarmament and
the prevention of
nuclear war.362
The previous
negotiating body for disarmament measures, which met in Geneva,
was reorganized and renamed the Committee on Disarmament with an
expanded 39 member representation, including the PRc.363 A new
Disarmament Commission, composed of all UN members, was also established by the General Assembly and was designed to report annually to the Assembly and make recommendations on ACD problems.
The Chinese delegation maintained that it was pleased that
the superpowers did not control the negotiations.
Yet, it remained concerned that the final documents failed to specify explicitly that the new negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, be fully representative and that it be composed on the basis of equitable geographical distribution.364 Moreover, the PRC
alleged that the document incorporated many of the unreasonable
positions of the superpowers,365 omitted any mention that the
superoowers' rivalry increased the likelihood of a new world
war366 and failed to c:: iticize the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
projected comprehensive test ban treaty.367 Perhaps most revealingly, a Chinese press release during the Special Session asserted that the PRC could not agree to disarmament alongs.ide the
superpowers while Soviet troops were arrayed along China's northern border and while Taiwan remained unliberated.368 Though the
latter assertion had heretofore been absent from Chinese disarmament proposals and has not appeared as explicitly since, PRC concern for foreign arms sales to Taiwan and continued calls for the
island's liberation in the Chinese press imply the possibility
that the Taiwan issue could become a complicating factor in establishing Chinese support for full-fledged participation in the
disarmament process.
Throughout 1978, the Chinese continued to view with disfavor the increasing intensity of the superpower arms race and
the failure of bilateral Soviet-American disarmament deliberations. 369
When the newly-formed Committee on Disarmament held
its first session in 1979, the PRC attended only as an observer,
though it reserved its right to take its seat at a future
time. 370
The Chinese, as part of their plan to assume a more
active role in disarmament negotiations, proposed at the first
session of the UN Disarmament Commission on May 15, 1979 their
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which has become the core
of later PRC disarmament proposals.371 In its Programme, the PRC
proposed the reduction of nuclear conventional weapons as well as
biological, chemical and other weapons of mass dstruction initiated and executed first by the superpowers.372
In addition,
the Chinese called for the establishment of zones of peace in
Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean and respect for the Indian
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Ocean peace zone.373
The Programme also called for the establishment of nuclear-free zones 1n the Middle East, Africa and
South Asia and respect for the status of the nuclear-free zone in
Latin America.374
Among
the more
basic principles emphasized were the
no-first-use principle,375
the
five
principles of
peaceful
coexistence376 and the declaration that no disarmament measure
may im~air the sovereignty, independence and security of any
state.J77 The bottom line, however, was that the PRC and other
nuclear powers would join in serious disarmament negotiations at
some point after the superpower3 had made substantial and satisfactory progress in the reduction of their armaments.378
Other elements in the PRC's Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament were included as inducements to garner the support of
the Third World.
Phrases such as:
"the actual process of disarmament should benefit the economic and social development of
States•; 379 "no disarmament measure may prejudice the right of
States to make use of modern scientific and technological
achievements to promote their economic development•;380 "the
question of disarmament • . . shjuld be discussed and settled by
all States on an equal footing"; 81 and, "the role of the United
Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened,•382
were probably incorporated for their propagandistic, rather than
their normative, effect.
However, the last reference -- to UN participation in disarmament negotiations -- has since been characterized as an "unusually warm endorsement of the UN role and recommendations in
disarmement," and may "indicate a willingness now to consider
other arms limitation treaties endorsed by the United Nations
•383
By implication, the PRC has advanced its support for disarmament verification provisions in its 1979 Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament and in its 1980 proposal for chemical disarmament. The former contains provisions on superpower reduction
of nuclear and conventional arsenals;384 the latter, a provision
for the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons
and the dismantling of production facilities.385 It seemed unrealistic that the Chinese would envision the execution of either
provision without adequate verification procedures.
What
lingering
doubts
existed about PRC support for
verification dissipated in 1982, when the Chinese introduced
their "Proposal on Essential Measures for an Immediate Halt to
the Arms Race and for Disarmament" before the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly.-386
Provision five of the proposal called for ·"strict and effective measures of international
verification." The international nature of verification is further clarified in the proposal as a "group . • . [of] representatives from all nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states
[which] should submit reports to the UN General Assembly annually
and whenever necessary.•387 In this manner, the 1982 disarmament
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proposal also fuels the supposition that the PRC seeks
role for the United Nations in disarmament.

a

more

acti~e

The PRC' s proposal in most other respects parallels the
principles espoused in the Comprehensive Frog r amme of Disarmament:
the no-first-use. principle is
retained; nuclear and
conventional armaments should be reduced; chemical weapons should
be prohibited; and all states should participate in disarmament
negotiations on an equal footing.
The only addition to these
principles appears to be the Chinese call for a 50 percent reduction in superpower nuclear arsenals -- previously the PRC had
used the term "substantial" reduction -- before the advent of
serious negotiations.
If there are troubling aspects to this proposal, they appear to be with respect to verification.
First, the Chinese suggestion for an international verification group composed of
nuclear and non-nuclear Neapon states appears cumbersome and unwieldy. -second, the 1982 proposal retains the provisions of the
1979 proposal that disarmament measures should not threaten the
sovereignty of any state.
How the PRC perceives the reconciliation of potentially intrusive "effective verification" operations
-- through national technical means or on-site verification -with the inviolability of sovereignty is unclear.
Nevertheless,
the most recent Chinese disarmament proposal is the first to suggest the need for verification and remains an unprecedented step
in PRC disarmament policy, however impractical that policy may
appear.388
Throughout all its deliberations, the Chinese have continued to stress the "stark reality of accelerated arms expansion
and intensified military expansion abroad by the superpowers,n389
and the right of Third World Countries to develop their own selfdefense programs and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.39~ The effect of this position has been to chill somewhat
the atmosphere surrounding disarmament negotiations and attribute
to the United States and the Soviet Union the primary responsibility for arresting the arms race and initiating the disarmament process.
The tradition of extensive opposition to superpower disarmament efforts provides one of the most obstructive elements for
arms inspection in the PRC.
Chinese participation in an arms
inspection arrangement would first involve the initiation and
implementation of a substantial resocialization of the population
on arms control and disarmament issues, an undoubtedly lengthy
and
complicated
process.
Furthermore,
this
process
of
resoc ial i za t ion would necessarily involve some form of reconciliation or rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
The political
rift that has existed between the Chinese and the Soviets is one
of the fundamental reasons the PRC refuses to negotiate with the
nuclear powers on arms control and disarmament issues.
The Chinese have consistently regarded the Soviet Union as the major
source of world tens ion.
The PRC response to the aggressive
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military presence of the Soviets along the Chinese-Soviet border391 and around the world has been a declaratory policy which
has stressed a posture of finite nuclear deterrence.3~2 The goal
of the Chinese nuclear deterrent strategy has been to minimize
the likelihood of a Soviet preemptive attack and reduce the vulnerabi 1 i ty of the PRC 1 s nuclear systems.
The Chinese have thus
undertaken a number of measures designed to "disperse, camouflage
and diversify•393 their nuclear delivery systems, hiding some
missiles in silos and others in mountainous locations, thus complicating detection.394 An arms inspection arrangement would run
counter to such a continuous and intensive process of war preparedness based on a limited retaliatory capacity requiring the
utmost in non-detection to be effective.
In effect, Chinese participation and interaction in the
international community will always depend, to a great degree, on
PRC-perceived priorities, values, and vulnerability.395
The
PRC 1 s sensitivity to previous superpower-controlled disarmament
negotiations and its ardent distrust of the Soviet Union makes
the likelihood of unreserved approval of intrusive arms inspection procedures presently improbable, particularly if the composition of the inspectorate includes Soviet participants.
The
entire approach of the Chinese to arms control and disarmament
issues suggests the formation of an inspectorate body composed of
impartial, Third World members whose reports are eventually funneled through a representative international body.
Such an inspectorate would receive a potentially greater degree of initial
cooperation from the relevant PRC governmental bodies involved in
the inspection process and could minimize Chinese assertions of
potential ulterior motives on the part of individual inspectors.
Moreover, the discernible anti-Soviet trends among the general
population would fail to disrupt as readily an inspection procedure which did not involve direct Soviet participation. Finally, greater Third World participation in the inspection proces~
would provide the PRC with what it may consider a more sympathetic ear towards potential superpower violations of the inspection agreement, a point not to be disregarded lightly giver
past Chinese attacks on superpower-controlled disarmament organs.
Though it is not the intent of this study to propose in detail
the working composition of an arms inspectorate, an awareness of
Chinese receptiveness to present disarmament proceedings may mak1
the finalization of future agreements somewhat easier.
Of course, PRC apprehension toward, and skepticism of.
present disarmament negotiations may prove obstructive of arm1
inspection inasmuch as the Chinese would be likely to envelop th1
operations of the governmental system in secrecy and encurnbeJ
even the simplest problems in bureaucratic red tape. The CCP anc
Chinese media have never been remiss in inculcating the masse:
with an attitude "that constant vigilance on the part of ever:
citizen is essential to prevent both foreign agents and subver·
sive ideas from penetrating•396 Chinese society.
This attitud•
endures despite the kind of PRC control over the population whicl
has been so thorough that it is unlikely a limited contingent o
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foreign inspectors would prove politically disruptive.
Inspectors would probably not be attending Chinese schools, working in
Chinese factories, or otherwise engraining themselves in the
fabric of PRC society so as to cause the system to break down.
Yet, increased cultural contacts and present-day reports in the
Chinese press criticizing Mao397 -- for so long the patriarch of
Chinese society -- may invariably lead to the kind of psychological self-reevaluation that encourages Chinese people to seek
knowledge of the outside world and prompts the PRC leadership to
labor under an anxiety about Chinese society becoming contaminated by foreign influence. Chinese reluctance to accept inspection for reasons of national security may manifest itself in implementation of stricter standards of civilian and police (public
and secret) surveillance over inspectorate members, particularly
since it would be unlikely that the PRC would be permitted to
maintain effective, selective control of the insoectorate's official itinerary within the country.398
•
Although Chinese support for verification remai:1s one of
the more laudable aspects of PRC disar~ament policy, the Chinese
have never publicly endorsed on-site inspection.
In fact, in
what was one of the very few press reports to even faintly allude
to on-site inspection, the Chinese noted that the United States
would have difficulty monitoring Soviet compliance with SALT II
because "there is no perfect solution to verification.•399 There
is no hint that the PRC considers on-site insoection less flawed
than other surveillance techniques nor that it- would find on-site
operations acceptable under provisions of its disarmament proposals opposing measures that impair the sovereignty, independence and security of any state.
At present, the net impact of
Chinese attitudes and policies toward disarmament would probably
prove obstructive to PRC participation in on-site inspection
arrangements.
In the final analysis, the single most constructive factor
conducive to Chinese participation remains, despite pervasive PRC
suspicion of superpower motives, the willingness and sincerity of
the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in genuine disarmament.
The reluctance of the superpowers to proceed pursuant
to the terms of the PRC 's disarmament proposals will probably
have an enervating effect on Chinese participation in, and affirmative support for, effective verification procedures.
But this is not to assert that the PRC would limit its participation in arms control and disarmament measures to arrangements based exclusively on its programs. Chinese declarations on
the strengths and weaknesses of recent proceedings are occasionally equivocal and often indecisive in suggesting more
feasible alternatives.
Any lack of resolve, however, is not to
be mistaken for weakness.
Rather, it is the result of the relative brevity of PRC participation in official international
intercourse.
The Chinese are frequently proferring official and
semi-official proclamations as lithmus tests for official international reaction.
Chinese positions are pliable; they may be
altered in response to vigorous foreign dissent or .adjusted to
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more appropriately fit the dictates of CCP ideology.
The more
positive the relationship between such variables, the greater the
likelihood for compromise. The position of the PRC with respect
to present-day disarmament measures is arguably more conducive to
Chinese participation than it has ever been.
This is a first
significant concrete move in the direction of disarmament and
suggests that the PRC no longer considers genuine disarmament a
mere hackneyed slogan.
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Feeney, Sino-Soviet competition in the United Nations, 17
ASIAN SURVEY 809, 818-19 (No. 9, Sept. 1977).

13.

Id. at 819 citing Wilson, China and the Third World, 7
PACIFIC COMHUNITY, at 216-17 (No.2, Jan. 1976). Cf. "PRC
Delegate to Arms Conference Comments on Restrictions,"
FBIS-CHI-79-179 (Sept. 13, 1979), at Al. ·see also Levine,
China and the Superpowers:
Policies Toward~ United
States and the Soviet Union, 90 POL!. SCIENCE Q. 637, 638
(No. 4, 1976-76).
The Chinese penchant for labels and belief in the
destructive power of words must be carefully analyzed by
any serious student of Chinese studies.
The structure of
communications in the PRC suggests that Chinese use of the
media is designed to ensure the stability of the system,
promote individual devotion to conformity and enforce consensus.
For an excellent ·analysis of the relationship of
communication and politics in the PRC, see Pye, Communications and Chinese Political Culture, lBASIAN SURVEY 221,
esp. 228-40 (No. 3, March 1978). See also Liu, Problems in
Communications in China's Modernization, 22 ASIM SURVEY
481
(No.
5, May 1982); R. WICH, SINO-SOVIET CRISIS
POLITICS:
A STUDY IN POLITICAL CHANGE AND COMMUNICATION
(1980).
In ordinary journalistic and academic parlance, the
term "superpower • connotes considerable size, population,
industrial-technological capacity and strategic power which
are all used to exert influence in the international community.
In the Chinese political lexicon, however, the
term "superpower" is distinctly more perjorative.
The
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policies of those countries "designated by the PRC as superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- are
often linked with expansionism, subversion, aggression,
racism, intervention, territorial encroachments, infringements on sovereign rights, colonialism, Zionism, hegemonism
and, inevitably, war.
f!· Three World's Speech, supra
note 11, at p. 11.
The distinguishing feature of the superpowers is their
quest for hegemony [bachuan], a word indicating "not the
legitimate leadership of an alliance or association founded
on common interest, but the unlawful and tyrranical use of
coercive force over the weak and the defenseless." Levine,
supra note 13, at 639. Cf. Walder, Press Accounts and the
Study of Chinese Society, 79 CHINA Q. 568 (Sept. 1979).
As such, the term "superpower" is a focal point around
which the Chinese have attempted to create a united front
of Third World and Second World countries whose common
interest is to defend their sovereignty against superpower
encroachment. Levine, supra note 13, at 638.
Though the PRC is itself committed to military
modernization and has, in fact, already tested an ICBM, it
lacks the "malevolent ambition" of the superpowers.
Id.,
at 639. See also "Beijing Press Reports on Successful Missile Test:-- 'Jiefangjun Bao Commentary,'" FBIS-CHI-80-103
(May 27, 1980), at L8; "Submarine-Launched Carrier Rocket
Tested," FBIS-CHI-82-201 (Oct. 18, 1982), at Kl.
Thus, any enlightened attempt to include the PRC as a
"superpower" based on its aggregate power potential, rather
than on its use of such power, would be strongly denounced
by the. Chinese.
Moreover, the Chinese definition of the
term would render its applicability to the PRC largely
incorrect.
14.

Feeney, supra note 12, at 819.

15.

g.

16.

~Three

17.

Guojifa, supra note 2, Chapter 4:
Wang Xuan, Guojia lintu
(National territory), pp. 135-62.
LENG AND CHIU, supra
note 1, at 244-45; HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 72-77; YAHUDA,
supra note 6, at 264; See generally, COHEN AND CHIU, supra
note 5, at 106-18; Guojifa ziliao xuanbian (Selected
materials on international law) compiled by Wang Tieya and
Tian Ruxuan (Law Publishing Co., Beijing, 1981).

.World's Speech, supra note 11. See also YAHUDA,
supra note 6, at 241; "Newspapers Note Importance of Three
Tasks for 1980s," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb. 5, 1980), at Ll;
"Huang Hua Addresses UN General Assembly," FBIS-CHI-82-193
(Oct. 5, 1982), at Al.
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18.

The PRC justified its 1979 counterattack against Vietnam
(SRV) on the basis of its right of self-defense.
The counterattack was designed to punish the Vietnamese for their
repeated incursions into Chinese territory.
See, e.g.,
Counterattack in Defense of Our Frontiers, Beijing Review,
No. 8 (Feb. 23, 1979), 3t 9; "Chinese Government Statement
on Counterattack Against SRV," FBIS-CHI-79-036 (Feb. 21,
1979), AT AS.
Cf, "Statement by Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesman," SC~P No. 5975 (Nov. 14, 1975), at 236 (PRC
troops killed members of an Indian patrol who had crossed
into Chinese territory.
Chinese justification was selfdefense).

19.

See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 244.
For China's
refusal to refer the Sino-Indian border conflict to an
international
tribunal, see, "Text of Chinese Foreign
Ministry Note to India," SCMP No. 3081 (Oct. 16, 1963) cited in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1441-42.
But see
Ellis and Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in
the People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 155,
159 n. 22 (No.2, 1981); Cf. "China Daily on Suit Against
U.S. Over Cargo," FBIS-CHI-82-104 (May 28, 1982), at Bl
(PRC demand for cargo compensation caused by u.S. submarine-Japanese freighter collision.
China's CCPIT legal
office presented brief to u.s. Jag Corps).

20.

Ch.inese commentators have consistently insisted that the
United Nations, in exercising its role in the maintenance
of international peace and security, should not intervene
in the internal affairs of other states. in. violation of
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, 59 Stat •. 1031, 3
Bevans 1153 (1945).
S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
WORLD ORDER 411 (1979).
Consistent with this belief, the
PRC objected to the UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) I
General Assembly resolution during the 1956 Suez Crisis as
ultra vires because Article 24 of the UN Charter assigned
the primary responsibility of maintaining international
peace and security to the UN Security Council. 1£., citing
Sun Nam, What is the United Nations Emergency Force?, Shihchieh chi-shih [World Knowledge], No. 24 (Dec. 20, 1956),
at 22.
The PRC has also objected to UN troop deployment in
Korea, Hungary, the Congo [ONUC], Cypress [UNFICYP], Vietnam, Tibet, Hong Kong anq Macao as contraventions of UN
Charter principles.
KIM, supra note 20, at 411.
See also
"UN Extends Mid-east Observer Force; PRC Does Not Vote,•
FBIS-CHI-80-110 (June 5, 1980), at Al; "UN Peacekeeping
Force Extended in Cyprus," FBIS-CHI-80-244 (Dec. 17, 1980),
at A3 (PRC did not vote).
In 1981, however, the PRC for the first time agreed to
help finance UN peace-keeping forces, declaring itself prepared to adopt a more flexible attitude on UN peace-keeping
operations.
See "PRC to Help Finance UN Peac·e-Keeping
Operations," FBIS-cHI-81-238 (Dec. 11, 1981), at. Al; "UN
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Envoy on Support to Peace-Keeping Forces," FBIS-CHI-81-241
(Dec. 16, 1981), at Al.
21.

See, ~~ Struggle for New International Economic Order,
Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 7 (Feb. 13, 1976), at 13;
Struggle for New Code (5th Session of UN Sea Law Conference), Peking (9eijing) Review, No. 32 (Aug. 9, 1976),
at 27; New International Economic Order: An Irrestistible
Historical Trend - Speech by Liu Xiwen, Head of the Chinese
Delegation at UNCTAD V on May 10, Beijing Review, No. 20
(May 18, 1979), at 11; "Issues at Law of Sea Conference in
Geneva Noted," FBIS-CHI-78-088 (May 5, 1978), at Al (supporting sovereignty and security of coastal state); "Xinhua
Reports on Law of Sea Conference Geneva Meeting":
'Opening
Session,' FBIS-CHI-79-056 (March 21, 1979), at Al (supporting international regime to oversee exploitation of the
seabed); "Xinhua Hails Adoption of Law of Sea Convention,"
FBIS-CHI-82-085 (May 3, 1982), at Al.

22.

Two of t!"le more recent Chinese responses to the use of
force by one nation against another concerned the aborted
American rescue attempt of the US hostages in Iran and the
Israeli occupation of Lebanon.
See "PRC Expresses Regret
Over U.S.
Rescue Attempt," FBIS-CHI-80-083
(April 28,
1980), at Al; "Renmin Ribao Commentator's Article," id;
"China Daily Assails Isr:ael's Lebanon Invasion," FoiS-CHI82-114 (June 14, 1982), at I3; "Government Condemns Israel's Invasion of Lebanon," FBIS-CHI-82-116 (June 16,
1982), at Il. See also note 5, supra.

23.

Chinese authorities have enunciated eight principles guiding economic aid to other countries, the second of which is
respect for sovereignty of recipient countries. See Eight
Principles Guidina China's·Economic Aid to Other Countries,
Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 4 (Nov. 25, 1977), at 28.

24.

KIM, supra note 20, at 411.
Because the law regarding the
sovereignty of a state was perceived as so immutable and
the power of a sovereign so superior, attempts to subvert,
dilute or transform sovereignty through such concepts as
"world law" [shijiefa] or "transnational law" [chaoguojifa]
were considered by the Chinese to violate international
law. ~· See also LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 244.

25.

KIM, supra note 20, at 411 citing Chou Keng-sheng, Hsin-tai
ying-mei, pp. 65-66.

26.

Id.

27.

The PRC became a member of the UN world organization on
October 25, 1971.
See 25 UN Y.B. 126 (1971).
See also H.
CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA: -x-cALENDAR OF EVENTS 1966-1980, 213 (1981) [hereafter PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80] •
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28.

See Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist
Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties in CHINA'S PRACTICE: OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW:
SOME: CASE: STUDIES 239-67 (Cohen ed.,
1972).
See also "Hsin Wan Pao Comments on Sino-Soviet
Treaty,• FBIS-CHI-78-242 (Dec. 15, 1978), at Nl (noting
that the USSR-PRC Peace and Friendship Treaty should be
abrogated because of Soviet abuses of it) 1 "Wen Wei Po on
I Unequal
Treaties, I Sovereignty, n FBIS-CHI-82-195 (Oct. 7,
1982), at W3 (noting that the UN Charter and the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties invalidate treaties signed under
duress) 1 "Shaanxi Ribao Discusses Nanj ing Treaty," FBISCHI-82-113 (June 11, 1982) at K9 (denouncing the PRC-UK
treaty - granting the British, in effect, control over Hong
Kong- as unequal).

29.

The Interplay of Wesphalia and Charter Conception of International Legal Order in THE: FUTURE: OF THE: INrE:RNATIONAL
LF;GAL ORDER:
TRENDS AND PATTERNS ( Falk and Black ed.,
1969) cited in KIM, supra note 20, at 410.

30.

KIM, s~pra note 20, at 415. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakla illustrates this rationale. The exercise of absolute
sovereignty
by
the
Soviet
Union
limited
the
sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.
Id., citing Chi Hsiangyang, Smash the New Tsars' Theory of Limited Sovereignty,
Hung-Ch'i (Hongqi), No. 5, pp. 87-90 (1969).

31.

KIM, supra note 20, at 415. See also LE:NG AND CHIU, supra.
note 1, at 244-45.
Cf., YAHUDA, supra note 6, at 2281
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 110.

32.

The five Principles [wuxiang yuanze] were first enunciated
by Jawaharlal Nehru on June 28, 1954.
In China's joint
declaration with Burma on June 29, 1954, these same principles were reaffirmed. The text is found in Kuo-chi kung-fa
ts'an-k'ao wen-chien hsuan-chi (Selected Reference Documents on Public International Law), (Peking Shih-chieh
chih-shih ch'u-pan she, 1958), pp. 2-3.
The five Principles are:
A) mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and
territorial integrity1
B)

non-aggression1

C) non-interference
affairs1

in

each

other's

D)

equality and mutual benefit, and1

E:)

peaceful coexistence.

internal

One of the more succinct and penetrating analyses ·of the
Five Principles is found in LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at
36-77.
See also HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 381 COHEN AND
CHIU, supra note 5, at 1191 YAHUDA, supra note 6, at 22829.
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33. · See generally, "Renmin Ribao Discusses PRC Foreign Policy,"
FBIS-CHI-82-211 (Nov. 1, 1982), at Al (Five Principles
serve
as
cornerstone
of
PRC
relations
with
other
countries).
See also "PRC Establishes Diplomatic Relations
With Portugal";" FBIS-CHI-79-028 (Feb. 8, 1979), at Al2l
"Ireland, PRC Establish Diplomatic Relations," FBIS-CHI-79L24
(June 26,
1979), at Gl1
"PRC,
Ecuador Establish
Diplomatic Relations," FBIS-CHI-79-250 (Dec. 27, 1979), at
Jl1 "PRC, Angola to Establish Diplomatic Relations," FBISCHI-82-188 (Sept. 28, 1980), at 13. Cf. "Diplomatic Relations Established with United States," FBIS-CHI-78-243
(Dec. 18, 1978), at Al (not specifically mentioning the
Five Principles).
Note that the PRC publishes the joint communiques establishing such relations in its treaty collection (tiaoyue
huibian), which seems to give these communiques the same.
force as treaties.
In the United States such communiques
are a form of political declaration only and do not have
the force of law.
34.

KIM, supra note 20, at 414.

See also note 5, supra.

35.

Id. at 414-15.
Note also that the PRC, in its provisional
Civil Procedure Law of 1982, has stated that "cases submitted to China by [a) foreign court <~ill be refused .if they
are incompatible with the sovereignty and security of the
PRC." See Yanling, China's Law of Civil Procedure, Beijing
Review, No. 33 (Aug. 16, 1982), at 22.

36.

KIM, supra note 20, at 415.

37.

Z. ZILE, R. SHARLET AND J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEt4
AHD ARHS INSPECTION:
A CASE STUDY IN POLICY IMPLE14E:rr.\·riON
19 (1972) [hereafter ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE).

38.

See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 199.
For acceptance of
this principle by Soviet juries, see, ~· J. TRISKA AND
R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAWS, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES
S0-52 (1962) cited in id., at 223.
See also L. HENKIN, R.
PUGH, 0. SCHACTER AND-H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-28
(1980).

39.

For an assessment of Chinese attitudes toward the legal
status of the United Nations, the binding force of UN
resolutions and Chinese representation in the world organization, see Chiu, The United Nations in LENG AND CHIU,
supra note l~t 195-242.
See ~ KIM, supra note 20, at
40 5-44.
Cf. HS IUNG, supra note 4, at 24 3.
Note that the
PRC has not acceded to the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, 21 UST 1418, TIAS No.
6900, 1 UNTS 15 (Feb. 13, 1946).
But cf. "Renmin Ribao
Urges Stronger United Nations Role," FBIS-CHI-82-207 (Oct.
26, 1982), at Al.
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40.

PRC publicists perceived a distinction between international legal order and world legal order. .The former was based
on the UN Charter's principles of national sovereignty.
The latter was considered to be an imperialist conspiracy
to remake the Charter into an instrument of a world government under the domination of the United States. KIM, supra
note 20, at 411.
See also K'ung Meng, A Criticism of the
Theories of Bourgeo~International Law Concerning the Subjects of International Law and Recognition of States, Kuochi wen-t' i yen-chiu [Research on International Problems]
No. 2 (Feb. 1960) in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 8899.
See also J. COHEN, CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 33'7(1972).

41.

Accession was deposited on September ll,
AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 27, at 219.

1979.

See

PRC

However, since that the time PRC has not officially
·published any change of position with respect to other
international organizations, nor did it publicize its accession to this Convention. The main thrust of the Convention is its extension of diplomatic privileges to the personnel of certain international organizations.
See TIAS
No. 521, 33 UNTS 261 (Nov. 21, 1947). The PRC's accession
was with respect to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (second revised text of annex II), the International
Civil Aviation Organization (annex III), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (annex IV), The
World Health Organization (third revised text ·of annex
VII), the Universal Postal Union (annex VIII), the International Telecommunication Union
(annex
IX),
the World
Meteorological Organization (annex XI) and the International Maritime Consultative Organization (revised text of annex XII).
See Statement of Treaties and International
Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the
Secretariat During the Month of September 1979, at 510 no.
521, U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.A/391 (1981).
~
also Guoj if a, supra note 2, Chapter 10,
zuzhi (International Organizations), pp. 363-410.

Guoj i

42.

21 UST 1418, TIAS No. 6900, 11 UNTS 15 (Feb. 13, 1946).

43.

See, ~· "PRC Delegate Addresses Secrity Countil on u.s.
Hostages," FBIS-CHI-80-001 (Jan. 2, 1980), at Al (supporting the implementation of the provisions of UN Security
Council Resolution 457 (1979) calling on Iran to release
the hostages); "PRC UN Delegate Supports Resolution Against
USSR," FBIS-CHI-80-005 (Jan. 8, 1980) (reaffirming Afghanistan's sovereignty and demanding the withdrawal of foreign
troops from Afghanistan soil); "Chinese UN Representative
Supports Resolution on Lebanon," FBIS-CHI-80-088 (May 5,
1980), at Al (supporting a Security Council resolution condemning Israeli military intervention in Lebanon); "Chen
Chu Addresses UNSC on I Palestine Question, In FBIS-CHI-80089 (May 6, 1980), at Al (calling for Security Council
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resolutions to support Arabs and Palestinians); "Xinhua
Commentary Praises UN Resolution of Palestine," FBIS-CHI80-149 (July 31, 1980), at Al (supporting a Security Council resolution in favor of Arab rights), "PRC Envoy Raps
South Africa, Supports Sanctions," FBIS-CHI-81-100 (1·1ay 6,
1981), at I4; "Government Condemns Israel's Invasion of
Lebanon," FBIS-CHI-82-116 (June 16, 1982), at Il (calling
on Israel to "abide by the relevant resolutions of the U.N.
Security Council").
Since 1979, the PRC has resorted more frequently to
the practice of applying UN resolutions to Chinese principled stands on aggression and disarmament.
44.

See, ~, "PRC UN Delegate Urges UK to Observe Rhodesian
Agreement," FBIS-CHI-80-024 (Feb. 4, 1980), at Al (urging
the UK to adhere to the London Agreement on peace in Rhodesia); "UN Commission on Human Rights Ends Session," FBISCHI-80-055 (March 19, 1980), at Al (praising UNHCR resolutions condemning the invasions of Afghanistan and Kampuchea); "China's Representation in II~F 'Restored,'" FBISCHI-80-077 (April 21, 1980), at Al; "PRC Representative
Supports UN Resolution on Aid to Kampuchea," FBIS-CHI-80092 (May 9, 1980), at Al (supporting a UNESCO resolution on
aid to Kampuchea); "World Bank Formally Restores China's
Membership," FBIS-CHI-80-098 (May 19, 1980), ·at A3.
Cf.
note 55, infra.
--

45.

See, ~, LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 11.
See also
Chou Keng-sheng, "The Persecution of Chinese Personnel by
Brazilian Coup d'Etat Authority is a Serious International
Illegal Act," Jen-min jih-pao, April 24, 1964 in id., at 27
n. 49.

46.

See O.O.N; Poderzhani Mezhdunarodnovo Mira [United Nations
and Support of International Law] 43-58 (1973) for support
of this principle.

47.

See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 11.
See also Fu Zhu,
Court Trial Violates International t:aW, Beijing Review, No. 11 (March 14, 1983), at 24-27; Guoj ifa, supra
note 2, Chapter 1:
Daoren (Introduction), Section 3, Part
5, p. 33.

u.s.

48.

See id., at 28 n. 51 citing Ying Tiao, Recognize the True
Facts of Bourgeois International Law From a Few Basic Concepts, Kuo-chi wen-t' i yen-chiu (Studies in Interntional
Problems) No. 1, Jan. 6, 1960.

49.

KIM, supra note 20, at 413.
Kim also notes that the PRC
has never nominated a candidate to the court.
Id., at 417.
But cf. "UN Adopts Declaration on Peaceful Settlement,"
FBIS-CHI-82-221 (Nov. 16, 1982), at Al (noting the adoption
of a UNGA resolution calling for, inter alia, the use of
the ICJ as a UN judicial organ, without stating that the
PRC was opposed to the resolution).
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50.

Id., at 417.
D07.

Cf., COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5,

at 1283-

Recently, however, the PRC has shown a greater willingness to participate in numerous international conferences.
The Chinese have attended, inter alia, the UN Congress on Crime Prevention, the Belgradeworld Law Conference, Geneva Disarmament Committee Talks, the UN Disarmament Committee discussion on the UN Refugee Committee's
Work and the Human Rights Commission.
See, ~· "PRC to
Attend UN Congress on Crime Prevention," FBIS-CHI-80-148
(July 30, 1980), at A3; "PRC Official Attends World Law
Conference in Belgrade," FBIS-cHI-80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980),
at A3; "PRC to Participate in UN Geneva Disarmament Talks,"
FBIS-cHI-79-177 (Sept. 10, 1979), at A2; "PRC Attends UN
Conference on Arms Restriction," FBIS-CHI-80-181 (Sept. 16,
1980), at A2; "PRC to Take· Part in Work of Disarmament Committee," FBIS-CHI-79-240 (Dec. 12, 1979), at Al; "PRC UN
Official Addresses Disarmament Committee," FBIS-CHI-80-095
(May 14, 1980), at A6; "PRC Participates in UN Refugee Committee's Nork," FBIS-CHI-79-128 (July 2, 1979), at A3; "PRC
Takes Part in Human Rights Commission l~ork ," FBIS-CHI-820 56 (March 2 3, 1 9 8 2 ) , at Al.
5:!..

KIM, supra note 20, at 417.
But cf. "PRC Reaffirms Support
of Sali!ll in UN Stalemate," FBIS-CHI-81-232 (Dec. 3, 1981),
at Al (reaffirming support for Tanzanian Foreign Minister
Salim for UN Secretary General).

52.

For the statute of the ICJ, see 3 Bevans 1179 (1945).
The
PRC, as a member of the United Nations, is ipso facto a
party to the Statute of the ICJ.
However, about a year
after the PRC became a UN member, it asserted its right
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, not to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
See Kim, su~ note
20, at 418.
Since 1972, the PRC has included
reservations to a variety of international agreements and
conventions it has acceded to, refusing to accept ICJ
jurisdiction over disputes arising thereunder.

53.

See KIM, supra note 20, at 457-62.

54.

Id., at 437-44.
See "Special Committee Discusses Revision
of UN Charter," FBIS-CHI-78-060 (March 28, 1978), at Al;
"Third World Scores Opposition to Revision of UN Charter,"
FBIS-cHI-78-209 (Oct. 27, 1978), at Al.
In both of these
examples, the PRC supported Third World demands for revision of the Charter to reflect the changing world situation.
Review of UN Charter - An Irreversible Trend, Peking
(Beijing) Review, No. 13 (March 26, 1976), at 21 (noting
that revision is reasonable in order to promote equality
among nations and destroy the privileged positions of the
superpowers) particularly with respect to the use of the
veto.
See also "Xinhua Sees Soviet Isolation in Using UN
Veto," FBIS-CHI-80 020 (Jan. 29, 1980), at Al; "NCNA Reports Deliberation on Composition of UN Organs," FBIS-cHI- 72 -

77-241 (Dec. 15, 1977), at A2; "A Mantis Can Never Stop a
Cart,• SCMP No. 5776 (Jan. 6, 1975), at 26.
55.

The Chinese position on international terrorism is a function of its role as vanguard of the Third World.
Though
the PRC objected explicitly to what it termed "adventurist
and terrorist acts," it also noted that imperialists,
Zionists, et al. often incorrectly brand legitimate international revolutionary movements as terror1sm.
See China's
Stand on International Convention Against Taking-Hostages,
Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 50 (Dec. 10, 1976), at 32.
See also Aerial Hijacking Condemned. Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 48 (Nov. 25, 1977), at 29 (supporting a UN
resolution condemning the threat or use of force against
aircraft or passengers but declaring reservations on parts
of the resolution referring to conventions ratified by the
"Chiang Clique" without formal PRC adherence); "PRC Joins
International Antihijacking Convention,"
FBIS-CHI-78-241
(Dec. 14, 1978), at A2; "UN Political ·committee Condemns
Aerial Hijacking," FBIS-cHI-77-213 (Nov. 4, 1977), at A2.
But see "Teng Hsiaoping Meets French Newspaper Delegation,"
FBIS=cHI-77-206 (Oct. 26, 1977), at Al4 (Teng comments condemning all terrorist acts as "anti-revolutionary and antiMarxist.")

56.

In 1981, the General Assembly enlarged the International
Law Commission from 25 to 34 members.
The PRC, for the
first time, nominated a member, Zhengyu Ni. He was elected
on Nov. 23, 1981 for a one-year term beginning Jan. 1,
1982.
See Law Commission Enlarged From 25 to 34 Members,
19 U.N. CHRONICLE 40 (No. 1, Jan. 1982).

57.

KIM, supra note 20, at 418-19.

58.

The Conferences were:
a)

The UN Conference on Prescription (Limitation)
in the International Sale of Goods (1974);

b)

The· UN Conference on the Representation of
States in Their Relations With International
Organizations (1975);

c)

The UN Conference on Plenipotentiaries on Territorial Asylum (1977);

d)

The UN Conference on Succession of States
Respect of Treaties (1977); and,

e)

The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict (1975-77 sessions). Id., at 419.
But~ note 50, supra.
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59.

The PRC is notorious for the publication of articles referring to violations of "well-known" international law principles, though the PRC itself never formally acknowledges
the existence of such principles.
For a case in point, see
· "PRC Delegate Addresses Security Council on U.S. Hostage~
FBIS-CHI-80-001 (Jan. 2, 1980), at Al (referring to the
principles of • • • "accepted diplomatic immunities"). Cf.
"International Law Research to be Strengthened," FBIS-CHI80-025 (Feb. 5, 1980), at LlO (calling for development of
PRC international law theory on basis of its "experience in
the international arena").

60.

The PRC has recently expressed its concern for strengthening education of international law. See "International Law
Research to be Strengthened," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb.
5,
1980), at LS; "International Law Society Founded," FBISchi-80-026 (Feb. 6, 1980), at L2.
Previous leading journals on international law and politics, including Guoji
wenti yanjiu [Journal of International Studies] and Shijie
zhishi [World Knowledge], which ceased publication as a
result of the Cultural Revolution, have recently resumed
publication. The publication of World Knowledge resumed in
1980; the Journal of International Studies in 1981.
See
also note 258 infra.
-With the enactment of several funda:ner.tal legal codes
and media coverage of domestic crime and international
events, Chinese legal consciousness has been enhanced.
Previously non-existent legal associations and a renewed
enthusiasm for legal training have recently surfaced.
See,
~,Lawyer's Association Set Up, Peking (Beijing) Review,
No. 21 (May 25, 1979), at 7 {providing legal advice and
representation in civil and criminal cases and foreign
trade and maritime disputes); Training Personnel in Political Science and Law, Beijing Review, No. 23 (June 8, 1979),
at 6; More Legal Advisory Offices in Beijing, Beijing Review, No. 7 (Feb. 16, 1981), at 4; China's Lawyers, Beijing
Review, No. 23 (June 7, 1982), at 14; "PRC Adopts 8-Year
Plan for Study of Law," FBIS-CHI-79-065 (April 3, 1979), at
L8; "Chinese Schools Training More Students in Politics,
Law," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at Ll8; "Beijing
Lawyers' Association Formed:
To Provide Legal Advice,"
FBIS-(HI-79-096
(May 16,
1979),
at
R2;
"Tianj in Law
School," FBIS-CHI -79-14 3 (July 24, 197 9) , at R3; "Tianj in
Municipality Establishes Law
Society,"
FBIS-CHI-79-145
(July 26, 1979), at Rl; "Northwest Political Law College,"
FBIS-cHI-79-165 (Aug. 23, 1979), at T3; "Beijing Lawyers
Prepare for Codes Taking Effect in January," FBIS-CHI-79173 (Sept. 5, 1979), at LS; "Fujian Law Conference," FBISCHI-79-204 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 08; "Jiang Hua Speaks at
Reopening of Beijing Law Institute," FBIS-CHI-79-208 (Oct.
25, 1979), at Rl; "PLA Revives Military Courts, Procuratorates," FBIS-CHI-78-237 (Dec. 8, 1978), at E21; "Harbin
Reopens Legal Office," FBIS-CHI-80-013 (Jan. 18, 1980), at
52; "Yunnan PLA Units Organize Legal Training Course,"
FBIS-cHI-80-015
(Jan.
22,
1980), at QS;
"Heilongjiang
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Counties Legal Service," FBIS-CHI-80-022 (Jan. 31, 1980),
at 53; "Justice Ministry Announces Plans to Train More
Lawyers," FBIS-CHI-80-101 (May 22, 1980), at L5; "Chinese
Judicial Weekly,", FBIS-CHI-80-121 (June 20, 1980), at Ll4;
"Course on Patent Law," FBIS-CHI-81-040 (March 2, 1981), at
A2; "Legal Consultants Office Set Up in Beijing," FBIS-CHI82-072 (April 14, 1982), at Kl7; "Xinhua Discusses Role of
Lawyers in Beijing," FBIS-CHI-82-077 (April 21, 1982), at
Rl; "Shenzhen Legal Advisory Department," FBIS-CHI-82-104
(May 28, 1982), at P4; "Sino-U.S. La•,o~ Symposium Held in
Beijing 8-13 June", FBIS-CHI-82-123 (June 25, 1982), at Bl;
"Inaugural Meeting of Science of Law Society Opens," FBISCHI-82-142 (July 23, 1982), at Kl.
These acts, coupled with China's official pronouncements on the establishment of an international law society
and China's increasing contacts with foreign governments on
issues of trade and law, generate optimism among lie stern
scholars that more formal publications on China's official
stance on international law issues will appear.
Recent PRC
editorials on international law appeared in Xinhua yuebao,
June 1980.
See especially Wang Tieai, Guojifa dangjinde
dongxiang [Trend of Today' s International Law], at 13.
Translation by author.
See also Guanyu xiandai guojifa
dingyi wenti, ~note 2.
61.

Jessup and Lauterpacht are two of the more notable "monist"
theory proponents.
See Ogden, supra note 3, at 326.

62.

Id. at 327.

63.

..!.£.,

citing K'ung Meng, A Criticism of tbe Theories of
Capitalist International Law on Elitist Entities and the
Recognition of States, Kuo-chi-wen t ' i yen-chiu; No. 2
(Feb. 3, 1960), at 44-53.
Note, however, that the PRC has rather actively promoted the work of the UN High Commission on Refugees
(UNHCR) in recent months and has supported the distribution
of relief material by UN personnel -- at least in Kampuchea
-- as a result of alleged Vietnamese (SRV) human rights
violations.
See, ~, "China, Cambodia Condemn SRV at UN
Human Rights Session," FBIS-cHI-79-052 (March 15, 1979), at
Al3;
"PRC UN Representative Gives Statement on Human
Rights," FBIS-cHI-79-208 (Oct. 25, 1979), at A2; "UN Pledging Conference Urges Aid to Kampuchea," FBIS-CHI-79-216
(Nov. 6, 1979), at E4; "PRC UN Delegate Condemns SRV for
Creating Refugee Issue,• FBIS-cHI-79-221 (Nov. 14, 1979),
at A2; "UN Commiss~on on Human Rights Ends Session," FBISCHI-80-055 (March 19, 1980),· at Al; "PRC Takes Part in Human Rights Commission Work," FBIS-CHI-82-056 (March 23,
1982), at Al.

64.

KIM, supra note 20, at 406.
Hungdah Chiu and Douglas Johnston used over 80 sources in a dozen languages to compile
their work.
D. JOHNSTON AND H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1967:
[hereafter JOHNSTON AND CHIU).

A CALENDAR

(1968)

65.

KIM, suora note 20, at 406.
See also Pye, suora note 13.
See ~ally J. TOWNSEND, POLITICS IN Cii'INA 289-337
(1980).

66.

See Chiu, Communist China's Attitude Toward International
Law, 60 AJIL 245, 259 n. 55 (April 1966).
See also LENG
AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 10; HSIUNG, supra ~ ~t 22.
In particular, Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ
refers to international conventions, international custom,
general principles of law and the teachings of highly
qualified publicists as sources of international law.
See
Art. 38, I(a)-(d) of the Statute of the ICJ, supra note~

67. · LENG AND CHIU, supra note ·1, at 10.
law anthology was recently published
1983. See Guojifa, supra note 2.

A new international
by the PRC in early

68.

HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 27 citing Chen T'i-ch'iang,
Tawain-A Chinese Territory, Review of Contemporary Law
(Brussels), No. 5 (1956), at 38-44.

59.

LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 5.
note 66, at 251.

70.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, suora

71.

One school subscribes to the view that there are two systems of international relations, bourgeois and socialist,
and, therefore, two systems of international law. The adherents of a second school of thought contend that a single
system of international law exists which is binding on both
bourgeois and socialist countries. The third and apparently strongest school holds that there is a general international 1 aw over and above, as well as d ist inc t from, the
bourgeois legal system.
See HSIUNG, supra note· 4, at 1718.

~ote

~

also Chiu,

~

37, at 20.

At least one other scholar pointed out that the
Shanghai Law Association in 1958 considered the possibility
of three systems -- socialist, bourgeois and general.
See
Chiu, International Law and a Universal System in LENG AND
CHIU, supra note 1, at a. ~ ~ Chiu, supra note 66, at
256; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 42-46.
72.

HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 16 citing Chou-Fu-lun, An Inquiry
Into the Nature of Modern International Law, Chiao-hsueh yu
yen-chiu [Teaching and Research) No. 3, 1958, at 52.
The
Chinese conception of international law is probably best
exemplified by Zhou Fu-lun's passage:
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International law, in addition to being a body of
principles and norms which must be observed by every country is also, just as any law, a political instrument;
whether a country is socialist or capitalist, it will to a
certain degree utilize international law in implementing
its foreign policy.
See also Goujifa dangjinde dongxiano,
Cf. Onuf, International Legal Order as an
244, 254-56 (No. 2, April 1979).

~note

Idea,

60.
73 AJIL

For a discussion of the evolution and politicalization
of another contemporary issue, see "Renmin Ribao Examines
Issue on Human Rights," FBIS-CHI-82-072 {April 14, 1982),
at Kl4.
73.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 19.
Cohen and
Chiu perceived the Soviet attitude towards custom to be
somewhat more flexible than Zile, Sharlet and Love indicated.
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 77.
See also K.
GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DOCTRINE AND
DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (1977).

74.

Chiang Yang, "The Reactionary Thought of 'Universalism' in
American Jurisprudence," Jen-min jih-pao (Dec. 17, 1963),
at 5 in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 902 n. 15.

75.

The Chinese have used such euphemisms as "principles of
international law and humanitarianism" and "standards of
international law and dignity and justice."
COHE~
AND
CHIU, supra note 5, at 78.
More recently, the Chinese have
employed the phrase "customary international
. practice" in referring to diplomatic privileges and immunities.
See note 5, suora.
See also Agreement on Trade Rel3tions
Between the Uii'Ited States-of America and the People's
Republic of China, TIAS no. 9630, signed at Beijing, July
7, 1979, Art. I, para. 3; Chiu, China's Legal Position on
Protecting Chinese Residents in Vietnam, 74 AJIL 685, 68589 (1980).
Bu Langli, Guojigongfa yuanli [General Principles of Public International Law) (3d ed., 1979), cited in
Zhongguo guoj ifa niankan [Chinese International Law Yearbook), 1982, pp. 393-95.

76.

Cohen and Chiu cited an incident between Burmese border
guards and Chinese residents.
The PRC accused the Burmese
of departing from "historical
factors and
traditional custom."
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 78.
Cf. note 5, supra, espcially SRV infringements on Chinese
sovereignty over the Hsisha (Xisha) and Nansha Islands.

77.

LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 10 citing Wei Liang, On the
Post Second World War International Treaties 1953-55, Kuochi t'iao-yueh chi [International Treaty Series) 1961, at
660.
See also Guojifa, supra note 2, Chapter 9, Wei Min,
Tiaoyue [Treaty Law), pp. 319-62.

- 77 -

78.

HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 27.

79.

Id.
See also Wei Liang, supra
note 77;. Guojifa, supra
note ~Chapter 9, Wei Min, Tiaoyue [Treaty Law), pp. 31962.

80.

LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 244.

81.

This quantity reflects the number of treaties included in
Professor Hungdah Chiu' s study.
See PRC AGREEMENTS 196680, supra note 27.

Cf. note 72, supra.

Scott included 1660 treaties in his study, 41 pecent
of which were concluded in the trade category.
See SCOTT,
supra note 4, at 253.
The number of treaties concluded by
the PRC in the trade area constitutes a political barometer
of the present importance of economic development in the
PRC.
82.

See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1109-1282,
esp. 1239-54; L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE (1969).
See also SCOTT, supra note
4, at 253.
Cf., "Renmin Ribao Refutes USSR Statement on
Sino-Soviet Treaty,• FBIS-cHI-79-075 (April 17, 1979), at
Cl (PRC has sovereign right to terminate treaty in view of
changed circumstances [rebus sic stantibus) and in accordance with provisions of the treaty).

83.

LEE, supra note 82, at 61; SCOTT, supra
Cf., HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 276-84.

84.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 253.

85.

Id., at 254.

86.

.!.£. ,

87.

In 1963, the U.S. State Department charged the PRC with.
violations of a number of treaties, including the 1953
Korean Armistice Agreement, the April 29, 1953 and October
14, 1954 PRC-Indian trade agreements and the 1955 Agreed
Measures Announcement between the United States and PRC
regarding the repatriation of civilians.
Id., at 36.
~
also HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 276-84.

note 4,

at

253.

at 9 0.

The Soviet Union continues to charge the Chinese with
treaty violations and other violations of international
law. One recent example of Moscow's reaction was the Chinese abrogation of the Sino-Soviet Peace and Friendship
Treaty.
See, What Reason is There for Moscow to Fly Into a
Rage?, Beij1ng Review, No. 16 (April 20, 1979), at 8; "Renmin Ribao Refutes USSR Statement on Sino-Soviet Treaty ,•
FBIS-cHI~79-075 (April 17, 1979), at Cl.
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88.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 90. · the "perpetual use, occupation
and control," of the Panama Canal was condemned as a usurpation of Panamanian sovereignty over the zone.
Thus, the
1903 U.S.-Panama Treaty was viewed as unequal.
See New
Canal Treaty - Panamanian People's Victory, Peking(i3ei)ing) Review, Nos. 37-38 (Sept. 13, 1977), at 34.

89.

See SCOTT, supra note 4, at 90.
The twin themes of coercion and exploitation have recently been cited in PRC articles addressing the British control over Hong Kong during
PRC-UK negotiations on the status of Hong Kong after 1997.
See, ~, "Shaanxi Ribao Discusses Nanjing Treaty," FBISCHI-82-113 (June 11, 1982), at K9.

90.

or Economic

91.

H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF
TREATIES 68 (1972) [hereafter cited as CHIU].
See also
SCOTT, supra note 4, at 94.

92.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 94.

93.

~.,

94.

See A Nuclear Fraud Jointly Hatched by the United States
and the Soviet Union, Peking (Beijing) Review (June 21,
1968), at 5.
See generally Part I, Chapter 2(3)4, infra on
the Chinese attitude on disarmament.

95.

See notes 32 and 33, supra.
Cf.
COMMlmiST CHINA NEGOTIATES (1968).

96.

KIM, supra note 20, at 426.
Kim notes that Chinese acceptance of multilateral agreements and UN multilateral treaties has been minimal.
See especially id., at 421-25.
Within the last three years, however, the PRC has ratified
numerous conventions.
See. ~, PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80,
supra note 27, at 213-21.
See also "PRC Joins International Hijacking Convention," FBIS-cHI-78-241 (Dec. 14, 1978),
at A2; "PRC Sign UN Convention on Discrimination Against
Women," FBIS-CHI-80-140 (July 18, 1980), at Al; "Ling Qing
Signs UN Accord on Conventional Weapons," FBIS-CHI-81-179
(Sept. 16, 1981), at Al; "Further on NPC Standing Committee
Session:
Weapons Convention Resolution," FBIS-cHI-82-046
(March 9, 1982), at K8; "Renmin Ribao on Refugee-Status
Pact, Protocol," FBIS-cHI-82-170 (Sept. 1, 1982), at Al
(PRC ratified UN "Pact on Refugee Status" and "Protocol on
Refugee Status").

97.

KIM, supra note 20, at 421-25.

98.

Id., at 426.

See Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political
Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties in 8
INT'L LEGAL MAT'S. 733 (1969), Annex to Final Act of Law of
Treaties Conference, A/CONF. 39/26, May 23, 1969.

at 93.

See also note 4, supra.
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generally A.

LALL,

HCW

99.

Id., at 427.
Kim also notes that the PRC has promptly
ratified amendatory protocols to convention or consti tutions of specialized agencies and the Amendment to Article
61 of the UN Charter, all of which are designed to increase
the representation in limited membership organizations.
Id.

100.

g.,

101.

COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1230-38.

102.

Jih-pen wen-t'i wen-chien hui-pien [Collection of Documents
on the Problem of Japan] (1948), at 125 cited in LENG AND
CHIU, supra note 1, at 12.
See also Chiu, supra note 66,
at 260.

103.

See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 12.
The 1955 SinoIndonesia Dual Nationality Treaty is cited as one example
of what is included in the compilation.
See id.
See also
Guojifa, supra note 2, Chapter 1:
Daorei1(Introduction),
Section 5, pp. 42-7.
Note that there is a recent publication of major treaties, General Assembly resolutions and
international agreements,· some of which the PRC is a party
to, that can now be found in a separate international law
text entitled Guojifa ziliao xuanbian, supra note 17, which
includes Chinese texts of 88 major documents.

104.

The 1982 PRC Constitution was adopted on Dec. 4, 1982 to
replace the 1978 Constitution.
The 1978 Constitution had
60 articles; its successor has 138.
See "Text of New PRC
Constitution Published," FBIS-cHI-82-2:rs--(Dec. 7, 1982), at
Kl-28 [hereafter 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION].
For the Chinese
text, see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa, Renmin ribao
(People' S· Daily), Dec. 6, 1982, p.l.

105.

at 431.

COHEN AND CHIU, supra

note 5, at 1230-38.

See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1977 (Hazard trans.) in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Vol. VIII, Blaustein and Franz ed.
1978).

~October 7,

The text of the provision reads as follows:
The USSR grants the right of asylum
[pravo ubezhitsa] to foreigners persecuted or defending the interests of
the working people and the cause for
peace, for participation in the revolutionary and
national
1 iberation
movement, [or] for progressive social,
political, scientific, or· other creative activity.
Compare the superseded 1978 Chinese Constitutional
provision (Art. 59); "The People's Republic of China grants
residence [ jul iu] to any foreign national persecuted for
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supporting a just cause, for taking part in revolutionary
movements or for engaging in scientific work."
106.

The recently circulated PRC Provisional Civil Procedure Law
contains provisions noting that, in the absence of strict
language to the contrary, any conflict between international treaties and conventions (to which the PRC is a party)
and the Law of Civil Procedure will be resolved in favor of
those international treaties and conventions except where
contractual clauses which specifically designate that China's law will be applied.
Yanling, China's Law of Civil
Procedure. Beijing Review, No. 33 (Aug. 16, 1982), 20 at
22.

107.

See note 5 supra.

108.

The PRC deposited its accession on Nov. 26, 1975 with
reservations concerning "the provisions about nuncios and
the representative of the Holy See in Arts. 14 and 16 and
on the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Art. 37
(regarding the privileges and immunities of service, technical and administrative personnel).
See PRC AGREEMENTS
1966-80, supra note 27, at 217.
See aisoKIM, supra note
20, at 425-26.
For the Convention, see 23 UST 3227, TIAS
No. 7502, 500 UNTS 95 (April 18, 1961-)-.-

109-.

PRC accession was deposited on July 2, 1979.
See PRC
AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 27, at 218.
For the Convention, see 21 UST 77, TIAS No. 7502, 596 UNTS 261 (April 24,
1963).-

110.

See note 41 supra.

111.

KIM, supra note 20, at 423 ..

112.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 113.
Hsiung, supra note 4, at 234.
See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1162-65;
CHIU, supra note 91; G. RHODE and R. WHITLOCK, TREATIES OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1978:
AN ANNOTATED
COMPILATION 1-6 (1980); PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note
27.
Note the problems that would arise by the application
of such a definition to a situation where one party to an
arms control or disarmament agreement is an international
organization, such as a UN special agency.
See generally
H. CHIU, THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO
CONCLUDE TREATIES, AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
TREATIES SO CONCLUDED (1966) [hereafter cited as TREATIES
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS].

113.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 113; HSIUNG, supra
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1163.

114.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 114; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5,
at 1163.

115.

Id.
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note 4, at 234;

116.

Id.

See also HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 234.

117.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 114; HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 234;
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1164.

118.

It is worthy of note that joint communiques have been
published in the official compilation of Chinese treaties
( tiaoyue huibian), which would imply that such communiques
have the force of treaties. See also infra note 149.

119.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 114; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5,
at 1164.
Cf., HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 234.

120.

In his work on international trade treaties, Wang Yao-t' ien
defined treaties as • documents which relate to the establishment, modification, or termination of the sovereign
rights and duties between two or more states."
SCOTT, su~ note 4, at 109 citing Wang Yao-t' ien, Kuo-c.hi mao=¥f
t'iao-yueh ho hsieh-ting (International Trade Treaties and
Agreements) Beijing· (Peking), 1958, at 9.
See also Faxue
Cidian [Law Dictionary], Shanghai, 1980, at 338.
Another author, Wei Liang, defined treaties as "agreement[s] between two or more states which must have received
the unanimous consent of ali contracting parties."
SCOTT,
~note 4, at 109 citing Wei Liang, Looking at the SoCalled McMahon Line From the ViewPoint of International
Law, Kuo-chi wen-t' i yen-chiu (Studies in International
PrOblems), No. 6 Beijing (Peking) 1960, at 46.

121.

In practice, the Chinese have recognized the capacity of
revolutionary groups to conclude treaties and have also
acknowledged semi-official arrangements between a special
agency of the PRC and a similar agency of a foreign country
as having the binding force of treaties.
SCOTT, supra note
4, at 110;· Faxue Cidian [Law Dictionary], Shanghai, 1980,
at 338.
Professor Hungdah Chiu noted that the PRC "does not
seem to exclude international organizations from concluding
treaties."
See CHIU, supra note 91, at 8.
Chiu cited PRC
participation in the International Organization for the
Cooperation O·f Railroads and the Korean Armistice Agreement
with the United Nations Command in Korea as examples supporting his hypothesis.
See also note 41, supra, on Chinese ratification of the UN Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies; TREATIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 112.
But see SCOTT,
supra note 4, at 112.

122.

For example, the PRC, before joining the International
Hijacking Convention, expressed its opposition to civil
aircraft hijackings in a UN General Assembly resolution.
The PRC noted that it had reservations on the positions of
the resolution dealing with the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal
Conventions on aerial hijacking since they had been nsigned
- 82 -

and ratified by the Chiang clique by usurping the name of
'China.'"
See "UN Political Committee Condemns Aerial
Hijacking," FBIS-CHI-77-213 (Nov. 4, 1977), at A2.
123.

See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1112.
the treaty, see 8 INT'L L. MATS. 679-727.

124.

See note 81 supra and accompanying text.

125.

The present general tasks for the PRC include making China
a great and powerful socialist country by the twenty-first
century by completing four moderniza.tions in agriculture,
industry, national defense, and sc1ence and technology.
See the preamble to the 1982 CONSTITUTION, supra note 104.
Cf.,
"AFP:
Teng Says PRC to Buy '.-Teapons Technology
Abroad," FBIS-cHI-77-196 (Oct. 11, 1977), at A6.

126.

See SCOTT, supra note 4, at 237.

127.

1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Arts.

128.

The most recent example of the treaty abrogation process is
illustrated by the St"anding Committee's abrogation of the
1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.
See "NPC Abrogates
1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty," FBIS-CHI-79-065 (April
3, 1979), at Cl.
See also "Huang Hua on Abrogation," FBISCHI-79-064 (April ~1979), at C2.

129.

1982 PRC CONSTITUTION,

130.

See 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 89(9).

131.

See SCOTT, supra note
note 4 , at 2 3 7.

132.

1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 67(13).
See
also "Decisions Announced at Fifth NPC Standing Committee
Session," FBIS-CHI-79-180 (Sept. 14, 1979), at Ll; "NPC
Standing Committee Makes Appointments, Concludes Session,"
FBIS-cHI-78-162 (Aug. 21, 1978), at E4.

133.

See HSIUNG, supra note 4,
122.

134.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 123.

135.

This procedure is outlined in id., at 124.
Scott noted,
though, that at the time of thepublication of his work,
the current. (post-Cultural Revolution) ratification process
was in doubt, largely because the Chinese had not ratified
any multilateral treaties through formally publicized procedures.
However, since the enactment of the 1978 PRC Constitution, there have been numerous examples of published
reports on ratification, including the procedure and the
relevant organs involved.
See, ~· "NPC Ratifies Treaty
With Japan, Accord With Romania," FBIS-cHI-78-160 (Aug. 17,

~

4,

For the text of

57, 67(14).

note 104, A.rt. 85.

at 122.

at 237;
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See also HSIUNG,

SCOTT,

supra

supra note 4,

at

1978), at Al; "NPC Approves Cooperation Agreement with
Romania," FBIS-cHI-78-160 (Aug. 17, 1978), at All; "NPC
Abrogates 1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty:
Official
Notification," FBIS-cHI-79-065 (April 3, 1979), at Cl.
See
also "Kyodo:
NPC Meeting Discusses Status of Sino-Soviet
Treaty:
Huang Hua on Abrogation," FBIS-CHI-79-064 (April
2, 1979), at C2; "Tanjung Reports PRC Revokes Fr iendshp
Treaty with USSR," FBIS-CHI-79-064 (April 2, 1979), at C3;
"Wanhu Presides at NPC Meeting Abrogating Sino-Soviet
Treaty," FBIS-cHI-79-066 (April 4, 1979), at Ll; "Renmin
Ribao Refutes RUUS Statement on Sino-soviet Treaty,• FBISCHI-79-075 (April 17, 1979), at Cl; "Ta Kung Pao on Expiration of Sino-Soviet Treaty," FBIS-cHI-80-072 (April 11,
1980), at U2; "Wen Wei Po on Expiration of Sino-Soviet
Friendship Treaty," FBIS-cHI-80-073 (April 14, 1980), at
Ul.
In these instances -- the ratification of the Japanese
treaty and the Romanian accord and the abrogation of the
Sino-Soviet Treaty -- the NPC Standing Committee submitted
its decision on the treaty to the entire NPC for formal
action.
There were no indications that the State Council
played any role in this procedure, despite the 1982 PRC
Constitutional grant of power to the State Council to "submit proposals on laws and other matters to the National
People's Congress or its Standing Committee" (Art. 32(2)).
Though the State Council's role in the ratification process
cannot be dismissed out of hand, present indications suggest a de minimis role for the executive organ in treaty
ratification or abrogation.
136., The PRC recently acceded to the UN Convention Restricting
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and to UN protocols
regarding refugees.
See note 96, ~·
The PRC has also
acceded to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
See "Fifth NPC
Standing Committee Reportage Continues:
UNConvention on
Women," FBIS-cHI-80-191 (Sept. 30, 1980), at Al; "PRC Signs
UN Convention on Discrimination Against Women," FBIS-cHI80-140 (July 18, 1980), at Al; Guojifa ziliao xuanbian,
supra note 17, No. 37.
Previously the ·PRC acceded to the
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft.
See "PRC Joins International
Hijacking Convention," FBIS-cHI-78-241 (Dec. 14, 1978), at
A2. ~ also SCOTT, supra note 4, at 125; HSIUNG, supra
note 4, at 239; COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 1202.
137.

See, ~· "Peking Joins International Hijacking Convention," FBIS-cHI-78-241 (Dec. 14, 1978), at A2; "Further on
NPC Standing Committee Session: Weapons Convention Resolution," FBIS-cHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at K8.
See also
HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 239.
--- ----

138.

~

HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 239, citing the PRC reservation to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention Relating to
POWs.
More recently, the PRC expressed its reservation as
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to Sec. 1, Art. 29 of the UN Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 136. ~ also
note 122, supra.
139.

HSIUNG, supra note 4, at 239.

14 0.

Id.

141.

SCOTT, supra note 4, at 132.

142.

The composition of the arbitral tribunals has varied with
the treaties the PRC is party to.
In some agreements, the
arbitrators must be citizens from the nation party to the
treaty; in others, they must be citizens of the country in
which the arbitration takes place.
In rare instances,
arbitrators may be nationals ·of a third country if the contracting parties can so agree. 1£., at 133.

143.

Id., at 132.

144.

The Soviet doctrine holds thai: treaties and national law
are legal categories of different legal systems.
Treaty
and municipal law have equal juridical force and are interconnected.
See
Mironov,
Sootnoshenie
Mezhdunarodnovo
Dogovora i Vn'ii't'rigosudarstvennovo Zakona (The Relationship
of International Tresties and Municipal Law) 1963 SOV!ET
Y.B. INT'L LAW 157-58 (1965).

145.

See LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 12. But cf. Article 46
of the UN Convention on Privileges, supra note 41, which
reads:
"It is understood that, when an instrument of accession or a subsequent notificaton is deposited on behalf
of any State, this State will be in a position under its
own law to give effect to the terms of the Convention . • •

ff.,

KIM, supra note 20, at 417-18.

n

146.

COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 10 5.
The most recent
published Chinese compilation of domestic laws and decrees,
Gong an fagui huibian [COLLECTION OF PUBLIC SECURITY LAWS],
printed by the Commission on the Study of Policy and Law,
Department of-Public Security, Beijing (1980) did not contain any such treaty.
The 1980 volume, however, does not
appear to be in tended to supersede preceding volumes and
past compilations are, therefore, still valid.

147.

See Article 17 of the Act Regulating the Entry, Exit, TranSlt, Residence, and Travel of Foreign Nationals, promulgated by the State Council on April 13, 1964, cited in
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 510-13.
-------

148.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, U.N. DOC. A/
CONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L. L. MATS.
679-727.
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149.

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
id., states, inter alia:
"A party may not invoke the provisions of itsinternal law as justifications for its
failure to perform a treaty." Since the PRC is not a party
to the Convention, it is not bound by this provision. ~
cf.
"Legality of u.s. Arms Sales to Taiwan Questioned,"
FBIS-cHI-82-025 (Feb. 5, 1982), at Bl (noting that, with
respect to the Taiwan Relations Act of the United States as
interfering with PRC sovereignty:
"a state cannot plead
its own law as an excuse for noncompliance with international law. There is not the slightest doubt on this point
among various nations and international lawyers.")
Note,
though, that the PRC adheres to many principles which have
become embodied in the Convention.
By not ratifying it,
the PRC may pick and choose from among those provisions it
may consider innocuous at any particular time.
Recently, the Chinese exhibited the kind of selective
behavior that created a lack of predictability in the
international legal community. Chinese jurists accused the
United States of violating international law on the basis
that the Taiwan Relations Act (a U.S. statute permitting
quasi-official recognition of Taiwan) contravenes the usPRC Joint Communique, which the Chinese consider to have
the legal force of treaty law.
As such, the Taiwan Rela.tions Act violates Article 27 of the Vienna Convention.
The United States, moreoever, is also not a party to the
·Convention.
Whether Chinese jurists were simply mistaken
as to the application of the Convention to a non-party, or
made their assertions on the grounds that the Convention
codified customary practice and was therefore binding on
nonmembers (although ths argument would bind the PRC as
well), is unkown.

150.

Article 100, of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104,
grants local people's congresses the right to "adopt local
regulations" as long as these local regulations do not conflict with the Constitution, laws, decrees and administrative orders.

151.

At the Second Session of the Fifth NPC o.n July 1, 1979, the
PRC adopted the Organic Law for Local Congresses and
Governments1 the Organic Law for People's Courts [hereafter
ORGANIC COURT LAW]1 and, the Organic Law for People's Procuratorates [hereafter ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAii].
All
laws entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980. For the Court and
Procuratorate laws, see Gongan faqui huibian, supra note
146, at 449-57, 458-~ For the English texts, see "Seven
PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-cHI-79146 (July 27, 1979) PART I:
Supp. No. 019.

152.

~

153.

U.S. CONST.·, art. VI, para. 2 states:
"This Constitution
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof1 and all Trea"ties made, or which shall be

note 82 supra.

- 86 -

made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land • • • • " The 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Article 5 states:
"No law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene the constitution."
154.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 27.

155.

In this regard, one might note that the NPC is supposed to
meet only once a year.
See Article 61 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104.

156.

See "NPC Session Presidium Holds Fourth Meeting 9 Sept.:
Article 45 Revision," FBIS-CHI-80-177 (Sept. 10, 1980), at
Ll.

157.

See generally "Further Coverage of 12th CPC National Congress:
Text of Constitution," FBIS-cHI-82-175 (Sept. 9,
1982), at Kl-19, [hereafter CCP CONSTITUTION], esp. Art.
30.

158.

Id., Art.

159.

Id., Art. 39 •. Artice 39 actually lists 5 measures of Party
discipline in order of severity:
warnings, serious warnings, removal from posts, probation, and expulsion.

160.

The significance of expulsion from the CCP is indicated
both by the volume of press coverage accorded such Party
sanctions and the use of rather vitriolic language denounc~
ing the activities of such CCP cadres.
See, ~· "Anhwei
CCP Committee Punishes Errant County Officials," FBIS-CHI78-177 (Sept. 12, 1978), at Gl (expelling a number of people from their posts for forgery and their resort to torture against others): "Yunnan Rally Reveals Case of Stolen
Party, State Secrets," FBIS-CHI-78-94 (May 15, 1978), at J3
(condemning the "grave crimes" of four Chinese Party cadres
for "stealing and revealing Party and state secrets"):
"Reportage, Comment on Dismissal of Luta Officials," FBISCHI-78-70 (April 11, 1978), at El (expelling Luta officials
who embezzled money and acted "in chorus with the gang of
four"):
"State
Council
Military
Commission
Decision
Punishes Luta Officials," FBIS-cHI-78-067 (April 6, 1978),
at E2:
"Hangchow CCP Exposes
Incident of TV-Selling
'Through Back Door,'" FBIS-cHI-78-064 (April 3, 1978), at
Gl (punishing cadres who sold TV sets to special customers
at "special" prices, leaving only a few sets to sell to the
public through normal distribution channels) •
See also
"Zhejiang Reopens Case, Dismisses Former City Officials,"
FBIS-cHI-80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980), at 06: "Liaoning Education
Worker Punished for Violating Discipline," FBIS-cHI-79-164
(Aug. 22, 1979), at 57; "Renmin Riabao Stresses Discipline
for Cadres,• FBIS-cHI-81-172 (Sept. 4, 1981), at K7; "Zhang
Yun Article on Punishing Corrupt Officials," FBIS-cHI-82062 (March 31, 1982), at K2; "Chemical Vice Minister Yang
Yibang Punished ,• FBIS-cHI-82-145 (July 28, 1982), at K4

3.
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(expulsion of Yang for "illegal activities"); "Eliminating
CPC 's Degenerate Elements Stressed," FBIS-cHI-82-156 (Aug.
12, 1982), at Kl; "Ming Pao: CPC to Expel 2 Million Members," FBIS-cHI-82-193 (Oct. 3, 1982), at W4.
More often than ·not, cadre acts considered marginally
undesirable are subjected to probation from the CCP and to
various forms of criticism; to wit, criticism (piping),
self-criticism
(ziwopiping)
and
mutual
criticism
(huxiangpiping).
See "Private Interests Criticized
in
Zhejiang Fraud Case," FBIS-cHI-80-204 (Oct. 19, 1979), at
07; "Newspapers Stress Need for Crticism, Self-Criticism,"
FBIS-CHI-81-161 (Aug. 20, 1981), at K3; "Renmin Ribao Article on Criticism, Self-Criticism," FBIS-CHI-81-168 (Aug.
31, 1981), at K3; "Radio, Youth Paper on Criticism, SelfCriticism," FBIS-cHI-81-171 (Sept. 3, 1981), at K3; "Tianjin Ribao Stresses Criticism, Self-Criticism," FBIS-CHI-81172 (Sept. 4, 1981), at R4.
161.

See, ~· "State Council-Military Commission Decision
Punishes Luta officials," FBIS-CHI-78-067 (April 6, 1978),
at E2 (noting that Luta Party Secretary Hsuan Shih-ming was
expelled from the CCP and arrested for his part in an embezzlement scheme); "Article Discusses Concealing Criminal
Behavior," FBIS-cHI-82-054 (March 19, 1982), at K8; "Zhang
Yun Article on Punishing Corrupt Officials," FBIS-CHI-82059 (11arch 26, 1982), at K2; "Hennan Arrests 'Political
Swindler' From Shandong," FBIS-CHI-82-070 (April 12, 1982),
at 04; Hsin Wan Pao on Imprisonment of Corrupt Officials,"
FBIS-cHI-82-150 (Aug. 4, 1982), at Rl; "Guangdong's Wang
Zhong Expelled
from Party,"
FBIS-cHI-82-168
(Aug.
30,
1982), at KlO (Wong was expelled from the CCP and arrested
for taking bribes.)

162.

Ching, The Current Political Scene in China, 80 CHINA Q.
691 (Dec. 1979).
Cf. Woodruff, China's development plans
must bear burden of past, Balto. Sun, Nov. 15, 1982, at C7.

163.

The removal of the derogatory labels of "landlords and rich
peasants" by the CCP Central Committee apparently occasioned such resentment.
See id., at 704.
See also "CCP
Central Committee Decide-s-to Remove 'Labels, Designations' ,• FBIS-cHI-79-021 (Jan. 30, 1979), at El.
The labels of "counterrevolutionary" and "bad element" continue
to be connected to criminal activity.

164.

Factionalism is an important element in both the implementation and execution of any CCP pol icy.
One should be
aware, however, that major policies are not susceptible of
intense mass debate and discussion in the PRC because they
are usually formulated in camera by only a small, select
number of CCP officials-=:. those comprising the members of
the Party Politburo and Central Committee.
However, some degree of disenchantment and conflict
has even been made public.
In 1980, NPC deputies passed a
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citizenship bill by a margin of about 3500-1, and four NPC
deputies abstained from voting on the PRC Marriage Law.
SeeP. SHORT, THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR 388 (1982).
165.

TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 294.
See also R.
FROM THE CENTER OF THE EARTH 73-4 (1982).

BERNSTEIN,

166.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 5.
Note, for
instance, a Tokyo-based report that four members of the CCP
Politburo, the most powerful organ of the CCP and, arguably, of the PRC, were dismissed for "grave mistakes."
The
study was not subsequently denied by the Chinese media,
lending credibility to the original report.
See "KYOOO:
Four Politburo Members Dismissed for 'Grave Mistakes',"
FBIS-CHI-80-043 (March 3, 1980), at Ll5.

167.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 6.

168.

See TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 82-176,

289-337.

The role of the CCP in the policy-execution process
was, at least before 1978, considerably more complex and
was interlaced with judicial and procuratorial functions.
In established Chinese practice, local CCP leaders and ad;ninistrative officials often interfered in the legal process.
In fact, a system of criminal justice was implemented, whereby the CCP secretary in charge of politicallegal'affairs at the local committee level was given direct
responsibility for review and approval of judicial decisions.
This sytem, known as shuj ipian ("deciding a case by
the secretary"), was rampant prior to the adoption of the
legal codes in 1979 and, despite PRC press exhortations to
the contrary, is suspected of being in existence even today.
See generally Chiu, Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Criminal Justice System, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN
STUD. No. 1-1981( 38), at 59.
Chiu, China's New Legal System, 79 CURRENT HIST. 29, 45 (No. 458, Sept. 1980); Chiu,
SOCialist Legalism:
Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People's Republic of China, 17 ISSUES AND STUD. 45, 53-55 (No.
11, Nov. 1981) [hereafter Chiu, Socialist Legalism].
See
also Yegorov, Changes in China's State Structure, 4 FAR
EASTERN AFF. 118, 125-26 (1980).
Yegorov noted a Jan. 15,
1979 Guangming Ribao report in which a Party secretary mistakenly wrote the number • eight" when, at the behest of a
local people's court, he was asked to approve a seven-year
sentence handed down to a defendant by that same court.
The Party secretary refused to correct his error, noting
that it was • improper to correct a writ ten resolution.•
Id., at 126. See also Hsia, Sources of Law in the People's
Republic of China:
Recent Developments, 14 INT 'L LAW 25,
29 (no. 1, 1978)[hereafter Hsia, Sources of PRC Law].
A less direct role in the legal process was recently
played by the CCP Central Commi~tee, which organized cadres
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to fan out into areas of local government and help thou..:.
sands of Chinese who were seeking "appeal of previous false
charges" levied before and during the Cultural Revolution.
See,
~'
"Central
Authorities
to
Aid
Beijing
·Petitioners," FBIS-cHI-79-131 (Sept. 17, 1979), at Ll;
"Central Authorities Respond to Beijing Petitioners," FBISC HI -7 9-17 6 (Sept • 10 , 19 7 9 ) , at L 1.
The exercise of concurrent procuratorial and judicial
powers by Party cadres may actually have been imposed by
the 1 anguage of the PRC state constitution then in force
(1954).
Such constitutional language nowhere granted exclusive judicial or procur.atorial power to the judiciary or
procuratorate, respectively.
Nevertheless, just prior to
the promulgation of the 1979 legal codes -- and, ironically, just after the enactment of the 1978 PRC Constitution
-- news articles appeared in which the CCP Central Committee called for the independence of the judicial and procuratorial organs and for the abolition of Party interference
in the legal process. See "CCP Plenum Elects New Politburo
Members, Communique Issued:
CCP Central Committee Communique," FBIS-cHI-73-248 (Dec. 26, 1978), at E4; "Beijing
Ribao Decries Interference in Legal Cases," FBIS-CHI-81-021
(Feb. 2, 1981), at LB.
Note the sequence of events in this instance:
Party
interference in the legal process, constitutiona: revision
requiring procuratorial and judicial independence, and a
CCP directive calling for the
independent exercise of
power.
Only after the last event occure~ was the matter
seriously addressed.
By virtue of such an example, the
omnipotence of the Party appears obvious.
However, the Party directive has not been strictly
followed.
See "Supreme Court President Discusses Legal
System Reforms," FBIS-CHI-80-168 (Aug. 27, 1980), at A7.
See also "Renmin Ribao on Rule by Law, Rule by Man," FBISCHI-81-166 (Aug. 27, 1981), at Kl (supremacy of law is not
fundamental to the PRC for it blindly negates the role of
the CCP and undermines socialism). But see the Preamble to
the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note """T04, which reads:
"This constitution
is the fundamental law of the
state and has supreme legal authority;" "Guangming Ribao on
Party,
Constitution Roles,"
FBIS-CHI-82-142
(July
23,
1982), at K7.
169.

There is, however, an undercurrent of sentiment in the PRC
that the Party be not above reproach.
In accord with the
present PRC policy of equality before the law, radio broadcasts and press articles have appeared which have, at least
ostensibly, rejected the notion of Party privilege.
See,
~,
"Pai Hsing on Arrest of Children of CPC Members,"
FBIS-cHI-82-192 (Oct. 4, 1982), at W3; Discipline Commission on Inner Party Member Privileges," FBIS-CHI-80-204
(Oct. 20, 1980), at L2; "Beijing Denounces Seeking of Special Privileges," FBIS-cHI-80-202 (Oct. 16, 1980),· at Ll;
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"Liaoning Holds Leading Cadres Responsible for Massacre,"
FBIS-cHI-80-183 (Sept. 18, 1980), at 51; "Radio Beijing:
Party Cadres Not Above State Law," FBIS-cHI-80-166 (Aug.
25, 1980), at Ll5; "Yin Fatang Deplores Xizang County Officials' Law Violations," FBIS-CHI-80-159 (Aug. 14, 1980), at
Q2; '"Youth Paper Comments on Sentences of Cadres' Children," FBIS-cHI-80-129 (July 2, 1980), at L6; "Renmin Ribao
Discusses Implementation of Law," FBIS-CHI-79-150 (Aug. 2,
1979), at Ll3.
Accord "Renmin Ribao Stresses Rule of La\~
Over Role of Individual," FBIS-CHI-80-186 (Sept. 23, 1980),
at Ll 7.
The responsiveness of the CCP to democratic principles
was also indicated in an article calling for the abolition
of 1 ifetime tenure for cadres in order to ensure responsible actions on the part of Party leaders. "Renmin Ribao
on Abolishing Lifetime Tenure for Cadres," FBIS-cHI-80-113
(June 10, 1980), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao on Advisory System
for Old Cadres," FBIS-cHI-81-098 (May 21, 1981), at Kl9.
See also Falkenheim, Liberalization and Reform in Chinese
POlitiCs, 79 CURRENT HIST. 33, 45 (No. 458, Sept. 1980).
The purpose of abolishing lifetime tenure is twofold:
it presents to the masses a flexible policy of reassessment
of cadre behavior designed to ensure consensus among Party
members toward evolving Chinese tactics and strategies;
and, it promotes c:ontrol by t:,e Party elite over the Party
bureaucracy by creating the possibility of a more rapid
personnel turnover rate.
In a sense, the call for the
abolition of lifetime tenure is the necessary corollary of
a democratic principle giving Party cadres .the right to
ventilate their personal views at organizational meetings
(granted by the CCP Constitution, supra note 157, Art. 4),
for the former grants the upper crust of Party leadership
-- a body of Party members most likely immune from lifetime
tenure modifications, notwithstanding such proposals
control over perceived irregular or abnormal behavior among
Party members at lower levels.
CCP control of the PLA may be illustrated by the 1978
enactment of PLA security regulations by the Party's Military Commission.
See "Military Commision Issues Documents
on Security," FBIS-cHI-78-099 (May. 22, 1978), at El.
See
also "Provisional Regulations on Military Offenses," FBISCHI-81-113 (June 12, 1981), at Kl.
170.

Mobilizing the masses is part of the Chinese pol icy of
duhuizhan ("Battle in which all forces are moblized").
See
BERNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 118.
See generally J. WANG,
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS:
AN INTRODUCTION (1980).
The CCP used its full arsenal to publicize the new legal
order, including scores of press reports on domestic law
enforcement.
Mass rallies were used in many instances to
help garner support for the legal codes, publicize crimes
for different purposes and lend legitimacy to the new legal
system.
See, ~· "Anhui Prefecture Calls Rally on Arrest
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of Cadre," FBIS-cHI-89-117 (June 15, 1980), at 01; "Qinghai
Court Sentences Criminals, Holds Rally," .FBIS-cHI-80-002
(Jan. 3, 1980), at T8; "Guangdong Criminals," FBIS-cHI-81023 (Feb. 4, 1981), at P5.
171.

The CCP has used PRC media to transform other issues into
mass campaigns.
See, ~· "Renmin Ribao Criticizes Japan's Revised Textbooks," FBIS-CHI-82-140 (July 21, 1982),
at D3.
The
Chinese,
Party dominance of
the
entire
bureaucratic system of the PRC may well be a basic feature
of politics in Communist systems.
According to such reasoning, the CCP has:
1)
ultimate authority over the appointment and removal of high-level bureaucrats; 2)
the
ability to maintain considerably high personnel mobility;
and, 3) authority over the bureaucracy by effecting a rapid personnel turnover rate.
See Chai, Communist Party Control Over the Bureaucracy:
The Case of China, 11 COMP.
POL. 359 (April 1979).

172.

The Central Committee is composed of leading Party members
who directly manage the Party, the army, and the government.
It is the symbol of established authority.
The
Chairmanship of the Central· Committee is the most prestigious office of the PRC.
See L. PYE, CHINA: AN INTRODUCThe chairmanship is presently held by Hu
TION 191 ( 1978).
Yaobang.
In 1977, there were 201 members of the Central
Committee and 132 alternates.
See List of the 333 Members
and Alternate Members of the llthCentral Committee of the
Communist Party of China, Beijing Review, No. 35 (Aug. 26,
1977), at .15.
See generally TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at
294-305.

173.

The members of the Military Commission of the Central Committee are chosen by the Central Committee.
See CCP CONSTITUTION, supra note 157, Art. 21, para. 5.

174.

Apparently, real power in the Party rests with the Politburo.
The Central Committee merely legitimizes policies.
PYE, id. , at 181 •
Since the Politburo is somewhat too large to operate
effectively, major decision-making power is entrusted to
its Standing Committee.
See generally TOWNSEND, supra note
65, at 89, 294-96.
·

175.

The Central Advisory Commission is beneath the Political
Bureau and the Secretariat and is responsible for, inter
alia, "the formulation and implementation of the party's
principles and policies ..
"
CCP CONSTITUTION, supra
note 157, Art. 22.
The interaction between the Secretariat
and the Advisory Commission is not altogether clear, although it is known that the latter body, by request of the
Secretariat,
is
entrusted
with
the
investigation
of
economic crimes by CCP officials.
See •china Daily Cites
Deng on Advisory Commission," FBIS-cHI-82-210 (Oct. 29,
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1982), at Kl5; "Deng Discusses Advisory Commission
Future," FBIS-cHI-82-208 (Oct. 27, 1982), at KS.

Role,

1'76.

The fundamental Party unit is zhibu or branch committee.
TOWNSEND, suora note 65, at 180.~se Party branches provide guid~to, and surveillance of, lower-level Party
activities.
Yet, the real strength of the CCP lies with
the dedicated cadre, the " [treasure] of the nation and
pride of the whole Party." Liu Shao-ch'i, ON THE PARTY 101
(1952) cited in id., at 182.

177.

The affairs of the PLA are constitutionally entrusted to
the Military Commission (Art. 93 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION).
See also Art. 21 of the CCP CONSTITUTION.
supra
note 157.
Presumably, the CCP Military Commission directs
military pol icy and supervises the work of the political
commisars in the army structure.
See PYE, supra note 174,
at 181.
See also "CCP Military Commission Decides to Suspend Vietnam Action," FBIS-CHI-79-044 (March 5, 1979), at
AS (suspending the PRC self-defense counterattack against
SRV forces on the Guangzi-Yunnan border); "CCP Military
Commission Issues Decision on Discipline," FBIS-CHI-78-069
(April 10, 1978), at E4 (calling for strict discipline of
army personnel according to Party pol icy); TOWNSEND, supra
note 65, at 91-95.· Cf. note 169, ~·
High-lavd milic3ry personnel in the PRC are found in
key ?Olitical positions. The Chinese do not have anything similar to the National Security Act of 1947 which
set up the u.s. Central Intelligence Agency and which does
not allow the military to occupy the top two CIA positions
at the same time.

~ost

178.

See Kakkar, The Role of the PLA During the Cultural Revolution, 13 CHINA REP. 29, 29-36 (No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1977);
Terrill, China and the \'lorld:
Self-Reliance or Interdependence,
55 FOR. AFF.
295,
304
(Oct. 1976).
See also
TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 91-95.
--- ----

179.

See, ~· "Tung Hsiang Comments on PRC War Preparedness,"
FBIS-cHI-78-232 (Dec. 1, 1978), at N3 (noting that the PLA
continues to remain vigilant in defending PRC interests so
as to help maintain the orderly and peaceful environment
the
PRC
needs
in
its
quest
to
achieve
the
four
modernizations).

180.

See, ~· "Renmin Ribao Points Out Duties in Fighting
Crime," FBIS-cHI-80-007 (Jan. 10, 1980), at Ll3.
In this
editorial, Wang Zhij iang noted the importance of the unity
of the Party, government, mass organizations, and cultural
and educational depart;nents in safeguarding public order.
See also "PLA Patrols Protect Border From SRV Attacks,"
FBIS-cHI-82-146 (July 29, 1982), at E2; "Beijing Soldiers
Maintain Law, Order," FBIS-cHi-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at

-
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Rl (noting that soldiers were helping public security departments to make arrests): "Peking Radio on PLA Duties,
Accomplishments," FBIS-CHI -77-2 32 (Dec. 2, 19 77), at Al.
No articulated code mandates PLA involvement in law
enforcement.
Whether PLA participation in combating crime
will diminish as a result of the formal establishment of
public security and procuratorial organs is uncertain,
though it would seem to contravene previous PRC policy of
mass participation in public security activities.
See Pollack, The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy, 35 BULL. OF
ATOM. SCIENTISTS 22, 25 (Jan. 1979):
The PLA is the backbone of [PRC] armed forces.
The
militia is the PLA 's effective assistant and powerful
reserve
In accordance with Chairman Mao's
teachings • • • the militiamen in the cities and the
countryside in positi-ve coordination w~th the PLA and
·public security depart!nents, have for years maintained
public order, dealt blows at the sabotage activities
by class
enemies and protected the people's
interests.
Id.
181.

1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 131.

182.

The PRC continues to prepare a civil code.
contained 501 articles.

A recent draft

The Civil Procedure Law was provisionally implemented
as of Oct. 1, 1982.
See "Jeij ing Radio Comments on Civil
Law Enforcement," FBIS-CHI-82-192 (Oct. 4, 1982), at Kl7.
See also "National Conference on Civil Law Closes," FBISCHI-82-134 (July 13, 1982), at Kll; "NPC Standing Committee
Session Ends in Beijing:
Civil Procedure Law," FBIS-CHI82-045 (March 8, 1982), at KG.
See also "Peng Zhen Reports
to NPC on Draft Laws:
Civil, Civil Procedural Law," FBISCHI-80-171 (Sept. 2, 1980), at L36; "Regulations on Civil
Law Procedures Outlined," FBIS-cHI-79-017 (Jan. 24, 1979),
at El2.
·
The PRC has also called for a more formalized Chinese
theory of
international
law.
See
"International Law
Research to be Strengthened," FBIS-cHI-80-025 (Feb. 5,
1980), at LlO.
Formal international law enactments are not
as urgent as domestic law .enactments to the PRC.
The
former are 1 ikely to be forthcoming only after the PRC has
reviewed and approved its domestic laws and has sufficiently tested the waters of the international legal order to
formulate precise rules flexible enough to permit Chinese
pursuit of the four modernizations with a minimum of foreign interference and a maximum of non-intrusive foreign
support.
183.

See generally, Heaton, Professional Military Education in
China:
A Visi·t to the Military Academy of the People's
Liberation Army, 81 CHINA Q. 122 (Marc, 1980).
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184.

1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 55.

185.

The PRC CRIMINAL CODE: was passed on July 1, 1979 at the
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and
entered into force on January 1, 1980.
See Gongan fagui
huibian, supra note 146, at 4-33.
Article 91 reads:
Offenders colluding with foreign countries and conspiring to jeopardize the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and security of the motherland will be sentenced to 1 ife imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment:
of not less than 10 years.
Article 92 reads:
Those plotting to over throw the govenmen t and split
the country will be sentenced to 1 ife imprisonment or
fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
Article 93 reads:
Those instigating, seducing, or bribing any state
functionary or any member of the armed forces, the
people's police, or the militia to detect, turn traitor or rebel will be sentenced to 1 ife impr ison:nent or
fixed-term imprison~ent of not less than 10 years.
Article 94 reads:
Those defecting and turning traitor will be sentenced
to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 3 and not
more than 10 years.
Those guilty of serious cases of
defecting and turning traitor or who lead their men to
defect to the enemy and turn traitor will be sentenced
to imprisonment of not less than 10 years or 1 ife
imprisonment.
Article 97 reads:
Those committing espionage or supporting the enemy in
the following manner will be sentenced to imprisonment
of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment; in
less serious cases, they will be sentenced to fixedterm imprisonment of not less than 5 and not more than
10 years:
1)

Stealing, spying
to the enemy;

2)

Supplying arms or other military materials
to the enemy; and

3)

Joining
a
organization
enemy.

and

supplying

information

secret service or espionage
or receiving orders from the
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These prov1S1ons are all part of the section of the
PRC Criminal Code on counterrevolutionary activities, the
most serious criminal violations in the PRC.
The English
text of the Criminal Code may be found in "Seven PRC Laws
Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-CHI-79-146 (July
27, 197 9) PART I:
Supp. No. 019 [hereafter PRC CRIMINAL
CODE).
The effective date of the laws published therein
was January 1, 1980.
186.

Mao's philosophy is often cited. ~· ~· On Protracted
War (May 1938) in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 143-44
(Vol. II 1965). See also J. COPPER, CHINA'S GLO.BAL ROLE 85
(1980); COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 5, at 181-89; Kux, China
- A Nuclear Power:
Strategic Posture and Defense Modernization, 2 AR.IIIADA INT'L. 106, 107-08 (Vol. 4, March-April
1980); Liu, The Modernization of the Chinese Military, 9
CURRENT HIST. 9 (Sept. 1980); YAHUDA, supra note 6, at 110;
note 221, infra.
Cf. Jencks, China's "Punitive" War on
Vietnam:
A~itarYAssessment, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 801 (No.
8, Aug • 19 7 9) •

187.

The PRC press has been particularly acrimonious with
respect to KGB activities,. which were perceived as part of
the Soviet's hegemonic plan to rule the world.
See, ~·
"Soviet Activiti&s in Singapore Denounced," FBIS-cHI-82-040
(March 1, 1982), at Cl; "USSR's Global Espionag~ Activities
Examined," FBIS-CHI-81-183 (Sept. 22, 1981), at Cl; "Renmin
Ribao Looks at KGB Activities in U.S.," FBIS-CHI-81-234
(Dec, 7, 1981), at Bl; "PRC Protests KGB Attempt to Force
PRC Diplomat to Defect," FBIS-CHI-80-170 (Aug. 29, 1980),
at Cl; "Soviet Spy Imprisoned, Chinese National Sentenced
to Death," FBIS-cHI-80-141 (July 21, 1980), at Cl: • 'Enemy
Agent' Caught Last Year Near Xinjiang Border," FBIS-cHI-79187 (Sept. 25, 1979), at T5; "Soviet Spy Activities at UN
Uncovered," FBIS-CHI-78-101 (May 24, 1978), at A4; "KGB's
Infiltration Into Foreign Countries Noted," FBIS-cHI-78-092
(May 11, 1978), at A6; "People's Daily Editor Warns KGB has
'Murder in its Heart'," FBIS-cHI-78-072 (April 13, 1978),
at A3; "US, USSR Expel Diplomatic Officials," FBIS-cHI-78016 (Jan. 24, 1978), at Al; "People's Daily Attacks Soviet
Spying in Europe," FBIS-cHI-78-014 (Jan. 20, 1978), at A6.
See
also
"AFP:
Gongren
Ribao
Warns
Against
'Enemy
AgentS"';" FBIS-cHI-79-069 (April 9, 1979), at L2.

188.

~~generally,

SAO RUE-WANG AND R. CHELMINSKI, PRISONER
OF MAO (1976); R. DEACON, THE CHINESE SECRET SERVICE
(1974).
See also Scalapino, The Policies of the Post-Mao
Era:
An EXam Iilation of the 11th Party Congress, 17 ASIAN
SURVEY 1049, 1051-53 (No. 11, Nov. 1977).
Contemporary Chinese intelligence forces may be a
throwback to the Chinese Censorate (dujiayuan) in Imperial
China, which served as special watchdog over the civil service and performed inspector-general and secret police
functions.
PYE, supra note 172, at 79.
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189.

The NPC reintroduced the Organic Regulations of the Urban
Neighborhood Committee, the Organic Regulations of the Subdistrict Office, the Temporary Organic Regulations of the
People's Meditation Committee and the Temporary Organic
Regulations of the Social Order and Security Co:nmi ttee.
See "Central Press Publishes NPC Regulations on Local Organizations," FBIS-cHI-80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L2-9.
The statutes permit local authorities to recruit members of
the population through the latters' work in mass volunteer
organizatons, to administer and enforce governmental decisions and to preserve law and order. The Security Committee regulations permit the formation of 3-11 members public
security committees in goverrunent organizations, plants
enterprises, schools and neighborhoods in cities and administrative villages in rural areas (Art. III) to assist
the government • in preventing traitors, spies, thieves and
arsonists and in eliminating counterrevolutionaries in order to safeguard state and public security" (Art. I).
See
also "Anhui Radio Calls for Suppression of Criminals,
Spies," FBIS-cHI-80-024 (Feb. 4, 1980), at 02; 1982 PRC
CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 111.

190.

TOWNSEND, supra note 65, at 318.

191.

See Scalapino, supra note 188, at 1052.

192.

Id.
See generally DEACON, supra note 188.
The existence
of the 8341 unit was implied in a recent reports on an attempted assassination of Deng Xiaoping. See "Taipei Rumors
Say Xu Shiyou Wounded in Attempt on Deng~FBIS-CHI-80-083
(April 28, 1980), at Lll. See also "AFP:
Spokesman Denies
Taiwan Claims of Xu Attempton Deng ,• FBIS-cHI-80-186 (May
1, 1980), at LlO.
Perhaps significantly, neither report
originated on the Chinese mainland.
Both were sent through
AFP (a foreign news service) wire services in Hong Kong. A
second report was issued through Hong Kong in 1982.
See
"Paper Reports Deng Xiaoping Shot in October," FBIS-CHI-82019 (Jan. 28, 1982), at Wl.
The PRC did not confirm the
accuracy of the report.

193.

Scalapino, supra note 188, at 1052.
The need for a clandestine security apparatus may also be seen in an unconfirmed report from Hong Kong of the existence of terrorist
organizations in the PRC.
See "Beijing Reported Investigating Terrorist Organizations,• FBIS-cHI-80-120 (June
19, 1980), at Ul; "Wan Jen Jih Pao:
Plane Crash Due to
Sabotage," FBIS-cHI-82-084 (April 30, 1982 ), at WS (plane
crash over Guangxi caused by terrorist group).
The PRC internal security apparatus is rather intricately structured at present.
The recent promulgation of
the Chinese criminal, marriage, and tax codes, the expected
promulgation of the civil codes, and the intensification of
Chinese contacts with foreigners has required a joint effort on the part of the Party, the government, the army and
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militia, the mass organizations, the cultural and educational departments and the public security organs in the
PRC to help safeguard public order. Such a joint effort is
probably a product of Party paranoia as to the effects of
Western principles on Chinese society, the lack of a clearly articulated role for any particular organ in the maintenance of public security, and the sheer number of Chinese
citizens who must be policed. See "Renmin Ribao Points Out
Duites in Fighting Crime," FBIS-CHI-80-007 (Jan. 10, 1980),
at Ll3 (noting the importance of unity among Party and
governmental organizations in the preservation of public
order); "Jilin Founds People's Police Armed Forces," FBISCHI-82-209 (Oct. 28, 1982), at 56.
The masses also have a role in preseving public
security, that of "self-surveillance."
See, Butterfield,
How the Chinese Police Themselves, N.Y. Times, .April 18,
1982, p. 32 (Magazine).
Cf. "AFP:
Shanghai Mob Kills
Drunken Hooligan," FBIS-CHI-80-099 (May 20, 1980), at 03
(noting that a crowd of about 100 people lynched a drunken
hooligan who had slapped a passerby. The police took no
action against the lynchers. The use of "mob" in the title
may be attributed to the fact that the report was issued
over a foreign wire service (AFP)).
Moreover, to increase administrative control over the
masses, the 12th Session of the 5th NPC Standing Committee
decided, in 1980, to r-eintroduce a number of legislative
enactments passed in the PRC in the 1950s.
One of these
was the December 31, 1954 Statute on Organization of Urban
Precinct Offices.
Under
the
Statute,
local
precinct
offices were created.
Through these precinct offices and
mass volunteer organizations known as urban population committees (created by the Statute of the Organization of Urban Committees, adopted Dec. 31, 1954 and reintroduced in
1980), public security organs keep urban residents under
strict surveillance through civilian administration departments which require mandatory registration of identity
documents and prevent citizens from moving freely in the
PRC without special permits.
See supra note 189.
See also
Yegorov, supra note 168, at 124-25.
The public security apparatus, therefore, is an amalgam of various legal and quasi-legal organizations with
overlapping functions.
Thus, the average Chinese citizen
is not subject to the arbitrary and ruthless tactics of a
single agency, such as Soviet citizens are in the Soviet
Union.
But surveillance in the PRC may be more extensive:
street committees,
for
example
the
lowest
level
governmental subdivision--- may monitor the menstrual cycles of young women to ensure compliance with population
control directives.
See F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA:
ALIVE IN
THE BITTER SEA 325-28(1982).
However, joint supervision
of internal security results in greater control of daily
routines and poses the possibility that PRC internal
security forces may become more susceptible of capricious
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and uncontrolled behavior in the execution of an arms control agreement.
194.

See Scalapino, supra note 188, at 1053.

195.

The increase in foreign contacts has been more subtle than
published reports indicate.
The Chinese continue torequire Western technological assistance in their drive to
realize the four modernizations.
This has required sales
negotiations with foreign officials.
See. ~· Kux, supra
note 186, at 107-08; Wallace, Rebuilding China's Army:
A
Job for the U.S.?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 9, 1981)
reprinted in.U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA, SELECTED ESSAYS AND
PAPERS 70-71 (Jan. 1982) (published by the National Conference on Asians in America and Asian Americans).
The PRC Joint Venture Law has also occasioned foreign
commercial contacts.
In addition, the number of diplomatic
and quasi-diplomatic visitors to the PRC, as well as
tourism, has increased steadily since 1977.
See Kallgren,
China 1979:
The New Long March, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 1, 3-4
(No.1, Jan. 1979).
A number of trips by Deng Xiaoping were well-covered
by the Chinese media.
Id., at 3.
In addition, groups of
Chinese journalists have travelled to Europe, Africa and
the United States.
Many wrote of their accounts in the PRC
press.
Combined with television transmissions, these reports provided Chinese citizens with one of their first
opportunities to view their leaders in the international
arena and to increase their knowledge of the outside world.
Id.
See
also
"Formalities
Simplified
for
Foreign
Tourists," FBIS-CHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3; "Youth
Federation to Increase Foreign Contracts," FBIS-CHI-80-102
(May 23, 1980), at A6; "More Areas, Cities Opened to
Tourists," FBIS-CHI-80-090 (May 7, 1980), at L23; "Plans
Made to Open More Areas to Foreign Tourists," FBIS-CHI-78114 (June 13, 1978), at Ell; "AFP:
Rules on Foreign Students' Travel Replaced," FBIS-cHI-78-020 (Jan. 3, 1978), at
El6.
But see "Regulations on Studying Abroad Approved,"
FBIS-cHI-82-147 (July 30, 1982), at K9 (warning PRC students abroad to carefully observe Chinese national security
laws); Peiping Clamps Down on Studies Abroad, China Post,
July 28, 1982, at 2; "Renmin Ribao Caut.ions Foreign Journalists," FBIS-cHI-82-044 (March 5, 1982), at Al; Peking
Curbs Contacts With Foreign Residents, N.Y. Times, July 15,
1982, at A9.

196.

See note 187 supra.
See
tion With CIA, Thailand,"
at El (denying Vietnamese
control of South Vietnam,

also "AFP:
PRC Denies CollaboraFBIS-CHI-82-138 (July 19, 1982),
claim of a PRC-CIA plot to gain
Laos and Cambodia by 1985).

197.

But see BUTTERFIELD, supra note 193, at 445, who reported
that People's Daily editors were forced to undergo selfcriticism ( ziwopiping) for printing a plea for artistic
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freedom from renowned PRC actor Zhao Dan, without first
seeking clear a nee for the ar tiel e from the CCP.
See also
"Kyodo Sources Say Renmin Ribao Editor Criticized," FIHSCHI-81-236 (Dec. 9, 1981), at K8 (Japanese news report on
alleged editorial error by People's Daily editor).
Note
that in the PRC, there is no constitutional preclusion of
legal or CCP interference with the press~
198.

See Chung, From Great Disorder
to Great Order:
The
Eleventh Party Congress and the Continuous Revolution.
13
CHINA REP. 7, 28 (No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1977).
See also the
1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 2, which gives
the people "the right to administer state affairs."

199.

Id., at 27. The "quadruple weapon" was more often referred
to as the "four bigs" in Chinese press parlance. The "four
bigs" first appeared in full in 1957. The press noted that
the "four bigs" were abused during the Cultural Revolution
by Lin Piao, the gang of four and their respective cohorts.
One "big" in particular-- the right to write big-character
posters -- ~as alleged to have become a vehicle for groundless accusations and character assassinations. The posters
supposedly led to in-fighting among the masses and harmed
many good people.
Such accusations preceded the 1980 Constitutional amendment of Art. 45.
See supra note 156 and
accompanying text.
See also "Renmin rti::>ao Cites Reasons
for Abolishing
'Fou-r-Bigs'," FBIS-CHI-80-194
(Oct.
3,
1980), at L3; "Deng Xiaoping on Importance of Revising Constitution,"
FBIS-cHI-80-191
(Sept.
30,
1980),
at L3;
"Guangming Ribao Notes Harm of 'Four Big Rights' ,"FBIS-CHI80-080 (April 23, 1980), at Ll4; "Xinhua Surveys People's
Deputies on 'Four Bigs' Abolition," FBIS-CHI-80-076 (.~pril
17, 1980), at Rl; "Nanfang Ribao: Abolition of 'Four Bigs'
Seen Necessary," FBIS-cHI-80-074 (April 15, 1980), at P4;
"Qinghai Ribao Article Hails Elimination of Four 'Rights',"
FBIS-cHI-80-066 (April 3, 1980), at Tl.
·
The CCP-sponsored media thrust for elimination of the
"four bigs" was prompted by a number of problems.
First,
the emphasis of da (great or big) denoted a new style of
authority-public -relationship in which individuals were
allowed to publisly criticize authority. Chung, supra note
198, at 27. This was apparently intolerable to CCP leadership.
Second, the intensity, capriciousness and scope of
the accusations alarmed the authorities.
See; ~·· "AFP:
Beijing Wallposter Hits CCP Leadership," FBIS-cHI-79-066
(April 4, 1979), at Ll (noting in an Agence France Presse
(foreign news service) report that wallposters had attacked
CCP leadership for its repression of certain authors of
big-character posters).
Rather than tolerate a burgeoning underground dissident-human rights movement, the CCP resolved to remedy the
problem by removing the major outlet for dissident discussion -- big-character posters.
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200.

Chung, supra note 198, at 27.

201.

Id., at 27-28.

202.

Article 45 of the 1978 PRC CONSTITUTION originally read:
Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration and the
freedom to strike, and have the right to
speak out freely, air their views fully,
hold great debates and write big-character
posters.
[emphasis added].
The 1980 amendment deleted the previously emphasized
text.
See "NPC Session Presidium Holds Fourth Meeting 9
Sep: Article 45 Revision," FBIS-CHI-80-177 (Sept. 10, 1980,
at L30.
The dispatch with which the Constitution was amended
albeit through proper legal channels -- indicates the
significance attached by the CCP to uncontrolled free
speech activities and the power of Party leadership in
supervsing the government and legal process.
See "Wen Hui
Bao on Shortcomings of Big-Character Posters," FBIS-CHI-80045 (March 5, 1980), at 01.

203.

Control of the press has been further strengthened by the
promulgation of a State Council "report" banning the "unauthorized" compiling and printing of books and publications.
See "State Council Approves Increasd Publication Controls,"
FBIS-CHI-80-138 (July 16, 1980), at L6.
See also Chinese
are Reminded of Reins on Expression, Bal to:-s~Feb. 17 I
1980, at A2.
The press has dictated the extent to which information
provided by PRC officials would not run afoul of CCP and
state secret laws.
An anonymous PRC legal official informed this author that court proceedings are state secrets
and should not be discussed until information on them is
released in the press.
See also "24th Session of NPC
Standing Committee
Closes,•
FBIS-CHI-82-164
(Aug.
24,
1982), at Kl (passing resolution on making Xinhua the state
organ for "unified" release of important news).
The role of the press in national construction is indicated merely by a perusal of FBIS reports over the last
eight years. Just after the PRC's admission to the United
Nations and prior to the promulgation of domestic legal
codes, the PRC press reported almost exclusively on international relations topics. With the enactment of the legal
codes and the emphasis on the four modernizations, an FBISPRC press report is now devoted to national, regional and
local affairs in addition to interational topics, which are
decidedly more limited in scope.
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The press has also been used to infuse Chinese society
with the proper attitudes toward certain foreign acts.
Vicious and frequent PRC condemnation of Japanese textbook
citations to the Japanese invasion of China is an example.
See, ~·, • Renmin Ribao Criticizes Japan's Revised Textbooks," FBIS-cHI-82-140 (July 21, 1982), at D3.
204.

See, .!L:.S..:.• "Renmin Ribao Discusses Law of Criminal Procedure," FBIS-cHI-79-168 (Aug. 28, 1979), at L5;
"Guangming Ribao Comments on Accused's Rights to Defense,"
FBIS-cHI-79-166 (Aug. 24, 1979), at L3; "Gongren Ribao
Looks at Importance of Joint Ventures," FBIS-CHI-79-153
(Aug. 7, 1979), at L7; "Renmin Ribao on Counterrevolutionary Crimes,"
FBIS-CHI-79-148
(July 31, 1979), at L6;
"Guangming Ribao Explains Role of Law in Modernization,"
FBIS-cHI-79-144 (July 25, 1979), at L2; "Jiefangj un Bao
Discusses Merits of Law on Joint Ventures," FBIS-CHI-79-142
(July 23, 1979), at Ll7; "Reportage on PRC's New Criminal
Law:
NPC Deputies'
Debate,"
FBIS-CHI-79-131 (July 6,
1979), at Ll2; "Director Peng Zhen Explains Draft Laws at
NPC Plenary Session," FBIS-CHI-79-125 (June 27, 1979), at
L4.
See also, "Renmin Ribao Discusses Joint Venture Law,"
FBIS-cHI-82-155 (Aug. 11, 1982) at Kl4; "Renmin Ribao on
Questions About Lin-Jiang Trial," FBIS-cHI-81-027 (Feb. 10,
1981), at LlO.
'

205.

See, .!L:.S..:.• "Jurist Fei Xiaotung Comments on Trial," FBISCHI-81-021 (Feb. 2, 1981), at L9; "Lawyers Discuss Dissidents Trial in Beijing," FBIS-cHI-80-241 (Dec. 12, 1980),
at L7 (justifying dissident Wei Jingsheng's sentence);
"Renmin Ribao Discusses Criminal Law Provisions:
Age of
Legal Responsibility, Previous Criminal Record," FBIS-CHI80-051 (March 13, 1980), at L24; "Renmin Ribao Explains
Sections of Criminal Law," FBIS-cHI-80-033 (Feb. 15, 1980),
at Ll5; "Renmin Ribao on Statute of Limitations in Criminal
Law," FBIS-cHI-80-008 (Jan. 11, 1980), at L7; "Renmin Ribao
Explains Two Types of Sentences," FBIS-cHI-79-241 (Dec. 13,
1979), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao Discusses Legal Status of
Criminals," FBIS-cHI-79-224 (Nov. 19, 1979), at Ll; "Renmin
. Ribao Discusses Exemption From Prosecution," FBIS-CHI-79.220 (Nov. 13, 1979), at Ll2; "Guangming Ribao Discusses
Counterrevolutionary Offenses," FBIS-cHI-79-165 (Aug. 23,
1979), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao Discusses Implementation of
Criminal Laws," FBIS-cHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979), at Ll;
"Continuation of Explanation of Criminal Procedure Law
Terms," FBIS-cHI-79-137 (July 16, 1979), at Ll; "Xinhua
Publishes Explanation of Criminal Procedure Law Terms, •
FBIS-cHI-79-136 (July 13, 1979), at Ll; "Newspapers Publish
Columns Explaining Legal Terms," FBIS-cHI-79-134 (July 11,
1979), at LS;
"Xinhua Explains PRC Criminal Law Terms,"
id., at Ll; "Reportage on PRC 1 s New Criminal Law:
Legal
Expert on Technical Points,"
FBIS-cHI-79-131 (July 6,
1979), at Ll6; "Reportage on ·pRC 1 s New Criminal Law: Noted
Jurist 1 s Description,• id., at Ll4; "Text of Peng Zhen 1 s
Explanation of Seven Draft Laws," FBIS-cHI-79-130 (July 5,
1979), at L9.
See also "Peng Zhen Explains Draft Revised
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Constitution," FBIS-CHI-82-084 (.l\pr il 30, 19 8 2 ) , at Kl;
"NPC Official Outlines New Marriage Law," FBIS-cHI-81-028
(Feb. 11, 1981), at Ll6.
206.

See,
~·,
"Guangzhou
Announces
Punishment
on
12
Criminals,"
FBIS-cHI-82-071
(April
13,
1982),
at P2;
"Shanghai Publishing House Copy Editor Arrested," FBIS-CHI82-070 (April 12, 1982), at 04; "Liaoning Tries Counterrevolutionary Murders Clique," FBIS-CHI-81-081 (April 21,
1981), at 54; "Gang of Four Trial Opens in Beijing," FBISCHI-80-226 (Nov. 20, 1980), at Ll; "Gang of Four Trial
Reveals More Crimes," FBIS-CHI-80-236 (Dec. 5, 1980), at
Ll; "Shanghai County Public Security Bureau Solves Murder
Case," FBIS-cHI-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at 01; "Hangzhou
Judicial Department Tries 'Serious' Criminal Case," FBISCHI-79-223 (Nov. 16, 1979), at 014; "Trial of Fu Yuehau
Begins in Beijing," FBIS-CHI-79-202 (Oct. 17, 1979), at L5;
"Political Dissident Sentenced to 15 Years Imprisonment,"
FBIS-cHI-79-201 (Oct. 16, 1979), at Ll (noting the sentence
imposed in Wei Jingsheng); "Guangdong Municipal Court Passes Verdict on Nine Hooligan Criminals," FBIS-CHI-79-170
(Aug. 30, 1979), at P8; "Anhui County CCP Committee Handles
'Beating-Smashing' Case," FBIS-cHI-79-167 (Aug. 27, 1979),
at 01; "Jilin: Lishu County Disciplines Law Violators,"
FBIS-CHI-79-164 (Aug. 22, 1979), at Pl.

207.

See,~·, "Commentator Urges Criminals Surrender by 1 May:
Offenders Surrender," FBIS-CHI-82-058 (March 25, 1982), at
Kl; "Economic Offanders Surrender Before Deadline," FBISCHI-82-076 (April 20, 1982), at K2; "Xinhua:
Many Beijing
Criminals Surrender to ?olice," FBIS-CHI-80-042 (Feb. 29,
1980), at R3.
Cf. "Guangdong Encourages People to Expose
Smuggling," FBIS-cHI-80-204 (Dec. 11, 1980), at Pl.

208.

See,~·· "Court Sentences Jiang Qing, Other Defendants,"
FBIS-cHI-81-016 (Jan. 26, 1981), at Ll; "Xinjiang Court
Sentences Murderer to Death," FBIS-cHI-79-234 (Dec. 4,
1979), at T3; "Shanghai Court Sentences Swindler," FBISCHI-79-233 (Dec. 3, 1979), at T4 (sentencing a quack doctor
to two years for removing intrauterine devices from women
and taking their money); "Harbin District Court Executes
Murderer," id., at Sl; "Zhejiang Court Sentences Follower
of Gang ofFour," FBIS-cHI-79-224 (Nov. 19, 1979), at 03
(sentencing defendant to three years surveillance and three
years deprivaton of political rights); "Shanghai Lecture on
Crimes Against Public Safety," FBIS-CHI-79-223 (Nov. 16,
1979),
at 011;
"Shanghai Wenhui
Bao Urges Punishing
Criminal Offenders," FBIS-cHI-79-204 (Oct. 19, 1979), at
02.
Cf.
"Liaoning:
Attacking
Counterrevolutionaries
Urged,"--FBIS-cHI-81-082 (April 29, 1981), at 53.

209.

See, ~·, "National Crime Rate Decreases; More Cases
Solved," FBIS-cHI-82-171 (Sept. 2, 1982), at K22; "Reduction in Crime Rate in Beijing Reported," FBIS-CHI-82-152
(Aug. 6, 1982), at Rl; "Crime Rate Drops in Beijing, Other
Municipalities," FBIS-CHI-81-157 (Aug. 14, 1981), at Kl;
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"Procuratorial Organs Handle Over 10,000 Cases in 18
Months," FBIS-cHI-80-193 (Oct. 2, 1980), at L6; "PRC Representative Addresses UN Congress on Crime," FBIS-CHI-80173 (Sept. 4, 1980), at Al; "New Weekly Notes Decrease in
·Urban Crime Rate," FBIS-cHI-80-150 (Aug. 1, 1980), at L6;
"Wei Guoqing Presides Over 11eeting of NPC Standing Committee:
Briefing by People's Court President," FBIS-CHI-80073 (April 14, 1980), at Ll; "Chief Procurator's Report,"
id., <~t L2; "Public Security Minister's Report," id., at
L3; "Kyodo Cites Jiefang Bao Report on Crime in Shanghai,"
FBIS-cHI-80-070 (April 19, 1980), at 05; "Fifth Jilin People's Congress Concudes:
Higher People's Court Report,
People's Procuratorate Report," FBIS-CHI-80-069 (April 8,
1980), at 55; "Heilo11gjiang Crime Rate Declines," FBIS-CHI80-040 (Feb. 27, 1980), at Sl; "Jiefang Ribao Comments on
Maintaining Social Order," FBIS-cHI-80-022 (Jan. 3, 1980),
at 06;
"Public
Security Ministry
Reports
Decline
in
Juvenile Crime," FBIS-CHI-79-246 (Dec. 20, 1979), at LlO.
210.

Lucien Pye noted that even though all media forms are vital
for legitimacy, the process which makes this true operates
in a way that forces the media to maintain a significant
gap between rhetoric and reality; in effect, to create an
imaginary world.
See Pye, Communications and Chinese
Political Culture, iBASIAN SURVEY 221, 244 (No. 3, March
1978).
See also Lonshchakov, The Chinese> Press:
~-Brain
washing MaCh~ 4 FAR EASTERN AFF. 148.
One recent e.xa'Tlple of the gap between Chinese rhetr ic
and reality concerns the existence of terrorist organizations and narcotics peddlers in the PRC.
In a Xinhua
(Hsinhua) report printed by the Chinese, Xie Bangzhi, PRC
vice-minister of Justice and head of the Chinese delegation
of the UN Congress on Crime, noted ir. an address to the
Congress that terrorist groups and major narcotics peddlers
were "non-existent" in the PRC.
See "PRC Representative
Addresses UN Congress on Crime," FBIS-CHI-80-173 (Sept. 4,
1980), at Al.
Yet, shortly after this statement appeared,
an article surfaced in the Chinese press that noted the
crackdown on drug-traffickers in Guangzhou province.
See,
"Guangzhou Cracks Down on Drug Addicts, Traffickers," FBISCHI-80-182 (Sept. 17, 1980), at Pl. See also "PRC Tightens
Security on Drugs Into Hong Kong," FBIS-cHI-82-215 (Nov. 5,
1982), at W6.
More significant, though, was a Hong Kong-based report
citing the existence of terrorist organizations in the PRC.
See "Beijing Reported Investigating 'Terrorist Organization'," FBIS-cHI-80-120 (June 19, 1980), at Ul.
A second
report -- this one published by the foreign wire service
Agence France Presse -- appeared in 1981, and noted the
PRC's
continuing
concern
with
terrorism.
See
"AFP:
Liberation Daily on Increase in Terrorism," FBIS-CHI-81-010
(Jan. 15, 1981), at L7.
The Chinese did not directly confirm or deny the accuracy of reports on terrorism until the
recent publicity surrounding a hijacking near Shanghai.
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See "Attempted Hijacking Near Shanghai Foiled," FBIS-CHI82-143 (July 26, 1982), at Kl.
A second alleged hijack
attempt was denied by PRC authorities.
See "AFP Says Authorities Deny Knowledge of Hijacking,-"--FBIS-CHI-82-147
(July 30, 1982), at Kl; "AFP Reports Official Spokesman
Denies Hijacking," FBIS-cHI-82-148 (Aug. 2, 1982), at KlO.
211.

See generally Kallgren, supra note 195, at 16-17.

212.

See,~··
How do Chinese Trade Unions Function?-- An
Intervie with Ma Chun-ku, a leading member of the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 49
(Dec. 8, 1978), at 5; Basic Principle of Trade Union Work
in the New Period, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 44 (Nov. 3,
1978), at 7.
See also, Worker's Congresses, Beijing Review, No. 26 (June 28, 1982), at 5; "Article on Protective
Role of Trade Unions,• FBIS-cHI-81-198 (Oct. 14, 1981), at
K24.

213.

See, ~·· Youth Movement:
A New Milestone, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 46 (Nov. 17, 1978), at 5; Glorious Mission
of the Chinese Youth, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 46 (Nov.
17, 1978), at 7; "CYL Commentator on Youth's Role in
Society," FBIS-cH-81-132 (July 10, 1981), at Kl2.

214.

See, ~· "Women's Movement in China:
Guiding Concepts
and New Tasks, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 39 (Sept. 29,
1978), at 5; Mobilizing Women for the New Long March,
Peking (Beijing) Review, (Sept. 29, 1978), at 3; "Gongren
Ribao Views Role, Contributions of Women," FBIS-CHI-82-160
(Aug. 18, 1982), at KS.

215.

See, KIM, supra note 20, at 52.

216.

See, id., at 49-93.
See also 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra
note T04, Preamble; PYE, supra note 172, at 189-213; Meisner, Marxism and Chinese Values in THE CHINA DIFFERENCE
101-16 (R. Terrill ed., 1979).
But see "Hongqi Article
Discusses Mao's Merits, Errors,• FBIS-cHI-81-106 (June 3,
1981), at K8.
The nature of this paper precludes a
detailed analysis of Chinese Communist ideology.
Examples of Maoist philosophy which have provided fundamental guidelines for Chinese actions include, inter
alia, his articles on military strategy and people's-wat=
fare.
See, ~· "The Atom Bomb is a Paper Tiger," SCMP
no. 6382 (July 18, 1977), at 9; "Strategically 'Pit One
Against Ten' and Tactically 'Pit Ten Against One'," SCMP
no. 5826 (April 17, 1975), at 16; "Study of Mao Tse-tung's
Military Writings:
The Pivotal Strategy Must be Mobile
Warfare,• id., at 11.
Chinese Communist ideological instruction emphasizes slogans and catch phrases which are
useful in providing political instruction to large segments
of the rural populace which have little schooling.
For an
excellent analysis of these slogans, catch phrases and the
use of numbers, ~ PYE, supra note 172, at 277-88.
~
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also "Renmin Ribao on Two-Line, Two-Frong Struggles," FBISC'iff=82-189 (Sept. 29, 1982), at Kl; "Hongqi Urges Learning
From Mao's Five Letters," FBIS-cHI-82-171 (Sept. 2, 1982),
at K26; More Red and Expert Cadres, Beijing Review, No. 22
·(June 2, 1980), at 3.
217.

See, ~, Wren, Mao's Birthplace is Losing
Tourists, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1982, p. Al2.

213.

KIM, supra note 20, at 55.
See generally M.
TSE-TUNG ON REVOLUTION AND WAR 87-88 (1970).

219.

KIM, supra note 20, at 63.

220.

Id.

221.

See On Protracted War (May 1938) in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO
TSE-TUNG 143 (Vol. II 1965).
~ also REJAI,
supra note
218, at 279; The Concept of People's War, Beijing Review,
No. 31 (Aug. 2, 1982), at 3; "Hongqi on People's \Var, Defense Modernization," FBIS-cHI-82-212; "AFP Notes PRC Position on Conflict with Soviets," FBIS-cHI-81-135 (July 15,
1981), at C2.

222.

See Leng, The Role of Law in the Peool e' s Republic of China
as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung' s Influence, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/
REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., No. 5-1978(17), at
18.

223.

See
law
the
for

224.

As Leng noted, two models of law have coexisted and competed with each other in the PRC -- the jural and the societal.
The
former
stands for "formal, elaborate and
codified rules enforced by a centralized and institutionalized bureaucracy." The societal model emphasized "socially
approved
norms
and
values,
implemented
by
pol itcal
socialization and enforced by social pressures."
Leng,
supra note 222, at 2.
Mao's focus was largely on the societal model.
The spate of legal codes which appeared in
1979-80 indicated a general shift towards a jural model,
though the societal has not by any means been abandoned.

225.

The mass 1 ine is a fund amen tal party pol icy, expounded by
Mao, which requires party cadres to integrate with the masses and to lead the masses in implementing Party. pol icy.
Id., at 2 n.8.
See generally id., at 2-8.

226.

See generally, Munro, The Malleability of Man in Chinese
Marxism, 48 CHINA Q. 609 (1971). See also Leng, supra note
222, at 11-18.
-- --

Lure

fot

REJAI,

MAO

id., at 8-11. Under Mao's concept, equality before the
for all persons has no place in people's justice. Yet,
PRC has, at least for the sake of appearance, called
equality before the law for all. See note 169, supra.
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227.

The phrase has often been translated as "to seek truth from
facts."

228.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 9.

229.

PRC press reports have occasionally assailed the 1 iberal
attitudes of curious Chinese in their contacts with foreigners.
Some of the reports have been official Chinese
releases.
See, ~· "Shanghai Radio Urges Propert Attitude Toward Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-80-084 (April 30, 1979),
at 02 (noting that it is "political ignorance to regard all
foreign things as good" and that the Chinese people should
never lose their ability to distinguish between "flagrant
followers [sic] and poisonous weeds").
"Beijing Radio Article on Foreign Influence,"
FBIS-CHI-82-194
(Oct.
6,
19892), at Cl; "Article Cites Corruption Imported From
West," FBIS-cHI-82-078 (April 22, 1982), at K3.
See also
"Guangming Ribao Discusses Proper Approach to ---p;)reign
Things," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at LlO; Ching, Offical's Punishment Gives Chinese A Message:
Don't Talk~o
Foreigners, Asian Wall St. Journal, April 5, 1982, at 10;
note 195, supra.
Other reports have been passed on by foreign news services.
See, ~· "AFP:
Restrictions Placed on Chinese
Contacts with Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-105 (May 30, 1979),
at L2 (aleging that the PRC restricted contact with foreigners by stipulating that Chinese citizens could no longer visit a foreigner's living quarters or eat with him in
restaurants without specific permission from heir work
units).
The Chinese press never officially published the
stipulations, but it never denied the report. A previously
released Renmin ribao article lends credence to the AFP
report.
In the ReriiiiTn ribao article, Chinese authorities
called for "energetic sanctions" against those who "sell
off [state] secrets."
The article was a reflection of CCP apprehension
brought on by the recent birth of the Beijing democratic
movement, some of the members of which were accused of
selling secrets to foreigners.
The publicity surrounding
the trial of Wei Jingsheng, a Chinese dissident accused of
selling secrets to the enemy, and the allegations against
Jiang Qing of giving non-public documents to a foreign
reporter also preceded the Renmin ribao article.
One was
left with a sense that official concernwas growing within
the CCP that the PRC was becoming more vulnerable to
espionage and disruption of its four modernizations plan.
See generally "Beijing Ribao Stresses Importance of Guarding Secrets," FBIS-cHI-79106 (May 31, 1979), at Ll; "AFP:
Beijing Radio Urges Protection of State Secrets," FBIS-cHI100 (May 22, 1979), at Ll. See also "Renmin Ribao Article
on Protecting State SecretsTFBIS-cHI-79-072 (April 11,
1980), at L8; "Beijing Ribao Urges Protecting State Assets,"
FBIS-cHI-82-097
(May 19,
1982), at Kl;
"Deng
Yingchao on Guarding Party Secrets," FBIS-cHI-82-128 (July
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2, 1982), at Kl; "Army Paper Stresses Vigilance
Espionage," FBIS-cHI-82-141 (July 22 1982), at Kl.

Against

230.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 9.

231.

For instance, the PRC continues to remain hostile toward
hegemonism (a term applied more to Soviet 3Cts than American one, though it is frequently used generally with
respect to "superpower" actions).
The Chinese even regard
the hegemonic acts of third party states to be the direct
result of superpower instigation.
~
"Newspapers Note
Importance of Three Tasks for 1980," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb.
5, 1980), at 11 (Renmin ribao report) and L2 (Jiefang ribao
commentary); "Renmin Ribao Commentator Urges Unity Against
'Soviet Aggression';" FBIS-cHI-80-095 (May 14, 1980), at
Cl;
• Israel Invasion of Lebanon, U.s. Role Scored," FBISCHI-82-119 (June 21, 1982), at Il.

232.

See generally TOWNSEND, supra note 64, at 289-337.

233.

That the NPC is a rubber stamp organ of the CCP is not unknown to the Chinese themselves, who have sarcastically
remarked that NPC delegates have two roles: to applaud the
speeches of CCP leaders and to raise their hands to vote
yes.

234.

NPC deputies serve for a period of· five years, though under
special circumstances, that term may be extended or shortened. 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra not~ 104, Art. 57.

235.

See "Power· of NPC Standing Committee Examined," FBIS-CHI82-089 (May 7, 1982), at K9.
Standing Committee members
are permanent members of the NPC.
See "Shandong's Bai
Rubing Receives NPC P~rmanent Members,• FBIS-CHI-81-103
(May 29, 1981), at 03.

236.

The designation of "statutes" appears to encompass both
"laws and decrees,• which appear in· both the 1978 and 1982
PRC CONSTITUTIONS.
With an eye toward legal precision, a
recent Guangming ribao article noted that there is a distinct hierarchical relationship among laws, decrees, and
policy decisions although this relationship may now be
blurred.
The ranking of 1)
laws;
2)
decrees; and 3)
policies in Article 9 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note
185; to wit, •acts committed
should be dealt with
according to the laws, decrees and policies" was deliberate. Decrees and policies cannot contradict the law (~.,
NPC-enacted statutes) and the law itself cannot contradict
the Constitution.
See "Guangming Ribao Discusses Enforcement of Policies, Laws,• FBIS-cHI-79-221 (Nov. 14, 1979),
at Ll; 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Arts. 5, 62.
Legislation and issues concerning it, are delegated in the
first instance to the Legislative Affairs Commission of the
NPC Standing Committee.
See "Laws Concerning State Structure to be Revised," FBIS-cHI-82-220 (Nov. 15, 1982), at
K4.
In reality, CCP directives are effectively the supreme
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law of the land, though it would appear that CCP rev1s1ons
of existing law should, for the sake of appearance, pass
the NPC or its Standing Committee, the only organs empowered to revise the law.
See "Peng Zhen Discusses Task
of Public Security Organs,-"--FBIS-cHI-79-147
(July 30,
1979), at Ll.
See also Chiu, Socialist Legalism, supra
note 16 8.
--- ---237.

Recently promulgated State Council regulations have addressed an enormous range of activities, including, inter
alia, obscenity bans, exchange control regulations., theuse
~police weapons, supervision over explosive materials,
rewards for invention, product standardization, and changes
in administrative divisions at or above the county level.
See, ~· "Pornographic Sound, Video Recordings Banned,"
FBIS-cHI-82-050 (March 15, 1982), at Kl5; "'Full·Text' of
Regulations on Exchange Control," FBIS-CHI-80-138 (July 16,
1980), at L4; "State Council Calls for Tight Control of
Explosives,• FBIS-cHI-80-029 (Feb. 11, 1980), at L4; "State
Council Revises Invention Reward Regulations," FBIS-CHI-79013 (Jan. 18, 1979), at El5; "State Council Issues Standardization Regulations," FBIS-CHI-79-158 (Aug. 14, 1979),
at Ll; "State Council Approves New Administrative Divisions," FBIS-cHI-80-039 (Feb. 26, 1980), at Ll.

238.

This constitutional procedure was outlined in the recent
ratification of the 1980 UN Convention on the prohibition
or restriction on the use of certain conventional weapons
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.
See "Ling Qing Signs UN Accord on Conventional Weapons,.......-pBIS-cHI-81-179 (Sept. 16, 1981), at Al;
"Further on NPC Standing Committee Session:
Weapons Convention Resolution," FBIS-cHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at K8
[hereafter UN Weapons Convention].
The legislative ordering suggested above parallels
that prescribed ·by the 1978 PRC CONSTITUTION, which was in
force for both acts.
See "PRC Signs UN Convention on Discrimination Against
Women,•
FBIS-cHI-80-140
(July 18,
1980), at Al; "Fifth NPC Standing Committee Reportage Continues:
'UN Convention on Women'," FBIS-CHI-80-191 (Sept.
30, 1980), at L4.

239.

'Important NPC-drafted domestic legislation, like the 1982
PRC CONSTITUTION, is circulated throughout the country in
draft form prior to promulgation for official reaction to
provisions and education of the public. See, ~, "Company Workers Discuss Draft Constitution,• FBIS-CHI-82-111
(June 9, 1982), at Kll; "CPPCC Meeting Discusses Draft Constitution," FBIS-cHI-82-116 (June 16, 1982), at K6; "Further PRC Draft Constitution Discussions Held," FBIS-CHI-82126 (June 30, 1982), at Kl.

240.

In July, 1979, the second session of the fifth NPC promulgated four new organic laws - the Organic Law for Local
Congresses and Governments, the Organic Law for People's
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Courts, the Organic Law for People's Procuratorates and the
Electoral Law for the NPC and People' Congresses - designed, inter alia, to define permissible limits of local
power.--xi! four laws in translation may be found in "Seven
PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-CHI-79146 (July 27, 1979) PART I:
Supp. No. 019.
The effective
date of the laws was January 1, 1980.
241.

An inspectorate would be well advised to peruse the texts
of the speeches of various speakers at NPC sessions to discern traces of policy trends and potential conflicts.
The
PRC preoccupation with consensus apparently precludes more
open disagreement.
The floor speeches accompanying the
adoption of new laws could be used as a gauge for Chinese
attitudes toward formulation and execution of those laws.
Cf. note 164 suora.
But cf. "Renmin Ribao on Whether
Speeches Can becrTmes,.......-pBIS-CHI-82-140 (July 21, 1982),
at K2 (inflammatory speeches may be considered a criminal
act under Art. 10 of the PRC Crimina! Code).

242.

See, ~· "Pornographic Sound, Video Recordings Banned,"
FBIS-CHI-82-050 (March 15, 1982), at Kl5 (State Council/CCP
regulations issued);
"Hainan
Issues Circular
on Pornographic Goods," FBIS-cHI-82-071 (April 13, 1982), at P3
(issued by Hainan regional CCP committee); "Yunnan Circular
.on Pornographic Materials,"
FBIS-CHI-82-084
(April 30,
1982), at Q2 (issued by the Yunnan provincial CCP committee
and provincial people's government).
See also "Guangdong
Issues Government Pornography Notice." FBIS-CHI-82-067
(April 7, ).982), at P3 (issued by the provincial people's
council); Guandong Circular on Illegal Foreign Exchange,"
id., at P2 (issued by the provincial people's government
pursuant to State Council regulations); "Shandong Issues
Circular on Control of Firearms," FBIS-CHI-81-123 (June 26,
1981), at 52; "Xizang Issues Circular on Speculation Profiteering," FBIS-CHI-81-072 (Feb. 25, 1981), at Q4.
One may
notice the rather frequent participation of party committees in the issuance - and drafting - of these circulars.
Of course, circulars are not the only legislative enactments
of
local
governmental
organs.
See,
~·
"Guangdong Promulgates New Labor Regulations," FBIS-CHI-82048 (March 11, 1982), at Pl; "Beijing Promulgates Market
Control Regulations," FBIS-cHI-81-018 (Jan. 28, 1981), at
R2; "Heilongjiang City Bans Unauthorized Firearms," FBISCHI-79-237 (Dec. 7, 1979), at Sl.
For examples of permissible limits for local conforming legislation, see "Xizang Passes Bills Amending National
Law," FBIS-cHI-81-210 (Oct. 30, 1981), at Ql; (supplementing the PRC crim.inal procedure code, marriage law, and
electoral law).
Cf. "Renmin Ribao:
Ulanhu Writes on
Regional Autonomy,"FBIS-cHI-81-139 (July 21, 1981), at K3;
"Environment Discussed at Gansu Congress Session: Adopts
Protection Measures," FBIS-cHI-81-208 (Oct. 28, 1981), at
T2; "Sichuan Congress Standing Committee Meeting Held:
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Resolution on
1981), at Q2.

Criminal

Celses,"

FBIS-CHI-81-213

(Nov.

4,

243.

It is suggested that perceived non-conforming legislation
or other legislative or judicial obstructions to arms inspection operations be brought first to the attention of
the recently reestablished Ministry of Justice, which coordinates judicial and procuratorial work.
See "Justice
Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBIS-CHI-82-149
(Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl3.
Presumably, initial contact wth
the Ministry would expedite investigation of the matter.

244.

In American law, for example, invalidity or portions of an
act or some of its applications will not cause the whole
act to fall if the valid portions or possible applications
wich remain are capable of being given legal effect, and if
the legislature would have intended that which remained to
stand alone.
See, ~· Berea College v. Kentucky, 211
U.S. 45, 54-56 (1908); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. ll8,
121 (1919); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 u.s. 286, 289 (1924);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Buckley v. Vales, 424 U.S.
1 (1976).
This has given rise to severability clauses.
See note, 40 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1927).
But cf. note 203
suora and accompanying text.
- - -American courts will invalidate an entire statute only
where an invalid provision is so dependent on an otherwise
valid statute as to, by its removal, affect the constitutional
features and purposes of the act.
See, ~·
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).

245.

Limited distribution is partly the result of paper shortages in the PRC.
See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 193, at 399.

246.

~.

Faxue yanj iu (Studies in law), Minzhu yu fazhi (Democracy and the legal system); Renmin gong an (People's
public security)(restricted circulation), Renmin jiancha
(People's procuratorate) (restricted circulation), Renmin
sif~
(People's
judiciary)(restricted
circulation)
and
Zhongquo fazhi bao (China legal system daily).
See also
"Chinese Judicial Weekly,• FBIS~HI-80-121 (June 20, 1980),
at Ll4; "Legal Journal Calls for Abolishing Old Legal Practice,• FBIS-cHi-80-218 (Nov. 7, 19809), at L2l.
Several law books have also been published, including
Guojifa (International law), Falu zhishi wenda (Questions
and answers on law) and Falu jiben zhishi jianghua (Talks
on basic knowledge of law).
See Chiu, Socialist Legalism,
supra note 168, at 47 notes 8 and 9.

247.

See Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 146.
~ also Faxue
cidian
(Law Dictionary]
(published
in
Shanghai,
PRC,
1979) (definitions of many legal terms useful to the PRC are
included therein); note 60 supra.

-lll

For earlier collections of PRC statutory material,~
Hsia, Sources of PRC Law, supra note 1-68, at 25; CHINESE
DICTIONARIES (Chinese-Eng 1 ish Translation Assistance Group
ed. 1982), at 202-05.
248.

The Chinese press reports the sentences handed down to
criminals, but rarely reports on the judicial proceedings
or on any judicial deliberations. ~· ~· "Heilongjiang
Tries
Cultural
Revolution
Criminals,"
FBIS-CHI-82-183
(Sept. 21, 1982), at Sl; "Xizang's Lhasa Municipal Court
Sentences Criminals," FBIS-cHI-81-150 (Aug. 5, 1981), at
Q3; "Guizhou Intermediate Court Convicts, Executes Murderer," FBIS-cHI-80-159 (Aug. 14, 1980), at Ql; "Hainan
Court Sentences Perpetrators of Rural Gun Fight," FBIS-CHI80-059 (March 25, 1980), at P7.
Two notable exceptions were the trial of dissident Wei
Jingsheng and the trial of the gang of four, both of which
received extensive coverage.
See, ~· "Political Dissident Sentenced to 15 Years' Imprisonment," FBIS-CHI-79-201
(Oct. 16, 1979), at Ll; "Further Reportage on Trial of Wei
Jingsheng:
'Xinhua Reporter Is Account, In FBIS-CHI-79-202
(Oct. 17, 1979), at Ll; -'Public Prosecutor's Statement,'
id., at L3; 'Renmin Commentator's Article,' id., at L4;
"Further Report on Renmin Ribao Commentator in Wei Trial,"
FBIS-cHI-79-203 (Oct. 18, 1979), at L2; "Gang of Four Trial
Reportage Continues," FBIS-cHI-80-230 (Nov. 26, 1980), at
Ll; 'Jiang Tengjiao Testimony,' id.; Huang Yongshen, Li
Zuopeng in Docket' id., at L3; 'Xinhua Chinese on Offier's
Testimony', id., atL5; 'Jiang Qing Interrogated in First
Tribunal,' id., at L6; "Gang of Four Trial Reportage Continues From Beijing," FBIS-cHI-80-232 (Dec. 1, 19890), at
Ll-40; Chiu Certain Legal Aspects of the Recent Peking Trial of the "Gang of Four" and Others, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/
REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPT. ASIAN STUD. (No. 3-1981 (40)),
at 27-38.

249.

Much of this author's information was based on Foreign
Broadcast Information Service [FBIS] reports, declassified
translations of Chinese materials put out by a department
under the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency, which
published almost all PRC laws in translation.
See, ~·
"Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-.
CHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART I:
Supp. No. 019; PART II:
Supp. No. 020; "State Council Approves Regulations on Top
Quality Products," FBIS-cHI-79-133 (July 10, 1979), at LlO;
"Text of Law on Environmental Protection," FBIS-cHI-79-182
(Sept. 18, 1979), at Ll; "State Council Approves Regulations on Foreign Ships," FBIS-cHI-79-188 (Sept. 26, 1979),
at Ll;
"Guangdong Promulgates
Regulations on
Illegal
Emigration," FBIS-cHI-80-008 (Jan. 11, 1980), at Pl; "Xinhua Publishes Regulations on Guarding State Secrets," FBISCHI-80-073 (April 14, 1980), at L7; "Regualtions on Use of
Police Weapons, Arms Issued," FBIS-cHI-80-138 (July l6,
1980), at L4; "Text of Provisional Regula tons on Lawyers,•
FBIS-cHI-80-180 (Sept. · 15, 1980), at L26; "NPC Standing
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Committee Issues New Laws:
'Joint Venture's Law Text',"
FBIS-cHI-80-181 (Sept. 16, 1980), at Ll6; 'Income Tax Law
Text,' id., at Ll9: "Marriage Law Adopted by Fifth National
People'sCongress," FBIS-cHI-80-184 (Sept. 19, 1980), at
L22; "Rules on Carrying Foreign Exchange Published," FBISCHI-81-154 (Aug. 11, 1981), at K4; "Xinhua Publishes Draft
of Revised Constitution," FBIS-cHI-82-083 (April 29, 1982),
at Kl.
250.

H. BERMAN AND P. MAGGS, DISARMAMENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET
LAW 12-13 (1967) [hereafter BER."'lAN AND MAGGS).
See also
ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 39: note 246
supra.
Chinese secrecy about PRC legal development is not a
new concept. Disclosure of information about the judicial
system was made punishable under the State Secrets Regulations adopted in the early years of the PRC (1951). Hsia,
Sources of PRC Law, supra note 168, at 27.

251.

~BERMAN

252.

The Ministry of Justice was established with the approval
of the NPC Standing Committee on September 13, 1979.
~
"Decisions Announced at Fifth NPC Standing Committee Session" FBIS-cHI-79-180 (Sept. 14, 1979), at Ll.

253.

See "Justice Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBISCHI-82-149 (Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl3: New Minister of Justice
Interviewed, Beijing Review, No. 42 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 34.
See also "Shaanxi Judicial Official Discusses Legal
System," FBIS-CHI-81-119 (June 22, 1981), at Tl.

254.

The Ministry of Justice was recetly assigned the following
tasks:

AND MAGGS, supra note 250, at 13.

1.

Guiding and managing the training of judicial per
sonnel, including directing political and law
schools to develop legal curriculums:

2.

Publicizing and propagandizing the legal system:

3.

Managing lawyers' work:

4.

Managing notarization work:

5.

Supervi.sing
canmi ttees 1

6.

Organizing participation in international judicial
activitiies:

7.

Investigating questions of theory and pol icy in
judicial work and iltudying juvenile delinquency
and other criminal activities:

the

work
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of

people's

mediation

8.

Supervising judicial administrative organs.

See "Justice Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBISCHI-82-149 (Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl4.
Note that these assigned tasks are an expansion of those powers earlier associated with the Ministry, wit·h the notable exceptions of the
tasks of compiling codes of laws and publishing law books.
Compare Ne•..r Minister of Justice Interviewed, Beijing Review, No. 42 (Oct. 19, 1979), at 3-4.
255.

Many of the guidelines for judicial personnel may be formulated by judicial committees, the people's cour-t organ entrusted with such tasks as summing up experience in juficial work, discussing important and complicated cases and
the application of relevant laws and decrees to them, and
exchanging views on criminal cases not specifically defined
in the criminal law.
See qenerally "Renmin Ribao· Discusses
Role of Judicial Committees," FB IS-CHI-80 -03 8 (Feb. 25,
1980), at Ll7; "Shaanxi Judicial official Discusses Legal
System," FBIS-cHI-81-119 (June 22, 1981), at Tl; "Justice
Minister Views Judicial Administration," FBIS-cHI-82-149
(Aug. 3, 1982), at Kl3.

256.

Article 43 of the 1978 PRC Constitution gave the procuracy
the power to "ensure observance of the Constitution and the
law," a power which was deleted from the 1982 Constitution,
but which nevertheless exists impliedly in the Organic Procuratorate Law.
Procuratorial powers were apparently not successfully
forged until the adoption of the 1979 Organic Procuratorate
Law.
As late as March 27, 1979 -- a full year after the
adoption of the 1978 Constitution, the chief procurator of
the Supreme People's Procuratorate, Huang Huoqing, was
still calling for the rebuilding of procuratorial organs
and the enlistment of a "good revolutionary contingent of
procuratorial cadres."
See "Huang Huoqing Article on Tasks
of Procuratorial Work," FBIS-cHI-79-060 (March 27, 1979),
at L7.
See also "Zhejiang Chief Procurator in Democracy,
Legal System:"fBIS-CHI-79-072 (April 12, 1979), at 06;
"Heilongjiang Ribao Editorial Stresses Procuratorial Work,"
FBIS-cHI-79-071
(April 11, 1979), at 51; Hubei Reestablishes People's Procuratorates,• FBIS-cHI-79-047 (March
8, 1979), at Hl; "Guizhou Province Reestablishes People's
Procuratorates," FBIS-CHI-79-043 (March 3, 1979), at J2;
"Guangzi Reestablishes People's Procuratorates,• id., at
H3; "Beijing Municipality Restores Procuratorial Organs,"
FBIS-cHI-79-042 (March 2, 1979), at Kl.

257.

See note 151 supra.
of Procuratorates,"
Ql.

Cf. "Guizhou Meeting Discusses Tasks
FBIS-cHI-79-054 (March 19, 1979), at

258.

See Yegorov, supra note 168, at 128.
Procuratorial duties
include striking at counterrevolutionaries, punishing other
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criminals, approving arrests ad suppressing treasonous activities.
ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAW, supra note 151, Art.
4.
See also "Henan Procuratorate Approves Arrest of Former
Yiyang Official," FBIS-cHI-79-068 (April 6, 1979), at P2.
259.

Yegorov, supra note 168, at 128.
See also "Chief Procurator's Report to NPC Session," FBIS-CHI-81-244 (Dec. 21,
1981), at K5; "People's Procuratorates Legal Achievements
Cited," FBIS-CHI-81-014 (Jan. 22, 1981), at L20; "Procuratorates Intensify Economic Crime Inspection," FBIS-CHI81-054 (!'larch 20, 1981), at L21; "National Conference of
Chief Procurators Held," FBIS-CHI-81-205 (Oct. 23, 1981),
at Kl; "Procuratorates Increase Work on Economic Cases,"
FBIS-cHI-80-170 (Aug. 29, 1980), at L9.

260.

There has been a number of instances of "rehabilitation"
and retrials in the PRC although the exact role of the procuracy in these processes is not clear.
In some instances,
the PRC rehabilitated (i.e., released and cleared of charges) those who had allegedly been unjustly prosecuted before
the capture of the Gang of Four.
See, ~· "AFP:
Government Rehabilitates Prominent Dissident Writer," FBIS-CHI80-223 (Nov. 17, 1980), at L9 (rehabilitation of Hu Feng,
who was imprisoned by Mao Zedong as a counterrevolutionary);
"Nei Monggol Completes Reexamination of Criminal
Cases," FBIS-CHI-80-230 (Nov. 26, 1980), at Rl; "Renmin
Ribao on Redressing False, Wrong Cases," FBIS-CHI-81-002
(Jan. 5, 1981), at Lll.
These articles reported on the wholesale reexa~ination
of criminal cases by "judicial departments" and "courts,"
in order to rehabilitate wrongly accused Chinese.
In practice, it appeared that the CCP issued the order for
rehabilitation and the courts simply adjusted their decisions.
In theory, there should have been some official
procuratorial
appeal
to
the
courts
to
initiate
the
reexamination process, although this was not reported.
There has also been a smattering of criminal retrials,
allegedly because of some deficiency in the applicaton of
the
law.
See,
~·
"Liaoning
Higher
Court
Annuls
Municipal Court Decision,• FBIS-CHI-80-100 (May 21, 1980),
at Sl; "Beijing Radio Praises Liaoning Procuratorate Decision," FBIS-cHI-80-101 (May 22, 1980), at 52.
These articles reported on an assault and robbery of three people.
The Liaoning Higher Court annulled the municipal intermediate people's court sentence of two years imposed on the
defendant for his conviction on the single offense of robbery.
The Intermediate Court, on defendant's appeal, reversed the District People's Court's five-year sentence (on
June 5, 1979).
In February 1980, the Liaoning Provincial
People's Procuratorate, pursuant to Art. 17 of the ORGANIC
PROCURATORATE Law, supra note 151, and Art. 149 of the PRC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, infra note 276, appealed to the
Liaoning Provincial HigherPeople' s Court on the ground
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The higher court retthat the sentence was too lenient.
ried the case in April 1980, found the defendant guilty of
multiple offenses, and sentenced him to seven years'
imprisonment.
~
also
"Liaoning
Retries
Cultural
Revolution
Criminal," FBIS-cHI-82-168 (Aug. 30, 1982), at 04 (alle.ging
mass demand for retrial of Jing Oechun, whose five year
sentence was considered too light for his crimes); "Liaoning Resentences 'Archcriminal' to 20 Years," FBIS-CHI-82176 (Sept. 10, 1982), at 51 (resentencing Jing Dechun for
murder, hooliganism, and gr~ft).
In Jing's case, PRC legal
theory would have dictated some form of procuratorial appeal of the original sentence, perhaps based on new
evidence garnered by procuratorial and public security organs. The articles, however, are not specific n the role~
of these organs in the subsequent disposition of the case.

But see "Supreme People's Court Overrules Shenyang
Court--necision," FBIS-cHI-80-218 (Nov. 7, 1980), at L32.
This appears to be the only publicized example of appellate
remand as a result of too harsh a sentence.
The Supreme
People's Court overruled the Shenyang Intermediate Court's
pronouncement of death on a charge of embezzlement, stating
that the defendants were guilty of the lesser crime of
theft, for which capital punishment should not issue.
The procuratorial exercise of power in these instances
indicates the degree of caution with which an arms inspectorate must approach this governmental body for requests of
ruling modifications.
Procuratorial power thus becomes a
double-edged sword and can be used as readily by PRC authorities to obstruct inspection operations as it can by an
inspectorate
to
protest
administrative
and
judicial
interference.
261.

Yegorov, supra note 168, at 128.

262.

Huang Huoqing, chief procurator of the Supreme People's
Procuratorate in 1979, was alleged to have disclosed at the
11th meeting of the CCP Central Committee that procuratorates were not clear on the limits of their functions and
power and that members of the CCP Central Committee did not
have a good grasp of the law. The abruptness 9f the latter
statement was probably one reason why the report of Hua's
remarks did not surface in the PRC press, but, rathe,, appeared in the Hong Kong Communist Press. ~ "Ming Pao on
'Unsound' PRC Procuratorial System," FBIS-cHI-79-146 (July
2 7, 19 7 9 ) , at Ul.

263.

Article 9 of the ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAW, supra note 151,
declares:
People's procuratorates shall exercise their procuratorial authority independently in accordance with the
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law and shall not be subject to interference by other
administrative organs, organizations, or individuals.
See also Article 133 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION,
supra----note 104.
Articles calling for procuratorial independence include "Hubei Holds Conference of Chief Procurators,
Court
Presidents,"
FBIS-cHI-79-179
(Sept.
13,
1979), at P3; "Ye Jianying Discusses Revisions in Nation's
Legal System," FBIS-CHI-79-032 (Feb. 14, 1979), at E4.
See
also notes 253-56 supra. Cf. "Renmin Ribao Praises Impartial Procurator," FBIS-CHI-82-055 (March 22, 1982), at Kl9.
Procuratorial integrity may be further undermined by
the probability that many procurators are CCP members.
Article 1 of the CCP Constitution, supra note 157, requires
CCP members to "carry out Party decisions."
Article 4 of
the ORGANIC PROCURATORATE LAW, supra note 151, calls for
procuratorial independence.
It is not difficult to envision the conflict that might arise when CCP cadres engaged
in procuratorial work are confronted with Party directives
which bear on procuratorial functions.
Cf.
"Tianjin People's Procuratorate Issues Rules for Cadre Conduct," FBISCHI-79-185 (Sept. 21, 1979), at R4 (noting that duties included:
upholding the principle of equality before the
law; refusing to accept bribes; guarding state and Party
secrets; strengthening investigatory work; and, exercising
procuratorial work independencly).
264.

See note 151, supra.

265.

See note 168, supra.

266.

Compare Ar tiel e 4 of the ORGANIC COURT LA\i, supra. note 151,
which declares:
"The people's courts exercise their judicial authority independently and are only subordinated to
the law."
The Chinese press has also published reports
calling for judicial independence.
See, ~, "Supreme
People's Court President on Judicial Organs," FBIS-CHI-80009 (Jan. 14, 1980), at Lll; "Hubei Holds Conference of
Chief
Procurators,
Court
Presidents,"
FBIS-CHI-79-179
(Sept. 13, 1979), at P3; "Ye Jianying Discusses Revisions
in Nation's Legal System," FBIS-cHI-79-032 (Feb. 14, 1979),
at E4; "Heilongjiang Judge Discusses Strengthening of Judicial System," FBIS-cHI-79-028 (Feb. 8, 1979), at L2.
See
also notes 253-56 supra.
---

267.

See "Central Press Publishes NPC Regulations on Local Organizations:
'People's Mediation Committees' ,• FBIS-cHI80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L6.
See also note 189 supra.

268.

See also "Mediation Organs Reduce Civil Cases in Hunan
Province," FBIS-cHI-78-156 (Aug. 11, 1978), at H2; "Mediators in Beijing Resolve Civil Disputes," FBIS-cHI-81-115
(June 16, 1981), at R2 •. China's System of Community Mediation, Beijing Review, No. 47 (Nov. 23, 1981), at 23; MediatiOri resolves 1.4 million civil cases, China Daily, July
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14,

1982, at 1; Five million mediators help solve
China Daily, Aug. 25, 1982, at 1.

civil

~'

269.

Yegorov, supra not 168, at 128.
PRC authorities are aware
that volunteer judges cannot serve the same function as
legally-trained ones and hence have made efforts to provide
judicial instruction to large numbers of those involved in
judicial procedure.
~, ~, "Tianjin Issues Rules of
Discipline for Court Jurors,• FBIS-CHI-79-165 (Aug. 23,
1979), at R2; "Beijing People's Courts Train Assessors,"
FBIS-cHI-79-141 (July 20, 1979), at Rl (noting that people's assessors were being trained pursuant to Article 9 of
the Organic Court Law); "Chinese Schools Training More Students in Politics, Law," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at
Ll8; "Beijing Judicial Assistants," FBIS-CHI-79-051 (March
14, 1979), at K2 (noting that judicial assistants were
being assigned to people's communes in Beijing municipality
to help with civil dispute9 and minor criminal violations);
"Fuj ian Court Vice-President's Suggestions on Legal System," FBIS-cHI-79-009 (Jan. 12, 1979), at Gl (calling for
the reestablishment of all judicial organs).

270.

"Two trials' actually means that the defendant is entitled
to one appeal of right to the next highest court before
judgment is final.
See, ~· "Beijing Municipal Court
Rejects Wei Jingsheng's Appeal," FBIS-CHI-79-217 (Nov. 7,
1979), at Ll.

271.

Higher and intermediate people's courts have also set up
"economic divisions" to handle "economic disputes."
See
"Beijing Wanbao Reports First 'Economic Trial' ,• FBIS-CHI80-125 (June 26, 1980), at Ll3 (factory claim for resti tution and punitive damages for delivery of faulty, obsolete
machinery from supplier. The court rejected the claim but
ordered the supplier to make the machinery suitable for its
intended purpose).
See also "More Economic Courts Established to Settle Disputes," FBIS-cHI-80-133 (July 9,
1980), at L6.

272.

See also 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, Art. 127.

273.

Since 1979, the Supreme People's Court has had original
jurisdiction in 4 cases: A)
the Gang of Four; B)
a case
involving a 3-star Chinese general; C) -a case involving an
American air force pilot shot down over Manchuria; D)
an
unpublicized case.
This information was imparted to the
author by an anonymous PRC legal official.

274.

Legal interpretation has since been divided among a nmber
of organs including the NPC Standing Committee, local
standing committees, the State Council, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Supreme People's Court.
For
an explanation of the interpretive jurisdiction of each,
see "NPC Standing Committee Meetng Concludes 10 June:
ReSolution on Law Interpretation," FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June
11, 1981), at K3.
See~ "Wang Harbin NPC Report on Law
- 118 -

Interpretation Cited,"
Kl5.

FBIS-cHI-81-118

(June 19, 1981), at

275.

Actually, Article 13 requires Supreme Court approval for
all
death sentences,
but
legislative
fiat
has
since
modified this provision.
For certain capital offenses,
Higher
People's
Court
approval
is
sufficient.
This
modification is designed to expedite punishment and is in
effect until Dec. 31, 1983.
See "NPC Standing Committee
Meeting Concludes 10 June:
Decisions on Death Sentences,"
FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June 11, 1981), at K4.

276.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, Art. 129.
The PRC Criminal
Procedure Code was passed on July 1, 1979 at the Second
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and entered
into force on Jan. 1. 1980.
See Gongan fagui huibian, su~ note 146,
at 34-65.
Th Eng ish text may be found in
"Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBISCHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART II:
Supp. No. 020.
The
effective date of the code was January 1, 1980.
See also
"Renmin Ribao Calls for Safeguarding Right of Appeal,"
FBIS-cHI-79-239 (Dec. 11, 1979), at L3.

277.

See, ~· note 260, supra.
But see Article 136
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 276, whih
that cases in which fact..Jal ambiguities exist
"returned for retrial to the .
• court which
heard the case" (Art. 136(3)).

278.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 276, Art. 131.

279.

ORGANIC COURT LAW, suora note 151, Art. 29.
A special
court and special procuratorate were set up to try the Gang
of Four.
See "Late Report:
Trial Arrangements Approved
for Gang," FBIS-CHI-80-190 (Sept. 29, 1980), at L24.

280.

Yegorov, supra note 168, at 126.

281.

Pursuant to Article 41, "All cases in the People's Courts
are heard in pub! ic except those involving special circumstances, as prescribed by law.
"
See also "Taichou
People's Municipal Court Praises Public Trials;n-FBIS-CHI78-220 (Nov. 14, 1978), at E8; "Shanghai Resumes Open Court
Hearings After 10 Years," FBIS-CHI-78-143 (July 25, 1978),
at G5.

282.

Yegorov, supra note 168, at 129.

283.

Id. Cf.
"Qinghai Ribao Urges Punishment of Policemen Who
Beat:People," FBIS-cHI-80-188 (Sept. 25, 1980), at Tl.

284.

Both the 1978 and 1982 PRC Constitutions have circumscribed
the official duties of pub! ic security bodies and passed
some of their functions to the procuratorate. The 1982 PRC
Constitution, however, does not detail procuratorial powers
as specifically as its predecessor, the 1978 Constitution,
- 119 -

of the PRC
stipulates
are to be
originally

other than noting that the procuratorate is a "state organ
for supervising the law" (Art. 131).
Impliedly, the 1982
PRC Constitution may therefore have restored some of the
previous powers of public security organs, although the
Organic Procuratorate Law is still valid.
285.

Adopted at the sixth session of the Standing Committee of
the Fifth NPC.
The text may be found in "NPC Promulgates
New Regulations on Arrests, Detentions:
Text of Regulations," FBIS-cHI-79-039 (Feb. 26, 1979), at E3 [hereafter
Arrest Regulations].

286.

Article 2 of the Arrest Regulations, id., precludes arrest
"except by the decision of a people'S court or with the
sanction of a people's procuratorate" (emphasis added).
Article 4, para. 1, empowers public security organs to make
arrests "as decided upon by a people's court or sanctioned
by a people's procuratorate." However, Article 4, para. 2,
notes that prior to an arrest by a public security organ,
the "sanction of a people's procurator ate" must be obtained.
The language is somewhat ambiguous, inasmuch as
Article 2 and Article 4, para. 1, use the disjunctive [or]
to indicate the requirement of the approval of either the
courts .2.! the procuratorates.
Article 4, para. 2, on the
other hand, appears to require procuratorial approval in
all cases.
In practice, it appears as if procuratorial approval
is always sought before arrest.
See "Peng Zhen Discusses
Task of Public Security Organs," FBIS-CHI-79-147 (July 30,
1979), at Ll.
Strong support for exclusive procuratorial
approval is implied by Article 47 of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 276, which grants the people's procuratorate the power "to approve arrest, not to approve
arrest, or to request a supplementary investigation."

287.

Article 6 of the Arrest Regulations, supra note 285, reads:
A public security organ may in an emergency detain,
before it has obtained a warrant, any active criminal
whose crime justified his arrest or who is suspected
of having committed a major crime provided he is:
1)

A person who is preparing to commit a crime
or is discovered immediately after committing
a crime1

2)

A person who is identified as having committed a crime by the victim of the crime or by
an eyewitness 1

3)

A person who is found to be carrying criminal
evidence on his person or keeping criminal
evidence at his home1
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4)

A person who is attempting to commit suicide
or to escape, or who is in flight after
having committed a crime;

5)

A person who destroys or fabricates evidence,
or is suspected of being an accomplice in
such acts;

6)

A person who carries no identification papers
and is suspected of having committed major
crimes here and there;

7)

A person who engages in beating, smashing,
looting or (illegal confiscation ? :
illegible Chinese-ed. note)
or who is
carrying out sabotage of work, production of
social order.

Article 6 is substantively ambiguous.
The first paragraph
permits detention of "any active criminal", while the
remainder of the provision invites a different reading:
that anyone who arouses suspicion is vulnerable to detention.
A perusal of PRC press reports from 1978-1980 did
not turn up any publicized stories of detentions made on
the basis of aroused suspicion, but an explanation of the
term "detention" in a 1979 article explaining criminal procedure terms refers to the possibility of detaining a person "seriously
suspected
of
a
crime."
See
"Xinhua
Publishes Explanation of Criminal Procedure Law Terms,"
FBIS-cHI-79-136 (July 13, 1979), at L2.
288.

See Article 6 of the Arrest Regulations, suora note 285.

289.

Public security organs detained an American student, teaching in the PRC, for the alleged violation of Chinese secrecy laws relating to agriculture. The United States claimed
that PRC public security organs violated a bilateral consular agreement between the two countries in detaining her.
See "American Expelled for 'Stealing China's Secrets',"
FBIS-cHI-82-107 (June 3, 1982), at Bl.

290.

The PRC has no insurance system to cover instances of tort
liabilty for harm to individuals. Thus, for example, in an
accident involving two bicyclists in Beijing, a public
security officer would fill out a report indicating whom he
believed the tortfeasor to be. On this basis, the tortfeasor would be responsible for compensating the other injured
party for medical bills, lost wages, etc.
The tortfeasor
would have no recourse to any judicial hearing prior to, or
after this determination.
In practice, though, compensation is often limited
because of the indigence of the tortfeasor and his relatives, who may also be required to make restitution.
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This information was imparted
anonymous PRC legal official.

to

the

author

by

an

291.

See Yegorov, supra note 168, at 129.
See generallv BUTTERFIELD, supra note 193, at 90-91, 334-35.

292.

See Renmin ribao,
note 168, at 129.

293.
294.

See

also

Ar t •

"""'S(T) •

PRC

Oct.

ORGANIC

21, 1978,

cited

PROCURATORATE

LAW,

in Yegorov,
supra

note

supra
151,

Detention in the PRC is not limited to formal imprisonment.
The Chinese employ a vast network of labor reform camps
populated by thousands of prisoners, many of whom are
political prisoners and many of whom have been sentenced
without the benefit of formal legal process.
The PRC employs two resocialization techniques:
reeducation through
labor and rehabilitation (reform) through labor.
The latter requires no judicial proceedings before nor judicial
review during assignment, which may be up to four years.
For a startling account of labor camp conditions, see BAO
RUE-WANG, PRISONER OF MAO (1976).
See also Anmesty International Report, Political Imprisolmnent in the People's
Republic of China (1978).
Comoare "Peng Chong Visits
Reeducation-Through-Labor Farm ,• FBIS-CHI-81-192 (Oct. 5,
1981), at K9; "Zhongguo Xinwen She on Visit to Beijing
Prison," FBIS-cHI-81-204 (Oct. 22, 1981), at K6; "AFP Correspondents Write on Visit to Beijing Prison," FBIS-CHI-80116 (June 13, 1980), at L4.
Given the informality, inconsistency, and relative
secrecy of labor reform camp pol icy, its application to
inspectorate personnel is doubtful.

295.

PRC press articles calling for a strengthened socialist
legal system abound.
See, ~· Wren, China Moves to
Resurrect A Credible Legai System, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1982, at Al;
"Political, Legal Work in Modernization
Urged ,• FBIS-cHI-82-150 (Aug. 4, 1982), at Kl; "Renmin
Ribao Article on Developing Legal System," FBIS-CHI-81-215
(Nov. 6, 1981), at K4; "Renmin Ribao on Democracy, Legal
System," FBIS-cHI-81-202 (Oct. 20, 1981), at K7; "Renmin
Ribao Carries More Excerpts of 'NPC Deputies' Speeches:
Opinions on Strengthening Legal Work,"
FBIS-cHI-80-187
(Sept. 24, 1980), at Ll4; "Huang Huoqing Addresses Conference on Prosecuting Criminals," FBIS-cHI-80-131 (July 7,
1980), at Ll3; "Renmin Ribao Discusses Stability, Legal
System,• FBIS-cHI-80-018 (Jan. 25, 1980), at Ll3; "Hongqi
Carries Peng Zhen Article on Socialist Legal System," FBISCHI-79-229 (Nov. 27, 1979), at L2; "Guangming Ribao Explains Role of Law in Modernization,• FBIS-cHI-79-144 (July
25, 1979), at L2; "Ye Jianying Discusses Revisions in Nation's Legal System,• FBIS-cHI-79-032 (Feb. 14, 1979), at
E4; n Fuij ian Court Notes Vice-President Is Suggestions on
Legal System,• FBIS-cHI-79-009 (Jan. 12, 1979), at Gl;
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"Peking Meeting Discusses Legal System, Democracy,w FBISCHI-78-232 (Dec. 1, 1978), at E8; "Kwangming Daily Calls
for Strengthening Legal System," FBIS-CHI-78-223 (Nov. 17,
1978), at E8; "Wang Feng Favors Strengthened Legal System,"
FBIS-cHI-78-250 (Dec. 28, 1978), at M3.
296.

See, ~· Peking Fires Its First Submarine-Launched Missile, N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982, at Al5; "Further Coverage
OT2o Sep Satellite Launched," FBIS-cHI-81-184 (Sept. 23,
1981), at K2; "Wen Wei Po Editorial on Upcoming ICBM Test,"
FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 12, 1980), at Ul; "Hua Guofeng Meets
China-Japan Friendship Delegation:
Kyodo Cities Hua on
ICBM," FBIS-cHI-80-096 (May 15, 1980), at D2; wLi Xiannian
Discusses ICBM Test at Wellington Press Conference," FBISCHI-80-097 (May 16, 1980), at E2; "Xinhua Reports 'Successful' Rocket Launch," FBIS-cHI-80-098 (May 19, 19809), at
El; "Beijing Press Reports on Successful Missile Test:
Jiefangjun Bao Commentary," FBIS-cHI-80-103 (May 27, 1980),
at LB.
In 1975, the PRC became the third nation to launch a
reconnaisance satellite. See Leng, Arms Control and Disarmament in Chinese Global POlicy [hereafter Leng) in CHINA
IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 164-86, 164 (Hsiung and Kim ed.,
1980) [hereafter HSIUNG AND KIM].
Through March 15, 1978, the PRC had conducted 20
nuclear tests, the first of which was on Oct. 16, 1964.
See "Satallite Launches, Nuclear Tests Listed," FBIS-CHI79-186 (Sept. 24, 1979), at L12.
Leng reported that 25
nuclear tests had been conducted by Dec. 14, 1978.
See
Leng, supra note 296, at 165.
The PRC has also recently
reported that it possesses nuclear-powered submarines.
See
Journal of Commerce, Sept. 29, 1380, at 9.
--

297.

After the 1980 ICBM test, a Wen Wei Po editorial reported
that the ICBM test proved the Chinese could master advanced
technology· and create a peaceful environment for its four
modernizations.
See "Ta Kung Pao on Launching of PRC
Satellites," FBIS-cHI-81-189 (Sept. 30, 1981), at W4; "Wen
Wei Po Editorial on Upcoming ICBM Test," FBIS-cHI-80-093
(May 11, 1980), at Ul.

298.

See, ~· wHuang Hua Speaks at UN Disarmament Session,w
FBIS-cHI-82-114 (June 14, 1982), at Al; wyu Peiwen Gives
PRC Stand on Disarmament Issues,w FBIS-cHI-81-147 (July 31,
1981), at Al; Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 32 (Aug. 5,
1966), at 15 cited in Leng, Arms Control, in LENG AND CHIU,
supra note 1,~5~ China's preoccupaton with the threat
to peace posed by the Soviet Union's global hegemonism is
frequently reported in the Chinese press and is often used
to justify self-defense efforts of the PRC and other Second
and Third World countries.
See, ~· • Renmin Ribao Discusses U.S., USSR 'Nucleomania' ,• FBIS-cHI-82-195 (Oct. 7,
1982), at Al; "Commentary Views USSR-U.S. Nuclear Talks,w
FBIS-cHI-82-071. (April 13, 1982), "Renmin Ribao on Soviet
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'Threat' to World Peace," FBIS-cHI-82-019 (Jan. 28, 1982),
at Cl; "Jiefangjun Bao Says USSR Led PRC to Nuclear Arms,"
FBIS-cHI-81-145 (July 29, 1981), at Cl; "Xinhua Commentary
on Soviet-SRV Plot Against PRC," FBIS-cHI-80-189 (Sept. 26,
1980), at C3; "PRC Media Warns Against Soviet Worldwide
Hegemonism ," FBIS-cHI-80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980), at C2; "Wen
Wei Po Reports on Soviet Threat on Chinese Border," FBISCHI-80-154 (Aug. 7, 1980), at U6; "Xinhua Comments on
Soviet Military Threat in S.E. Asia," FBIS-CHI-80-151 (Aug.
4, 1980), at Cl; "Soviet Expansionism Must be Stopped to
Prevent World War," FBIS-CHI-80-140 (July 18, 1980), at Cl;
"Hongqi:
Soviet Economy Geared for War," FBIS-CHI-80-139
(July 17, 1980), at Cl; "Renmin Ribao on Soviet 'Peace Offensive' Against Norway," FBIS-cHI-80-064 (April 1, 1980),
at C2; "Renmin Ribao Quotes Xinhua on Soviet Threat to
South Asia," FBIS-cHI-80-035 (Feb. 20, 1980), at Cl; "Renmin Ribao on Soviet Partial Withdrawal," id., at C2; "Xinhua Correspondent on Increasing Soviet Threat," id., at C3.
299.

The most direct exception is the recent PRC accession to
the UN Weapons Convention, supra note 238.
The PRC has also acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol
for the prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare on Julv 13, 1952.
See JOHNSTON liND CHIU, suora
note 64, at 275:
---The Chinese ambassador to Mexico signed Additioal Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) on Aug. 21,
1973.
On April 23, 1974, the PRC ratified Additional Protocol II and delivered the instrument of ratification to
Mexico, the depository for the Treaty, on June 11, 1974.
See U.N. DOC. A/9718 (Sept. 4, 1974); U.N. DOC. A/9209
(Oct. 9, 1973), at 2.
See also PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80,
supra note 27, at 216.
-- --The Chinese also signed Additioal Protocol I I to the
Treaty of February 14, 1967 for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons on Aug. 21, 1973. See PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80,
supra note 27, at 214.

300.

On Jan. 21, 1960, the NPC Standing Committee asserted that:
China has always favored universal disarmament and
will unhesitatingly commit herself to international
obligations to which she agrees.
However, it must be
pointed out that any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal participation and
the signature of her delegate, cannot, of course, have
any binding force on China.
Beijing (Peking) Review,
No. 4 (Jan. 26, 1960), at 14 cited in LENG ArlO CHIU,
supra note 1, at 248.
---
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301.

See Leng, supra note 296, at 166; LENG AND CHIU, supra note
1, at 249.

302.

The Chinese have characterized the superpower nuclear monopoly as an attempt to keep "the spear [while not allowing] others to have the shield."
See "People's Daily on
US-USSR Controversy Over Neutron Bomb," FBIS-cHI-78-080
(April 25, 1978), at Al.
See also L. LIU, CHINA AS A
NUCLEAR POWER IN WORLD POLITICS--r5"-26 ( 1972); LENG AND
CHIU, supra note 1, at 246-50; KIM, supra note 20, at 172;
U.N. DOC. A/8536 (Nov. 24, 1971), at 3; "U.S., USSR Nuclear
Disarmament Roles Discussed," FBIS-CHI-82-188 (Sept. 28,
1982), at Al (condemning a comprehensive nuclear test ban
as an effort to help the superpowers consolidate their
nuclear
superiority);
"PRC UN
Representative
Condemns
Superpowers' Arms Race," FBIS-CHI-78-208 (Oct. 26, 1978),
at Al (arms control negotiations were a fraud designed to
maintain the superpower nuclear monopoly); "Huang Hua to
Attend UN Disarmament Meeting," FBIS-CHI-78-093 (May 12,
1978), at Al (PRC continued to oppose exclusive possession
of nuclear weapons by superpowers); "US-USSR Interest in
Test Ban Talks Revived," FBIS-CHI-77-246 (Dec. 22, 1977),
at Al (comprehensive test ban treaty precluded other nations from conducting nuclear tests).
As late as mid-1980, the PRC exhorted Third World
countries to break the superpower nuclear monopoly.
S.:e
"PRC UN Official Addresses Disarmament Committee ,• FBISCHI-80-095 (May 14, 1980), at A6.

303.

During the late 1950s, the Soviet Union began to modify its
previous support for total nuclear disarmament in favor of
1 im i ted nuclear arms control.
The Soviets proposed, for
instance, nuclear free zones in Germany ( 1956) and in the
Middle East (1958). See Leng, supra note 296, at 166.
In the context of the developing Sino-Soviet rift, the
PRC moved away from its support of Soviet arms control proposals and asserted its own position, calling for the "concrete,
thorough,
total,
and
resolute
prohibition and
destruction" of nuclear weapons.
Peking (Beijing) Review,
No. 31 (Aug. 2, 1963), at 8.
See also People of the World,
United for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (printed by the
Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1963); A. YODER, CHINESE
POLICIES TOWARD LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 22 (1980); Verbatim Record of the 27th Meeting of the First Committee, U.N.
DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.27, at 13 (Nov. 4, 1980) (statement of Mr.
Wu Zhen); Verbatim Record of the lOth Meeting of the First
Committee, U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.l09, at 26 (Oct. 22, 1980)
(statement of Mr. ·Lai Yali); Speech by the Chairman of the
Chinese Delegation at the First Substantive Session of the
UN Disarmament Commission, PRC Press Release (May 15, 1979)
(Annex); "Ji Pengfei Reiterates PRC Nuclear Policy,·" FBISCHI-82-091 (May 11, 1982), at A2; "PRC Delegate Addresses
Geneva Disarmament Conference," FBIS-cHI-80-025 (Feb. 5_,
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1980), at Al; "PRC Representative Speaks on Disarmament at
UN Meeting ,• FBIS-cHI-79-210 (Oct. 29, 1979), at Al; "Lai
Yali Scores Superpowers at Disarmament Session End," FBISCHI-79-113 (June 11, 1979), at AS; "PRC Delegate Speaks on
Nuclear We a pons in La tin America," FB IS-cHI -7 9-0 85 (May 1,
1979); at Jl; "PRC Delegate· to UN Addresses Disarmement
Issue," FBIS-cHI-78-223 (Nov. 17, 1978), at Al; "Chen Chu
Submits Paper," FBIS-CHI-78-112 (June 9, 1978), at A2;
"Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-104 .(May 30, 1978), at A3;
"Chinese Representative Reiterates China's Principal Stand
on Disarmament at UN First Committee," SCMP no. 6238
(Dec. 13, 1976), at 39; "Chinese Delegate Exposes Soviet
'Disarmament' Fraud," SCMP no. 5981 (Nov. 24, 1975), at 29.
304.

The exclusion of any plan to eliminate conventional forces
was based largely on the Mao Zedong concept of the atom
bomb as a "paper tiger."
In accordance with Mao's teachings, the atom bomb and other nuclear weapons would not
play the decisive role in war:
such weapons were useful
from a tactical standpoint only and not from a strategic
one. Rather, the "people's war [was] a hundred and a thousand times stronger than the power of
atomic
weapons."
See "The Atom Bomb is a Paper Tiger" SCMP no.
6382 (July 18, 1977), at 9.
See also "Atom Bombs Are Also
Paper Tigers,• SCMP no. 6367 (June2"4: 1977), at 178; Leng,
Arms Control, in LENG AND CHIU, supra note 1, at 246-47;
Powell, Gr~at Powers and Atomic Borobs are 'Paper Tigers',
23 CHINA Q. 55, 55-63 (July Sept. 1965); Leng, ~ note
296, at 165.
Mao considered bombs important for sel £-defense purposes.
To a large degree, contemporary Chinese leaders
have incorporated this philosophy into their justifications
for modernizing and upgrading their weapons capability so
as to assure themselves of a peaceful environment for pursuit of the four modernizations.
However, current PRC
policy has modified somewhat the earlier military philosophy of Mao.
In its drive towards modernization, the PRC
has recognized the need for parity of manpower, economic
strength and weapons development.
As such, the Chinese
have begun to mode·rnize their weapons system through such
actions as the improvement of nuclear delivery systems and
the purchase of up-to-date conventional weapons from Engiand, West germany, France, the United States and other
Western nations.
See Godwin, China and the Second World:
The Search for Defense Technology, 2 CONTEP. CHINA 1, 3-9
(Fall, 1978); Leng, supra note 296, at 175. See also
COPPER, supra note 186, at 39 (noting that the PRC does not
possess abundant quantifies of any of the critical metals
used in weapons production or high-technology industry).
Cf. Wren, U.S. to Raise Technological Level of Products the
Chinese Can Buy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, at Al; u.s. and
China Forging Closer Ties; Critics Fear That Pace is Too
Swift, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1980, at Al.
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The importance of military modernization has produced
some conflict among the upper crust of Chinese leadership
as to the "pace of [military] modernization and its assignment priority as compared to that of the other three components of the modernization drive (agriculture, industry,
and science and technology),"
Leng, supra note 296, at
175.
Michael Kau of Brown University recently remarked
that competition between military and civilian sectors in
the PRC for the allocation of resources is probably rather
keen.
M. Kau, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Meeting of the
American Association for Chinese Studies and the 5th Annual
Meeting of the Asian American Assumbly for Policy Research
(Charlottesville, Va., Nov. 15-16 (1980)).
Just prior to the 1979 war with Vietnam, Chinese pronouncements had deemphasized the importance of military
modernization vis-a-vis the other three modernizations.
Leng, supra note 296, at 176. Leng points out rather accurately that the 1979 military encounter with Vietnam "exposed some weaknesses of the PLA in equipment and techniques" and compelled the PRC to channel a larger share of
its available resources into military modernization. l£.
Increases in PRC military expenditures take on an even
greater significance when viewed in light of the concommitant Chi!'lese announcement to slow down economic·· growth, cut
back on or cancel fore·ign commercial contacts and reevaluate modernization plans.
See Report on the t~ork of the
Government, Beijing Review, No. 27 (July 6, 1979), at 9-20
(statement of Hua Guofeng at the 2nd Session of the Fifth
NPC).
At least one author has surmised that the rehabilitation of Deng X.iaoping and a close political compatriot,
Defense Minister ~eh, in 1977, Hua Guofeng's rise to power
after Mao's death, and the arrest of the Gang of four
(which had been· accused of opposing military modernization)
implied increased support for modernization programs for
both conventional and nuclear weapons.
See YODER, supra
note 3 0 3 , at 19 •
305.

Chiao Juan-hua Explains Chinese Government's Principle
[sic] Stand, Peking (Beijing) Review, No. 49 (Dec. 3,
1971), at 14-16 cited in Leng, supra note 296, at 169.

306.

Leng, supra note 296, at 169.
most optimistic note in China's
ment policy is the PRC's "firm,
support for the establishmen~ of
the globe." KIM, supra note 20,

307.

A Dec. 22, 1974 Renmin ribao editorial, in denouncing the
1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, modified the PRC's previous
support for nuclear free zones -- a concept first preferred
on July 31, 1963. The editorial asserted that "unless preceded by a 'no-first-use' agreement, the establishment of
- 127 -

Samuel Kim found that the
arms control and disarmapositive, and unequivocal
nuclear free zones around
at 172.

such zones would only bind the 1 hand and foot 1 of nonnuclear countries while leaving the nuclear powers to continue production, stockpiling or even the use of nuclear
weapons." Leng, suora note 296, at 167.
308.

See, ~·· "PRC Reiterates Arms Control Formula at Geneva,"
FBIS-cHI-82-152 (Aug. 6, 1982), at Al; "Text of PRC Proposal at UN Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-127 (July 1,
1982), at Al; "Huang Hua Speaks at UN Disarmament Session,"
FBIS-cHI-82-114 (June 14, 1982), at Al; "PRC Addresses
Geneva Committee on Disarmament," FBIS-CHI-82-044 (March 5,
1982), at Al; "Yu Peiwen Addresses Disarmament. Meeting in
Geneva," FBIS-cHI-81-150 (Aug. 5, 1981), at Al; "PRC UN
Official Addresses Disarmement Committee," FBIS-CHI-80-095.
(May 14, 1980), at A6; "PRC Delegate Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference," FBIS-CHI-80-025 (Feb. 5, 1980), at
Al; "PRC Representative Speaks on Disarmament at UN Meeting." FBIS-cHI-79-210 (Oct. 29, 1979), at Al; "Lai Yali
Scores Superpowers at Disarmament Session End, 1 FBIS-CHI79-113 (June 11, 1979), at A8; Speech by the Chairman of
the Chinese Delegation at the First Substantive Ses•ion of
the UN. Disarmament Commission, PRC Press Release (may 15,
1979 (Annex), reprinted in Beijing Review, No. 22 (June 1,
1979), at 17-19.
For a good review of the development of the PRC 1 s disarmament policy,~ Leng, supra note 296, at 165-72.

309.

The PRC voted ~gainst three 1971 draft resolutions calling
for an end to nuclear testing, a 1972 Soviet resolution
1 inking the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to
the non-use of force, a 1974 Soviet resolution calling for
a ten perce.nt reduction of the military budgets and the
permanent members of the Security Council, three 1974
resolutions concerning SALT talks, nuclear test bans and
nuclear non-proliferation, and a number of 1976-77 resolutions at the Thirty-first and Thirty-second General Assembly Sessions on Arms Control and Disarmament.
See Leng,
supra note 296, at 169 and accompanying notes.
--·
Moreover, China has argued against UN involvement in
disarmament matters, not because of the lack of an appropr iate international forum but because of "the lack of .
will for genuine disarmament on the part of the superpowers."
See U.N. DOC. A/C.l/31/PV.50 (Dec. 2, 1976), at
6; "Chinese-Representative Reiterates China 1·S Principal
Stand on Disarmament at UN First Committee," SCMP no. 6238
(Dec •. 13, 1976), at 39; KIM, supra note 20, at 172.
The PRC refused to participate in the 35-member Special Comittee of the World Disarmament Conference, although
the Chinese voted for the Committee's establishment. Leng,
supra note 296, at 171-72.

310.

Leng, supra note 296, at 169.
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311.

The PRC frequently justifiea its nuclear tests on the basis
of maintaining
sufficient self-defense
capability and
breaking the superpower nuclear monopoly.
See, ~··
"Details of China's First Nuclear Test Revealed," FBIS-CHI81-148 (Aug. 3, 1981), at W3; "Successful Nuclear Test Conducted 15 March," FBIS-CHI-78-053 (March 17, 1978), at El;
"China Conducts Another Nuclear Test," SCMP no. 6431 (Sept.
27, 1977), at 81; "Press Communique:
China Successfully
Conducts New Hydrogen Test,• SCMP no. 65227 (Nov. 26,
1976), at 203; "China Successfully Conducts Another Underground Nuclear Test," SCMP no. 6208 (Oct. 28, 1976), at
150;
"China Successfully Conducts Another
Underground
Nuclear Test,• SCMP no. 5971 (Nov. 10, 1975), at 14.
See
also note 296 supra.
--

312.

Articles stressing the danger of a new world war, with particular emphasis on the Soviet Union as the most dangerous
source of war, abound in the PRC.
See, ~·· "Renmin Ribao
on Soviet 'Threat' to World Peace," FBIS-cHI-82-019 (Jan.
28, 1982), at Cl; "Renmin Ribao Looks Toward International
Situation in 1980s," FBIS-cHI-80-013 (Jan. 18, 1980), at
A2; "Hongqi Commentator on Detente, Danger of War ,• FBISCHI-79-229 (Nov. 27, 1979), at Al; "Renmin Ribao on Increasing Danger of Nuclear war ,• FBIS-cHI-79-140 (July 19,
1979), at Al; "US-USSR Balance of Terror Theory Viewed as
Erroneous," FBIS-CHI-78-071 (April 12, 1978), at Al; "Commentary Says World War Can be Delayed But Not Avoided,"
FBIS-CHI-78-057 (March 23, 1978), at Al; "Jenmin Jihpao
Article: Blindness Through Gains Dooms All Reactionaries,"
SCMP no. 6353 (June 3, 1977), at 181; "Commentary by Hsinhua Correspondent:
Soviet Social-Imperialism--Most Dangerous Source of War ,• SCMP no. 5820 (March 27, 1975), at
185.
Chinese attitudes on war and civilian defense as noted
above undoubtedly increase the prevalence of internal
secrecy
regulations
and
make
inspectorate
work more
difficult.

313.

See,~··
"U.S., USSR START Talks Recess:
No Progress
Seen,• FBIS-cHI-82-157 (Aug. 13,_1982), at Al; "China Daily
Looks at U.S. - Soviet Arms Talks ,• FBIS-CHI-82-134 (July
13, 1982), at Al (reviewing superpower "tactics• at START
talks); "U.S.-USSR Arms Talks Disputes Termed 'Certain' ,•
FBIS-cHI-82-128 (July 2, 1982), at Al; "Renmin Ribao Views
Soviet-u.s. Arms Race, Talks,• FBIS-cHI-82-107 (June 3,
1982), at Al; "Prospects of USSR-u.s. Disarmament Talks
'Gloomy' ,• FBIS-cHI-82-104 (May 28, 1982), at Al; "U.S~,
Soviet Disarmament Proposals Said 'Tricks' ,• FBIS-CHI-82095 (May 17, 1982), at Al; •u.s.-soviet Arms Negotiations
Termed Farce,• FBIS-cHI-82-047 (March 10, 1982), at Al;
"U.S.-USSR Geneva Talks To Be Fruitless," FBIS-cHI-82-008
(Jan. 13, 1982), at Al; "Pinning Hopes on U.S.-USSR Talks
'Dangerous' ,•
FBIS-cHI-81-226 (Nov.
24, 1981), at Al;
•u.s.-soviet Disarmament Talks, Prospects Reviewed," FBISCHI-78-046 (March 8, 1978), at AS.
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314.

The phrase translates as "a wind sweeping through a tower
heralds a rainstorm."
It has appeared in PRC press reports
in connection with mounting opposition to imperialism,
colonialism, and hegemony from Third World Countries.
It
has also been less than accurately translated in these reports as "the wind sweeping through the tower heralds a
rising storm in the mountains."
See, ~., "Third World-Motive Force of History," SCMP no. 5725 (Nov. 4, 1974), at
52.

315.

This proverb was usually used to indicate that the superpowers had already passed the apex of their pow.er and were
no longer capable of controlling the fate of the international community.
In press reports, it has been translated
as "flowers fall off, do what one may."
.The phrase was
particularly prevalent in the period from 1974-77.
See,
~·· "An Chih-yuan Addresses UN First Committee," SCMP no.
5737 (Nov. 20, 1974), at 158; "gen-min Jih-pao Article:
Flowers Fall Off, Do What One May," SCMP no. 5713 (Oct 10,
1974), at 229.

316.

This phrase was often employed to describe the task of
Third World countries in fending off American and Soviet
competing interests.
It has been translated in PRC press
reports as "letting the tiger in through the back door·
while repelling the wolf through the front gate," though
this is technically inaccurate.

317.

See "Second UN Special Disarmament Session Viewed," FBISCHI-82-111 (June 9, 1982), at Al (noting, inter alia, that
disarmament· cannot be divorced from the
international
situation).

318.

See Leng, supra note 296, at 166-67.
See also "Huang Hua
Speaks at UN Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-114 (June
14, 1982), at Al; "Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-104 (May
30, 1978), at A3 (denouncing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
and Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as unacceptable because
they preserve the nuclear monopoly); "US-USSR Interest in
Test Ban Talks Revived," FBIS-CHI-77-246 (Dec. 22, 1977),
at Al. The Chinese also noted that "the British-AmericanSoviet tripartite 'partial nuclear test ban treaty'" of
1963 had not halted the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
nor the improvement in their quality.
In addition, the
Soviet army had grown, superpower warship tonnage had
doubled and military expenditures had increased.
See "Co,mmentary by Hsinhua Correspondent: After Signing Tripartite
Treaty," SCMP no. 6014 (Jan. 14, 1976), at 135. Cf. YODER,
supra note 303, at 12.

319.

COPPER, supra note 186, at 13.

320.

Id.
Such Chinese reasoning has perpetuated the military
doctrine of a people's war strategy, for even a nuclear
strike directed at the PRC would not annihilate the Chinese, who would, in turn, be prepared to resist subsequent
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invasion efforts.
China's preparation for a nuclear was is
also illustrated by Mao's philosophy of "dig tunnels deep,
store grain everywhere," a concept that has prompted a number of Chinese civil defense efforts.
See Middleton, Vast
Array of Air-Raid Shelters tunnel Underl:hina's Main ~
ies, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1976, p. Al, 8, col. 1; Pollack,
supra note 180, at 25-27.
See also Coon, Defense Priorities in Post-Mao Peking, 8 PARAMETERS 13, 17-19 (No. 4,
1977); Kux, supra note 188, at 107-08.
"AFP:
Beijing
Takes Nuclear-;--chemical Warfare Precautions" FBIS-CHI-80063 (March 31, 1980), at Ll3 (Beijing authorities launched
a "mobilization and training campaign" to prepare residents
for a nuclear or chemical attack); "Peking Municipality
Building Underground Shelters," FBIS-CHI-78-213 (Nov. 2,
1978), at K2; "Chairman Mao's Guildeline on War-- Su Yu's
Article:
Great Victory of Chairman 11ao' s Guideline on
War," SCMP no. 6403 (Aug. 16, 1977), at 59 (China must be
prepared against war and much dig tunnels deep and store
grain everywhere); "Foreign Minister Chao Juan-hua Speaks
of
International
Situation
at.
Dinner
for
James
R.
Schlesinger," SCMP no
6180 (Sept. 16, 1976), at 219 (dig
tunnels deep, store grain everywhere).
321.

COPPER, supra note 186, at 15.

322.

Leng, suora note 296, at 168.
See also "U.S., USSR Nuclear
Disarmament Roles Discussed," FBIS-CHI-82-188 (Sept. 28,
1982), at Al; "UN Disarmament Session Ends, Viewed as
Failure," FBIS-CHI-82-1135 (July 14, 1982), at Al; "China
Daily Looks at u.s.-soviet Arms Talks," FBIS-CHI-82-134
(July 13, 1982), at Al; "Renmin Ribao Views Nuclear Disarmament Proposals," FBIS-CHI-82-108 (June 7, 1982), at Al;
"Renmin Ribao Reviews US-Soviet Disarmament Talks," FBISCHI-79-100 (May 22, 1979), at Al; "Commentary Scores Superpowrs' Obstruction of Disarmament,·" FBIS-CHI-78-123 (June
26, 1978), at Al; "People's Daily Comments on Arms Race,
Disarmament," FBIS-cHI-78-108 (June 5, 1978), at A2; "U.S.USSR SALT Talks Used to Gain Military Advantages," FBisCHI-78-035 (Feb. 21, 1978), at A2; "People's Daily on us.Soviet Negotiations," FBIS-CHI-78-007 (Jan. 11, 1978), at
Al; •u.s.-soviet Troop Talks Labelled 'A Fraud,'" FBIS-CHI77-243 (Dec. 19, 1977), at Al; "Peking Raps Fraudulent Arms
Limitation Talks," FBIS-CHI-77-200 (Oct. 17, 1977), at Al;
"Commentary by Hsinhua Correspondent:
'Typical Example of
Saying One Thing and Doing Another,'" SCMP no. 6344 (Dec.
21, 1976), at 86; "New Soviet Trickery in Vienna Talks,"
SCMP no. 5805 (March 6, 1975), at 154.

323.

Liebe, China and the Global Balance of Power: A Political
Solution of the Nuclear Predicament, 12 PEACE RESEARCH 7, 7
(No. 1, Jan. 1980).
See also "U.S., Soviet Space Arms Race
Criticized," FBIS-CHI-82-134 (July 13, 1982), at Al; "Media
Discuss U.S.-USSR Nuclear Arms Talks,"
FBIS-CHI-81-228
(Nov. 27, 1981), at Al; "SALT II Ends:
New Phase of Arms
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Race Begins,• FBIS-cHI-79-109 (June 5, 1979), at All
•Peking Assesses Status of Current SALT TAlks," FBis-CHI78-212 (Nov. 1, 1978), at All "U.S.-USSR SALT Talks Used to
Gain Military Advantages,• FBIS-cHI-78-035 (Feb. 21, 1978),
at A21 "People's Daily Article Discusses SALT Issues,•
FBIS-CHI-77-237 (Dec. 9, 1977), at All "Jenmin Jihpao Article:
'Limitation" of Nuclear Weapons or Contention for
Nuclear Superiority?", SCMP no. 5769 (Jan. 9, 1975), at
157.
324.

See, ~·· "SALT II Ends:
New Phase of Arms Race Begins,•
FBIS-CHI-79-109 (June 5, 1979), at All "Xinhua Reviews Drama of SALT Negotiations," FBIS-cHI-79-094 (May 14, 1979),
at All "Peking Assesses Status of Current SALT TAlks,•
FBIS-cHI-78-212 (Nov. 1, 1978), at All "USSR Begins Deployment of New Land-Based ICBM," FBIS-cHI-78-039 (Feb. 27,
1978), at A41 "U.S.-USSR SALT Talks Used to Gain Military
Advantages," FBIS-cHI-78-035 (Feb. 21, 1978), at A21 "Jenmin Jihpao Article:
'Limitation' of Nuclear Weapons;-ci[
Contention for Nuclear Superiority?", SCMP no. 5769 (Jan.
9, 1975), at 157.
See also Blechman, Do Negotiated Arms
Limitations Have a Future?, 50 FOR. AFF. 102, 106-12 (F~ll
1980).

325.

Pollack, supra note 180, at 22.
The unremittingly hostile
pictures painted by PRC press releases on Soviet intentions
and behavior are paralleled by press releases depicting the
United States as a declining power.
The shift in thinking
has required some degree of reorientation of Chinese defense policies and Chinese statements responding to the
manifold forms of Soviet power.
Id., at 22-23.
See also
"Renmin Ribao on Soviet 'Threat' toWorld Peace," FBIS-CHI82-019 (Jan. 28, 1982), at Cl1 "UN Delegates Criticize USSR
Afghan Presence: Ling Oing Address," FBIS-CHI-81-222
(Nov. 18, 1981), at All "PRC Media Warns Against Soviet
Worldwide Hegemonism:
'Threat' in Indian Ocean,• FBIS-CHI80-165 (Aug. 22, 1980), at C21 "Efforts to Conquer Afghanistan,• id., at C31 "Aggression: Czechoslovakia to Afghanistan,• id., at C41 "Policy of 'Offensive Detente,'" id., at
C71 "'Slanders' in Africa, Middle East,• id., at Cl01 "Wen
Wei Po Reports on Soviet Threat on Chinese Border ,• FBISCHI-80-154 (Aug. 7, 1980), at U61 "Soviet Expansionism Must
be Stoped to ·Prevent World War," FBIS-cHI-80-140 (July 18,
1980), at Cl1 "Xinhua Says Vietnamese, Soviets Threaten
Southeast Asia,• FBIS-cHI-80-097 (May 16, 1980), at Ell
"Renmin Ribao Quotes Xinhua on Soviet Threat to South
Asia," FBIS-cHI-80-035 (Feb. 20, 1980), at Cl1 "Xinhua Correspondent on Increasing Soviet Threat,• id., at C3, "Renmin Ribao: Soviet Invasion of 'Utmost Gravity,'" FBIS-cHI80-001 (J~n. Z, 1980), at C4 (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violates UN Charter)l Beijing Radio Discusses War
Danger, Superpower Contention,• FBIS-cHI-79-245 (Dec. 19,
1979),
at
All
"PRC
UN
Delegate
Denounces
Soviet
Hegemonism,• FBIS-cHI-79-234 (Dec. 4, 1979), at All "PRC
Presents Draft Resolution on Hegemonism to UN,• FBIS-cHI79-215 (Nov. 5, 1979), at Al (all· states were urged to
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cease their hegemonic policies and to halt infiltration,
interference, '.lggression and subversion); "PRC UN Delegate
Speaks on Social Imperialsm," FBIS-CHI-79-207 (Oct. 24,
1979), at Al; "Commentary:
Dance Atop Volcanoes,• SCMP no.
6256 (Jan. 11, 1977), '.It 117 (popular Soviet Resentment
'"ill bury the Soviet military machine); "Commentary by
Hsinhua Correspondent:
New Tsars' Military Exercises,•
SCMP no. 6129 (July 6, 1976), at 44.
See generally,
Garner, SALT II: China's Advice and Dissent, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 12 2 4 (No • 12 , Dec • 19 7 9 ) •
326.

See Pollack, supra note 180, at 23.
See also "Chairman
Mao's Great Strategic Concept -- About Differentiating the
Three Worlds," SCMP no. 6416 (Sept. 6, 1977), at 1.

327.

Mathew, China Offers to Monitor SALT
April 20, 1979, at Al.
"PRC Refuses
Stations," FBIS-CHI-81-118 (June 19,
U.S. Sets Up Military Base in PRC,"
5,1982), at Bl; "AFP:
PRC Refuses
U.S. Base," FBIS-CHI-82-003 (Jan. 6,

328.

See "U.S., USSR Nuclear Disarmament Roles Discussed," FBISCHI-82-188 (Sept. 28, 1982), at Al; "Huang Hua Speech,"
FBIS-CHI-78-104 (May 30, 1978), at A3; Leng, supra note
296, at 178-79; Verbatim Record of the 27th Meeting of the
UN ~irst Committee, U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.27, at 13 (Nov.
5, 1980) (statement of Mr. Wu Zhen).
See also, "U.S.-USSR
Interest in Test Ban Talks Revived," FBIS-CHI-77-246 (Dec.
22, 1977), at Al.

329.

See "Commentary:
At Loggerheads Yet Dreaming
SCMP no. 6321 (April 18, 1977), at 52.

3 30.

See id.
See also "Renmin Ribao Views Nuclear Disarmament
Proposals;r-FBIS-CHI-82-109 (June 7, 1982); at Al; "Commentary Views USSR-U.S. Nuclear Talks,• FBIS-CHI-82-071 (April
13, 1982), at Al.

331.

See Leng, supra note 296, at 179.

332.

See, ~., "Peking Raps Fraudulent Arms Limitation Talks,"
FBIS-CHI-77-200 (Oct. 17, 1977), at Al; "UN Disarmament
Session Ends, Viewed as Failure," FBIS-cHI-82-135 (July 14,
1982), at Al.

333.

See "PRC Delegation Attends UN Disarmament
FBIS-cHI-79-178 (Sept. 11, 1979), at A4.

334.

See "Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-cHI-78-104 (May 30, 1978), at
A3; Verbatim Record of the lOth Meeting of the First Committee, U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.lO, at 21 (Oct. 22, 1980)
(statement of Mr.Lai Yali); "Renmin Ribao Discusses UN Disarmament Sessions," FBIS-CHI-82-130 (July 7, 1982), at Al.
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Date, Washington Post,
Comment on U.S. Radar
1981), at Kl; "Kyodo:
FBIS-CHI-82-002 (Jan.
Comment on Report of
1982), at Bl.

the

Same,•

Confe.rence,"

Leng
also cites
to
a
Chinese proverb
used
to
illustrate the unfair restrictions of the superpowers
Zhun zhouquan fanghuo buzhun baix inq d iandenq (The mag istrates are allowed to set fires, while the common people
are forbidden even to light lamps.) Translation by author.
See speech by Shiao Juan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of
the PRC at the Plenary Meeting of the 27th Session of the
UN General Assembly (1972) cited in Leng, supra note 296,
at 179.
335.

Leng, supra note 296, a.t 179.
See also "People's Daily
Views US-USSR Contention in Space," FBIS-CHI-78-111 (June
8, 1978), at Al.
The Chinese have since attended the UN
Outer Space Committee Session as an observer so as to
broaden exchanges with other countries on the peaceful uses
of outer space. See "PRC Delegate Speaks at UN Outer Space
Committee Session-;;'FBIS-CHI-80-132 (July 8, 1980), at A2;
"Delegate to UN Meeting Enunciates Space Policy," FBIS-CHI82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982), at Al.

336.

YODER, suora note 303, at 26.
See also Arms Sales to Taiwan Endanger Sino-American RelafiOns=:-comment on "The New
York Times" Editorial of November 20, Beijing Review, No.
49 (Dec. 7, 1981), at 9 (US arms sales to Taiwan infringe
upon PRC sovereignty); "Criticism of U.S. Interference in
PRC Affairs," FBIS-CHI-82-135 (July 14, 1982), at Bl3;
•u.s. Accused of Interference in PRC Affairs," FBIS-CHI-82133 (July 12, 1982), at B2; "U.S.-Taiwan Agreement Violates
U.S.-PRC Agreement," FBIS-CHI-80-195 (Oct. 6, 1980), at Bl
(agreement giving full diplomatic privileges to Taiwan representatives in the United States violates the US-PRC joint
communique); "Reagan's China Policy Impairs Future US-PRC
Relations," FBIS-CHI-80-169 (Aug. 28, 1980), at Bl; "U.S.
Government Approves New Arms Sales to Taiwan," FBIS-CHI-80122 (June 23, 1980), at Bl; "Renmin Ribao Hits Reagan's
Views on Taiwan," FBIS-cHI-80-124 (June 25, 1980), at B2;
"Renmin Ribao Criticizes Reagan's Statements on Taiwan,"
FBIS-CHI-80-119 (June 18, 1980), at 82.

337.

See, ~., "Chen Chu Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-128 (July 23,
1978), at A2 (expressing PRC support for small and mediumsized countries' proposals in the final document of the
1978 UN Disarmament Conference); "People's Daily Urges
Third World Participation in Disarmament," FBIS-CHI-78-105
(May 31, 1978), at A2; "Huang Hua to Attend UN 'Disarmament' Meeting," FBIS-CHI-78-093 (May 12, 1978), at Al (supporting third World efforts to develop nuclear weapons for
self-defense purposes) 1 "PRC to Attend Special Conference
on Disarmament," FBIS-cHI-78-044 (March 6, 1978), at Al
(noting the Chinese decision to participate in the 1978 UN
Disarmament Conference, though the PRC had shunned earlier
participation
because
of
superpower
control
of
the
discussions).
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The Chinese have also condemned the superpowers for
their control of the UN Law of the Sea Conference, particularly as it concerned the formation and voting procedure of
an international sea-bed authority.
See, ~·, "PRC Representative Speaks at Law of Sea Conference," FBIS-CHI-80173 (Sept. 4, 1980), at A2; "Renmin Ribao on UN Law of Sea
Conference," FBIS-CHI-81-158 (Aug. 17, 1981), at A3.
338.

See, ~-, "Text of PRC Proposal at UN Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-127 (July 1, 1982), at Al; "Renmin Ribao
Views Chemical Weapons Controversy," FBIS-CHI-82-045 (March
8, 1982), at Al; "PRC Envoy Assesses Results of Geneva Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-80-156 (Aug. 11, 1980), at Al
(noting that progress in negotiations on the prohibition
of, inter alia, chemical and radiological weapons was "preliminary o--r-:- • • even superficial"); "PRC Proposes Chemical Disarmament at Geneva Conference,"
FBIS-cHI-80-121
(June 20, 1980), at A2; "PRC UN Official Addresses Disarmament Committee," FBIS-CHI-80-095 (May 14, 1980), at A6
(noting
that
"agreements on
the
prohibition
of
the
research, production and use of all chemicals and toxic
weapons and on the destruction of existing stockpiles of
such weapons be concluded through negotiations as soon as
possible").
See also Leng, supra note 296, at 179; "PRC
Representative Speaks on Disarmament at UN Meeting," FBISCHI-79-210 (Oct. 29, 1979), at Al.

339.

See, ~·· "Renmin Ribao View~ Chemical Weapons Controversy," FBIS-CHI-82-045 (March 8, 1982), at Al; "Soviet Use of
Toxic Gas in Afghanistan Viewed," FBIS-CHI-82-008 (Jan. 13,
1982), at Fl; "Renmin Ribao Article on Chemical Disarmament
Talks," FBIS-CHI-81-121 (June 24, 1981), at Al; "Renmin
Ribao Comments on Soviet Chemical Weapons Use," FBIS-CHI80-163 (Aug. 20, 1980), at Cl; "USSR 'Producing, Stockpiling, Using Chemical Weapons,'" FBIS-CHI-80-158 (Aug. 13,
1980), at Cl; "Beijing Radio on Soviet Use of Chemical
Weapons," FBIS-CHI-80-063 (March 31, 1980), at Cl; "Xinhua
Commentary on SRV Use of Chemical Weapons," FBIS-CHI-80-062
(March 28, 1980), at El; "Beijing in Russian Denounces
Soviet Use of Nerve Gas," FBIS-CHI-80-054 (March 18, 1980),
at Cl; Verbatim record of the lOth Meeting of the First
Committee, U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.lO, at 27 (Oct. 22, 1980)
(statement of Mr. Lai Yali).

340.

The 1982 disarmament proposal was entitled the "Proposal on
Essential Measures for an Immediate Halt to the Arms Race
and for Disarmament."
It was presented at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament on
June 21, 1982.
For the text of the proposal, see The UN:
China's Disarmament Proposal, Beijing Review, No:-28 (July
12, 1982), at 11; "Text of PRC Proposal at UN Disarmament
Session," FBIS-cHI-82-127 (July 1, 1982), at Al.
For the text of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, see Speech by the Chairman of the Chinese Delegation at the First Substantive Session of the UN Disarmament
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Commission, PRC Press Release (May 15, 1979) (Annex), .reprinted in Beijing Review, No. 22 (June 1, 1979), at 17-19.
341.

See KIM, supra note 20, at 172.

342.

See note 238 supra.

343.

See KIM, supra note 20, at
17 9.

344.

See "PRC Delegate Attacks USSR at Nairobi Envirorunental
Meeting," FBIS-CHI-80-087 (May 2, 1980), at A2.

345.

~,

346.

See "Lai Yali Scores Superpowers at Disarmament Session
End," FBIS-cHI-79-113 (June 11, 1979), at AS; "Renmin Ribao
Discusses UN Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-130 ~July 7,
1982), at Al.

347.

For these resolutions, see U.N. DOC. A/C.l/PV. 2007 (Nov. 4,
1974), at 62; A/C.l/PV.2024 (Nov. 20, 1974), at 53-55; A/
C.l/PV.2026 (Nov. 21, 1974), at 27; A/C.l/PV.2084 (Nov. 11,
1975), at 23-25; A/C.l/PV.2095 (Nov. 21, 1975), at 38 cited
in KIM, supra note 20, at 173 n.l65 .

. 348.

See, ~·, "Soviet Position Regarding Tlatelolco Treaty
Attacked," FBIS-cHI-78-106 (June 1, 1978),· at A7.
The
Soviets were denounced on the basis that their "acceptance"
of the Propocol in 1978 was contingent upon the understanding that Latin American countries did not have the right to
conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and that
these countries would not receive Soviet recognition of
declared Latin American sovereign rights over 200-mile execlusive economic fisheries zones. See also "NCNA Condemns
Soviet 'Disarmament' Talk at UN," FBIS-cHY=77-230 (Nov. 30,
1977), at Al.

349.

See,~·· "Stalling or Obstinate Resistance- Soviet Stand
Toward Tlatelolco Treaty," SCMP no. 6287 (Feb. 25, 1977),
at 124.

350.

See "PRC to Attend Special Conference
FBIS-cHI-78-044 (March 6, 1978), at A2.

351.

See "Huang Hua to Attend UN Disarmament 'Meeting," FBIS-CHI78-093 (May 12, 1978), at Al.

352.

"Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-cHI-78-104 (May 30, 1978), at A3.

353.

~g.,

354.

~

172~

Leng, supra note

296,

at

~·· Not So Harmless Fallout From China, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 1980, §4, at El8 (Letters to the Editor).
~
generally Anguilo, supra note 2.

at A3-8.

id., at A4-5.
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on

Disarmament,"

355.

See id., at AlO.

356.

See id., at AlO.
See also Leng, supra note 296, at 170;
"Developments at UN Disarmament Session Discussed," FBISCHI-78-109 (June 6, 1978), at Al (noting that small and
medium-sized countries were reasonably demanding that disarmament negotiations should extend to conventional as well
as nuclear arms).

357.

See "Huang Hua Speech,"
AlO.

358.

Id.
See also "PRC Representative Speaks on Disarmament at
UN Meeting;--FBIS-CHI-79-112 (June 9, 1979), at A2.

359.

See "People's Daily Urges Third World Participation in Disarmament," FBIS-cHI-78-105 (May 31, 1978), at A2.

360.

See, ~·, "Commentary Scores Superpowers' Obstruction of
'Disarmament'," FBIS-CHI-78-123 (June 26, 1978), at Al; PRC
Scores Superpowers Actions at Disarmament Conference,"
FBIS-CHI-78-119 (June 20, 1978), at Al; "People's Daily
Views US-USSR Contention in Space," FBIS-CHI-78-111 (June
8, 1978), at Al; "Commentary Decries Kremlin's Sham Disarmament," FBIS-CHI-78-105 (May 31, 1978), at Al.

361.

See,~.,
"Chen Chu Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-128 (July 3,
1978), at A2; "Chen Chu Submits Paper,• FBIS-CHI-78-112
(June 9, 1978), at A2; "People's Daily Urges Thizod World
Participation in Disarmament," FBIS-CHI-78-105 (May 31,
1978), at A2; "Huang Hua Speech," FBIS-CHI-78-104 (May 30,
19 7 8) , at A2.

362.

See Leng, supra note 296, at 170-71.

363.

See Final Document of the Special Session of the General
ASSembly on Disarmament, reprinted .i!L_l7 INT'L. L. MAT'S.
1016, 1033 (Art. 120) (1978).

364.

See "Chen Chu Speech,"
A2.

365.

See "NCNA Correspondent Questions Value of Disarmament Debate," FBIS-cHI-78-129 (July 15, 1978), at Al.

366.

See Leng, supra note 296, at 171.

367.

Id. Cf.
•u.s., USSR Nuclear Diarmament Roles Discussed,"
FBIS-cHI-82-188 (Sept. 28, 1982), at Al.

368.

~

369.

See, ~·, "People's Daily Comments on US-USSR Nuclear
Talks,• FBIS-cHI-78-220 (Nov. 14, 1978), at Al; "People's

FBIS-CHI-78-104

FBIS-cHI-78-128

(May 30, 1978), at

(July 3, 1978), at

"Press Scores Superpowers' Actions at Disarmament Conference:
NCNA Commentary,"
FBIS-CHI-78-119
(June 19,
1978), at A2.
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Daily Criticizes Vienna Disarmament Talks," FBIS-CHI-78-218
(Nov. 9, 1978), at Al; "People's Daily Warns of Soviet Intenions in SALT," FBIS-cHI-78-213 (Nov. 2, 1978), at Al;
"PRC UN Delegate Denounces Soviet Disarmament Proposal,"
id., at A2; "Peking Assesses Status of Current SALT Talks,"
FBIS-CHI-78-212 (Nov. 1, 1978), at Al; "Resent.11ent of
Superpowers' Arms Race Cited at UN," FBIS-CHI-78-210 (Oct.
30, 1978), at Al; "PRC UN Representative Condemns Superpowers' Arms Race," FBIS-CHI-78-208 (Oct. 26, 1978), at Al;
"Peking Raps New Soviet MBFR Disarmament 'Swindle'," FBISCHI-78-203 (Oct. 19, 1978), at A2 (denouncing the Soviets
for obstructing talks on disarmament in Central Europe).
370.

See "First Session of Geneva Disarmament Committee Opens,"
FBIS-cHI-79-018 (Jan. 25, 1979), at Al.
The PRC did not
participate in either the first or second sessions, but did
participate in the third. See "PRC to Take Part in Work of
Disarmament Committee," FBIS-CHI-79-240 (Dec. 12, 1979), at
Al.

371.

Speech by the Chairman of the Chinese Delegation at the
First Substantive Session of the UN Disarmament Committion,
PRC Press Release (May 15, 1979) (Annex), reprinted in
Beijing Review, No. 22 (June 1, 1979), at 17-19.

372.

Arts. !!(2), II(3), III(l), III(2). See also "PRC UN Envoy
Comments on
Superpowers'
Disarmament,"
FBIS-CHI-81-205
(Oct. 23, 1981), at AS; "PRC Addresses Geneva Disarmament
Committee," FBIS-CHI-82-044 (March 5, 1982), at Al; "Ji
Pengfei Reiterates PRC Nuclear Policy," FBIS-CHI-82-091
(May 11, 1982), at A2; "Second UN Special Disarmament Session Viewed," FBIS-CHI-82-111 (June 9, 1982), at Al.

373.

Art. III(5).

374.

Art. III (6).

375.

Art. III(l)2.
See also "Yu Peiwen Addresses Disarmament
Meeting in Geneva,·~s-cHI-81-150 (Aug. 5, 1981), at Al;
"PRC Addresses Geneva Committee on Disarmament," FBIS-CHI82-044 (March 5, 1982), at Al.

376.

Art. III(l).

377.

Id.

378.

Art !!(2).

379.

Art. !!(1)4.

380.

Art. !!(1)5.

381.

Art. !!(1)7.

382.

Art. !!(1)8.
Cf. "Renmin Ribao Urges Stronger
Nations Role, • -rers-cHI-82-207 (Oct. 26, 1982),
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United
at Al

(suggesting that the UN play a greater role in preserving
international security).
383.

YODER, supra note 303, at 24.
Yoder noted that PRC willingness to endorse ON-sanctioned treaties might extend to
the previously condemned test ban treaties.
The Chinese
position, however, has not borne out Yoder's conjecture.
The PRC has subsequently reiterated its opposition to a
comprehensive test ban, noting that the only way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war is through the complete
prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.
Verbatim
Record of the 27th Meeting of the First Committee (Agenda
Items 31-49 and 121), U.N. DOC.A/C.l/35/PV.27, at 13 (Nov.
4, 1980) (statement of Mr. Wu Zhen). See also •u.s., USSR
Nuclear
Disarmament
Roles
Discussed,"
FBIS-CHI-82-188
(Sept. 28, 1982), at Al (justifying PRC refusal to participate in nuclear test ban negotiations under the Geneva Disarmament Committee).
On October 22, 1980, Lai Yali of the Chinese Delegation asserted that the call for a comprehensive ban on
nuclear testing was "understandable" and that other nuclear
states would cease nuclear tests when the superpowers had.
Verbatim Record of the lOth Meeting of the First Committee
(Agenda Items 3-49 and 121.
U.N. DOC. A/C.l/35/PV.lO, at
26 (Oct. 22, 1980) (statement of Mr. Lai Yali).

384.

See note 372 supra and accompanying text.

385.

See "PRC Proposes Chemical Disarmament of Geneva
ference, n FBIS-CHI-80-121 (June 20, 1980), at A2.

386.

See note 340 supra.

387.
388.

In addition to the inherent problems in the most recent PRC

Con-

Id.

disarmament proposal, there are also issues arising out of
the Chinese philosophical construct for the atmosphere of
disarmament negotiations.
For example, the PRC appears
unwilling to convene a world disarmament conference until
certain basic demands are met, including the withdrawal of
all foreign troops, the cessation of foreign military aggression (particularly in Kampuchea and Afghanistan) and
occupation, and the preservation of and respect for the
independence, sovereignty and terrotirial integrity of all
countries.
See Verbatim Record of the 27th Meeting of the
First Committee (Agenda Items 31-49 and 121), U.N. DOC.A/
C.l/35/PV.27, at 11 (Nov. 4, 1980) (statement of Mr. Wu
Zhen).
Much of Chinese opposition is based on the pe~cep
tion that the aggression perpetrated by the Soviets in Afghanistan and the· Vietnamese in Kampuchea violates the UN
Charter and specific UN resolutions.
See "Xinhua Views UN
Resolution on Afghanistan," FBIS-cHI-81-224 (Nov. 20, 1981)
at Al: "UN Envoy on USSR-SRV Threat to Southeas·t Asia, •
FBIS-cHI-81-212 (Nov. 3, 1981), at Al: "Xinhua Says Vietnamese, Soviets Threaten Southeast Asia,• FBIS-cHI-80-097
- 139 -

(May 16, 1980), at El; "Renmin Ribao:
Soviet Invasion of
'Utmost Gravity'," FBIS-cHI-80-001 (Jan.2, 1980), at C4.
Se~ also note 298, supra.
389.

See Verbatim· Record of the lOth Meeting of the First Committee (Agenda (Items 31-49 and 121), U.N. DOC.A/C.l/35/
PV.lO, at 31 (Oct. 22, 1980) (statement of Mr. Lai Yali).
See also "Ren:n in Ribao on U.S. -USSR Talks on Nuclear Arms
Ti1Europe," FBIS-CHI-780-185 (Sept. 22, 1980), at Al; "Honqi Article Criticizes Superpower Disarmament Efforts,"
FBIS-CHI-80-119 (June 18, 1980), at Al.

390.

"Reports of Nuclear Material to s. Africa Unfounded," FBIS-CHI-81-228 (Nov. 27, 1981), at Il; "PRC Representative Speaks on Disarmament at UN Meeting," FBIS-cHI79-210 (Oct. 29, 1979), at Al; "PRC Delegate to Arms Conference Comments on Restrictions," FBIS-CHI-79-179 (Sept.
13, 1979), at Al (asserting that Third world ·and other
small and medium-sized countries have the right to develop
their armed forces for self-defense purposes).

391.

See,~·· "Wen Wei Po Reports on Soviet Threat on Chinese
Border," FBIS-CHI-80-154 (Aug. 7, 1980), at U6 (noting that
USSR military activities along the Sino-Soviet border posed
a threat to the PRC); "China Issues Statement on Conditions
for PRC-USSR Talks," FBIS-CHI-79-081 (April 25, 1979), at
Cl (noting that the normalization of PRC-USSR relations
cannot occur until the Soviets withdraw their troops from
border areas).

See,~··

The border conflict occasionally flares.
U.S. Senator
Henry Jackson reported a 1979 border clash after a trip to
the PRC.
See "Senator Jackson Reveals .New Sino-Soviet Border Clash,.....-FBIS-CHI-79-166 (Aug. 24, 1979), at Cl.
See
also "Soviet Violations of PRC Border Reported," FBIS-CHI79-168 (Aug. 28, 1979), at Cl; "USSR-PRC Rift Said to Hold
Apart Two Mongolias," FBIS-CHI-82-212 (Nov. 2, 1982), at
C2.
392.

See Pollack, supra note 180, at 26.

393.

Id.

394.

Id.

395.

See Whiting, China After
(No. 11, Nov. 1977).

396.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 37, at 58.
See also
"Shanghai Radio Urges Proper Attitudes Toward Foreigners,"
FBIS-cHI-79-084 (April 30, 1979), at 02; "Guangming Ribao
Discusses Proper Approach to Foreign Things," FBIS-cHI-79091 (May 9, 1979), at LlO; "State Council Announces Decision on Tourism,• FBIS-cHI-81-202 (Oct. 20, 1981), at K9;
Ban Yue Tan on Dealings with Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-81-238

Mao,
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(Dec. 11, 1981), at K9; "Dazhang Ribao on Pursuit of Foreign Things," FBIS-CHI-82-072 (April 14, 1982), at 03;
"Article Cites Corruption Imported from West,• FBIS-CHI-82078 (April 22, 1982), at K3; "Beijing Radio Article on Foreign Influence,• FBIS-CHI-82-194 (Oct. 6, 1982), at Kll.
397.

See,~·· "Hongqi Article Discusses Mao's Merits, Errors,"
FBIS-CHI-81-106 (June 3, 1981), at K8.

398.

Of course, the PRC retains its sovereign right to control
the movement of foreigners within its jurisdiction particularly for national security reasons, but it is quite
probable that the parties to an inspection arrangement will
attempt to delimit, to the extent possible, the permissible
scope of unrestricted movement of inspectors to ensure effective verification (i.e., that relevant military installations are monitored)~uch efforts would lead to uniform
and reciprocal activities that permit predictability in
inspection operations.

399.

See "Renmin Ribao Discusses Problems with SALT
tlon," FBIS-cHI-79-117 (June 15, 1979), at A3.
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Verifica-

PART II:

LEGAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXISTENCE AND OPERA·TION OF AN INSPECTORATE ON PRC SOIL

Chapter 3. THE STATUS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS ON CHINESE
TERRITORY
The presence of inspectorate personnel on Chinese soil will
present delicate and complex legal and administrative problems
compounded by the present ambiguous legal posture of the Chinese
toward the concept of privileges and immunities.
Chinese sensitivity to infringements on sovereign rights as well as the
PRC's somewhat hesitant approach towards foreign contact create
serious obstacles to the effective operation of inspectorate components -- the organization, inspectors, and staff -- in the PRC.
Under international law, the PRC is empowered to prescribe
and enforce rules governing the activities of an inspectorate
while its members are within Chinese territorial jurisdiction.!
The power to enact laws governing the rights of foreigners is
implicitly vested in the National People's Congress (the rubber
stamp legislative organ of the Chinese Communist Party2) under
the 1982 PRC Constitution, Article 62(3).3 There is at present
no single unified national legislation on the rights and duties
of foreign nationals in the PRC and so, resort must be had to
numerous individual legislative enactments to determine their
applicability to foreign nationals.
Applicable rules are found in the Act Regulating the Entry,
Exit, Transit,
Residence,
and Travel
of Foreign Nationals
[hereafter Foreign National's Act] as well as in other national,
provincial and municipal legislation.4
The PRC has also concluded a number of treaties containin~ provisions regulating the
status of foreign nationals in China.
Article 2 of the Foreign
National's Act provides that "foreign nationals in China shall
observe the laws and decrees of China."
At least in principle,
therefore, foreign nationals have rights and obligations under
Chinese law similar to those of Chinese citizens, subject,
undoubtedly, to exceptions.6
The absence of these rights would probably have little impact on foreign
inspectorate personnel.
Other
exceptions,
however, may affect inspectorate operations, particularly where
they may apply to Chinese nationals associated with the inspection team.
For example, Chinese administrative -- and legal -impediments t·o marriage between Chinese and foreign nationals may
have a practical, though indirect, impact on inspection operations.? Still other exceptions, such as Chinese restrictions on
photography, travel and the gathering of information may have a
profound
influence ·on
the
effectiveness
of
verification
procedures. a
At present, the National People's Congress, its Standing
Committee, and the relevant Party organs are considering the provisions of a comprehensive Civil Code, whose provisions affect
the rights and obligations of foreign nationals.9
However, the
degree of protection to be afforded foreign interests in areas
- 142 -

such as copyright, inheritance~ and other property and nonproperty laws is, as yet, unclear.lO
Moreover, the extent to
which the PRC will provide for specific legislative enactments
which could circumvent the rights of foreign nationals in
extraordinary circumstances for purposes of national security is
at best speculative.
The impact of the forthcoming PRC Civil Code on foreign
nationals will depend to some degree upon the element of
reciprocity.
Exemptions or retaliatory restrictions may be imposed by the Chinese Communist Party or the National People's
Congress to coincide with special privileges or limitations
placed on Chinese nationals in particular countries abroad,ll
despite the possible discriminatory effects on different groups
of foreign nationals within the PRC.
Exceptions to the general
rule of equality between foreign nationals and Chinese citizens
and between groups of foreign nationals are especially justifiable where the PRC deems them to be in the interest of state or
economic security.
A. Disputes Arising Out of the Activities of An
Inspectorate
Some arms
inspection experts have already noted the
potential for deliberate or inadvertent inspectorate violations
of Chinese domestic law.l2
The potential rights and duties of
inspectorate members under the PRC Civil Procedure Code are still
unclear although the recently circulated provisional code indicated that "cases involving foreign nationals and organizations
or international organizations enjoying judicial immunity" will
be handled pursuant to PRC laws and the provisions of treaties to
which the PRC is a party.l3 Cases involving foreigners who have
not been accorded relevant privileges and immunities are to be
handled br an intermediate people's court as the court of first
instance. 4
The application of the PRC Criminal CodelS to foreign
nationals also appears to be speculative, despite the fact that
it was promulgated in 1979.
Pursuant to Article 3 of the
Criminal Code, the criminal law applies to foreigners who commit
crimes within Chinese territory,l6 unless otherwise specified by
law .17
Never the less, the Chinese have inconsistently applied the
Criminal Code to different foreign nationals.
For example, the
PRC expelled an American teacher in June 1982 for violating PRC
secrecy laws relating to agriculture,l8 and a Soviet national was
sentenced to 7 years imprisonment in 1980 for violating PRC
secrecy laws relating to military intelligence.l9
Although the
latter violation may appear more egregious, both acts were
punishable under the counterrevolutionary provisions of the PRC
Criminal Code (Arts. 90-104) which require a minimum three year
sentence upon conviction.20 Moreover, the brevity of the reports
on the two different cases offered no clues as to justifications
for the variance in applied sanctions.21
Undoubtedly, these
inconsistencies will cause anxiety for inspectorate members and
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prompt the suggestion of seeking full prosecutorial
ensure full and fair inspection operations.
B.

immunity to

General Procedural Application of the PRC Criminal Law
to an Inspectorate

The PRC Criminal Code is primarily concerned with offenses
committed in Chinese territory by a citizen of the PRC or of a
third country or by a stateless person.
By territory, the PRC
law refers to territorial land, sea and air, including foreign
ships navigating on the high seas or docked at PRC ports and
airplanes flying within PRC air space, or parked at Chinese
airports.22
There are also explicit prov1s1ons for offenses committed
outside Chinese territory by Chinese citizens.
For serious offenses considered to jeopardize the state, such as counterrevolutionary acts, betrayal of state secrets, forgery of national
currency, embezzlement, or bribery, Chinese citizens are punishable under the PRC Criminal Code regardless of whether the act is
considered an offense under the law in the place of commission.23
Other offenses are punishable under Chinese law when the sentence
in the PRC would not be less than three years and when the crime
is also punishable under the place of commission.24
Chinese judicial organs may. also prosecute a foreign national when he comes within the terri tor ial j ur isd ic tion of the
PRC for acts considered an offense punishable by law in the place
of commission: for acts punishable under Chinese law committed
against the PRC or a Chinese citizen: or, for an act punishable
by not less than three years' imprisonment under Chinese law.25
Article 19 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code provides for
the jurisdiction of a people's court "in the place where the
crime is perpetrated," except where it is "more appropriate" to
try the accused· in the jurisdiction in which he has resided.
Judging by the present lack of trained judicial personnel in many
of the PRC's rural areas and by the publicity a criminal trial of
a foreign national would draw, it is likely that Article 19 would
be used to justify moving a trial to one of the larger cities,
such as Beijing. Concepts of venue and forum non conveniens appear to be foreign to the PRC.
----- --Depending on the severity of the offense, the case may be·
heard in the first instance by a lower people's court,2EI an
intermediate people's court where the offense has a bearing on
the entire province,27 a higher people's court,28 or the Supreme
People's Court where the offense has a bearing on the whole country.29 An open trial shall be conducted unless state secrets,
persona) shameful secrets, or juvenile ·delinquency are· involved. 0 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 62 (15) of the 1982
PRC Constitution, the National People's Congrees is empowered to
•exercise such other functions and powers" as it deems necessary.
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In the recent trial of the Gang of Four, the Fifth National
People's Congress Standing Committee set up a special procuratorate and a special court to prosecute and try the ten defendants
involved.31
Though a number of scholars questioned the legal
basis for their establishment,32 it remains conceivable that, on
the basis of the sensitive nature of a prosecution of an inspectorate member within the PRC, special organs may be established.
Such organs, by virtue of their special status and exposure to
scrutiny by outside parties, could be used by the Chinese both to
attempt to portray to the outside world total impartiality and
evenhandedness in dealing with foreign nationals and to convince
the Chinese masses, by the use of "special" treatment, of the
seriousness of the offense.

c.

The Criminal Justice System in the PRC and Its Application to an Inspectorate
1.

Arrest and Detention

The recently enacted Arrest and Detention Regulations33
outline the procedures involved in the arrest and pretrial detention of a criminal defendant.
Under the Regulations, the arrest
of a criminal is to be carried out by a public security organ34
after obtaining a warrant35 pursuant to a "decision of a people's
court or with the sanction of a people's procuratorate•36 within
the local jurisdiction. Moreover, evidence against any arrested
criminal is supposed to be submitted to an appropriate people's
procuratorate within three days, or, in extraordinary circumstances, within seven days after the arrest is made.37
The period of detention pending preliminary investigation
is dictated by Article 92 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which
provides for a maximum of two months for an accused.
This
period, however, may be extended by one month on approval of· a
people's procuratorate at the next higher level.
If a case is
particularly serious and complicated, the Supreme People's Procuratorate shall report the case to the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress for approval of a further extension on
the detention period in order to complete an investigation.38
Under a 1954 Act, reconfirmed in 1979,39 the accused is to
be detained in a detention house, used for confining minor offenders pending adjudication of their cases.40
The detention
house differs from
a
jail
cell, which
is used
to hold
•counterrevolutionary offenders and other important criminal
offenders whose cases have already been adjudged.•41
Although these provisions are designed to protect a defendant pending completion of an investigation, the most sensational
trial in PRC history -- the trial of the Gang of .Four -- violated
a number of procedural and substantive safeguards embodied in the
newly enacted criminal codes, leading one to believe that justice
in the PRC may become very often the slave of political expediency.42 The potential impact on an inspectorate team is immense,
since the extremely sensitive nature of inspection operations and
the potential seriousness of any violations of Chinese criminal
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laws creates an atmosphere of uncertainty as to both the application of criminal 1 aw provisions and the possibility of redress
for Chinese violations of their own legal codes.
Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code provides
that trials in a higher people's court or :.he Supreme People's
Court as a court of first instance should be conducted by a
"collegiate tribunal composed of from one to three judges and two
to four people's assessors," except in simple civil cases or
minor criminal ones.43
Assessors, too, were curiously absent
from the Gang of Four trial.
Such omissions and commissions by
the highest legal organs of the PRC suggest problems .for inspection operations by evincing a willingness on behalf of Chinese
authorities to circumvent or ignore established legal provisions
when it is in PRC interests to do so.
2. Legal Assistance
Provisions for legal assistance are an essential component
of an arms control agreement, for one might expect instances in
which inspectorate personnel will require legal counsel, relating
to either official or personal affairs.
There are several alternatives for providing legal assistance, including a legal staff composed of international civil
servants or an internal international legal staff working in conjunction with PRC legal advisory offices.44 Provisions for nonChinese legal counsel would be desirable from a foreign point of
view to ensure impartiality on the part of counsel. The Chinese,
however, have effectively cut off foreign legal practice in the
PRC, creating problems in representation, devotion to operations,
and discretion in handling sensitive inspectorate matters.
The primary impediment to foreign representation in the PRC
is
the
statute
entitled
the
"Provisional
Regulations
on
Lawyers.•45
Article 8 stipulates that:
"Those .citizens who
cherish the PRC, support the socialist system and have the right
to elect and be elected are eligible to be lawyers after passing
an examination
"
Despite the lack of reference in the
regulations to what foreign law firms or lawyers may or may not
do in the PRC, Article 8 appears to preclude foreign representation.
This presumption is supported by recent PRC statements.
In January 1982, Jiang Datao of the Ministry of Justice noted
that foreign lawyers "cannot qualify as lawyers and cannot work
as lawyers in China.•46
In addition, a preliminary outline of
the draft Civil Code47 and the provisional Civil Procedure Law48
indicated that no foreign organization or individual may intervene in a civil trial and that all lega~ representation must be
entrusted to PRC legal advisory office attorneys because pr~vate
practice is non-existent in the PRC,
Thus, the supposedly inherent right of representation, pursuant to Article 26 of· the
Criminal Procedure Code, is more restrictive than it at first
appears to be.
A second major stumbling block to legal assistance in the
PRC is the absence in the Chinese criminal justice system of the
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"assumption [sic] of innocence" of a criminal defendant.49 This
is supported by the fact that the Chinese do not perceive the
defense lawyer as an advocate for the accused. Rather, a defense
lawyer is an advocate of the "legitimate rights and interests" of
the accused, which officials in the PRC have noted compels him to
"base his case on facts, using the law as a guide" and thereby
protect the rights of the Chinese people as a whole.SO
The
attorney is thereby relegated to a position of acting not to defend the accused on the merits of the claim but rather of serving
as an advocate for leniency in punishment.Sl
The most logical
conclusion to draw from this is that the interests of the Chinese
people and the criminal defendant would best be served by a Chinese attorney because a Chinese attorney in all likelihood would
be more capable of protecting the client within the framework of
the PRC legal system.
Several other issues arise in the context of Chinese representation. Law schools and legal societies have only recently
been reestablished.52 Legal research is in its incipiency53 and
the number of lawyers is pitifully small.54 The lack of trained
professionals is even reflected in the PRC Criminal Procedure
Code, which provides for legal representation by lawyers, close
relatives or guardians of the accused, other citizens, or the
defendant himself.SS The recent promulgation of the PRC legal
coces has left little time for the developnent of judicial experience.
Application of statutory provisions is sporadic, the
concept of stare decisis is unknown,56 and punishment is often
meted out for oolitical motives rather than on the basis of sound
legal doctrine·. 57 Moreover, the Chinese legal system continues
to be beset by problems of judicial and procuratorial. dependence
on the Chinese Communist Party.58
Despite the fact that PRC legal advisory offices in many
areas maintain separate departments to handle foreign legal affairs,59 Chinese legal personnel in these offices are trained
only to handle cases involving maritime accidents or foreign
trade disputes.
Moreover, many of these cases are eventually
turned over to arbitration bodies for final resolution and few,
if any, of these attorneys have been compelled to protect foreign
interests from the beginning to the end of a dispute.
Because
there is no specific legislative act or administrative practice
providing for the extension of legal advisory services to nonjuridical persons, a question arises as to whether legal advisory
offices may offer their services to any form of inspectorate, or
whether such services would be restricted to those juridical personalities recognized by Chinese law.
The most desirable alternative for an arms inspectorate is
the establishment of a coordinated body of non-Chinese staff
attorneys who work in conjunction with the relevant departments
of PRC advisory offices on general retainer.
This particular
legal advisory form possesses a number of advantages over other
suggested bodies.
First, the international composition of the
legal staff ensures a dispassionate professional commitment to
the interests of an inspectorate in its conflicts with the Chinese system.
Second, it provides personnel familiar with the
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potentially complicated. machinations of differing legal systems.
Third, the use of PRC "advisory offices" guarantees the presence
of Chinese attorneys most familiar with the political and proprietary underpinnings of the PRC legal system and avoids any conflict with PRC regulations on exclusive Chinese legal representation in Chinese courts.
Fourth, resort to "advisory offices" is
a flexible concept in that where appropriate, Chinese legal advisors can suggest alternative methods of dispute resolution. This
avoids the formal rudiments of adversar ial 1 itigation which the
Chinese have traditionally abhorred.
Despite its advantages for an arms inspectorate, this composite legal advisory .l>ody will require two acts.
First, an
amendment of PRC law to incorporate a specific provision on foreign legal representation in the PRC judicial system would be
·needed. Second, it would be necessary to obtain the procurement
of guaranteed assurances of independent legal authority before
any recruitment of Chinese attorneys takes place.
Absent these
two requirements, the legal staff would be unable to maintain the
delicate balance of impartiality, commitment to
inspection
operations, and familiarity with the Chinese legal system that
are crucial to adequate legal assistance.
D. Vexatious Criminal Statutory Provisions
According to Ar tiel e 2 of the PRC Criminal Code, the task
o'f the criminal law is to punish criminals -- particularly counterrevolutionary offenses -- and protect the· public order.oO Article 10 then offers an extremely broad, confusing, and disturbingly vague definition of a criminal offense.61
Because of the extreme sensitivity of the PRC to the
principle of the inviolability of state sovereignty, an inspectorate team must remain alert to the scrutiny its operations are
likely to receive from Chinese authorities and to the potential
for creating explosive political issues through its activities.
The ambiguity and broad sweep of many of the provisions of
Chinese laws are often designed to serve a political purpose.
Inspectorate team members are, therefore, vulnerable to the
shifting tides of Chinese political expediency and national
security.
Though foreign offenses will often be treated pursuant to
Article 30 of the PRC Criminal Code, which provides for deportation as· an exclusive penalty, the same provision notes that
deportation may be a "supplementary penalty.•62
Bence, other
provisions must be examined for relevance.
Of significant import to PRC citizens connected with inspection procedures and to foreign national~ unprotected by
diplomatic immunity is the use of the criminal law term
"counterrevolutionary acts• (fangemingzui).
Despite the fact
that a full chapter, comprising fifteen articles, is devoted to
counterrevolutionary crimes in the PRC Criminal Code,63 the term
is defined only nebulously as an act "jeopardizing the People's
Republic of China by aiming at over throwing the political power
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of the proletariat or the socialist system.•64
The impact of
this particular section of the present PRC Criminal Code on the
operative work of an inspectorate cannot be overestimated.
Almost any action an inspector may wish to take within the purview
of his official duties may conceivably violate the provisions on
counterrevolutionary acts.
One Chinese authority has defined counterrevolutionary
crimes to include collusion with a foreign country, splitting the
country, jeopardizing the motherland and engaging in espionage.65
This latter term, espionage, is defined somewhat further in Article 97 of the PRC Criminal Code, which lists "stealing, spying
and supplying information to the enemy •
supplying arms or
other military materials to the enemy, [or) joining a secret
service or espionage organization" as counterrevolutionary activities.66 Nowhere in the relevant laws of the PRC, however,
are espionage and other terms explictly defined.
Moreover, the Criminal Code's ambiguities extend to other
statutes.
The PRC secrecy statute -- the 1951 Provisional Reg-·
ulations on Guarding State Secrets67 -- is designed, inter alia,
to prevent counterrevolutionaries from "gathering intelligence
[or) selling . . • leaking or losing state secrets.•68 The provision which lists information that is considered a "state
secret" is, in essence, an amalgam of military, economic, political and social secrets, incorporating everything from military
logistical information to weather reports. o9
In practice, the
statute has been used to classify additional matters, including
the telephone numbers of Beijing residents. 70
Yet, nowhere in
this statute -- the violation of which is considered a counterrevolutionary act punishable under the PRC Criminal ·Code -- are
terms 1 ike "state
secrets,"
"secret information,"
"spies,"
"counterrevolutionary act" and the like, further explained.
In
addition, the State Secrets Regulations are buttressed by a common PRC legislative practice known as the "all-encompassing provision," by virtue of which the law becomes sweeping legislation.
The catch-all provision of the State Secrets Regulations connotes
state secrets as "all other state affairs which should be kept
quiet,•71 thus subsuming almost any matter the Chinese Communist
Party deems necessary in a particular instance.
It is therefore
quite likely that the present broad scope of these provisions can
only serve to impede inspection functions.
Improper authorization for verification activities, insufficient documentation to
support inspection operations, potential ultra vires verification
procedures, or blatantly illegal action may well constitute proscribed acts.
This may be particularly true of indigenous personnel who per form inspection functions and who are more 1 ikely
to be held accountable under Chinese law for indiscretions and
infractions.
Several articles of the PRC Criminal Code 1 ist counterrevolutionary activities for which either a prison sentence or
death may be imposed.72
Yet, the exact distinction between a
counterrevolutionary crime and an ordinary one, for which punishment is less severe, is difficult to draw. According to one PRC
author, the difference depends on "the aim of the perpetrator.•73
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If that statement holds any legal weight, then all counterrevolutionary crimes appear to be intentional crimes, despite the fact
that the PRC Crimina! Code does not stipulate that the perpetrator recognize that his acts will harm the PRC~ nor that he foresee the harm; nor that he wish (direct intent) or consciously
permit (indirect intent) the harm to occur. Crimes of negligence
are, in most instances, omitted from the category of counterrevolutionary acts, though if the act is egregious, it could be
prosecuted under this section.74
Perhaps the most terse distinction between an ordinary
crime and a counterrevolutionary one is that the latter causes
the more direct harm to the state.
Crimes such as speculation,
profiteering and theft, though they undermine the socialist
economic system, are- carried out by criminals for individual
objectives.
Absent counterrevolutionary intent, such activites
would
not
constitute
counterrevolutionary
crimes
in
most
instances.
Another significant legal concept in the PRC Criminal Code
is one not admitted in Western legal doctrine -- the use of
analogy ( leisi). 75
By analogy, the Chinese refer to the legal
justification for treating an act not listed in the law as
criminal, a concept in direct contravention to the Western legal
maxim nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without an existing law
making an act a crime):/6 Although the PRC has cited the use of
analogy as a necessary stipulation in order to "avoid constantly
changing the criminal law,•77 it is not difficult to imagine the
potential for abuse by PRC authorities if and when it became
necessary to hamper
the performance of the duties of an
inspectorate.
Counterrevolutionary crime and analogy are not the only
pitfalls in the Criminal Code confronting inspectorate members.
Foreign "nationals or aliens not granted diplomatic privileges and
immunities or granted diplomatic privileges and immunities, but
engaging in egregious criminal activities, are also vulnerable to
prosecution under the provisions against violations of public
security.78
Crimes harmful to public security include arson~
breaking dikes~ sabotaging bridges, houses, airfields and navigation passages; and, causing explosions or using other dangerous
means to destroy factories and other industrial facilities,
rivers and water sources, public or private property.79 Sabotaging airlines, shipping lines, railroads and other transportation
facilities, sabotaging radio stations and other communication
facilities; and, sabotaging gas, electric, or other flammable
facilities are also violations of public security.BO Once again,
though, the main thrust of these provisions dealing with sabotage
is not clearly defined, leaving ample room for difficult disputes
over the proper scope of inspection activities and the appl ication of Chinese criminal law provisions.
Chinese law is also unique in that criminals are often
rewarded with reductions or remissions of penalties if they
surrender voluntarily81 or engage in self-denunciation, a direct
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application of the PRC pol icy of "leniency to confessors, severity to resisters.•82
Thus, the full thrust of PRC criminal
code provisions is an effective deterrent to unauthorized or ultra vires activities.
Statutory provisions are sweeping and ambiguous, capable of incorporating most or all of inspectorate
operations not explicitly exempted from their scope.
As a result, it is readily apparent that arms inspectorate
operations would be only marginally effective in policing arms
control agreements if appropriate inspectorate personnel were not
granted immunities from, or privileges with respect to, Chinese
substantive and procedural laws and regulations.
E. Informal Social Control of Inspectorate Functions
One additional factor merits consideration with respect to
potential disputes arising out of inspectorate operations and
operative PRC control over such activities.
Western political
analysts have often observed that Communist countries often tend
to suffer from a rampant political paranoia. 83 This phenomenon
may be expressed in several ways, but perhaps its most appropriate description for the purposes of an inspectorate would be peer
group jurisdiction.84
Peer groups such as Communist Youth
Leagues,
urban
neighorbood
committees,
people's
mediation
committees, social order committees and the like operate on the
fringes of administrative and criminal law in the PRC.
They are
often established for broad and nebulous purposes such as
maintaining social order: enforcing patriotic and law abiding
education: informing against and conducting surveillance of
counterrevolutionaries: carrying out propaganda and education on
policies and laws: and, supervising the masses.85
These peer groups are often aided in their endeavors by
common citizens, by the People's Liberation Army (the PRC armed
forces) and by the public security organs.
Though such groups
would probably offer only minimal prolonged physical interference
with inspection activities, their danger lies in their nuisance
value.86 Furthermore, the lack of experience that inspectorate
foreign nationals can be expected to have with such institutions
may cause more serious consequences. Strong reactions by inspectorate personnel to peer group efforts may result in criminal
culpability under the rather sweeping provision of the PRC
Criminal Code, which stipulates that "no one is allowed to disrupt public order by any means whatsoever.•87
Such groups do not technically exercise formal criminal,
civil, or administrative jurisdiction.
By and large, many of
these peer groups have no formal enforcement powers and only some
are legally recognized as surveillance forces within the PRC.
But, they are encouraged· to oversee daily activities, including
the registration of building tenants and guests, the mediation of
intra-familial squabbles, reports on suspicious activities, and
even the monitoring of the menstrual cycles of young women to
ensure compliance with population control regulations.88 Provisions in present bilateral and multilateral agreements calling
for immunity from such jurisdiction (i.e., civil, criminal, or
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administrative) would therefore be insufficient and irrelevant.
As such, the recognition of this phenomenon should compel the
parties to an arms control agreement to revise the provisions on
jurisdictional immunities to encompass the potential activities
of these groups.
In general, the individuals who comprise an
inspectorate team, as well as the inspectorate enterprise, would
be severely hampered in their operations if they were not in some
way protected from the brunt of Chinese state jurisdiction.
It
is therefore helpful to examine privileges and immunities provided under Chinese law which may be available to inspectorates
and inspectorate operations.
Chapter 4. DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER EXISTING
CHINESE LAW
A. General Observations
The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to inspectorate personnel would permit "the free and unhampered exercise of the organization's functions and maintain the dignity of
the organization and the individuals associated with it."89
In
accordance with the norms of international relations, the Chinese
may grant a privilege or immunity from either PRC enforcement
jurisdiction (such as arrest, detention and prosecution) or prescription jurisdiction (such as the right to demand compliance
with Chinese laws).
In practice, the PRC grants an i~munity from
enforcement jurisdiction only.
The Chinese term for immunity -- mianchu -- translates
literally as "an exemption" and thereby imparts an understanding
that such immunity connotes an exemption from all aspects of a
particular law -- i.e., an exemption from PRC enforcement and
prescription jurisdiction.
However, such a term is contrary to
customary Chinese practice, which recognizes that foreign diplomats and certain international personnel are accorded specific
diplomatic privileges90 but are not relieved from the obligation
to respect the laws and regulations of the PRc.91 As such, the
Chinese are empowered to call for the expulsion of "privileged"
diplomats who have "act[ed) wildly in defiance of the law."92
The PRC has noted that criminal violations by foreign representatives are usually handled through diplomatic channels:
the PRC
may ask the sending state to deal with the offenders in accordance with the law [of the sending state]93 or it may declare the
foreign representative persona non grata and demand his immediate
recall from the PRc.94
---

B. Privileges and Immunities Under the Diplomatic
Convention
The Chinese, by virtue of their ratification of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations95 [hereafter Diplomatic Convention), have recognized, at least in principle, that persons
granted full diplomatic privileges and immunities enjoy personal
inviolability96 and are "immune from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state."97 A diplomatic agent is not subect to "any
form of arrest or detention" 98 and "is not obliged to give
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evidence as a witness.•99 Moreover, the rece~v1ng state is expected to treat a diplomatic agent "with due respect and .
[to) take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.•lOO
Article 8 of the PRC Criminal Code incorporates the
customary right to diploma tic privileges and immunities from
enforcement jurisdiction, providing that criminal liability for
"foreigners who enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity shall be
resolved through diplomatic channels.•lOl The wording of Article
8 appears to be deliberately circumscribed:
those accorded special treatment are apparently restricted to formal diplomatic
personnel. Among those protected would be heads of state, ambassadors, ministers, charges d'affaires and armed forces attaches.
The precise wording of Article 8 is significant, for it
appears that the privileges and immunities of personnel, other
than those not subject to Chinese criminal jurisdiction by virtue
of treaties concluded by the PRC (such as upper level diplomatic
agents), would not automatically be incorporated into Chinese
domestic law.
Thus,
immunities and privileges granted
to
lower-level inspectorate personnel would have to be incorporated
into Chinese domestic law by direct legislation.l02 Article 11
of the PRC Crimina! Procedure Code stipulates that no criminal
prosecution will be sought against those "exempt from criminal
responsibilities as stipulated by law and decrees.•l03 From this
provision, it is possible to conclude that there are numerous
forms of PRC legislation which may be used to grant privileges
and immunities to those other than recognized diplomatic personnel and which would automatically be incorporated into PRC domestic law. The demarcation between those forms of PRC legislative
acts which do and those which do not automatically incorporate
privileges and L~munities into Chinese domestic law is not clear,
particularly in light of the recent conflict involving the u.s.PRC Consular Convention and the detention of an ~~erican teacher
for
allegedly violating Chinese
secrecy 1 aws
relating
to
agriculture .104
Chinese laws do not broach the subject of whether measures
involving direct physical restraint of diplomatic personnel are
permissible in extraordinary circumstances. Although some articles on diplomatic privileges and immunities which appeared in
the PRC during the Cultural RevolutionlOS suggested the absolute
inviolability of the person of diplomatic personne1,l06 both
concomitant Chinese practice and subsequent international law
treatises have suggested that restraint is permissible at least
in circumstances involving self-defense or the prevention of the
commission of a crime by a diplomatic personage.l07 Because of
the sensitive nature of material inspectorate agents are likely
to seek, certain PRC policies must be clarified. Furthermore, in
light of PRC practices, it would be unwise and unsafe to presume
automatic incorporation of broad privileges and immunities into
PRC domestic law.
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C. Privileges and Immuniites of Consular Officials and
Personnel of International Organizations
Persons associated with international and c~nsular organizations are granted more limited privileges and immunities than
those granted diplomats. The 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relationsl08 [hereafter Consular Convention], which the PRC
ratified in August 1979,109 provides, inter alia, that "consular
officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending
trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a
decision by the competent judicial authority."llO Consular personnel may be called upon to give evidence in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings ,111 but are not obligated to
testify or to produce evidence on matters pertaining to official
consular functions.ll2
Moreover, there is immunity from the
judicial or administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state
with respect to official acts.ll3
The Consular Convention is inadequate for purposes of
granting privileges and
immunities to
inspectorate
agents.
First, consular personnel under the Consular Convention are still
susceptible to the criminal
jurisdiction of the
receiving
state .114 Moreover, there is .no provision for the absolute inviolability of consular premises.
The effect on inspectorate
operations would therefore be quite severe.
Operations may be
hampered by potential arrests, detentions, prosecutions, and confinements of inspectorate personnel.
In addition, the inspection
team's premises and equipment could be subject to the intrusion
of the host state, a fact which could lead to interference with
operations, harrassments of personnel, or tampering with facilities or equipment.
With respect to international organizations, the PRC's
recent accession to the ON Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized AgenciesllS [hereafter UN Convention
on Privileges], is an unprecedented step in Chinese historical
and political doctrine towards recognition of international
organizations as juridical personalities under international law.
Pursuant to the ON Convention on Privileges, the specialized
agenciesll6 "shall possess juridical personality" and "shall have
the capacity (a) to contract, (b) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property, (and] (c) to institute legal proceedings.•ll7 The specialized agencies, their property and assets "shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived
their immunity." 118
The PRC's accession, however, is not necessarily an indication of unequivocal Chinese recognition of international organizations as a legitimate subject of international law, nor does it
signal firm support for participation in multilateral conventions
for the protection of diplomatic and international personalities.
First, the PRC has refused to accede to the ON Convention on
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Privileges as it applied to all international organizations enumerated therein.llg Second, the PRC has not ratified any convention directly granting the United Nations recognized juridical
status.l20
Third, the PRC has continued to oppose compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and has refused to ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents.l21 Moreover, as a sel £-proclaimed non-aligned
nation the PRC is not party to any regional convention such as
ASEAN1~2 and presumably, therefore, recognizes no special privileges and immunities for such an organization.
Because of this,
it would also be difficult to predict whether Chinese treatment
of communist international organizations would differ from the
treatment of non-communist ones.
Nevertheless, by virtue of PRC accession to the UN Convention on Privileges, to which the Soviet Union has already acceded ,123 there now exists a mutually agreeable framework from
which to conclude subsequent agreements concerning international
immunities.
Moreover, Chinese accession to the UN Convention on
Privileges is illustrative of a change of heart by the PRC.
Where once the Chinese had refused to grant specialized international (UN) agencies even limited protection because of their
dependence on the United Nations, itself a non-juridical personality, they now have offered them a breadth and scope of
protection similar to those accorded diplomatic agents.
Within the framework of the UN Convention on Privileges and
pursuant to the PRC's new approach, no censorship shall, be
applied to the official communications and correspondences of the
specialized agencies.l24
Moreover, the archives~ documents and
premises of these agencies shall be inviolable.! 5 Property of
the specialized agencies is " immune from search, r equi si tion,
confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference,
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative
action.•lT6
Aside from the formal, juridical recognition of international UN agencies, the PRC has even granted legal status --.
albeit 1 imited -- to other internationall27 and foreign government entities.l28 These limited immunities may be recognized in
order to protect appropriate personnel in the exercise of their
official functions.
These immunities do not represent clear
customary rules of international law, but are the result of the
special status of certain foreign official personnel, who may be
required to engage in limited activities, including business ventures, educational and cultural exchanges, and political negotiations.l29
Despite affirmative steps by the PRC to broaden its perceptions of legitimate privileges and immunities, wholesale optimism
regarding future PRC positions on the subject is discouraged.
Patterns of unequivocal Chinese behavior have only just emerged,
and past practice has indicated a willingness by the PRC to alter
its international legal and diplomatic positions, often without
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apparent cause, particularly
change their course.l30

when

prevailing

political

winds

Because the status of an inspectorate determines the scope
of its privileges and immunities, it is crucial that the parties
to an arms control agreement carefully choose the form of inspectorate and endow its members with broad well-defined privileges
and immunities.
Recognition that present practice provides for
more limited preferential treatment for consular and international organizations would seem to mandate a provision for
specific and comprehensive privileges and immunities for the
members of inspectorates teams.
D. Chinese Reactions to Privileges and Immunitiesl31
According to the Chinese view, "diplomatic privileges are
the special rights and preferetial treatment, based on the principles of equality and reciprocity .
. mutually granted by
countries which have established diplomatic relations with each
other.•l32
In practice, however, the Chinese have recognized
limited privileges and immunities for representatives of governments or entities with which the PRC did not have full diplomatic
relations.l33 Furthermore, the Chinese have often ignored those
privileges and immunities rightfully granted to diplomatic representatives of foreign states.l34 Since its admission to the
United Nations, however, the PRC has been much more consistent in
according and respecting the privileges attached to the conduct
of diplomatic personnel and in granting them immunity from local
administrative, civil and criminal processes and sanctions.
In
addition, the PRC has adhered to general international practice
in allowing these privileges and immunities to remain in effect
as long as diplomatic departure from this is considered to be
reasonably connected to official duties.l35
The modern international practice granting governments both
the right to declare those who have abused their privileges and
immunites persona .!12!! grata and the right to deport them creates
a problem.
Subject to potential protest or retaliatory action
from the sendin% state, this rule is a function of unilateral
determination.l3
No justification need be given by a government
for invoking it.l37 In addition, what constitutes abusive conduct by a d~lomatic agent is itself open to .unilateral interpretation.l3
The issue of abuse of privileges and immunities
subsumes questions of fact and questions of law, regarding the
nature of the conduct, the application of relevent lawa to such
conduct and the consequences of a finding of abuse.l39
Uncertainty as to what constitutes abusive conduct in a
particular country can create potential inhibiting factors for
effective verification procedures.
Recently, for example, the
PRC expelled a British student for writing the slogan "Long Live
the Gang of Four" on a classroom blackboard .140 Though international practice does not accord to foreign students any official
privileges and immunities, this incident indicates the potential
explosive nature of unilateral determination of abuse.
As a
result, if an arms inspectorate is considered an international
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organization, the prov1s1ons of the arms control agreement should
specifically identify the requisite international privileges and
immunities and should provide for a method of dispute settlement
of alleged abuse cases which does not permit unilateral determinations of abusive conduct.
Previous international agreements
have failed in this respect. Provisions regarding privileges and
immunities to be accorded appropriate personnel working for particular international org ani za tions have been so general as to
vest in member states ultimate interpretive power.
The UN
Charter, for example, obligates member states to grant the Organization "such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the fulfillment of its purposes•l41 and to grant representatives
of the United Nations "such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the organization.•l42
Ultimately, the extent of
privileges and immunities and their proper interpretations rest
with individual sovereign nations and are thereby susceptible of
various and sundry legal constructions.
Although both the Soviets and the Chinese have traditionally opposed the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice,l43 the Chinese have been much more receptive to
hegotiationi conciliation, and arbitration as methods of dispute
settlement. 44 The PRC has, for instance, consistently abided by
arbitration awards involving its domestic corporations and nationalsl45 despite the fact that it is not a signatory to the
1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.l46
By 'emphasizing the role of the peaceful settlement of disputes through nonadversarial means,l4T the signatories to an arms
control agreement can avoid disagreeable incidents of unilateral
declarations
of
abuse
of
privileges
and
immunities
and
interference with the effective operation of verification and
inspection.l48
If an arms control inspectorate is composed strictly of
foreign nationals, presumably from states which are signatories
to the arms agreement, then inspection operations could probably
be conducted utilizing the privileges and immunities which presently comprise the rules of diplomatic intercourse. Foreign inspectors could presumably be endowed with the same privileges and
immunities as high-level embassy personnel, with additional
privileges being granted by the host PRC .when necessary for
effective operations.
They may also be subjected to similar
diplomatic procedures such as persona ~ grata declarations for
claimed abuses.
Whether or not one considers some of the present methods
for addressing diplomatic abuses simple to work with in arms
control agreements because they are the most familiar, there are
certain pitfalls.
Persona ~ grata ,rrocedure is still instituted upon unilateral determination.! 9 Swift deportation of
undesirable personnel, even if justified, would still be expected
to interfere with orderly verification and inspection processes~
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One possible approach, similar to that contained in Draft
Annex II of the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,lSO is to postpone deportation of persona n2.!l grata until the arrival of an
appropriate replacement.
Undue delays in sending replacement
personnel may be avoided by providing for reasonable time limits
for dispatch (persona non grata may be confined to inspectorate
headquarters in the interim), assuming, of course, that the time
required for bilateral personal security checks of replacement
officials can be minimized through mutual agreement.
E. Conclusion
Concern for the image of the PRC, particularly in the wake
of formal diplomatic relations with the United States, has led
the Chinese to deal leniently with minor transgressions by
foreignerslSl and extremely harshly with incidents involving
Chinese attacks on foreign nationals.l52
It is hardly correct,
however, to assert that the Chinese would be unperturbed by major
transgressions committed by foreigners.
In fact, the PRC can be
expected to be rather sensitive to such incidents, particularly
where they may interfere with Chinese national interests.
Because of such sensitivitiy, harsh, radical measures to correct
any injustices could not be entirely ruled out.l53
One must
always remember tha the true nature of the PRC 's treatment of
official foreign personnel is inevitably politically motivated,l54 international norms of diplomatic privileges and immunities notwithstanding.
In a country as vast and tightly controlled as the PRC, it
becomes fairly simple to regulate events.
By maintaining effective control over the media, for instance, the PRC is capable of
quelling or inflaming public opinion on certain events.l55 Incidents involving inspectorate members, regardless of the degree of
pr iv i1 eges and immunities accorded such personages, may have a
detrimental effect on inspection operations by making them seem
less acceptable to the Chinese people, with whom inspectorate
personnel must interact and upon whom inspectorate personnel must
rely to some degree to discharge their duties.
This is true
particularly if the PRC considers it necessary to publicize such
an incident, accompanied by the often acerbic ballyhoo of press
and
radio
commentaries,
editorials,
letter
write-ins,
and
published public reactions.
At the same time, Chinese reactions to these incidents will
have repercussions on Chinese foreign relations. The PRC will at
some point be required to balance its. own interests against the
potential impact of international reaction.
The choice the PRC
makes will illustrate its willingness or reluctance to create
strong affirmative support for arms inspection.
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Chapter 5.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OPERATIONS IN THE PRC:
SPECIFIC PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENT PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO
AN INSPECTORATE

A. Entry Into and Exit From the PRC
Entry (ruiing) and exit (chujing) continue to be regulated
by the Foreign National's Act.l56 Pursuant to this act, after a
foreign national obtains a passport (huzhao)l57 visas (9ianzheng) for entry into the PRC are issued abroad by Ch~nese
diplomatic and consular organs (Art. 4). Within China, visa applications are handled by appropriate public security bureaus
(Art. 4). The issuance of visas for those holding official passports ( gongwu huzhao) are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, to a lesser extent, appropriate alien affairs offices
and public security bureaus (Art. 4).
In practice, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs is informed of all applications for visas,l58
thus giving it, for the most part, full discretion in granting or
refusing permission to enter or leave the PRc.l59
Since such
decisions are considered administrative affairs, they are not
subject to judicial review.
In extreme circumstances, though, it
would be conceivable to file a complaint with the procuracy and
have the Procuratorate, pursuant to Article 176 of the PRC
Criminal Code, prosecute state functionaries for abusing their
:Hscretion.
PRC visa restrictionsl60 are similar to those of the Soviet
Union:
a single visa is not valid for use throughout the entire
country, but only for destinations specifically authorized in the
visa (Art. 8).
Prior permission must be obtained for travel
outside the scope of the visa and separate visas are necessary
for travel to each individual city.l61
A recent significant development in Chinese visa regulations has been PRC authorization of multiple entry-and-exit
visas, which permit unlimited entry and exit _at proper checkpoints for the limited life (e.g., two years) of the visa.l62
Procurement of such visas would greatly expedite inspectorate
operations, where frequent and necessary border crossings by inspectorate personnel may be indispensable to such operations.
Delay in the issuance of a visa is one potential concern
for inspectorate personnel, though such concern may be alleviated
by provisions in the arms control agreement for reasonable processing periodsl63 and by good faith among the parties.
To regulate the movement of foreign nationals into and
through the PRC, the Foreign National's Act provides for checkpoints, both at the border (Art. 9) and throughout the country
(Art. 16). It is at these points that travel documents and proper immunization certificates are inspected and customs procedures
instituted.
Official entry-exit points are scattered throughout
the PRC, giving an arms inspectorate ad~quate access to the country. Should circumstances arise, additional passage points could
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conceivably be authorized by international agreement or domestic
decree.
Passage across the Chinese border is also governed by a
number of other domestic legislative acts.
The Act on Frontier
Defense Inspect~on assigns the protection of PRC border regions
to People's Liberation Army (PLA) defense forces at frontier
defense inspection stations.l64
All persons and the means of
communication and transportation for entering or leaving the
country, as well as accompanying baggage and goods, must pass
through specially designated harbor, airport, and national boundary (ground transportation] stations at which frontier defense
inspection stations are located (Art. 1-3). All flights of foreign aircraft, or Chinese aircraft arriving from or leaving for
foreign destinations must report their flight patterns and manifests and have them approved by the Ministry of ·Foreign
Affairs.l65
Any attempt to cross the border into the PRC without appropr iate authorization is punishable under Article 176 of the
PRC Criminal Code, which provides for imprisonment of up to one
year, detent-ion, or surveillance for illegal crossings of "the
national boundary (frontier) in violation of border control regulations." Furthermore, Article 17 of the PRC Foreign National's
Act stipulates that violations may be punishable by warnings,
fines, or expulsion.
Violations committad by foreign nationals
possessing diplomatic immunity are supposed to be handled through
diplomatic channels.
Perhaps the most obvious suggestion in alleviating some of
the restrictions now before arms inspectorate personnel regarding
their entry into and exit from the PRC is to request an exemption
from the requirements of the aforementioned acts directly from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This would appear to be the
simplest and most expeditious method to secure freedom of passage.
An arms control agreement could also stipulate for an
amendment to the relevant acts to permit freedom of entry and
departure without special permission.
Another balanced solution
might be some form of domestic legislation designating unnecessary Chinese interference with the entry and exit of inspectorate
team members as a. crime and requiring procuratorial prosecution
of Chinese officials who obstruct their freedom of passage.
B. Customs
Because of the official and extraordinary nature of inspection operations, it is unlikely that the full range of customs
regulations would apply to the passage of inspectorate personnel
and their cargo, equipnent, documents, and personal items across
the PRC border.
Customs regulations are embodied in three Chinese statutes, though they ar_e augmented by additional customs
orders promulgated by the PRC from time to time.
These three
statutes are the provisionsal regulations governing the entry and
exit of passengers, crews and baggage of aircraft,l66 rail transport,l67 and sea-going vessels.l68 The regulations also contain
a number of overlapping provisions dealing with entry into and
- 160 -

exit from the PRc.l69 The regulations are fairly uniform in content, permittin~ consistency in inspection for compliance with
customs, health 70 and tariff regulations.l71
Inspection procedures are exercised at the stations of first entry and
departure.l72
Pursuant to each of the three regulations, the "special
cases" posed by the entrance or departure of foreign attaches and
diplomatic agents should be referred to the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,l73 which handles customs inspection for such
personnel according to separate rules, regulations and agreements
and in conformance with international practice.
Undoubtedly,
though, there will be some overlap between these separate rules
and ordinary customs regulations, particularly as they apply to
PRC bans on the import or export of Chinese national currency,
firearms, ammunition, military weapons, lottery or raffle tickets
and books, journals, photographs, movies, film, files and tapes
that would be harmful to or cast aspersion on the political or
cultural relations of the PRc.l74
Smuggling is the most serious customs violation in the PRC.
The illegal possession, storage, sale, or transfer of such goods
as Chinese currency, precious metals and valuable cultural relics
may result in punishment under Articles 116, 117, 118, and 173 of
the PRC Criminal Code of up to ten years' imprisonment, fines and
the confiscation of the property in question. Smuggling is today
a major business in the PRC and the Chinese are vigilant in enforcing customs regulations in order to reduce the amount of contraband flowing in and out of the PRc.l75
Regardless of the means of transportation used to enter
into or exit from the PRC, it is likely that customs measures
would defer to the specific inspectorate arrangements, which
would presumably include extensive privileges and imunities from
strict inspection measures.
Official correspondence is often transferred into and out
of the PRC through the use of the diplomatic pouch, an internationally recognized means of protecting the inviolability of such
communications.
Chinese practice has heretofore protected the
diplomatic pouch,l76 but the wording of the Diplomatic Convention
may permit the pouch to be opened or detained if PRC authorities
suspect that it may contain items other than "diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use (Art. 27(4)),177 although such inspection must be in the presence of the diplomatic
agent (Art. 36).
The courier who accompanies the pouch enjoys
the right of personal inviolability (Art. 27(5)). There appears
to be no publicized evidence that the Chinese will protect the
pouch only when the courier is within reasonable proximity to it,
though courier accompaniment appears to be standard practice.
Soviet customs officials, on the other hand, have been known to
open the pouch in instances where the courier is not within reasonable proximity.l78
Under
the Diplomatic Convention, personal
baggage of
diplomatic agents is not subject to customs inspection unless
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there are "serious grounds for presuming that it contains articles not covered in paragraph 1 [such as i terns imported or exported in commercial quantities or items not intended for personal use] . . • , or articles the import or export of which is
prohibited by the law or controlled by the quarantine regulations
of the .receiving state• (Art. 36(2)).
Once again, however, the
Chinese reservation attached to Article 37(2)-(4) of the Diplomatic Convention obscures somewhat the applicaton of these privileges to administrative, technical and service personnel attached
to a foreign embassy.
Chinese regulations prohibit the sale of imported goods by
foreigners, 119 so it must be assumed that diploma tic effects
remain diplomatic property and eventually must be removed from
the PRC.
Past and present Chinese practices indicate the need for
changes in customs regulations and conventions in order to ensure
the smooth operation of inspection procedures.
As a general
rule, the scope of privileges and immunities will, of course,
depend on the composition of an arms inspector (adversary or
international).
But it appears that current PRC recognition of privileges
and immunities would be insufficiently broad under either arrangement.
The PRC is on record as opposing full juridicial
recognition of international organizations.
The status of personnel associated with these organizations has not yet been
broached officially by the Chinese. As for official foreign personnel, PRC recognition of privileges and immunities is limited,
at best.
In some instances, there has simply been no precedent
for preferential customs treatment peculiar to an arms inspectorate (e.g., operational equipment shipments). In other instances,
customs privileges currently accorded, for example, secondary
diplomatic personnel (i.e., technical, administrative, and service staff) are inadequate for inspectorate purposes. Technical
personnel, in particular, would probably be required to perform
many of the more arduous tasks of controlling the movement of
equipment, records, and supplies.
For the arms inspection effort, customs delays, tar iff burdens and complicated clearance
procedures imposed on secondary personnel may interfere with the
completion of the mission.
The relatively small number of
personnel involved should make a broad grant of privileges and
immunities to all
inspectorate members at least reasonably
feasible.
C. Housing, Accommodations and Services
As is the case in the Soviet Union, most tangible projterty
in the PRC, aside from small private agricultural plots,l CJ is
socialistically owned, i.e., belongs to the state or to collective organizations controlled by the State and· the CCP.
For the
purposes of inspectorate members' accommodations, there appears
to be no known practice of permitting foreign or international
personnel access to Chinese socialist housing.l81
Moreover,
there is a significant urban housing shortage in China which
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makes any Chinese decision to extend access to housing facilities
to foreigners a very unlikely proposition.
Hotel accommodations are also in extremely short supply.
According to a recent U.S. State Department report, for example,
even Chinese organizations are unable to secure reservations for
foreign guests in Beijing's (Peking's) better hotels until one or
two days before arrival.l82 The impact of increased numbers of
long-term diplomatic residences and business visitors has forced
the PRC to often make use of very poor accommodations.
Under these circumstances, the most sui table ar rang em en t
for inspectorate accommodations may be to request separately
built facilities from the Chinese government, with such housing
leases operating extra legem.l83
In fact, such an arrangement
has legal precedent. Under present diplomatic and consular practices, for example,
1)

[a] receiving state shall either facilitate the
acquisition on its territory, in accordance with
its laws, by the sending state of premises
necessary for its mission or assist the latter
in obtaining accommodation in some other way.

2)

It shall also, where necessary, assist missions
in obtaining suitable accommodations for their
members .184

In addition, arrangements for special accommodations for
inspectorate personnel has precedent in PRC practice, as well.
Because of the housing shortage, the Chinese have recently begun
making separate guest houses available to prominent business delegations.l85 Such segregated housing also offers administrative
advantages to both sides:
[It] assures conditions more commensurate with
the outsider's standard of living, and gives the
[Chinese] state better control over the visitors' activities and contacts with the local
population.l86 It also enhances the security of
the visitors' premises.
When special premises
are thus set aside, it is easier to safeguard
their inviolability (if any). Being segregated,
the residents are insulated to a certain extent
from ordinary intercourse with the local populace and petty officialdom.
Finally, [Chinese]
authorities find it easier to provide the necessary external protection (police, fire) to concentrated residential premises.l87
Most service organizations in the PRC are state enterprises
directly subordinate to China's State Councn.l88
What this
means is that foreigners who seek to visit or work in the PRC
must consult with, and obtain the active cooperation of, Chinese
state commissions, ministries, offices or special agencies.
In
practice, a single venture in the PRC requires contact with
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numerous agencies.
For example, foreign joint venture partners
will have contact with their Chinese counterpart, as well as the
Foreign Investment Commission, the General Administration for
Industry and Commerce and the Bank of China in order merely to
initiate venture operations.l89 Inspectorate personnel who seek
access to restricted areas of the PRC in order to conduct some
form of inspection procedure -- say, of an industrial facility -may need to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of National Defense, the Ministry of Public Security and perhaps
the Ministry directly in charge of the facility to be visited,
such as the Third Ministry of Machinery.
An inspectorate may not only be required to deal with these
types of Chinese state organizations. For some purposes, the PRC
has established commissions and agencies for dealing specifically
·with foreign requests: inspectorate members would be obligated to
deal with these entities.
Undoubtedly, inspectorate members
might wish to voluntarily deal with such specialized agencies or
commissions where the latter are able to secure better goods or
services -- such as food or transportation -- than ordinary channels would permit.
It is not difficult to envision the potential for interference with inspection operations if the Chinese choose to
harass an inspectorate or force the temporary curtailment of
operations by creating various obstacles to obtaining proper
food, supplies and services in the PRC.
In such instances, it
would be unlikely that inspectorate personnel could circumvent
the problem by importing the items. Chinese customs regulations,
tariff considerations, clearance procedures and time lags could
all prove prohibitive. Of course, the import of such items will
probably
be
necessary
at
intervals
during
inspectorate
operations, but it may be preferable for an inspectorate to limit
quantities and regulate the intervals between shipments. In very
many ways, the procurement of housing, goods, supplies and services in the PRC is one of the more significant tests of Chinese
commitment to arms inspection.
Under these circumstances, it becomes imperative than an
arms control agreement specifically enumerate the necessary procedures involved for the procurement of necessary goods, supplies
and services from the appropriate governmental organs of the PRC.
In addition, the agreement should stipulate reasonable time
periods in which the requests should be filled.
At the very
least, the parties involved should commit themselves in general
terms to facilitating the procurement of such items.
D. Communications
Communications will probably qualify as one of the more
sensitive aspects of arms inspection arrangements in the PRC. An
arms inspectorate has two choices:
it may rely exclusively on
the Chinese public communications network or it may establish its
own ·communication system.
In each instance, the parties to an
arms control accord will be required to balance the needs of an
inspectorate for rapid and confidential communication with what
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traditionally has been full Chinese state control over the public
communications network.
The Chinese Ministry of Communications is the organ mainly
responsible for the communications network in the PRC, though a
separate Ministry -- the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications
-- has administrative responsibility for mail
services.l90
Communications responsibilities are also shared with a number of.
specialized agencies, including the Ministry of Radio and Television and the Ministry of Electronics Industry, both of which are
subordinate to the State Council.l91
There are little hard data at present which indicate the
difficulties in negotiating with these organs, but undoubtedly
the ease with which separate communications agreements are concluded will impact on the choice between utilizing Chinese communications or establishing independent facilities.
The PRC has
not made publicly available much direct dc:mestic legislation on
cc:mmunications, but it is bound to a number of international
agreements and has promulgated supplementary regulations which
will affect inspectorate communications.
Perhaps the most secure form of international communications which currently exists is the diplomatic pouch. There are,
however, limits on its confidentiality. As was previously indicated, the pouch -- pursuant to the Diplomatic Convention -- may
be used to transfer official documents only (Art. 27(4)).
Furthermore, there is still the unanswered question of whether the
PRC will resort to its sovereign right to open the pouch when
violations are suspected.l92
It should be recognized that the
potential for interference with the contents of the pouch is
mitigated somewhat by the provision of the Diplomatic Convention
permitting "the mission [to] employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and messages in code or cipher" (Art.
27 ( 1) ) .193
Chinese accession to the Diploma tic Convention and
recognition of the use of the pouch for diplomatic and consular
personnel should permit at least a presumption that the PRC would
be willing to grant to an inspectorate the unhampered use of the
pouch procedure.
Though the diplc:matic pouch guarantees, for the most part,
security and accuracy of communications, emergency situations may
require more rapid means of communication. Telephone, telex, or
cable relays ought to be considered in such instances, though
their present deficiencies in the PRC are less than encouraging
for inspectorate needs.
For example, the quality of telephone
service in the PRC is not always satisfactory and is often very
poor with respect to long distance telephone connections.l94 In
addition, there is at present no form of emergency "hot-line•
connection between the PRC and the major powers, such as .that
which exists between the United States and the Soviet Union,
which the Chinese might employ as a prototype for confidential
inspectorate telephone service.l95
Foreigners are permitted to use public telex facilities,
which exist in Beijing and Guangzhou, but they must punch their
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own tapes.l96
Moreover, adec:wate two-way Chinese telex communications are non-existent.l97 More promisingly, foreign business companies with offices outside hotels in Beijing have been
allowed to install their own telex lines using foreign equipment.l98 Should an inspectorate be ··granted the same privilege,
it would undoubtedly facilitate communications, but the telex
system is currently too restricted to be of major value.
However, the importance of developing international communications systems is not lost on the Chinese, who are actively
engaged in the work of the International Telecommunications Union
and its various organs.l99 The PRC is also party to the International Telecommunications Convention, 200 a provision of which
calls for the establishment, operation, maintenance and protection of "channels and installations necessary to carry on the
rapid and uninterrupted exchange of international .telecommunications• (Art. 36). The Convention is particularly relevant to the
establishment ·of an inspectorate under the auspices of the United
Nations, since Article 29 already grants to UN telecommunications
operations the rights and obligations of the Convention's provisions.
The effectiveness of the Convention as ,a framework for
the standards and administration of international communications
systems is significantly enervated by Article 33, which grants to
each member and associate member "the right to suspend the international telecommunication service for a indefinite time either
generally or only for certain relations and/or for certain kinds
of cqrrespondence • • • • upon notification of other members.
For purposes of postal communications, reliance on the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union201 would also prove ineffective as a standard for conditions of service for inspection
operations. Though the Constitution calls for "freedom of transitu for postal communications (Art. 1(1)), other provisions ensure the inviolability of national sovereignty and the protection
of each member's vital security interests.
Thus, the Consti tution declares that 0 the provisions of the Acts of the Union do
not infringe upon the legislaton of any country in anything which
is not expressly provided for by those Acts" (Art. 24) and
prohibits the mailing of items "whose import or circulation is
prohibited in the country of destination" (Art. 2B(l)(d) ).
The vulnerability of international communications traffic
to unilateral danestic restrictions creates the potential need
for independent communications systems.
Where speed, accuracy,
and sec.recy are of utmost importance, perhaps the most judicious
method is to permit an arms inspectorate to operate its own
shortwave radio transmitters. Unfortunately, current Chinese law
prohibits the use of radio transmitters by unlicensed operators.202 Chinese law also prohibits any foreigner from owning
private radio transmitters in the PRc.20:l There are also anumber of other unr-elated regulations with peripheral importance to
inspectorate communications. Two -- the Measures Governing Foreign Vessels Entering and Leaving Port 204 and the Measures
Governing Foreign Vessels on Bordering Rivers 205 -- preclude the
use of, inter alia, wireless transmitters and radio telephones by
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foteign vessels in inland Chinese waters except in emergency circumstances.206 More recently, the PRC's National People's Congress (NPC) has promulgated additional regulations on foreign
ships,207 a chapter of 'which deals specifically with communications,
though
its
contents have not been made generally
available.
Ideally, the inspectorate should either seek some form of
Chinese legislation exempting it from such restrictions or obtain
the active cooperation of the appropriate Chinese authorities to
procure necessary 1 icenses.
However, reliance on any form of
communication system
particularly when used across Chinese
borders -- will not be free from the practical implications of
modern international relations, which often dictate the need for
routing surveil! ance of communications to and from its territory
by a host state.
The 1982 PRC Constitution and Chinese criminal laws address
communications interference, although they do not explicitly proscribe or authorize surveillance of correspondence as a general
operational practice. Rather, relevant legal provisions indicate
that surveillance procedures are to be conducted in strict conformity with the law and only on a showing of cause.
Article 40
of the 1982 PRC Constitution, for example, protects a PRC citizen's freedom and privacy in correspondence, except where public
security or procuratorial organs may check and censure correspondence "to meet the needs of state security or of investigation
into criminal offenses."
In theory, therefore, interference with
communications would seem to require some prerequisite showing of
good or probable cause to initiate surveillance.
In practice,
the language of the Constitution is ambiguous enough -- and due
process in the PRC vague enough -- to permit periodic and random
monitoring by public security and procuratorial organs of any
suspicious communications.
Article 86 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code authorizes
the seizure of mail and telegrams "of an accused."
Such wording
implies that seizure of communications is unauthorized in the
absence of some prior criminal culpability, though, practically
speaking, the information in the seized documents may occur only
with the "approval of a public security organ or people's
procuratorate, at which time the appropriate post and telecommunications office(s) are obligated to surrender the items." The
articles of communication are expected to be held by PRC authorities only if they prove relevant to the case (Art. 87).
The PRC Criminal Code also punishes any postal or tel ecommunications worker who opens, hides, or destroys letters or telegrams without permission by detention or imprisonment for not
more than two years (Art. 191).
International communications are often subject to interference for reasons of national security. The means employed are
significantly more surreptitious than those mentioned in Chinese
laws and regulations. The preoccupation of the PRC with the prevention of security leaks has led to the promulgation of broadly
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worded P.rovisional regulations on guarding state and military
secrets,208 by virtue of which even the more subtle forms of communications interference -- such as the monitoring of telephone
conversations and the inspection of incoming or outgoing foreign
mail -- could not be ruled out. Though a Chinese Embassy attache
recently stated that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by
Chinese officials were prohibited in the PRc,209 there appear to
be no statutory restrictions regulating or forbidding the practice, aside from broadly-worded Constitutional guarantees of inviolability of the person (Art. 37), correspondence (Art. 40),
and home (Art. 39). Where necessary or appropriate for national
security reasons, however, Chinese communications agencies can be
expected to utilize surveillance techniques.
In extreme instances, these agencies may even assist inspectorate personnel in
wiretapping or eavesdropping.
Notwithstanding international agreement provisions to the
contrary,210 inspectorate personnel should probably be prepared
for such practices, though the extent to which they a~e used by
the PRC may depend greatly on the amount of involvement and participation of Chinese officials in inspection operations. To the
extent procedures are jointly operated or carefully overseen by
Chinese authorities, there would probably be less reason to monitor or interfere with the transmission of confidential inspectorate information, since Chinese nationals would have access to
much of the information as active inspectorate personnel.
E.

Freedom
of
Movement
Supplies in the PRC

of

Personnel,

Equipment

and

1) General Observations
Any study of the PRC's approach to Chinese domestic travel
by foreign personnel is an empty exercise without at least a
rudimentary understanding of China's concern for the preservation
and protection of its sovereignty.
Chinese positions vis-a-vis
freedom of movement in the PRC are at once the product of a
traditional fear of foreign encroachment and a desire to reinstate the PRC as a major cultural and economic mecca through more
open contacts with foreigners. The polarity of such concerns has
engendered a policy of oversight and supervision in the PRC that
may be unmatched anywhere else in the world -- with the possible
exception of the Soviet Union.
Though such surveillance may be
distracting and disconcerting to the foreign visitor, it is undoubtedly indispensable to contemporary Chinese economic, cultural, political, and military security.
There are a number of published laws and regulations
governing domestic travel by foreign visitors, though more
importantly, there are also practical and sometimes more subtle
restrictions which are communicated among cadres only by word of
mouth or restricted-circulation directives (e.g., among PRC officials or CCP members).
The implementation of an effective inspection arrangement requires a Chinese commitment to divulge all
appropriate regulations and policies, to repeal those _which are
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most offensive to unhindered operations and to permit unimpeded
access to inspection points within and beyond Chinese borders.
Recent Chinese practices regarding freedom of movement by
foreigners yield ambiguous results with respect to PRC acceptance
of 1 iberal policies toward domestic travel.
2) Movement of Personnel
Chinese contacts with foreign nationals have increased
dramatically in recent years, as the PRC strives to implement its
four modernizations program and establish itself as a major force
in world politics.
The influx of foreigners has placed a significant strain on the political fabric of the PRC, which must
straddle the line between a traditional Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
philosophy that stresses the "poisonous influence" of foreign
elements2ll and a proclivity for exchanges with foreign nations
that further contemporary Chinese inter est s.
The current tendency of the Chinese to embrace more 1 iberal travel policies
should not mislead the reader into believing that restrictions on
foreigners are insignificant or nonexistent.
In fact, the PRC
still maintains rather severe r estr ic tions on the mobility of
foreigners in China and the pages of the PRC press are frequently
peppered with articles calling for caution in Chinese dealings
with foreign visitors.212
For an arms inspectorate, a reasonable degree of mobility
in the PRC is essential to inspection operations.
Inspectors,
observers, staff personnel and others associated with verification procedures must be free to move about in China to the extent
necessary to carry out their official functions.
Unimpeded movement between inspectorate headquarters and inspection sites as
well as between headquarters and points abroad should be guaranteed.
The freedom of movement of essential equipment, records
and supplies of a inspectorate should likewise be provided for in
any inspection agreement.
Chinese restrictions on freedom of travel must be understood on two levels:
there are direct impediments on free movement of foreigners, embodied in rules, regulations and accepted
reciprocal practices;213 and, there are indirect restrictions,
such as those created by potential dependence on government controlled means of transportation. An adequate inspection arrangement should address both levels.
At present, certain areas of the PRC are absolutely closed
to foreigners;214 other areas, such as those containing nonsecret defense facilities and factories, are usually closed to
foreign visitors, though the Chinese have infrequently granted
permission to foreign officials to visit such installations.215
There are also restrictions on travel in • open" (freely accessible) areas.
Foreign visitors may journey to open cities but
find •closed" (restricted) highways and facilities.216
Foreigners on temporary visits to the PRC face even greater restrictions, for the China Travel Service -- like In tourist in the
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Soviet Union -- will map out an itinerary which maxlffilzes Chinese-supervised travel to designated areas along assigned routes
and minimizes uncontrolled free movement.
This, of course, is
not to assert that the PRC authorities are inflexible with regard
to travel arrangements.
Individually-proposed travel plans were
very recently made possible217 though the itinerary must be approved by the proper Chinese administrative organs, is subject to
modification or cancellation on short notice and requires various
check-in-points to facilitate control.
Special permission from
public security bureaus (gonganju) in the PRC -- which, in instances involving internal travel permits for foreigners, may, in
turn, be required to obtain the authorization of the Information
Department of the Foreign Ministry -- is necessary before travel
to many areas will be permi t'ted.
Travel restrictions are often embodied in unpublished regulations.
However, the Chinese press has occasionally published
the more significant governmental pol icy decisions to relax
travel restrictions,218 probably as an indication to the Chinese
and foreign public of the PRC commitment to political liberalization.
One significant facet of travel in the PRC is the present
requirement of assigning all aspects of the trip of a foreign
visitor to various host organizations, a fairly common bureaucratic
oversight
and
surveillance
technique
in
Communist
countries. The initial host organization may be the China Travel
Service, Chinese universities, Chinese business organizations,
the Foreign Trade Ministry, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
However, in many instances, there are additional organizations
which must be contacted or informed of travel arrangements.
For
example, r estr ic ted industrial installations may be opened to
foreign military and political personnel on rare occasions, provided approval is first obtained from the Foreign Ministry, the
Ministry of National Defense, public security bureaus and often
the Ministry directly supervising the facility (e.g., the Second
Ministry of Machine Building). 219
Such overlapping and var iegated control channels can create delay, tedium, and the necessity for learning the procedures and idiosyncracies of different
organizations and for developing working relationships with
different groups of people.220 Though not necessarily peculiar
nor unusual, the sheer number of enterprises which may be required to participate in any given foreign venture would tend to
work to the disadvantage of an inspectorate, to which prompt inspection operations may be essential.
Currently, most travel arrangements are initiated either
through requests to the Information Department of the Foreign
Ministry (official personnel) or to the China Travel Service (for
tourists and other foreign visitors).
The China Travel Service
js by no means the insidious organization that Intourist (of the
Soviet Union) has been known to be, though, understandably, the
participation of the Agency in handling domestic travel arrangements for an inspectorate may cut both ways.
Any preferences
granted the China Travel Agency in booking flight and room reservations may facilitate inspectorate movement throughout the PRC.
- 170 -

Conversely, the Agency can impede travel through its monopolization of travel procedures; it may book bogus plan reservations or
allege full seating, for example, in order to ensure that inspectorate members are not able to travel on a particular flight.221
These observations dictate the need for either careful negotiation of travel arrangements by conventional means or for special
transportation services for inspection members.
Outside of particular modes of travel for foreign visitors
in the PRC, there is one important Chinese law which governs the
movement of foreign persons in China -- the Foreign National's
Act.222 The Act is designed with PRC national security in mind
and is indicative of the form of strict control over foreigners
which is accomplished by significant and constant contact between
foreign visitors and public security bureaus (gonganju).
Pursuant to the Foreign National's Act, foreigners are required to obtain special permission to travel when they seek to
travel outside the jurisdiction of the major administrative unit
they reside in (Art. 14).223 The traveller is expected to follow
the routes, use the means of communication, reside in the places
and ride the means of transportation noted in the travel documents (Art. 15).
Residence and travel of foreign nationals in
"important national defense and military localities and restricted areas" (emphasis added) is prohibited (Art. 6).
Public
security bureaus are empowered to check on foreign nationals with
regard to their observance of the provisions of the Act, and
foreign nationals are expected to comply with such checks (Art.
16).224
Presumably, if a travel route must be changed for reasons
of accident or illness, a foreign visitor would be obligated to
notify and receive the approval of a local public security bureau. Moreover, when an alien travels alone to designated cities
or towns, one may assume that he would not be entitl'ed to stop
off in any cities or towns en route without advance permission
from a local public security bureau and a proper or justifiable
reason for the stay.225
Permission to reside in the PRC is governed by Chapter III
of the Foreign National's Act.
In effect, the provisions of this
chapter extend control over the movement of foreign nationals to
various other official and quasi-official organs
including
schools, enterprises, hotels and private residents22~ who accommodate them (Arts. 3, 11). All foreign nationals must apply for
residence registration and be registered in the place in which
they reside (Arts. 10, 11).
Changes of residence require the
certification of appropriate documents by competent Chinese organs (Art. 13).
Moreover, foreign nationals residing in the PRC
are obligated to "proceed to public security organs within a
specified period of time" to present documents for examination
(Art. 12).
The Act is not specific as to permissible durations for
temporary residence of foreign nationals, though its predecessor
stipulated for stays ranging from six months to five years.227
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There is also no provision in the Act as to the appropriate
method for addressing situations where travel documents are lost,
damaged, or destroyed during the period of travel. Presumably, a
foreign national would be required to report his problem to a
local publ.ic security bureau for replacement.
In the Provisional
Rules that were subsequently abrogated by the Foreign National's
Act, a foreign national, after losing his travel documents, was
required to place an ad in a local newspaper "delaring that the
documents were null and void" ( shengming zuofei). 228 Under the
Foreign National's Act, however, this deed is no longer required.
Foreigners are required to obey Chinese laws and decrees
(Art. 2). Infractions are addressed by Article 17, which grants
to public security organs the power to enforce administrative and
criminal sanctions against violators.229 Though Article 17 does
not enumerate prohibited actions beyond those violations of the
Foreign National's Act, it would seem that the possession of
fraudulent (zaqi), forged (weizao), materially altered (yuequan)
or unauthorized ( wuquan) documents 1 the possession of i terns prohibited by law (such as contraband or weapons);230 or, the violation of other laws and decrees of the PRC would also fall within
the purview of Article 17. These violations may also fall within
the ambit of Article 5, which gives organs handling applications
for entry, exit, transit, residence and travel of foreign nationals apparent carte blanche "authority to cancel or declare null
and void" travel documents (including visas) for whatever reason.
The Foreign National's Act is indicative of the tight supervision
over foreign travel in the PRC, the potential pitfalls that beset
an inspectorate by broad and ambiguous language and the need for
appropriate privileges and immunities to permit less restricted
personal mobility by inspectorate members.
Moreover, the movement of inspectorate personnel is inextricably intertwined with
the problems of, and regulations governing, access to state-owned
and inspectorate-owned means of transportation.
3) Means of Transportation in the PRC and the Movement
of Personnel and Supplies
a) Chinese Transportation
State-controlled means of transportation are currently
the major mode of access to points in the PRC.
Private means of
transportation, with the exception of bicycles, are virtually
non-existent in the PRC and there are currently no private means
of transportation for hire.231 As such, any form of inspectorate
travel arrangements calling for the chartering of trasnportation
will require the active participation of numerous Chinese state
agencies. Once more, the monopolization of services by the state
lends itself to potential abuse and infringement of inspection
operations.
It is not altogether clear what administrative agencies
oversee Chinese transportation services. There is, for example,
a separate ministry for railways in the PRC, though there are no
ministerial-level agencies responsible for maritime transport or
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civil aviation.
Though a special agency exists for civil aviation -- the Civil Aviation Administration -- the Vessel232 and
Aircraft233 Regulations of the PRC call for the participation of
Maritime and Aviation Administrative Bureaus in entry-exit inspection procedures.
It is not certain which existing agencies
handle these duties, nor whether such agencies are in any way
similar to, or have replaced, the older ones. The presumption of
probable overlapping functions among transportation agencies,
particularly with respect to travel service for foreigners, creates confusion, delay and the potential for such problems as:
last-minute flight cancellations; the exclusion of certain types
of material or equipment from carriage by rail or boat; damage or
loss of equipment caused by negligent or intentionally malicious
handling; and, the possibility of unauthorized inspections of
inspectorate
documents
or
equipment
en
route
by
Chinese
personnel.
b) Inspectorate-Supplied Transportation
Just how permissive Chinese authorities are with regard to
the alternative of allowing foreign visitors to import and use
their own private means of transportation is not known.
Automobiles, arguably the most essential form of inspectorate transportation next to air transport, are a notable exception. 234
Chinese legal practice does permit diplomatic envoys, attaches
and other official personnel to own and operate private automobiles in the PRC, though arrangements are controlled by the PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and handled through diplomatic channels.
Though this practice provides at least a starting point
for alternative transportation services, it is obviously not entirely free from Chinese control.
According to Chinese officials, there are no privileges and
immunities accorded diplomatic personnel with respect to driving
regulations.235 All foreigners desiring to drive automobiles in
the PRC are required to pass a written test and a road test in
order to obtain a Chinese driver's license. Arrangement fo.r the
testing procedures are made through the Traffic Safety Division
of the local Public Security Bureau (gonganju) in the PRc.236
The Chinese do not currently have motor vehicle insurance
regulations in effect. 237
According to Chinese officials, at
least part of the reason for this lies in the paucity of foreign
automobiles in the PRC. 238 Accordingly, expenses incurred as a
result of accidents are not handled through 1 iabil ity or comprehensive insurance coverage; rather, they are dealt with
through diplomatic and administrative channels. Thus, costs are
borne, in some cases, by the sending state and, in other cases,
by private or public organizations with which a foreign national
involved in an accident is employed.239
Chinese Embassy officials in the United States have stated
that all drivers in the PRC must abide by traffic regulations,240
though the 1957 Public Security Regulations241 currently applicable permit the waiver of penalties for violations in instances
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where the offender was "definitely ignorant of the regulations.•242 Although the PRC is not a party to the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic,243 indications are that major Chinese traffic regulations do conform to Convention provisions.244 There is
also a number of secondary traffic rules which occasionally find
their way into current Chinese publications.245 Some of these,
in fact, could be used to the detriment of inspection operations.246 Indisputably, inspectorate members should be provided
with copies of relevant regulations and amendments to avoid
potential interference with Chinese laws and the inspectorate's
mission.
Though conformity with Chinese traffic regulations appears
to be the rule for all foreigners in the PRC, Chinese enforcement
procedures may be weakened by PRC adherence to international
diplomatic conventions, which recognize
full
immunity from
criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of Chinese organs.247
Moreover, specific provisions in these conventions
obligate the receiving state to ensure freedom of movement and
travel, 248 though they are often couched in terms which permit
unilateral alterations of regulations and policy in the interests
of national security.249
The severity of Chinese treatment of foreigners involved in
serious traffic accidents will depend probably on both the nature
of the accident and the status of the foreigner involved.
The
PRC Criminal Code does not directly address the issue of the
liability of an operator of a motor vehicle involved in a serious
accident, but the Code does provide for punishment for manslaughter (Art. 133) and for unintentional bodily injury (Art.
125).
Even in the absence of local regulations, Chinese acceptance of the use of analogy (Art. 79) would arguably permit
serious auto accidents to be brought within the purview of such
Criminal Code provisions.
Although it appears that Chinese
ratification of international conventions on privileges and
immunities would probably insulate most inspectorate personnel
from criminal liability in traffic accident cases, adequate
privileges and immunities covering all inspectorate personnel
(including staff and service personnel, who would be likely candidates for criminal prosecution by virtue of Chinese reservations to international diplomatic conventions) should be obtained.
Additionally, there is little information available on
the right of local Chinese public security bureaus to impound
vehicles involved in traffic accidents.
One might envision the
degree of interference which local police might impose on inspectorate agents involved in minor accidents causing only slight
property damage if impoundment was standard procedure in all or
many accident cases.
It is imperative therefore, that certain
privileges and immunities from Chinese jurisdiction also be extended to motor vehicles used by inspectorate members.
The most convenient long-distance mode of travel for inspectorate purposes would be by air.
International law recognizes the principle of the exclusive sovereignty of a state over
the airspace above its territory.250
In conformity with this
principle, the Chinese announced in 1958 that •no foreign ves- 174 -

sels for military use and no foreign aircraft may enter China's
territorial sea and the airspace above it without [PRC] permission • . • • "2 51
On the basis of this sovereign jurisdiction, the PRC State
Council promulgated on the Flight Rules Governing Foreign Civil
Aircraft252 in 1964.
Though these rules, like those of the
Chicago Convention, are applicable to civil aircraft and may not
cover, therefore, certain non-civilian inspectorate aircraft,
they are nevertheless useful as a gauge of Chinese attitudes
toward, and tolerance of, foreign aircraft over and in PRC
territory.
The flight rules were made public by the Civil Aviation Administration of China.253 According to the rules, foreign
civil aircraft can enter or leave China or fly within China only
in accordance with bilateral or multilateral agreements to which
the PRC is a party, or with the permission of the Chinese government obtained through diplomatic channels.
Foreign civil aircraft are required to obey the orders of the air traffic control
departments designated by the Civil Aviation Administration and
abide by the flight regulations.
Foreign civil aircraft, its crew members and its passengers
must abide by the laws of the PRC while in China and must adhere
to the decrees and regulations for entrance, departure and transit through China.
Chinese PLA air defense planes on duty !'!lay order foreign
civil aircraft to land at designated airfields if they violate
the rules governing flight within China.
Such aircraft may continue their flights only with the permission of the PRC Civil
Aviation Administration.
These regulations generally reflect much of what was embodied in the Convention on International Civil Aviation254
[hereafter Chicago Convention], to which· the PRC acceded on
February 20, 1946.255
The Chinese have closely adhered to Chicago Convention
provisions256 both in subsequent bilateral air navigation agreements257 and in unilateral declarations regarding specified restricted and non-restricted areas for overlights in Chinese
territory.258 However, the PRC has objected to unregulated fifth
freedom traffic as envisioned in the Chicago Convention, though
its objection apparently parallels those of many other states.259
The Chinese have also recently expressed condemnation of
aircraft hij ackings and other aerial crimes.
The PRC acceded to
both the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft260 and the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.261
Hijacking is also a punishable
offense under the PRC Criminal Code (Art. 100). 262
of

In short, the viability of inspectorate aircraft as a means
transportation within the PRC depends greatly upon Chinese
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cooperation.
The PRC adamantly rejects any notion that international law advocates unrestricted innocent passage along unspecified air corridors within domestic airspace.
The amount of
Chinese territory open to foreign overflights is probably rather
small, as is the number of airfields and air corridors available.
Chinese concessions in these areas are expected to be rather
circumscribed.
The significance of familiarity with all available Chinese
laws and regulations regarding air flight cannot be overestimated.
Any agreement on the use of inspectorate aircraft will
require full Chinese cooperation in disclosing the composite of
PRC air law as it presently exists.
As a first step, the PRC
should be compelled to exchange "all basic laws and regulations
covering foreign air trasportation, navigation and operation of
aircraft, air traffic rules, immigration, customs, landing permits, passports, currency, quarantine, aircraft registration,
aircraft
airworthiness,
communications
1 icensing,
airmen
personnel 1 icensing, accident investigation, and airport noise
regulations."263
Some authors have also suggested that interfe-rence between inspectorate air travel and domestic air services
might be minimized by the establishment and operation independent
inspectorate facilities and installations, the use of long-range
aircraft and the requirement of prior notification of intended
travel plans. 264
The seasonal and temporal disadvantages of using vessels as
a means of transportation for inspectorate personnel probably
outweigh any advantages.
Nevertheless, the use of ships may be
contemplated for transporting oversized equipment or for offshore
monitoring. Therefore, some familiarity with Chinese regulations
concerning access to and activities in ports and internal waterways is necessary.
For purposes of exercising territorial jurisdiction, the
PRC claims as its internal waters:
1) harbor areas; 2) inland
gulfs or bays inside a closing line not exceeding 24 nautical
miles; 3) straits and other waters which have historically belong
to the PRCJ265 and, 4) a territorial sea extending twelve nautical miles • ..:66
Chinese r egul at ions on maritime traffic are embodied in
three sets of PRC rules, the 1964 Rules Regulating Passage of
Foreign Nonmilitary Vessels Through the Qiongzhou Strait267
[hereafter Qiongzhou Strait Regulations],
the 1957 Measures
Governing Foreign Vessels Entering and Leaving Port268 [hereafter
Port Regulations], and the 1966 Measures Governing Foreign Vessels on Bordering Rivers269 [hereafter River Regulations].
These three regulations are bou~d by a common thread -the preservation of Chinese security. 70
For example, passage
through the Qiongzhou Strait is 1 imited to daytime hours only
(Art. 6). Under the Port Regulations, only certain ports designated bt the Ministry of Communications are open to foreign vessels.27
Foreign ships may not enter or leave a port on a river
bordering the PRC and other countries or on a Chinese river
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reaching neighboring
bilateral commercial
approval. 272

countries,· except in accordance with a
agreement or with prior PRC government

The captain of a vessel is required to fill out inbound and
outbound reports -- including information on passengers and car7o
-- for inspection by local port administration authorities.2 3
Foreign vessels in Chinese ports must also submit to customs procedures and all ships must observe health and quarantine regulations.274 Crews and passengers are subject to both personal and
luggage inspection pursuant to the Provisional Regulations Concerning Inspection of Incoming and Outgoing Vessels, Passengers,
Crew and Baggage.275 Pilotage is compulsorr; for entry into and
departure from a port on a bordering river.2 6 Failure to comply
wth the orders of a Chinese pilot is a violation of harbor regulations and in one instance, • resulted in detention followed by
an order requiring the offending vessel to leave the port immediately, and in a ban on the Master from returning.•277
Maritime accidents occurring in PRC waters and ports must
be expeditiously reported.278 The use of wireless trans:nitters,
radar, rocket signals and other similar equipment is forbidden
except
in
emergency
circumstances.279
Under
the
Port
Regulations, weapons and ammunition must be sealed and stored
(Art. 7(1)).
Under the River Regulations, weapons and ammunition "should
be delivered to the Port Affairs Supervision Office for custody"
(Art. 8(1)). Passengers and crews of foreign vessels are strictly prohibited from taking photographs or making sketches or drawings, or otherwise engaging in conduct violating the laws and
decrees of the PRc.280 The departure of vessels may be temporarily delayed or prohibited for a multiplicity of violations, including, inter alia, violations of PRC laws,281 violations of
technical and tariff regulations282 and unseaworthiness.283 Previous strict prohibitions against shoreleave for foreign seamen
have yielded to more 1 iberal regulations. 284
Though 1 ittle is
actually known about Chinese jurisdiction over criminal and civil
disputes involving foreigners in port areas, it is most likely
that Chinese authorities would assert jurisdiction on the basis
of territorial sovereignty.285
The preceding rules and regulations indicate that, at
present, access to PRC ports and inland waterways and general
mobility of foreign vessels in the PRC are extremely limited. An
inspectorate should be apprised on the probability that Chinese
concessions regarding jurisdiction over port areas and inland
water routes may well be minimal because of their vital importance to PRC military and economic security.
Nevertheless,
inspectorate operations will undoubtedly require some utilization
of water
routes and
harbors.
Tt
is suggested
that the
inspectorate members employ their own means of transport and
resort to PRC vessels only for secondary support functions.
Ideally, the Chinese should be requested to provide limited
privileges and immunitie.s for both crews and vessels.
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c) Transportation of Inanimate Cargo
The conveyance of inanimate movable cargo within the PRC is
an issue requiring a careful enumeration of specific privileges
and immunities.
By virtue of its accession to th'e Diplomatic
Convention, the Consular Convention and the UN Convention on
Privileges, the PRC is on record as advocating a fairly broad
immunity for movable property of diplomatic and consular agents
and for representatives of international organizations. However,
the provisions of the relevant instruments differ in scope.
For
example, both the Diplomatic and Consular Conventions provide for
the inviolability of archives, documents and official correspondence.286 The Diplomatic Convention also immunizes the personal
-baggage of a diplomatic agent, provided there are no serious
grounds for assuming it contains articles not covered by permissible exemptions.2B7 The UN Convention on Privileges288 provides
for a more unqualified immunity -- albeit one that may provoke
more technical legal and semantic arguments.
Section 13 (a) accords to representatives of members • immunity from . • . seizure
[not inspection) of their personal baggage."
At the same time,
Section 13(f) accords to representatives the same immunities with
respect to personal
baggage as are accorded to diplomatic
agents289
to wit, immunity from inspection (in ordinary
circumstances) .
Where some provisions are given strict legal effect, two
problems arise.
First, the relevant provisions would appear to
immunize certain forms of inspectorate cargo, without immunizing
the means by which it is transported.
Thus, it would be permissible to search the means of transportation carrying such items
although not the cargo-- and may result in considerable delay
in transporting equipment and documents.290
Second, where cargo is immunized, the relevant convention
provisions refer to official archives, documents and correspondence. Additional problems are created when "the cargo contains
things that are not subsumed by [these) categories.•291
The problem is sufficiently acute with respect to inanimate
cargo transported by inspectorate means of transportation; it is,
however, compounded when cargo is shipped via Chinese transportation.
Under these circumstances, and absent additional privileges and immunities, inspectorate cargo may be no different from
ordinary Chinese cargo.
As such, it is susceptible of seizure
under the PRC Criminal Procedure Code, which authorizes Chinese
investigators to conduct examinations and searches in order to
collect criminal evidence and to seize objects and documents
which may be used to prove the accused guilty or not guilty.292
To ensure the inviolability of inanimate, movable cargo
used for inspection purposes, the parties to an arms control
agreement must distinguish among and identify items or articles
intended to be transported as part of verification procedures and
extend to them requisite privileges and immunities.
Within a
framework
currently
existing
in
international
diplomatic
relations, certain inspectorate items could be transported by
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diplomatic pouch. 293
However, in its current recognized form,
the pouch is not a viable means of transporting most inspectorate
cargo. 294
Undoubtedly, arrangements should be made to protect
all inspectorate cargo and transportation with adequate immunities and to broaden the base of acceptable pouch items to include
environmental sampling for laboratory analysis at facilities outside the PRc.295
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FOOTNOTES
1.

This is a recognized principle of sovereignty. See "Rerun in
Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to Foreigners," Foreign
Broadcast Information Service on China [hereafter cited as
FBIS-cHI] No. 027, 1980 [hereafter cited by year and number
e.g., 80-027] (Feb. 7, 1980), at L21.
According to the
article, "without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of
the receiving state.
They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of the state." The obligation
of foreign nationals to obey the laws and regulations of
the PRC while within its jurisdiction is also noted in Art.
32 of the 1982 PRC Constitution, [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xianfa] which states: "The People's Republic of China protects the lawful rights and interest of foreigners within
Chinese territory, and while on Chinese territory foreigners must abide by the law of the People's Republic of China.•
See •Text of New PRC Constitution Pubished," FBISCHI-82-235 (Dec. 7, 1982), at Kl [hereafter cited as PRC
CONSTITUTION].

2.

Chinese. on the mainland have sarcastically remarked that
NPC representatives have two
roles:
to applaud
the
speeches of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and to
raise their hands to vote yes.
F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA:
ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 421 (198.2).

3.

PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 1. Article 62(3) grants to the
National People's Congress (NPC) the power to "enact and
amend basic statutes . . . • "

4.

Act Regulating the Entry, Exit, Transit, Residence, and
Travel of Foreign Nationals (in Chinese: Waiguoren rujing
chujing guojing juliu luxing guanli tiaoli [hereafter cited
as Foreign National's Act].
The Act was passed by the National People's Congress' Standing Committee at its !14th
meeting, March 13, 1964 and was promulgated by the Premier
of the State Council on April 13, 1964.
Jenmin jihpao [in
Pinyin:
Renmin ribao] [hereafter cited as JMJP] April 20,
1964, p. 2.
For a translation of the text, see J. COHEN
AND H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A
DOCUMENTARY STUDY 510-13 (2 Vols. 1974) [hereafter cited as
COHEN AND CHIU].
This is the basic statute still regulating the movement of foreigners.

5.

Other laws may be found in COHEN AND CHIU, id., at chaps.
15-18, oassim, and in a recent collection of public security laws promulgated from 1950-79 by the PRC and published
in Chinese. See Gongan fagui huibian, 1950-79 [Collection
of Public Security Laws], printed by the Commission on the
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Study of Policy and Law,
Be ij ing, 19 80.

Department

of

Public

Security,

Applicable laws include customs regulations, health
and immunization regulations, border security regulations,
civil aircraft regulations, and the like.
6.

See text accompanying notes 18-21, infra.

7.

Recently, a Chinese woman was given a two-year sentence of
reeducation through labor for living with a French diplomat
prior to marriage, despite the fact that both had already
obtained official PRC permission to marry.
The French
diplomat was asked to leave by the Chinese government. See
French Press China to Free Envoy's Lover, Balto. Sun, Nov.
11, 1981, at A3.
(Marriage to foreigners is not explicitly
forbidden in the PRC's new marriage law).
See also "Marriage Law Adopted by Fifth Na tiona! People's Congress,"
FBIS-CHI-80-184 (Sept. 19, 1980), at L22.
But mixed marriages have been frowned upon.
See COHEN AND CHIU, supra
note 4, at 662-67.
Other incidents involving foreigners and Chinese nationals in unauthorized contact have helped to chill intimate relationships in the PRC. See, ~· Zhonggong yan
zhuofang sudian jianu ming bubai zhiyuan (Communists claim
"hotel incident"; Canadian woman declares her innocence)
World Journal, Sept. 10, 1982, at 1.
(In this case, public
security officials detained a female Canadian citizen of
Chinese'extraction who was a guest of an American news correspondent in his hotel room.
For not reporting the meeting in advance, he was fined 140 renminbi (appx. $90 at
that time).
See also "AFP:
Chinese Girl Forced From
Diplomats Car ,;;--FBIS-CHI-82-201 (Oct. 18, 1982), at Kl3
(young Chinese girl forced from French diplomat's car by
"scores" of unidentified Chinese).

8.

The PRC prohibits 16 mm. photography as a result of an unflattering documentary of China made by an Italian movie
director. This information was supplied to the author by a
State Department official.
Restrictions on gathering information are the most
significant obstacles to inspectorate operations. See Provisional Regulations on Keeping State Secrets (Baoshou
guojia jimi zhanxing tiaoli], in Gongan fagui huibian, su~ note 5,
at 472-76 (hereafter cited as State Secrets
Regulations], passed June 1, 1951 by the National People's
Congress Standing Committee at its 87th meeting and promulgated on June 8, 1951.
A translation of the text may be
found in "Xinhua Publishes Regulations on Guarding State
Secrets,• FBIS-cHI-80-073 (April 14, 1980), at L7. The Act
lists broad categories of information, including weather
reports and telephone numbers, which fall within the ambit
of State Secrets (Id., Art. 2).
This law is designed to
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prevent unauthorized leaks in the PRC, a country where information is parceled out like fine tea, to few people and
in small quantities.
9.

~·

~· "Beijing Paper Cites Peng Zhen on Civil Law,"
FBIS-cHI-81-119 (June 22, 1981), at Kll.

10.

Fox Butterfield reported that PRC publishing services
publish foreign materials without compensating their authors, in violation of inter nation copyright conventions,
which the PRC has chosen not to ratify. See BUTTERFIELD,
supra note 2, at 390.
---

11.

For an example of the use of reciprocity concerning exemptions from customs duties, see Art. 10 of the Consular
Agreement Between the Union OfSoviet Socialist Republics
and the People's Republic of China (June 23, 1959) cited in
G. RHODE AND R. WHITLOCK, TREATIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, 1949-1978:
AN ANNOTATED COMPILATION (1980).
Note also PRC retaliatory actions, such as the Chinese
request of the SRV (Vietnam) to close down the latter's
three consulate-generals in Canton, Kunming, and Nanning
provinces after the SRV, in effect, had prevented the PRC
from setting up a Chinese consulate-general in Ho Chi Minh
City.
See "Sino-Vietnamese Relations Continue to Deteriorate:
Appointment of Consul-General Canceled." FBIS-CHI78-120 (June 21, 1978), at AlO.

12.

It is within the realm of reasonable foreseeability
that persons performing arms inspection functions [in
the PRC] would occasionally commit or be accused of
committing violations of laws for the protection of •
• [Chinese] public order.
This would be so even if
certain kinds of normally culpable conduct were deemed
privileged in the interest of arms inspection activities •
The relatively small number of individuals involved, combined with their probable character traits, would be bound to keep down the count of
such incidents, but their total absence could not be
guaranteed.
Leaving aside spectacular instances of
violence and vice, there would still remain countless
opportunities for breaching rules of conduct by reason
of ignorance, inattention, misunderstanding, or other
common human failings.

z. ZILE, R. SHARLET AND J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM AND ARMS INSPECTION:
A CASE STUDY IN POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION 197 (1972) [hereafter cited as ZILE,
SHARLET AND LOVE] •
13.

See "NPC Standing Committee Session Ends in Beijing: Civil
P"[[cedure Law,• FBIS-CHI-82-045 (March 8, 1982), at K6.
Presumably, organizations and international organizations
would include diplomatic missions, consular delegations,
and certain of the UN Specialized Agencies, all by virtue
of PRC ratification of international conventions, whose
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provisions envelop such organizations.
and 115, infra.

See notes 95,

108

An inspectorate could reasonably appear in one of two
forms:
adversary (composed of members of certain other
parties to an ACD agreement) or international (composed of
members of disinterested countries, perhaps under (UN auspices). The PRC is on record as supporting an international verification body, though this may not be akin to support for an international on-site inspection team.
Although an inspectorate is not entitled to privileges
and immunities as a matter of law, at least within the ambit of convention provisions acceded to by the PRC, it appears that the Chinese suggestion of an international
verification organization may have been prompted by PRC
recognition of the probability--and more palatable belief-that personnel of an international organization would be
less likely to cause serious national security concerns.
This is particularly true when one investigates frequent
PRC press reports "that condemn at least one other nuclear
power, the Soviet Union (a probable member of an adversary
inspectorate), for the constant, oppressive, and dangerous
clandestine activities of the KGB in third countries. See,
.!L:.9..:.• "Renmin Ribao Looks at KGB Activities in u.s., FBISCHI-81-234 (Dec. 7, 1981), at Bl. See also note 89, infra.
14.

See "NPC Standing Committee Session Ends in Beijing, Civil
Procedure Law," FBIS-CHI-82-045 (March 8, 1982) K6, at K7.

15.

The PRC CRIMINAL CODE was passed on July 1, 1979 at the
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and
was promulgated on Jan. 1, 1980. See Gongan fagui huibian,
supra note 5, at 4-33.
For the English text of the PRC
CRIMINAL CODE, see "Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC
Second Session,......--pBIS-cHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART I:
Supp. no. 019 [hereafter cited as Supp. no. 019] at 33-62.

16.

Article 12 of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
is also applicable to foreigners who commit crimes in the PRC.
This
effectively grants foreign nationals the full spectrum of
procedural rights due them when criminal prosecution is
initiated.
The PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE was passed on
July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress and entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980.
See Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 34-65.
For the
English text of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, see "Seven PRC
Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session, FBIS-cHI-79-146
(July 27, 1979) PART II: Supp. no. 020 [hereafter cited as
Supp. no. 020], at 1-31.

17.

The phrase "unless otherwise specified by law" applies to
foreigners who enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities
and will be addressed more fully in text infra at Chapter
4.

--
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18.

See "American Expelled for 'Stealing China's Secrets,•
FBIS-CHI-82-107 (June 3, 1982), at Bl; Weisskopf, China
Holds American as Suspect in Spy Case, Washington Post,
June 2, 1982, p. Al.

19.

See •soviet Spy 'Imprisoned', Chinese Natipnal Sentenced to
Death," FBIS-CHI-80-141 (July 21, 1980), at Cl.

20.

Sentences range from 3 years for less serious cases to the
death sentence for more serious offenses.

21.

Lisa Wichser, the American teacher, was treated leniently
by the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, and expelled for violating Chinese secrecy laws--presumably, the
1951 Provisional Regulations on Keeping State Secrets, su~ note
8-~which
is punishable as counterrevoluntionary
activity under the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Arts.
90-104.
The Soviet spy, Nikolay Petrovich Zhang, was sentenced
under Article 3 (which makes the PRC CRI!HNAL CODE applicable to foreigners) and Article 97, para. 3 (supporting
the enemy by joining an "espionage organization• ).
Though the explanation for the differences in the
laws' application was most probably politically motivated,
it is important to note that there is a legal basis for
Wichsler' s dissimilar treatment.
Article 30 of the PRC
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, states:
Deportation may be applied as an exclusive or supplementary penalty to a foreigner who has committed an
offense.
[emphasis added]

22.

See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 321.

23.

See "Reportage on PRC's New Criminal Law: Legal Expert on
Technical Points, "FBIS-cHI-79-131 (July 6, 1979), at Ll6.

24.

See id.

~-

See also PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Article

25.

PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 5.

26.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 14.

27.

1£.,

28.

Id., Art. 16.

29.

1£.,

30.

See Ar tiel e 7 of the PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S COURTS,
passed on July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth
National People's Congress and entered into force on Jan.
1, 1980,
in Gongan fagui huibian, suPra note 5, at 449-57.

Art. 15.

Art. 17.

- 184 -

For the English text,
20-27.

~

Supp. no. 19, supra note 15, at

31.

See "Fifth NPC Standing Committee Reportage Continues:
'Special Court, Procuratorate Members'," FBIS-CHI-80-191
(Sept. 30, 1980), at 15.

32.

For example, Prof. Hungdah Chiu attacked the legal grounds
for the establishment of the special organs on the basis of
the fact that Articles 20 and 31 cited below provide for
the establishment of permanent (standing) divisions and not
mere ad hoc creations.
He also pointed out the legal defectsin"the composition of the special procuratorate and
special court. See Chiu, Certain Legal Aspects of the Recent Peking Trials of the "Gang of Four" and Others, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD.,
No. 3-1981 (40), at 27-38 [hereafter cited as "Gang of Four
Trial"].
See also The ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES, passed on July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress and entered into force on
Jan. 1, 1980, in Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at
458-64.
The English text may be found in Supp. no. 019,
supra note 47, at 27-33.
Article 20 of this law states:
"The
Supreme
People's
Procuratorate
shall
extablish
criminal, disciplinary, prison and economic procuratorial
divisions.
It may also, according to its need, establish
other organs.•
Article 31 of the PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S COURTS,
supra note 30, states:
"The Supreme People's Court shall
establish a criminal court, a civil court and an economic
court, and may also set up other courts as needed."
PRC
jurist Zhang Youyu defended the establishment of the special court on the basis of the latter provision. See Jianpan Wu and Tao Ouyang, "On Problems of the Application of
Law Concerning the Trails in the Counterrevolutionary Cases
of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing ,• Faxue Yanj iu (Legal Studies),
No. 6, p. 3 (1980).

33.

See "NPC Promulgates New Regulations on Arrest, Detentions,"
FBIS-cBI-79-039 (Feb. 26, 1979), at E2 [hereafter
cited as Arrest and Detention Regulations].
Prior to the
enactment of these regulations, detention was frequently
arbitrary.
For example, the PRC detained two Americans who
had inadvertently strayed into PRC territorial waters in
their yacht for almost 10 months -- Feb. 16 - Dec. 6, 1969.
No charges were ever filed against the Americans in that
period. ~B. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 188 (1979).

34.

See Arrest and Detention Regulations, id., Art. 4.

35.

Id., Art. 5. There are no indications in these regulations
that the issuance of warrants in the PRC depends on such
Western concepts' as probable cause.
It appears sufficient
that the warrant is requested by official personnel.
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36.

..!.!! • ,

Art. 2 •

37.

..!.!! • ,

1\.r t. 8 .

38.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 92, para.
2.

39.

The 1354 Act of the PRC for Reform Through Labor was reconfirmed by the NPC Standing on Nov. 29, 1979.
See "12th
Meeting of NPC Standing Committee Ends:
ApprovalOf Regulations," FBIS-cHI-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at L3.
On the
same day, Nov. 29, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued its Decision on the Question of the Validity of Laws and Decrees Enacted Since the
Founding of the PRC, cited in Gongan faaui huibian, supra
note 5, at 447-48.
For the English text, ~ "12 Meeting
of NPC Standing Committee Ends:
Adopts Resolution on Past
Laws," FBIS-CHI-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at L3.
This deci'"'
sion reconfirmed the validity of certain PRC laws and regulations enacted in the early 1950s and suspended during
the Cultural Revolution of the 1 ate 1960s.
See also "Renmin Ribao Editorial Hails Validity of Past Laws," FBIS-CHI79-233 (Dec. 3, 1979), at L4.

40.

See the 1954 Act of the PRC for Reform Through Labor, id.,
Art. B.
This Act is used as the basis for removing undesirables from the mainstream of Chinese society much like
Soviet psychiatric institutions are used against dissidents
in the USSR.
See also P. SHORT, THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR
114-16 (1982). --

41.

Id. The jail cell is designed to isolate serious criminal
offenders from minor offenders.

42.

See "Gang of Four Trial," supra note 32, at 27-38.
See
text accompanying notes 18-21 supra and notes 130 and
154 infra.

~

43.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 105, para.
2.
See also Ar tiel es 9 and 10 of the PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR
PEOPLE'S COURTS, supra note 30.
People's assessors are unlike jurors as we know them in
the United States.
But see "Shanghai Districts Elect,
Train People's Court--:JUries," FBIS-cHI-80-154 (Aug. 7,
1980) (This article was probably mistranslated, incorrectly
substituting "juries" for "assessors." There are no juries
in the PRC.)
First, the assessors are usually intimately
familiar with the facts of the defendant's case before trial.
Most often, they are chosen from the defendant's danwei or workplace and have an unfavorable predisposiTIO'ii
toward the defendant's action. This is in keeping with the
Chinese principles of isolation and confrontation:
singling out the accused, confronting him with his acts, and
securing his confessions and repentance, usually in the
form of sel f-er i tic ism.
Assessors serve only in the court
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of first instance.
At the appellate level there are three
judges and no assessors.
Second, there are no legal devices such as voir dire
with its attendant rights of dismissal for cause or peremp
tory challenges as Western legal systems know them. Assessors, once appointed (ostensibly, they are to be elected by
the people, although they are often selected by local officials) are expected to serve; no lawyer will challenge
their presence neither with cause nor without. See, ~,
"Hunan's Use of Peale's Assessors Proves Effective," FBISCHI-80-205 (Oct. 21, 1980), at L7 (Hunan assessors "chosen"
for 3-4 year terms and may be removed at any time for incompetence or negligence.)
Cf. "Jiefangjun Bao on System
of Assessors for Military Courts," FBIS-cHI-80-197 (Oct. 8,
1980), at L8.
44.

See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 215.

45.

Adopted at the Aug. 26, 1980 session of the Standing committee of the National People's Congress, in Zhongguo baike
nianj ian 1981 (China encyclopeadic yearbook 1981), Beijing
1982, at 190-91. For a translation of the text, see "Text
of Provisional Regulations on Lawyers," FBIS-CHI-80-169
(Aug. 28, 1980), at L6.
See also "Renmin Ribao, Discusses
Regulations for Lawyers" FBIS-cHI-82-Gll (Jan. 18, 1982),
at Kl6.

46.

See Peking Restricts Foreign Legal Firms, Dealing Setback
to Some U.S. Lawyers, Asian Wall St. Journal, Jan. 1, 1982,
p. 6. There are American firms in the PRC, including Baker
& McKenzie, with offices in Beijing hotels, but their work
is confined largely to trade negotiations and issues. None
of the US attorneys, however, is licensed to practice law
in the PRC.
There are no provisions in the Provisionl Regulations
on Lawyers for foreign representation of foreign nationals,
including foreign official personnel.

47.

See "Regulations on Civil Law Procedures Outlined,"
CHI-79-017 (Jan. 24, 1979), at El2.

48.

See "NPC Standing Committee Session Ends in Beijing: Civil
Procedure Law," FBIS-cHI-82-045 (March 8, 1982), at K6.
See also "Jurist Discusses New Civil Procedure Law," FBISCHI-82-046 (March 9, 1982), at KlO; Yanling, China's Law of
Civil Procedure, Beijing Review, No. 33 (Aug. 16, 1982), at
20.

49.

See "Wang Harbin on Legal Question on Trial," FBIS-CHI-80241 (Dec. 12, 1980) at LS; "Gang of Four Trials Opens in
Beijing; Indictment Read:
'Jurist Interviewed on Trial',"
FBIS-cHI-80-226 (Nov. 20, 1980), at L2. This is not to say
that the • presumption of innocence" has been completely
ignored.
Prior to the promulgation of the PRC CRIIHNAL
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FBIS-

CODE, a Renmin Ribao article called for the "assumption of
innocence" to be included in the CODE. "Renmin Ribao Article Discusses Judicial Procedure," FBIS-CHI-79-046 (March
7, 1979), at E7.
50.

See "Renmin Ribao Explains Role of Defense Lawyer," FBISCHI-80-242 (Dec. 15, 1980), at Ll7.
See also "Commentary
on Correct Understanding of Defense Lawyei""S""Role," FBISCHI-80-187 (Sept. 24, 1980), at Ll4; "Vice Justice Minister
Interviewed on Regulations on Lawyers," FBIS-cHI-80-178
(Sept. 11, 1980), at L27; "Renmin Ribao on Questions About
Lin-Jiang Trial," FBIS-CHI-81-027 (Feb. 10, 1981), at LlO;
The Role of Chinese Lawyers, Beijing Review, No. 46 (Nov.
17, 1980), at 24; China's Lawyers, Beijing Review, No. 23
(June 7, 1982), at 14.

51.

The attorney in the PRC is a state functionary who represents a particular client only on the advice and consent
of.the Chinese Communist Party. The attorney is not expected to defend his client's interests too zealously, and his
main function is merely to present to the court mitigating
circumstances of his client's guilt.
No attorney in the
PRC fights for the innocence of his client, and, within at
least a tacit understanding between the Chinese Communist
Party and PRC lawyers, no defendant is ever really innocent.
This information was provided to the author on Dec.
6, 1982, by a PRC attorney currently enrolled in a US
educational institution.
For an overview of the Chinese code of "leniency to
those who confess, severity for those who resist," see
"Leniency For Those Who Confess Crimes Advocated," FBISCHI-82-066 (April 6, 1982), at K4;
"Renmin Ribao on
Criminal Law Leniency, Severity," FBIS-CHI-81-234 (Dec. 7,
1981), at K24 (noting that the "leniency, severity" code
dates back as far as 1940 and was part of Mao Zedong's 1952
directive on the Struggle Against the "Three Evils" and the
"Five Evils.")

52.

During the entire period of the Cultural Revolution, from
1966-1975 legal codes, lawyers, judicial officers, legal
practice, and all formal legal institutions ceased to exist.
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, a rebirth of
law as an institution of the PRC began.
See, ~··
"Chengdu Law School," FBIS-cHI-066 (April 7, 1981), at Q2;
"International Law Society Founded, Officers Elected,•
FBIS-cHI-80-026 (Feb 6, 1980), at L2; "Tianjin Municipality
Establishes Law Society ,• FBIS-cHI-79-145 (July 26, 1979),
at Rl; "Northwest Political Law College," FBIS-cHI-79-165
(Aug. 23, 1979), at T3; "Tianjin Law School," FBIS-cHI-79143 (July 24, 1979), at R3.

·53.

See ~-, "PRC Adopts 8-Year Plan for Study of Law". FBISCHI-79-065 (April 3, 1979), at L8; "International Law
Research to be Strengthened" FBIS-cHI-80-025 (Feb 5, 1980),
at LlO; "Shaanxi Criminal Law Studies" FBIS-cHI-79-196
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(Oct. 9, 1979), at R2; "Guangming Ribao Reports New Programs in Legal Education" FBIS-cHI-80-080 (April 23, 1980),
at L3.
54.

See ~, "Vice Minister Wang Notes Shortage of Lawyers,"
FBIS-cHI-80-212 (Oct. 30, 1980), at L3.
See also "Legal
Consultants Office Set Up in Beijing," FBIS-cHI-82-072
(April 14, 1982), at Kl7; "Judicial Bureaus Set Up Throughout Beijing," FBIS-cHI-81-075 (April 20, 1981), at Rl;.
"Justice Ministry Announces Plans to Train More Lawyers,"
FBIS-cHI-80-101 (May 22, 1980), at Ll5; "Beijing Lawyers
Prepare for Codes Taking Effect in January," FBIS-CHI-79173 (Sept. 5, 1979), at L5.

55.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 26.

56.

The PRC socialist legal system is organized as a civil law
system. Stare decisis, a principle of the common law, is
unlikely to prevail in a country having the civil law as
the basis of its jurisprudence.

57.

See,

58.

See,~,

"People's Daily Publishes Articles on Legal System," FBIS-cHI-79-006 (Jan. 9, 1979), at Ell; "H~ilongj iang
Judge Discusses Strengthening of Judicial System," FBISCHI-79-028 (Feb. 8, 1979), at L2; "Ye Jianying Discusses
Revisions in Nation's Legal System," FBIS-CHI-79-032 (Feb.
14, 1979), at E4; "Supreme Court President Discusses Legal
System Reforms," FBIS-CHI-80-168 (Aug. 27, 1980), at L7;
"Renmin Ribao Carries More Excerpts of NPC
Deputies'
Speeches:
'Opinions on Strengthening Legal Work'," FBISCHI-80-187 (Sept. 24, 1980), at Ll4; "Progress Being Made
in Rebuilding Legal System,"
FBIS-CHI-80-126
(Nov.
5,
1980), at L4; "Beijing Ribao Decries Interference in Legal
Cases," FBIS-cHI-81-021 (Feb. 2, 1981), at LB. See also
Chiu, Structural Changes in the Organization and operatiOn
of China's Criminal Justice System, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/
REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., No. l-1981 ( 38) 1
at 7-9; Chiu, Socialist Legalism:
Reform and Continuity in
Post-Mao Communist China, 17 ISSUES & STUD. 45, 53-55 (No.
11, Nov. 1981); SHORT, supra note 40, at 389.

59.

See ~·· "Beijing Lawyers' Association Formed; To Provide
Legal Advice,• FBIS-cHI-79-096 (May 16, 1979), at R2; "Harbin Reopens Legal Advice Office,• FBIS-CHI-80-013 (Jan. 18,
1980), at S2; "Yunnan Legal Advice Offices,• FBIS-cHI-80082 (April 25, 1980), at Q2; "Qinghai Legal Offices,• FBISCHI-80-069 (April 8, 1980), at T2; "Nei Monggol Judicial
Bureau,• FBIS-cHI-80-093 (May 12, 1980), at R4; "Work of
Legal Advisory Offices Reviewed ,• FBIS-cHI-82-004 (Jan. 7,
1982), at K8; "Legal Consultants Office Set Up in Beijing,•
FBIS-cHI-82-072 (April 14, 1982), at Kl7.

60.

See
PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 2.
According
to Aritcle 2, the task of the criminal law is to:

~,

text accompanying notes 18 and 19, supra.
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Struggle against counterrevoluntionary crimes and acts
of criminal offenses • . • protect the personal rights,
democratic rights, and other rights of citizens, maintian public order and order in production, work teaching, scientific research and the life of masses
61.

Article 10 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, defines
a criminal offense as
Any action which endangers state sovereignty and territorial integrity, jeopardizes the dictatorship of the
proletariat,
sabotages
socialist
revolution
and
socialist construction, disrupts public order, encroaches upon the property of the whole people, the
collective or legitimate privat.e property, infringes
upon the personal rights, democratic rights and other
rights of citizens or any other act which endangers
society and is punishable according to law is an offence.
However, if the offense is obviously a minor
one and if its harm is negligible, it should not be
considered a crime.

62.

Inspectorate personnel will more than 1 ikely be accorded a
certain range of privileges and immunities in operating
within PRC territory.
Violations of domestic law by immunized foreign nationals is customarily handled by oersona
non grata proceedings (i.e. expulsion).
See text accom
panying note 94, infra.
But, expulsion is likely to be
viewed as a supplementary penalty in instances where violations are egregious (eg:
Stealing military secrets during
inspectorate operations).
In such an event, the act is so
ultra vires that it might not protect an otherwise immunized foreign official from criminal prosecution. Cf. PRC
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 30; note 21, supra.-

63.

See PRC CRIMINAL CODE,
Arts. 90-104.

supra note 15, PART 2:

CHAPTER I,

64.

Translation by author from Faxue Cidian (Law
(published in Shanghi, PRC, 1980), p. 118.

Dictionary)

65.

"Renmin Ribao Article on Counterrevolutionary Crimes,•
FBIS-cHI-79-148 (July 31, 1979), at L6.
See also "Guangming Ribao Discusses Counterrevolutionary Offe""ii'SeS,• FBISCHI-79-165 (Aug. 23, 1979), at Ll; "Renmin Ribao Defines
Counterrevolutionary Words, Deeds," FBIS-cHI -80-0 4 7 (March
7, 1980), at L6.
Cf. "Correction to Supplement on Laws
Adopted at 5th NPC 2nd Session,• FBIS-cHI-79-165 (Aug. 23,
1979), at Ll7.

66.

PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 97(1) -

67.

~

68.

State Secrets Regulations, supra note 8, Art. 1.

(3)._

note 8, supra.
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6 9.

Id • , Ar t. 2.

70.

This information was imparted to the author by Profssor Jan
Prybyla, Pennsylvania State University, at the recent 24th
Annual Conference of the American Association for Chinese
Studies, held in Baltimore, MD., November 6-7,1982.

71.

State Secrets Regulations, suora note 8, Art. 2, para. 17.
See also P. SHORT, supra note 40, at 362.

72.

See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 91-97, 100-103.
Note that a recent NPC Standing Committee decision suspended the death sentence review procedure of the Supreme People's Court for certain criminal offenses (all capital
crimes except embezzlement and counter revel ution) until
1983.
See "NPC Standing Committee Concfudes 10 June:
Decisionson Death Sentences," FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June 11,
1981), at K4.

73.

"Renmin Ribao Article on Counterrevolutionary Crimes,"
FBIS-cHI-79-148 (July 31, 1949), at L6.
See also "Shanghai
Lecture on Crimes Against Public SafetyTFBIS-cHI-79-233
(Nov. 16, 1979), at 011 (intentional acts of saboteurs
should be severely punished while negligent acts endangering public safety should be dealt with according to "legal
action", which is, presumably, less severe); Faxue Cidian,
suora note 64, at 118; Lecture V:
Suppress All Counterrevolutionary Criminals; Advance the Consolidation of the
Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 13 CHINESE LAI'I' & GOV'T.
38, 41 (No. 2, Summer 1980).

74.

See, ~, "Further Reportage on Bohai No. 2 Accdent,•
FBIS-cHI-80-173 (Sept. 4, 1980), at L21 (noting that 4 men
who were accused of dereliction of duty in relation to the
Bohai No. 2 oil
rig accident that killed 72 Chinese
received prison sentences ranging from one to four years).

75.

See PRC
States:

CRIMINAL

CODE,

supra

note

15,

Art.

79,

which

Those who commit offenses not explicitly defined in
specific articles of the criminal law may be convicted
and sentenced according to the most approximate article
in the criminal law.
However, permission must be obtained from the Supreme People's Court.
76.

Arguably, Western creative statutory interpretation often
fills the analogy role. See ~, United States v. Mandel,
591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 961
( 1980) (noting the ever expanding use of the mail fraud
statute to cover activities previously considered to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of state regulation).

77.

See "Renmin Ribao Explains Section of Criminal Law,"
ffi-80-033 (Feb. 15, 1980), at Ll5.
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78.

See PRC CRIMINAL CODE,
Arts. 105-115.

supra note 15,. PART 2, CHAPTER II,

79.

Id.

80.

~ee

generally Lecture VI:
Struggle Against Crimes of Harmlng Public Security:
Safeguard the Security of the People's Lives and Property, 13 CHINESE LAW & GOV'T. 46, 47
(No. 2, Summer 1980).

81.

PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 63.

82.

See note 51, supra.
~ &.22 "Jeifang Ribao Comments on
Maintaining Social Order ,• FBIS-cHI-80-002 (Jan. 3, 1980),
at 06.
For examples of cases where criminals were exempted
from punishment or·given lighter sentences because of selfdenunciations (admissions of guilt), ~ "Henan Sentences
Man for 'Appealing' Wei Jingsheng Case,• FBIS-CHI-79-246
(Dec. 20, 1979), at 041 "Beijing Press Highlights Execution
of Convicted Murderer ,• FBIS-cHI-80-059 (march 25, 1980),
at L8.
·

83.

~

84.

Cf. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 198.

85.

An excellent example of such committees and their respective purposes is offered by the 1980 reintroduction of four
sets of regulations, previously enacted in 1952.
The Organic Regulations of the Urban Neighborhood Committee, the
Organic Regulations of the Subdistrict Office, The Temporary Organic. Regulations of the People's Mediation Committee and the Temporary Regulations of the Social Order
and Security Committees were repromulgated by the NPC.
See
"Central Press Publishes NPC. Regulations on Local Organizations,• FBIS-cHI-80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L2-9.
Cf.
"Renmin Ribao Notes Effectiveness of Criminal Surveillance,". FBIS-cHI-80-005 (Jan. 8, 1980), at Ll7.16

generally R. BERNSTEIN, FROM THE
(1982)1 BUTTERF!ELD, supra note 21 J.
IN CHINA 289-337 (1980)1 ZILE, SHARLET
121 H. ROS ITZ KE, THE KGB : THE EYES OF

CENTER OF THE EARTH
TOWNSEND,
POLITICS
AND LOVE, supra note
RUSSIA (1981).

Surveillance by the masses may be a throwback to the
Shan Yang era (circa 350 B.C.), where failure to denounce
an offender was punishable by death.
See D. BLOODWORTH,
THE CHINESE LOOKING GLASS 36 (1980 ed.).
86.

~

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 198. One can
envision the potential for such groups to utilize obscure
regulations to harass an inspectorate; For example, a new
Beijing (Peking) sanitation regulation calls for fines to
be imposed on those who spit on, urinate in, or litter the
streets of Beijing.
See "Peking Municipality Issues New
Sanitation Regulatons,n-pBis-cHI-78-242 (Dec. 15, 1978), at
K21 "Beijing Vice Mayor Urges Stricter Sanitation Laws ,•
FBIS-cHI-81-152 (Aug. 7, 1981), at Rl.
See ~ "1957
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Public Security Regulations
(Feb. 26, 1980), at LB-15.

Published."

FBIS-cHI-80-039

87.

PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 158.

88.

See ~' Butterfield, How the Chinese Pol ice Themselves,
N.Y. Times, April 18, 1982, at 32 (Magazine).

89.

ZILE, SHA~ET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 79. The PRC has
questioned the dignity of Soviet Embassy personnel on more
than one occasion, claiming that they serve as agents of
the KGB.
See ~· •soviet Activities in Singapore Denounced," FBIS-cHI-82-040 (March 1, 1982), at Cl1 "Indonesian Expulsion of Soviet Diplomat Viewed." id.J "Renmin
Ribao Looks at KGB Activities in U.S. ,• FBIS-cHI-81-234
(Dec. 7, 1981), at Bl. "KGB-Agency of Fascist Repression,
Spying, Subversion,• SCMP no. 5969, Nov. 6, 1975, at 2311
"Jen-min Jih-pao Article: Dirty, Ugly Espionage Activities
of Soviet Revisionists," SCMP no. 5580 (March 26, 1974), at
65.

90.

See ~' "Further Commentary on Netherlands Sub Sale:
'Ranking of Envoys Explained', "FBIS-cHI-81-013 (Jan. 21,
1981), at G4 (noting that diplomatic envoys "diplomatic
privileges" and not "diplomatic privileges and immunities"). But see "Renmin Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to
ForeignerS";'" FBIS-cHI-80-027 (Feb 7, 1980), at L21 (addressing the effect of the criminal law on those who enjoy
"diplomatic privileges and immunity")! Article 8 of the PRC
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, also addresses those with
diplomatic privileges and immunities.
The apparent ambiguity is probably more the result of
the imprecision in press reporting than the pronouncement
of differing Chinese legal standards.
Cf. "PRC Protests
KGB Attempt to Force PRC Diplomat to Defect," FBIS-cHI-80170 (Aug. 29, 1980), at Cl (PRC note protesting KGB attempts to incite Chinese diplomatic defection in violation
of international laws and norms on relations between
countries).
The nature of the difference between privilege and immunity can also be gleaned from an examination of Chinese
domestic news reports. A recent Jiangsu circular, for example, decried the use of • special privileges"
by Party
(CCP) members in housing construction projects.
See
"Jiangsu Circular Forbids Special Privileges,• FBIS-cHI-80246 (Dec. 19, 1980), at 04.
The suggestion is that the
term "privilege" connotes special treatment over and above
the usual treatl\lent, but does not refer to special treatment outside the usual, a phrase best described by an exemption, or, in English translation, an immunity [mianchu).
For instance, certain Chinese officials :nay beeie=
pected to travel fairly freely within the PRC. Where such
officials receive better accommodations en route, they are
receiving privileges. However, an average PRC citizen, who
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is not permitted to travel freely, would require an exemption to travel to a restricted area.
Chinese recognition of diplomatic privileges and immunities may extend back as far as the Boxer Rebellion in
1900.
The Chinese commander-in-chief in Peking sent a
telegram to the viceroys of South China, stating.
"When
two countries are at war, it has been customary since antiquity not to injure the envoys.
."BLOODWORTH, supra
note 8 5 , at 2 6 •
91.

See "Renmin Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to Foreigners,"
FBIS-cHI-80-027 (Feb 7, 1980), at L21.
According to the
. article, "without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of
the receiving state.
They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that state.•
See also Article 41 of the Diplomatic Convention, infra note 9s:--

92.

See "Renmin Ribao Discusses Laws Applicable to Foreigners,"
FBIS-cHI-80-027 (Feb 7, 1980), at L21.

93.

Parties to an inspection arrangement must address the issue
of the waiver of immunity by a sending state, which is incorporated in the Diplomatic Convention infra note 95, the
Consular Convention, infra note 108 and""tiieUN Convention
on Privileges, infra note 115.
By virtue of such an international practice, a grant of extensive, jurisdictional
immunities to foreign inspectorate personnel would not
necessarily immunize these agents from legal process, since
absent immunity granted to them by the sending state for
acts performed within the scope of official duties, the
host state might couple expulsion of personnel for transgressions in the host country with a formal request for
prosecution by the sending state.
In practice, requests of this nature are rarely made or
honored, because of the inability of· the requesting state
to enforce its request in the sending state.

94.

Article 41 of the Diplomatic Convention, infra note 95.
See also "AFP:
PRC Expels Dutch Newspaper Correspondent,"
FBIS-cHI-81-096 (May 19, 1981), at G2 (for activities • incompatible with the status of a correspondent").
See
generally, COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 929-1108.
---

95.

Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T< 3227,
T.I.A.S.
No.
7502,
500 U.N.T.S.
95
[hereafter
cited
as
Diplomatic
Convention]
The
PRC
deposited its accession on Nov. 26, 1975 with reservations
concerning "the provisions about nuncios and the representative of the Holy see in Arts. 14 and 16 and on the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Art. 37" (regarding the
privileges and immunities of service, technical and administrative personnel).
See H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, A CALENDAR OF EVENTS 1966-1980,
217 (1981) [hereafter cited as PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80).
See also S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER
425-26(1979).
96.

Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Art. 29.

97.

12_., Art. 31 ( l).

98.

12_.' Art. 29.

99.

Id., Art. 31(2).

100. 12_.' Art. 29.
101. See also Fu Chu, "Diplomatic Privileges," Shih-chieh chihshih no. 21:
32 (Nov. 10, 1965) cited in COHEN AND CHIU,
supra note 4, at 949; PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra
note 16, Art. 12; Keng and Chuan, Practice Regarding

Diploma tic and Consular Privileges and Immunities, in LAW
IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-94 (Keng and Chiu ed.,
1972) [hereafter cited as LENG AND CHIU).
102. There

is 1 ittle available information on automatic incorporation of PRC-ratified treaties into PRC municipal law.
For example, in the most recent compilation of PRC domestic
laws and regulations, no treaties are included. See Gongan
fagui huibian, supra note 5.
However, the recently circulated PRC Provisional Civil
Procedure Law contains provisions noting that, in the absence of strict language to the contrary, any conflict
between international treaties and conventions (to which
the PRC is a party) and the Law of Civil Procedure, will be
resolved in favor of those international treaties and conventions, except where specific contractual clauses designate that PRC law will apply. ~ Yanling, supra note 48,
at 22.

103. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Art. 11, para.

6.
104. See note 18 supra.

The US Embassy protested alleged Chinese disregard for the US-PRC Consular Convention for
detaining Ms. Wichser, the American graduate student teaching in Beijing.
Embassy officials claimed they had not
been notified of the arrest in timely fashion and had been
unable to visit her during 4 days of detention despite provisions of the bilateral consular convention permitting
speedy access to imprisoned Americans. See also Weisskopf,
China Reported Set to Expel American Held 1n Spy Case,
Washington Post, June 3, 1982, p. Al. Note that prior to
the promulgation of Chinese detention regulations and the
ratification of the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95,
the PRC was often arbitrary in its treatment of foreigners
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who violated ·chinese Law.
In two separate instances in
1969, for example, the PRC detained American yachtsmen who
had inadvertently strayed into Chinese territorial waters.
Two of them were detained without formal charges for almost
10 months (from Feb. 16, 1969 to Dec. 6, 1979).
See KISSINGER, supra note 33, at 180,188.
--105.

~, ~,

Fu Chu, "Diplomate Privileges," Shih-chieh chihshih, no. 21:32 (Nov. 10, 1965) cited in COHEN AND CHIU,
supra note 4, at 949. ~ generally, id:; at 933-55.

106. See Diplomatic Convention, supL! note 95, Art. 29.
107. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTE.RNATIONAL LAW:
A TREATISE 791-92
(Vol. I: Peace, H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed, 1955). Oppenheim suggested that diplomatic agents may be restrained
upon the commission of acts which disturb the internal order of the state. Id., at 791.
Cf., Chunq-hua jen-min
kunq-ho kuo min-fa chi-pen wen-t'i (Fundamental problems of
the civil law of the PRC7 Peking, 1958) p. 41 cited in
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 1001. "Diplomatic immunity is a matter of comity in international relations.
It
does not affect the uniformity and independence of [the
PRC'S] legal sovereignty .... Id. See also "Jenmin Jihpao Article:
Dirty,
Ugly
Espionage
Activities
of
Soviet
Revisionists,• SCMP no.5580 (March 26, 1974), at G5 (Chinese arrests of Soviet KGB agents are in conformance with
"generally accepted norms of international law").
108. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereafter
cited as Consular Convention].
The PRC deposited its accession on July 2, 1979. See PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra
note 95, at 218.
109.

~

PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 218.

110. Consular Convention, supra note 108, Art. 41. Grave crime
is not further defined in the Convention, but would probably include all capital offenses in the state where the
act was conmitted.
111. Id., Art. 44(1).
112. Id., Art. 44(3)
113.
114.

M·,
M·•

Art. 43.
Art. 41.

115. UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 521, 33 U.N.
T.S. 261 [hereafter cited as UN Convention on Privileges].
PRC accession was deposited on Sept. 11, 1979.
See PRC
AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 218. ·
---
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The PRC's accession was with respect to the UN Food and
Argricul tural Organization (second revised text of annex
II), the International Civil Aviation Organization (annex
III), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (annex IV), the tiorld Health Organization (third revised text of annex VII), the Universal Postal Union (annex
VIII), the International Telecommunications Union (annex
IX) and the International Maritime Consultative Organization (revised text of annex XII). See Statement of Treaties
and International Agreements Registered on Filed and Recorded with the Secretarariat During the Month of September
1979, at 510 no. 521, U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.A/391 (1981).
The PRC did not accede to the UN Convention on Privileges with respect to the International Labor Organization,
the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and other UN agencies in the
accordance with Articles 57 and 63 of the UN charter.
The
PRC has also not acceded to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 9f the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946,
21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, nor has
it apparently acquiesced to Section 32 of the UN Convention
on Privileges, which permits Int~rnational Court of Justice
jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Convention.
Within the UN Convention on Privileges, two distinct
classes of international persons are recognized: representatives of members and officials.
Representatives of members of specialized agencies, in the course of their official
function,
enjoy
the
following
privileges
and
immunities:
a)

b)
c)
d)

e)

fl

Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from
seizure of their personal baggage, and in respect
of words spoken or writ ten and all acts done by
them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of every kind;
Inviolability for all papers and documents;
The right to use codes and to receive papers or
correspondence by courier or in sealed bags;
Exemption in respect of themselves and
their
spouses from immigration restrictions, aliens' registration or national service obligations in the
State in which they are visiting or through which
they are
passing
in
the
exercise
of
their
functions;
The same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official
missions;
The same immunities and facilities in respect of
their personal baggage as are accorded to members
of comparable rank of diplomatic missions (Article
V, Section 13).
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Under Section
agencies shall:
a)
b)

c)
d)
e)

f)

19,

officials

of

the

specialized

Be immune from legal process in respect of works
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in
their official capacity;
Enjoy the same exemptions from taxation in respect
of the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the
specialized agencies and on the same conditions as
are enjoyed by officials of the United Nations;
Be immune, together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them, from immigration restriction and alien registration;
Be accorded the same privileges in respect of exchange facilities as are accorded to officials of
comparable rank of diplomatic missions;
Be given, together with their spouses and relatives
dependent on them, the same repatriation facilities
in time of international crises as officials of
comparable rank of diplomatic missions;
Have the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first taking up
their post in the country in question.

116. The specialized agencies are basically international organizations operating under UN auspices and created for the
purpose of corrdinating activities connected with internation trade, communication, and human welfare. The specialized agencies covered by the UN Convention on Privileges,
supra note 115, are enumerated therein.
117. UN Convention on Privileges, supra note 115, Art.
3.

II,

Sec.

118. Id • , Art. II I, Sec. 5.
119.

~

note 115, supra.

120. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
United Nations and UN Personnel, supra note 115.

of

the

121. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against
Internationally
Protected
Persons,
Including
Diplomatic Agents, done Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
122. ASEAN is the acronym for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, composed of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the
Philippines.
It is a regional organization designed to
foster economic and secrui ty relations among members and
between ASEAN and the United States and Japan.
See
generally Sours, ASEAN and U.S. Foreign Policy, in ASIA AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 173-90 (Hsiung and Chai ed. 1982)
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123. The USSR deposited its accession on Jan. 10, 1966. See
Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the Secretary
General Performs Depositary Functions, Lists of Signatures,
Ratifications, Accessions, etc., (as of Dec. 31, 1979),
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/13, at 46.
124. UN Convention on Privileges, supra note 115, Sec. 12.
125. _!E.., Sees. 5 and 6.
126. _!E.., Sec. 5.
127. To facilitate the purchase and delivery of foreign high
technology equipment, for example, the PRC has recently
recognized and accepted the safeguard clause for an export
license issued by the Coordinating Committee for Export
Controls (COCOM).
COCOM is a Paris-based, fifteen nation
organization comprised of Western nations which trade with
Communist countries.
The clause, known as Form 629, allegedly permits periodic COCOM on-site inspection of installations in the PRC to verify that the commodities supplied are being used for the purpose for which they were
intended (i.e., civilian, non-military use).
See China
Recognizes Form 629:
Permits Monitoring of :SoensitTVe
Equipmnt, 6 CHINA BUS. REV. 55 (No. 4, July-Aug. 1979).
But see Miller, U.S. is Holding up Peking Atom Talks, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 19, 1982, p. All.
COCOM inspector privileges would seem to be implied by
the nature of the agreement, which requires the Chinese to
admit COCOM agents into limited-access areas to monitor the
use of purchased equipment.
128. Recent reports have cited the existence and operation of a
joint US-PRC electronic intelligence gathering station in
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Reg ion in western China, to
monitor Soviet missile and suspected electromagnetic pulse
testing.
See, e.g., U.S., China jointly run spy station,
Balto. Sun, June 18, 1981, p. Al, col. 1; "PRC Refuses Comment on U.S. Radar Station, "FBIS-cHI-81-118 (June 19,
1981), at Kl. See also "Kyodo: U.S. Sets Up Military Base
in PRC, "FBIS-cHI-82-002 (Jan. 5, 1982), at Bl (issued by
Japanese wire service); "AFP:
PRC Refuses Comment on Report of U.S. Base,"
FBIS-cHI-82-003 (Jan 6, 1982), at Bl.
According to the report, CIA agents occasionally visit the
facility.
Presumably, they are accorded limited privileges, such as customs exemptions, and are permitted into
an obviously restricted area.
129. Foreign government officials performing official acts in a
third country have been extended certain diplomatic privileges and immunities in the 1969 United Nations Convention
on Special Missions.
U.N. DOC. A/7375, Annex I, Dec. 11,
1968.
The Chinese have not ratified this Convention, but
some of its provisions would be useful in formulating
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requisite privileges and immunities for an arms inspectorate. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 89-92.
Another potential source for the formulation of arms
inspectorate privileges and immunities is 'the Draft Annex
II on the Privileges and Immunities of the Control Organization Under the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Discussion of the latter is omitted from this paper because
of consistently vehement Chinese objections to the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, but an excellent treatment of the Annex
and its relationship to inspectorate privileges and immunitie as they apply to the Soviet Union may be found in
id., at 108-10.
13 0. See, .!l....:.!l..:.• PRC d isr eg ard of the US-PRC Consular Convention
in detaining Lisa Wichser, supra note 104.
Note that this
incident, the first major one involving a US national since
US-PRC normalization in 1979, occurred at a time where usPRe relations had cooled significantly as a result of
American insistance on the U.S. right to continue arms
sales to Taiwan, in what the PRC considered a violation of
PRC sovereignty. See, e.g., "Xinhua Hits Helms Over Arms
Sales to Taiwan," FBIS-CHI-82-021 (Feb. 1, 1982), at Bl;
"Sino-U.S. Ties Based on Respect for Sovereignty," FBISCHI-82-024 (Feb. 4, 1982), at Bl.
131. See oenerally,
ll3-19.

ZILE,· SHARLET AND LOVE,

supra note 12,

at

132. Chung-yang cheng-fa kan-pu hsueh-hsiao hsing-fa chiao-yenshih,
Chung-hua
jen-min Kung-ho-kuo
hsing-fa
tsun-tse
Chiang-i (Lectures on the general principles of criminal
law of the PRC; Peking, 1957), pp. 40-42 reprinted in COHEN
AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 1000-1001.
133. The PRC, for instance, has permitted the PLO to maintain an
office in Beijing (Peking).
This information was supplied
to the author by Prof. Hungdah Chiu of the University of
Maryland School of Law and by the Chinese Embassy in
Washington, D.C.
134. See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 931-1042.
The PRC has, in fact, protested some of the same acts it
had performed when such acts were performed by others. See
.!l....:.!l..:.• "Chinese Government Strongly Protects Against Soviet
Authorities Fascist Atrocities of Kidnapping Chinese Diplomat and Brutal Treatment of China's Internaitonal Train,"
SCMP no. 5545 (Feb. 4, 1974), at 35 (protesting the kidnapping and unlawful questioning of Kuan Heng-kuang, who was
returning to the PRC after completing a tour of the Chinese
Embassy in the Soviet Union.
135. See generally COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 1016-42.
See also" PRC Protests U.S. Inspection of Diplomats' Bag,•
FBIS-cHI-82-095 (May 17, 1982), at Bl.
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136. See PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 15, Art. 30.
13 7. See,

~·

note 154, infra.

138. See,

~·

text accompanying note 110, supra.

139. See,

~·

note 21, supra.

140. See Ying xuesheng kaige wanxiao zhonggong yaoba ta guzhuo
[English student makes jokes: China wants to deport him],
Lianhe bao (United Daily News) [AP Report] July 7, 1981,
p. 2.
Actually, the British student was accused of writing
two slogans. Both slogans siren bang wansui [Long Live the
Gang of Four] and Weidade shehui zhuyizhe Jiang Qing wansui
[Long Live the Great Socialist Jiang Qing]--were not
specifically branded as counterrevolutionary by Chinese
authorities, but the PRC immediately informed the British
Embassy that the youth was to be deported.
141. U.N. CHARTER, 59 STAT. 1031, 3 BEVANS 1153 (1945), ART. 105
( 1) •

142. Id., Art. 105(2). A U.S. District Court recently held that
international practice did not grant t::> foreign nationals
employed by the United Nations the same degree of immunity
as foreign diplomats.
Thus, the seizure of illegally obtained
national
secrui ty
information
from
a
foreign
minister did not violate his right to diplomatic immunity.
United States v. Enger, 442 F.Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978).
143. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 117; S. KIM,
~ note 95, at 418.

~

144. See Ellis and Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement
in the Peoples Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 155,
161-64 (No. 2, 1981).
145. Where the arbitral awards are fair and do not violate Chinese laws and policies, PRC enterprises will usually execute them.
Where they refuse to execute the award, the
party requesting enforcement may petition the relevant PRC
goverrunent department or the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) or appeal to the Chinese courts to enforce the award. Ten Tsien-Hsin [sic] and
Lin Shao-Shan, •People' s Republic of China," 3 YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 160 (1978).
146. [1958] 21 U.S.T. 2517,
(done June 10, 1958).

T.I.A.S.

No.

6997,

330 U.N.T.S.

3

147. Despite the fact that the PRC does not belong to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has not ratified
the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA,
the latter document may also serve as a useful referent for
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the formulation of an acceptable agreement concerning the
scope of the
immunities
to
be enjoyed
by
an
arms
inspectorate.
The IAEA Agreement, for example, provides for mutual
consultation between a protesting state and the Agency when
an abuse of privileges and immunities is alleged (Art. 26).
If such an abuse has in fact occurred, the State party may
withhold from the Agency the benefits of the privileges or
immunities so abused, provided it does not interfere with
the principal functions of the Agency (Art. 30). See ZILE,
SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 104-07.
-148. The PRC has even indicated its willingness to use third
country arbitration sites and to apply the law of the locus
of arbitration.
See Ellis and Shea, supra note 144, at
169.
149. See text accompanying notes 136-39 supra.
150. Under Draft Annex II of the Proposed Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, after consultation and in the event of continued
disagreement on whether an abuse has occurred, the complaining Party may request a replacement (Art. 7 (B) (3)),
though the departure of the first member must not take
place until the arrival of the replacement.
See generally
ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 108-110, 117-19.
151. Chinese tolerance of proprietary violations is limited.
In
a case recently reported to this author by an ABC news correspondent, an American businessman was expelled from the
PRC for engaging in sexual relations with a Chinese prostitute.
Prostitution is illegal under Article 5(8) of the
1957 Public Security Regulations, repromulgated in 1980.
See "1957 Public Security Regulations Published," FBIS-CHI80-039 (Feb. 26, 1980), at L8-15.
Punishment of nationals
under that provision was set at:
1) detention under 10
days1 2) a fine of not more than 20 yuan (approx. $8 at
that time) 1 or 3) a warning.
See also "Porngraphic Sound,
Video Recordings Banned," FBIS-CHI-82-050 (march 15, 1982),
at Kl5.
Moreover, the PRC has published incidents between foreign nationals in China such as the recent clash between
African and Arab students attending the Chinese Medical
College. One African student allegedly was killed. Though
Shenyang public security and judicial departments were put
in charge of investigating the incident, the two relevant
embassies were informed and, presumably, the matter was
further handled through d ipi om a tic channels although this
latter point was not subsequently confirmed by FBIS reports.
See "Shenyang Investigates Fatal Brawl Among Foreign Students," FBIS-cHI-80-117 (June 16, 1980), at A2.
See~ "Education Ministry Statement," id.
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152. See, ~· "Chinese Court Pronounces Death Sentence on
Counterrevolutionary Criminal," SCMP no. 3720 (June 17,
1966), at 1-3 cited in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at
995-99.
-153. See note 19 supra (Chinese national, who had defected to
the USSR and returned to the PRC for clandestine activities, executed by firing squad.)
154. A case in point is the recent AFP report of the expulsion
of a Dutch newspaper correspondent for "activities incompatible with the status of a correspondent," official parlance for what are often subversive or clandestine activiies. "AFP:
PRC Expels Dutch Newspaper Correspondent,•
FBIS-CHI-81-096 (May 19, 1981), at G2.
Ironically enough,
the PRC press, which usually reports on such cases as an
indication of the effectiveness of Chinese counter intelligence operations, did not publicize the case (AFP is
Agence France Press, a foreign news service operating in
East Asia). The AFP report carne on the heels of the PRC's
extreme disapproval with the Netherland's sale of Dutch
submarines to Taiwan.
The irnpl ic a tion, of course is that
the journalist was removed partly as a retaliatory measure
for the Netherland• s act.
See also note 21 supra and accompanying text.
The treatment of Ms. Wichset; may have
been indirectly linked to the growing resentment of the PRC
towards U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a topic that often found
its way into the PRC press during 1982, prior to the issual'lce of the second US-PRC Joint Communique in August
1982.
155. A barrage of PRC press reports on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
and Chinese claims of regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong
when the Treaty of Nanjing· lapses in 1997 attest to the
number of articles and the vitriolic language employed in
order to gain mass support for PRC policies.
See, ~· "Ta Kung Pao Hits Shultz Statement on Taiwan,•
FBIS-cHI-82-136 (July 15, 1982), at Wl; "U.S. Taiwan Lobby,
Kuomintang 'Conspiracy' Hit," FBIS-cHI-82-138 (July 19,
1982), at Bl; "Conservatives' Aim to Create 'Two Chinas'
Scored," FBIS-CHI-82-185 (Sept. 23, 1982), at Wl; "PRC's
Sovereignty Over
Hong Kong
Reviewed,"
FBIS-CHI-82-183
(Sept. 21, 1982), at Wl; "Wen Wei Po Comments on SinoBritish Talks," FBIS-82-187 (Sept. 27, 1982), at W3.
156. See note 4, supra.
157. Inspectorate personnel of an international inspectorate
team may be issued a UN laissez passer or a comparable certificate noting their official business. See ZILE, SHARLET
AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 123-24.
158. This information was provided to the author by a cultural
attache of the Chinese Mission in New York on June 29,
1981.
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159. Observers reported that the Chinese government had eased
its policy on granting visas for Chinese nationals to
travel abroad.
See "Difficulties in Obtaining Exit Visas
From PRC Noted,"""""'FBIS-CHI-78-132 (July 25, 1978), at El7.
Since 1978, however, the PRC has not, in practice, been as
lenient as reported. One reason may be Chinese concern for
defection..
See Bernstein, Peking is Troubled by Rise in
Defections to West, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1982, at A22.
See
also "Regulations on Studying Abroad Approved," FBIS-cHI82-14 7 (July 30, 1982), at K9.
Exit and reentry permits are aughorized for foreigners
by the Foreign Ministry and the Public Security bureau involved. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 94.
The purpose of requiring permits is simple:
it allows
for identificaton, numbering, and control of foreigners.
160. The Chinese governmnt has waived on occasion, the visa requirement for citizens of neighboring countries.
See
"Agreement on Mutual Exemption of Visa Reached Between
Governments [sic] of PRC and Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam," SCMP no. 5530 (Jan. 9, 1974),
at 107.
But ~ "Late Report: New PRC-SRV Border Regulations Stipulated," FBIS-CHI-78-134 (July 12, 1978), at A24.
161. The PRC apparently waived certain visa restrictions in certin instances.
Soviet TASS commentator Yakovlev was given
permission to visit "any place" (presumably within the
bounds of Chinese na tiona! security r estr ic tions) on his
one month visa.
"PRC Grants Visa to TASS Commentator
Yakovlev," FBIS-cHI-79-169 (Aug. 29, 1979), at C3. See also
"Formalities Simplified for Foreign Tourists, "FBIS-cHI-82205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3 (foreigners travelling to any
of 29 municipalities need not obtain a travel certificate
or advance notification).
Cf. "PRC Will Now Receive Individual Tourists," FBIS-cHI-82-199 (Oct. ].4, 1982), at K9
(noting Chinese willingness to accept individual tourists
as well as groups).
162. See Crew Members of Aircraft and Vessels, United States
Pe'Ople's Republic of China Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 9965
(Jan 7, 1981).
The visas are provided on a reciprocal
basis.
163. Zile, Sharlet and Love suggested the osibility of including
an exhortatory provision in the arms control agreement patterned after Section 30 of the Agreement on the Privileges
and Immunities of the IAEA, which calls for dealing with
visa applications "as speedily as possible."
ZILE, SHARLET
AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 125.
164. An illustration of these border regulations was found in a
recent Chinese publication.
These particular regulations
were set up for Yunnan province and designated, inter alia,
that prior permission must be obtained before outsiders
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could enter Yunnan (Art.
) 1 that passes must be carried at
all times (Art. 4)1 that all cars and people entering the
province must submit to inspection (Art. 9)1 and that smuggling was prohibited (Art 8).
See Yunnan jiaqiang bianjing
guanl i (Yunnan strengthens border management) reor in ted in
Zhonggong wenti ziliao (Reference Materials on Chinese Issues), No. 125 (March 8, 1982), at 11-13.
See also "Xizang
Issues Rules on Entry from Other ProvinceS";" FBIS-CHI-81218 (Nov. 12, 1981), at Ql.
For
examples
of
PLA
activities
in
defending
PRC
sovereignty, see "Heilongjiang Border Defense Foils 'Abnormal' Soviet Activities," FBIS-cHI-78-025 (Feb. 6, 1978), at
Ll1 "Inner Mongolia Border Defense Unit Discovers 'Enemy'
Vehical," id., at Kl1 "Kirin Border Guard Captures Suspected Saboteur;" id., at Ll.
PRC provinces have also recently
set up their ·own border defense pol ice forces to protect
public
security and
Chinese
sovereignty.
See,
~··
"Guangdong Establishes Armed Border Defense Police Force,"
FBIS-cHI-80-211 (Oct. 29, 1980), at Pl1 "Zhejiang Sets Up
Armed Police Units for Border Defense," FBIS-CHI-80-249
(Dec. 24, 1980), at 081 "Guangxi, Yunnan Militiamen Help
Defend Border," FBIS-CHI-82-209 (Oct. 28, 1982), at 56.
165. Information was provided to the author in an interview with
a PRC official at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
June 26, 1981.
Note also that the PRC does not issue
coundtrip tickets for transportation within the county.
Return reservations must be made or reconfimed at each
departure point.
See Frustrations of Expatriate Life in
Peking, Asian Wall St. Journal, Jan. 18, 1982, at 11.
166. Jinchukou feiii jiyuan luke xinglijiancha zhanxing tongze
[Provisional Regulations Concerning Inspection of Incoming
and Outgoing Aircraft Passengers, Crew and Baggage] (May
24, 1951) [hereafter AIRCRAFT REGULATIONS] reprinted in
Gongan faqui huibian, supra note 5, at 277.
Translation by
author.
167. Jinchukou lieche cheyuan luke xinglijiancha zhanxing tongze
[Provional Regulations Concerning Inspection of Incoming
and Outgoing Trains, Passengers, Crew and Baggage] (May 24,
1951) [hereafter RAILWAY REGULATIONS] reprinted in Gongan
fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 280.
Translation by
author.
168. Jinchukou chuanbo chuan uan luke xin li"iancha zhanxin
tongze
Provisional Regulations Concerning Inspection of
Incoming and Outgoing Vessers, Passengers, Crew and Baggage] (Jan. 27, 1950) [hereafter VESSEL REGULATIONS] reprinted in Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 282.
See
also infra note 194.
Translation by author.
169. For example, the VESSEL REGULATIONS, id., stipulate that
foreign sailors must have a valid visa before entry into
the PRC will be permitted (Art. 8).
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170. See generally Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quoj ing weisheng
j ianyi tiaol i (Chinese Border Regulations Regarding Health
and Immunization) (March 6, 1951) Art. 2(3) reprinted in
Gongan fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 297; RAILWAY REGULATIONS, supra note 167, Art. 2(2); VESSEL REGULATIONS, supra
note 16 8, Art. 2 ( 4 ) •
The
Aircraft
Regulations,
presumably
the
most
applicable statute based on the 1 ikel ihood of the use of
aircraft as a means of transportation, also stipulate that
inspection is conducted only once at the port of entry and
the port of departure, "unless special circumstances exist"
[emphasis added], Art. 3.
Special circumstances are not
further defined.
171. See, ~' "Increase in Chinese Customs Duties Reported,"
FBIS-cHI-82-169 (Aug. 30, 1982), at W5. (noting increases
of from 25-67 percent on popular consumer items).
172. Such procedures technically apply to foreigners and their
means of transportation.
Nevertheless, domestic airline
flights may be required to undergo inspection procedures in
at least two instances:
1) where the flight destination
includes areas where smuggling is rampant; and, 2) in special cases.
AIRCRAFT REGULATIONS, supra note 166, Art.
9(1), 9(2).
The "special cases" exception is one of the
more appropriate examples of the type of sweeping contextual legal definitions that can play havoc with inspection
operations.
The entire nature of inspection operations is
"special" and leads to an interesting supposition:
since
this "special case" escape clause applies to flights which
would otherwise be exempt from inspection, query its analogous use by the Chinese to circumvent customs and inspection exemptions and irnmun i ties usually accorded d ipl om a tic
agents and their goods?
173. See AIRCRAFT REGULATIONS, supra note 166, Art. 6; RAILWAY
REGULATIONS, supra note 167, Art. 5; VESSEL REGULATIONS,
supra note 168, Art. 7.
174. See generally, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS WITH
CHINA 31 (Nov. 1980) [hereafter DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA].
175. Smuggling receives extensive press coverage in the PRC,
more than any other economic crime except embezzlement.
See, ~' "Guangdong CCP Committee Inveighs Against Smuggling," FBIS-cHI-80-233 (Dec. 2, 1980), at Pl; "Smuggling
Activities Will Not be Tolerated," FBIS-cHI-81-168 (Aug.
31, 1981), at K6; "Renmin Ribao Reports on Shenzhen Smuggling Case," FBIS-cHI-82-049 (March 12, 1982), at Kl.
To help combat smuggling activity and "safeguard he
socialist economic order," the PRC recently promulgated
"Customs Measures to Reward Those Who Assist in the Investigation of Smuggling" in order to help expose major smuggling operations.
Rewards include material incentives,
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such as bonuses and prizes. See "Ta Kung Pao Publishes PRC
Customs Measures," FBIS-CHI-79-214 (Nov. 2, 1979), at U4.
176. This statement was confirmed by Mr. Jeffrey Buczacki, China
Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C. in an interview on June 26, 1981.
177. Debate still continues among membes of the International
Law Commission (ILC) as to whether to provide for the absolute inviolability of the diplomatic pouch in a protocol to
the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95.
See Status of
the Diplomatic Courier and the Diplomatic Bag Not Accompanied by the Diplomatic Courier, Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 170,
179-80 (Vol. II, Part 2, 1979).
178. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 131. These
authors cited an example of a train ride.
Ordinarily, a
courier who rides a train in which the pouch travels in a
separate baggage car would be considered within "reasonable
proximity" to the pouch.
However, if the courier were to
ride in a car which became decoupled from the baggage car,
such "reasonable proximity" vanishes and customs officials
may dispense with any courtesies and open the pouch.
179. A recent 1981 article stated that a Hong Kong businessman
was fined 12000 yuan (approx. $7000 at that time) for
buying cars from foreign embassies and trying to sell them
in Beijing (Peking), in violation of a rule prohibiting
foreigners from selling imported goods. See "Businessman's
Illegal Activities,"
FBIS-CHI-81-009 (Jan. 14, 1981), at
E2.
180. See, ~· "Privately Run Industry Seen as Indispensable,"
FBIS-CHI-82-186 (Sept. 24, 1982), at K3; "Remmin Ribao Commentator on Expanding Private Plots,• FBIS-CHI-81-122 (June
25, 1981), at Kl.
181. See oenerally Frustrations of Expatriate Life in Peking,
Asian Wall St. Journal, Jan. 18, 1982, at 11. Cf. "Discipline Commission on Illegal Housebuilding," FBIS-CHI-81-193
(Oct 6, 1981), at KG (calling for halt to illegal building
of private homes by cadres).
182. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 32.
183. The same suggestion was offered by other authors with
respect to inspection operations in the Soviet Union. ZILE,
SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 184-85.
Unquestionably, tight state control practiced by the Soviet and Chinese governments and similar concern for administrative
problems in handling foreigners account for the similarity
in suggestions regarding inspection operations in both
countries.
184. See Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Art. 11; Consular
Convention, supra note 108, Art. 30.
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185.

~DOING

BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 32.

186. The Chinese desire to isolate foreigners from proloned contact with Chinese citizens .was shown in a recent AFP report
from China which stated that PRC authorities had restricted
Chinese contacts with foreigners by stipulating, ~
alia, that Chinese could no longer visit a foreigner's
living quarters or eat with him in restaurants without
specific permission from their work units.
Ostensibly, at
least, the restrictions were declared for the purpose o·f
"block[ing] up the canal of security leaks" to foreigners
in the PRC.
See "AFP:
Restrictions Placed on Chinese Contacts with Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-105 (May 30, 1979), at
L2.
See also "Shandong Meeting Discuss [sic] Foreign Students," FBIS-cHI-81-238 (Dec. 11, 1981), at K9 (admonishing
Chinese to be friendly but circumspect); "Fujian Bans Gifts
in Dealing With Foreign Firms," FBIS-cHI-82-033 (Feb. 18,
1982), at 02 (banning Chinese from accepting foreign gifts,
which ironically and probably unintentionally, makes the
PRC one of the few Asian countries enforcing provisions
similar to those of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-213, Sections 102, 103, 104, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified at 15 u.s.c. Sections 78a, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff
(Supp. I 1977)).
See generally "State Council Announces
·Decision on Tourism," FBIS-cHI-Bl-202 (Oct. 20, 1981), a.t
K9 (calling on Chinese to display to tourists the super'iority of the socialist system).
187. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 184.
188. See Agencies Directly subordinate to China's State Council,
7 CHINA BUS. REV. 9 (No. 5, Sept.-oct. 1980).
189. See Articles 3 and 8
Chinese and Foreign
the Second Session
printed in Supp. no.

of the PRC Law on Joint Ventures Using
Investment, adopted July 1, 1979, at
of the Fifth People's Congress, ~
020, supra note 16, at 31.

190. Telecommunications services remain somewhat limited in
1 ight of the fact t~at 1981 reports indicate that the PRC
operates only 3 standard internatonal communications ground
stations. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BACKGROUND NOTES - CHINA
16 (June 198Ti.
However, the PRC allegedly announced that
it will launch its first communications satellite in 1983
or 1984.
See "AFP Reports Space Program Outlined at Conference," FBIS-cHI-82-153 (Aug. 9, 1982), at K4.
As a
·result of the developnent of Chinese satelite communications, the PRC has also taken a stronger stand on the issue
of geostationary orbit.
See "Delegate to UN Meeting Enuniciates Space Policy," FBIS-cHI-82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982),
at Al.
191. The Ministry of Radio and Telvision was established to replace the Central Broadcasting Administration.
The Ministry of Electronics Industry was established as the organ
which merged the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building, the
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National Bureau of Radio arid Television Industry, and the
State Administration of Computer Industry.
See "NPC Approves Government Appointments, Restructure," FBIS-CHI-82086 (May 4, 1982), at Kl.
192. See notes 176-78, supra.
But see "PRC Protests U.S. Inspection of Diplomats'
Bag ,•
FBIS-cHI-82-095
(May 17,
1982), at Bl. Cf. "AFP Reports Restriction of Embassy Propaganda," FBIS-cHI-82-168 (Aug. 30, 1982), at K5 (reporting
on PRC restrictions on the dissemination of writings harmful to China's internal affairs).
193. See also Consular Convention,

supra note 108, Art. 35(1).

194. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 34.
195. The absence of a US-PRC hotline, arguably the only potential hot line that might exist between the PRC and another
major power, was confirmed by a State Department source in
a phone interview on June 25, 1981.
196. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 174, at 34.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See China's Participation in International Orqanizations, 6
CHINA BUS. REV. 28, 30 (No. 3, May-June 1979).
200. PRC accession with a reservation was deposited on November
16, 1972.
PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 213.
For the Convention, see 18 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. No. 6257
(1967).
201. Acceptance by the PRC was made on December 5, 1950.
See D.
JOHNSTON AND H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 1949-1967:
A CALENDAR 5 (1968).
The PRC also
deposited its acceptance of the 1969 Additional Protocol to
the Universal Postal Convention on February 7, 1973.
See
PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, supra note 95, at 213.
--202. See Zhongyanq renmin zhengfu gonqanbu bugao [Bulletin of
the Central People's Government's Division of Public Safety] (March 12, 1950) reprinted in Gonqan fagui huibian,
supra note 5, at 258.
Translation by author. See also
"Beijing Wanbao:
Private Radio Station Dismantled," FBISCHI-81-115 (June 16, 1981), at K4.
Private radio transmitters were banned ostensibly because of their potential for
interfering with PRC sovereighty and because of their propaganda value.
For example, a Sept. 16, 1969 London Evening News article reported the existense of a clandestine
ant -Mao radio station operating the the PRC. See KISSINGER, supra note 33, at 185 (1979).
---
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203. See Regulations Governing the Use of Private Radio Transmitters, supra note 202, Art. 1. Article 1 also stipulates
that violators will be severely punished. Article 2 called
for the dismantling of any previously owned foreign transmitters within 7 days of the promulgation of the rule.
Since the rule was promulgated in 1950, no foreign transmitters have been permitted in the PRC and it is likely
that Article 2 is currently obsolete.
204. Promulgated by the Ministry of Communications of the PRC,
March 14, 1957.
Reprinted in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note· 4,
at 559-61.
In Chinese the Regulations are known as Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui waiguoj i chuanbo j inchu gangkou
guanl i ban fa and may be found in Gong an fagui huibian, ~
~note 5, at 287
[hereafter PORT REGULATIONS].
Translation by author.
205. Promulgated by the Ministry of Communications on April 19,
1966.
Reprinted· in COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 567-70
(in Chinese:
Guojing heliu waiguoji chuanbo guanli banfa,
cited in Gongah fagui huibian, supra note 5, at 293
[hereafter RIVER REGULATIONS].
Translation by author.
206. _See PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 7(2).
RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, Art. 8(2).

~also

207. "State Council Approves Regulation on Foreign Ships,• FBISCHI-79-188 (Sept. 26, 1979), at Ll.
208. See ~· "Military Commission Issues Documents on Secur ity,•
FBIS-cHI-78-099
(May 22,
1978), at
El;
"Xinhua
Publishes Regulations on Guarding State Secrets," FBIS-CHI80-073 (April 14, 1980), at L7; note 8 supra.
209. The inter'view was conducted by the author on June 26, 1981.
210. Both the Diplomatic Convention (Art. 27), supra note 95,
and the Consular Convention (Art. 35), supra note 108, provide for the inviolability of official correspondence.
211. See, ~· "Shanghai Radio Urges Proper Attitude Toward
Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-084 (Apr i1 28, 1979), at 02.
See
also "Beijing Radio Article on Foreign Influence," FBISCHI-82-194 (Oct. 6, 1982), at Kll; "Yangcheng Wanbao Discusses Foreign
Influences,•
FBIS-cHI-82-037
(Feb.
24,
1982), at K5; "Guangming Ribao Discusses Proper Approach to
. Foreign Things," FBIS-cHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at LlO.
212. See id. See also •Article Cites Corruption Imported From
West;" FBIS-cHI-82-078 (Apri'l 22, 1982), at K3; "Dazhang
Ribao on Pursuit of Foreign Things,• FBIS-CHI-82-072 (April
14, 1982), at 03; "Fujian Bans Gifts in Dealing With Foreign Firms,• FBIS-cHI-82-033 (Feb. 18, 1982), at 02; "Ban
Yue Tan·on Dealings With Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-81-237 (Dec.
10, 1981), at Kl6; (Oct. 20, 1981), at K9; "Shandong ·Meeting Discuss [sic] Foreign Students,• FBIS-cHI-81-115 (June
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16, 1981), at W4; "AFP:
Restrictions Placed on Chinese
Contact With Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-79-105 (may 30, 1979),
at L2.
See generally BUTTERFIELD, supra note 2; BERNSTEIN,
supra note 83.
213. One accepted practice is the r estr ic tion placed on the
freedom
of movement
of
foreign
attaches
in
Beijing
(Peking).
According to one PRC official at the Chinese
Embassy in Washington, D.C. (interview conducted on June
26, 1981), there are no hard and fast limits on travel, but
foreign attaches are generally accorded the right of free
movement in a circumscribed area of up to 70 km. from the
embassies.
However, the maximum limit depends on what
areas are encompassed.
For ex·ample, within Beijing, unrestricted travel may extend 70 km. north-eastward but only
15 kms. southward. But ~ BERNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 94
(noting a 15 mile radius around the whole of Beijing beyond
which foreigners could not go).
Restricted crreas are located south of Beijing.
The 70 km. northeastward limit, which is significantly
greater than 40 km. restriction generally imposed by the
Soviet Union on Foreign diplomats, exists because that part
of the Great Wall is located rather far from Beijing and is
open to foreigners without special permission.
214. See, ~· "Xisha Quandao Designed Restricted Military
Zone," FBIS-cHI-62-225 (Nov. 22, 1982), at WS (noting that
the Paracel Islands and 12-mile territorial waters surrounding them were declared a military zone [no civilian
access)); "USSR-PRC Rift Said to Hold Apart Two Mongol ias,"
FBIS-cHI-82-212 (Nov. 2, 1982) at C2 (reporting, inter
alia, that the lao-mile border area between Inner and Outer
Mongolia is a military zone).
Article 6 of the FOREIGN
NATIONAL'S ACT, supra note 4, states that residence and
travel of foreign nationals in important defense and military
localities
and
in
restricted
areas
shall
be
prohibited.
215. This information was provided to the author by Mr. Jerry
Buczacki of the U.S. State Department, China Divison, in a
telephone interview on June 26, 1981.
216. For an excellent overview of life in the PRC for a foreigner, see D. BONAVIA, THE CHINESE (1980) ; BERNSTEIN, supra
note 83; J. FRASER, THE CHINESE:
PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE
(1980).
217. See e.g., "PRC Will Now Receive Individual Tourists," FBISCHI-82-199 (Oct. 14, 1982), at K9; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
CHINA-BACKGROUND NOTES 18 (June 1981).
See also "Formalities Simplified For Foreign Tourists,"
FBIS-CHI-82-205
(Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3.
Prior to these articles, visas
were usually granted only to groups.
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218. Anytime a foreigner wishes to leave from and return to the
PRC, he must first apply to the Foreign Ministry, then to
the Public Security Bureau, for an exit permit and a reentry permit. ~ BERNSTEIN, supra note 83, at ~4.
See id.
~ also "Dazu Grottoes in Sichuan Opened
to Visitors,"
FBIS-cHI-81-111 (June 10, 1981), at Q2.
"Plans Made to
Open More Areas to Foreign Tourists,• FBIS-CHI-78-114 (June
13, 1978), at Ell; "AFP:
Rules on Foreign Students' Travel
Relaxed,• FBIS-cHI-78-0.20 (Jan. 30, 1978), at El6.
Cf.,
Foreign Scholars and Students in China, Beijing Review,_No.
11 (March 17, 1980), at 9. But see "Regulations on Studying Abroad Approved," FBIS-c"'iff=8H47 (July 30, 1982), at
K9; "State Council Announces Dec is ion on Tour ism," FBISCHI-81-202 (Oct. 21, 1981), at K9; "Fuj ian Ribao on Abuses
in Securing Exit Permits,• FBIS-cHI-82-039 (Feb. 26, 1982),
at 03 (announcing a Fuij ian Prohibition on CCP members·
securing exit permits for their families through guanxi, or
•pull"). The types of exit permits concerned were not explained, although they are presumably for internal transit
only.
·
219. This information was supplied to the author by an official
at the U.S. State Department in a phone interview on June
25, 1981. The Second Ministry of Machine 13uilding was in
charge of nuclear development in the PRC.
It is now the
Ministry of Nuclear Industr~. See "NPC Approves Government
Appointments, Restructure,• FB:iS=C:HI-82-086 (May 4, 1982),
at Kl.
Machine Building Ministries are common Soviet and Chinese euphemisms for high-technology and weapons facilities.
For example, Zhang Jun, former Minister of the Seventh
Ministry of Machine Building, was made the Minister of
Space Industry in the 1982 ministerial reorganization that
abolished the Seventh Ministry.
Presumably, the former
Seventh Ministry was engaged in high-technology work.
See
•NPC Approves Government Appointments, Restructure," FB!S=
CHI-82-086 (May 4, 1982), at Kl.
220. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 138.
221. Chinese ticket offices frequently maitain that reservations
are booked on a particular airline flight or train, when in
reality there are vacancies.
This is to ensure the
availability of seats for important organization or officials who might book last minute reservations. Apparently,
these offices would rather risk the loss of ticket revenue
than run the risk of unavailability of seats. See Frustration of Expatriate Life in Peking, The Asian warr-st. Journal, Jan. 18, 1982, p.ll.
Travel in the PRC is not an uncomplicated process.
An
inspectorate faces numberous obstacles, in addition to bogus plane reservations cited above:
round trip bookings
are apparently non-existent (reconfirmation must be made at
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each destination) and airline flights are frequently cancelled or disallowed because of weather conditions. Id.
222.

note 4, supra.
This Act replaced the August 10, 1954
Provisional
Rules
Governing
Travel
of
Foreigners
(Waiguoqiaomin luxinq zhanxinq banfa), reprinted in Gonqan
faqui huibian, supra note 5, at 265. The latter rules were
considerably more restrictive and specific than the ones
that superseded them.
Chinese authorities may have sought
more sweeping statutory leeway to address the problems and
concerns generated by the presence of foreign nationals in
the PRC1 hence, the revised rules. Translation of relevant
provisions were made by the author.

~

223. A perfect example of legislating by administrative fiat
recently occured in the PRC. On Oct. 22, 1982, the Ministry of Public Security announced that foreign travellers
may now travel to any of 29 designated municip~lities without a travel certificate or advance notificaton. The Foreign National's Act has not been amended to reflect these
changes.
See
"Formalities
Simplified
for
Foreign
Tourists," FBIS-CHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3.
224. Such checks are probably 1 imited to document and baggage
checks, though the language could be used to justify more
intrusive checks.
225. Authorization for deviations in travel plans is required by
Article 15. A proper or justifiable reason presumably subsumes reasons of accident or illness.
However, just what
type of reason would constitute a proper justification ~or
a public security organ, in the absence of specific incidents, would be mere conjecture.
226. To this author, it appears as if the force of the Foreign
National's Act on private residents has been virtually
eliminated by subsequent PRC pronouncements.
In 1979, for
example, foreign press services reported that Chinese contacts with foreigners were being closely monitore by work
units and public security organs, or, in some instances,
were being altogether prohibited. See notes 211 and 212
supra.
In the Soviet Union, it is well-known that prolonged or
unauthorized contact with foreigners may result in administrative, political, or criminal sanctions, though
whether such punitive actions exist under PRC jurisdiction
is not as widely known.
These circulated reports, supra
notes 211 and 212, however, have indicated that Chinese
responses paralleled Soviet ones.
227. See the August 10, 1954 Provisional Rules Governing Travel
of Foreigners, supra note 222, Art. 6.
228. Id., Art. 8.
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229. Article 17 states:
Local public security organs shall, according to the
gravity of the matters involved, give foreign nationals
who violate the provisions of this act punishment in
the form of warning, find, detention, orders to leave
the country within a time limit, expulsion, and so
forth or they shall pursue
these violations for
criminal
responsibility "according
to
law"
[~
falu].
Cases of violation of the prov1s1ons of this act
involving foreign nationals who enjoy diplomatic immunity
shall be handled through diplomatic channels.
(emphasis
added).
230. Pursuant to the Regulations Coverning the Use o.f Weapons
and Arms by the People's Pol ice, only authorized public
security officials are permitted to carry and use weapons
in the PRC.
See "Regulations on Use of Police Weapons,
Arms Issued," FBfs-cHI-80-138 (July 16, 1980), at L4.
See
also "Shanxi Issues Rules on Use of Pol ice Equipmen"'t";""
'FBIS-cHI-81-035 (Feb. 23, 1981), at R5; "Renmin Ribao Comments on Firearms Control," FBIS-cHI-81-099 (May 22, 1981),
at K21; "Guangzhou issues Notice on Personal Weapons,"
FBIS-CHI-81-ll2 (June ll, 1981), at Pl.
The 1957 Public
Security Regulations, Article 9, provide for detention of
less than 5 days, a fine of under 10 yuan or a warning to
those possessing or using guns and ammunition for "sports
or athletic purposes" without govern:nent permission.
See
"1957 Public Security Regulations Published." FBIS-CHI-80039 (Feb. 26, 19i:IO), at L8-15.
231. This information was provided to the author by a cutural
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., on June
28, 1981. Cf. "Official Cited on Transportation Shortcomings." FBIS-cHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl6.
232. See note 168 supra, Art. 7.
233. See note 166 supra, Art. 2(1).
234. Recently, the Chinese eased foreign national travel retrictions.
See "Formalities Simplified for Foreign Tourists,"
FBIS-cHI-82-205 (Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3. Within this article, it was also reported that "foreign travellers may use
their own cars only on the highway between Beijing and
Tianjin.• Id., at Kl4.
It is not clear from this article
which cl a sST es] of foreign traveller [ s] may have his own
car
in the PRC,
although it is known that certain
diploma tic personnel may do so. But cf. "Be ij ing Circular
Bans
Misuse
of
State
Vehicles.• -FBIS-cHI-145
(July
29,1981), at Rl.
235. This information was provided to the author by a culural
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington o.c., on June
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26, 1981. Note that this conflicts with standard international practice regarding diplomatic envoys.
The host
country will usually issue a domestic 1 icense upon presentation of a valid license from the receiving state.
Article 13 of the 1957 Public Security Regulations
calls for "detention of less than 10 days, a fine of under
20 yuan, or a warning" to be issued to "anyone" who, inter
alia, drives a defective motor vehicle, speeds, violates
traffic signs, or drives a motor vehicle without a valid
driver's license.
See "1957 Public Security Regulations
Published," FBIS-cHI-80-039 (Feb. 26, 1980), at L8.
Note that many foreigners, because of the abundance of
bicycles and bicycle accidents and the lack of insurance
law or defined principles of tort liability, prefer to use
PRC-supplied transportation.
236. This information was supplied to the author by a cultural
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington D. C., on June
26, 1981.
237. Id.
Note that the Chinese have set Up a special agency,
the People's Insurance Company of China, to help handle
insurance arrangements pursuant to, inter alia, joint venture contracts.
The establishment of this agency perhaps
portends the eventual promulgation of automobile insurance
regulations.
238. See note 236, supra.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See "1957 Public Security Regulations Published," FBIS-CHI80-039 (Feb 26, 1980), at L8-15.
242. Id., Art. 20.
243. (Sept. 19, 1949].
U.N.T.S. 3.

3 U. S.T.

3008,

T. I.A.S.

No.

2487,

125

244. In 1955, the PRC promulgated numerous decrees on regulations governing urban traffic. See TAO-TAI HSIA, GUIDE TO
SELECTED LEGAL SOURCES OF MAINLAND CHINA 143-44,
224
(1967).
245. See, !!..:..S.·, • Restrictions on Motor Vehicle Noise Issued. •
FBIS-cHI-79-135 (July 12, 1979), at Ll6.
See also note 241
supra, Art. 13.
246. For example, the noise regulations cited id., designate
certain areas where horns may not be blown and generally
limit the maximum amount of horn noise which may emanate
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from a vehicle.
Violations are punishable, though punishment is usually meted out in the form of a fine.
Inspectorate members are vulnerable to repeated harassment for
violations of such restrictions.
247. See Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Arts. 29-31; Consular Convention, supra note 108, Arts. 41-43; UN Convention on Privileges, supra note 115, Sees. 4, 13, 19.
248. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95,
Convention, supra note 108, Art. 34.

Art.

26;

Consular

249. For example, Article 26 of the Diplomatic Convention, supra
note 95, stipulates that freedom of movement shall be
guaranteed to diplomatic personnel "subject to the laws and
regulations [of the receiving state) concerning zones, entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of
national security." The Consular Convention, supra note
108, at Article 34 uses identical language.
250. See the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, TIAS No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295
(Dec. 7, 1944) (Art. 1). The 1919 Paris International Convention for Air Navigation, Art. 1, expresses a similar
principle.
See J. GREENFIELD, CHINA AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA, AIR, AND ENVIRONMENT 188 (1979)
251. PRC Declaration Regarding Territorial Waters, September 4,
1958 cited in 8 Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-Kuo Fa-kuei Huipien [Collection of Laws and Regulations of the PRC), at
112-13. See also GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 188.
Chinese writer Hsu Tun-chang has remarked:
In view of the present highly developed air traffic, it is impermissible for any country to carry
out within its territory or in areas under its effective jurisdiction any activities that encroach
on the erritorial air of other countries or are
detrimental
to their aviation or international
security.
See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at
593.
252. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 596-97. The PRC recently supplemented these regulations with its decision to
implement security checks at airports in order to safeguard
aircraft and passengers."
Airport Security Checks to be
Effective 1 April," FBIS-CHI-81-061 (March 31, 1981), at
L20.
See also "Further Reports on Guangdong Plane Crash:
Safety~easures Strengthened
(announcing new, but unpublished, safety regulations after a crash that killed 104
people. The crash occured under mysterious circumstances,
with rumors that a would-be hijacker blew up the aircraft.
Th~
safety regulations,
therefore, may have
included
tighter security checks).
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253. The Civil Aviation Administration of China is actually
known by the title the General Administration of Civil
Aviation [GACA], which answers to the State Council and has
functions similar to those of the FAA and CAB in the United
States.
It also performs special aviation tasks connected
with commercial aviation.
See Young, The Dragon and the
Eagle -- A Study of u.S. China Relations in Civil Air
Transport, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN COMTEMP.
"ASIAN STUD., No. 3-1979(24), at 58 n.l41.
After the recent reorganization of the State Council,
the GACA did not appear as a separate department under the
executive organ and may have been partly subsumed by the
Ministry of Aviation Industry, although this is not entirely clear.
Cf., American and 20 Others Die in Chinese Air
Crash, N. Y: Times, Dec. 26, 1982, at 13 (Around the
world).
254. GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 191. KIM, supra note 95, at
383-84.
255. KIM, supra note 95, at 385.
Chinese ratification did not
include any reservations. Others authors observed that
With minor exceptions, then, PRC practice does not
diverge from Chic ago Convention pr inc ipl es.
In many ways
the PRC duplicates generally accepted international rules
in its bilatera,l agreements.
The deviations are not unusual
See King and Rossevelt, Civil Aviation
Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 14 HARVARD
INTL. L. J. 316, 322 (1973).
256. The Chicago Convention, supra note 250,
alia, that

stipulates,

inter

Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the
other contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in
international air services, shall have the right, subject to the observance of the terms of the convention,
to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its
territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes
without the necessity of obtaining prior permission,
and subject to the right of the State flown over to
require landing.
Each contracting State nevertheless
reserves the right, for reasons of safety of flight, to
require aircraft desiring to proceed over regions which
are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation
facilities to follow prescribed routes, or to obtain
special permission for such flights. (Art. 5)
The strength of this right of non-scheduled flight is enervated by subsequent provisions.
The Chicago Convention,
Article 9, also provides that:
a)

Each contracting State may, for reasons of military
necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit
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uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying
over certain areas of its territory, provided that
no distinction in this respect is made between the
aircraft of the State whose territory is involved,
engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting
States 1 ikewise involved.
Such prohibited areas
shall be of reasonable extent and location so as
not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation.
b)

Each contracting State, reserves also the right, in
exceptional circumstances or during a period of
emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and
with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or
prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its
territory, on condition that such restriction or
prohibition shall be applicable without distinction
of nationality to aircraft of all other states.

c)

Each contracting State, under such regulations as
it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering
the areas contemplated in subparagraphs (a) or (b)
above to effect a landing as soon as practicable
thereafter at some designated airport within its
territory.

Article 20 requires states to ensure that 311 aircraft have
proper identification markings.
Article 29 obliges states
to ensure that proper documentation-- including radio and
crew 1 icenses passenger and cargo manifests -- be carried
on board. Article 16 explicitly grants the receiving state
the right to search foreign aircraft upon landing and
departure.
257. King and Roosevelt, supra note 255, at 319-22, 322-38.
See
also COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 597-603; GREENFIELD,
supra note 250, at 190-93.
258. See, ~· "AFP:
PRC Declares Hainan 'Danger Zone' for
Planes,• FBIS-cHI-79-162 (Aug. 20, 1979), at Ll3 (PRC
notification was communicated to foreign embassies without
explanation. Speculation as to the reason for the restriction ranged from Chinese mil itray exercises to satellite
recovery); "PRC to Allow Foreign Airlines to Use New Air
Route,• FBIS-cHI-79-140 (July 19, 1979), at L1 (The PRC
opened an air route over Guangzhou, Kunming and Lincang and
designated Guangzhou airport as an emergency landing site
for foreign airlines); "AFP:
PRC Easing Restrictions on
the Hong Kong-Bangkok Air Route,• FBIS-cHI-80-107 (June 2,
1980), at El.
(As of May 15, 1980, the PRC eased an "airspace· ban" it had imposed on a Hong Kong-Bangkok air
corridor.)
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259. King and Roosevelt, supra note 255, at 322.
The third,
fourth and fifth freedoms are known as "commercial freedoms."
They deal with the transportation of passengers and
freight.
The fifth freedom -- unrestricted carriage of
passengers and freight from one foreign country to another
-- is particulary offensive to Chinese sovereignty claims.
See King and Roosevelt, supra note 255, at 320.
The PRC
also has not complied with the Chicago Convention on the
publication of civil aviation statistics (Art. 67).
GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 193.
260. 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, done
Sept. 14, 1963, entered into force Dec. 14, 1969.
The PRC
deposited its accession onNov. 14, 1978.
See generally
"PRC Accedes to International Civil Aviation Conventions,"
FBIS-cHI-80-201 (Oct. 15, 1980), at A2.
261. 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, done Dec. 16, 1970 ~
tered into force Oct. 14, 1971.
The PRC deposited its accession on Oct. 14, 1980.
See PRC AGREEMENTS 1966-80, su~ note 95, at 221. See generally "PRC Accedes to Interi1'a="
tional Civil Aviation Conventions," FBIS-CHI-80-201 (Oct.
15, 1980), at A2.
262. Articles 100 and 103 (dealth penalty for heinolls counterrevolutionary crimes) were involved in the recent publicized hijacking attempt in Shanghai.
See "AFP Reports 11
Oct. Failed Hijack Attempt," FBIS-CHI-82-197
(Oct. 12,
1982), at K8.
263. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 158 (discussing
previous US-USSR proposals on exchanges of information on
civil aviation).
264. H. BERMAN AND P. MAGGS, DISARMAMENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET
LAW 29 (1967).
265. For an example of this pervasive theme in Chinese jurisdiction over territorial waters and surrounding land areas,
see, ~· China's Indisputable Sovereignty Over Xisha and
Nansha Islands,
Beijing Review, No. 6 (Feb. 11, 1980), at
4.
266. See COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 482-89, 474-78.
~
also Cheng, The Law of the Sea in LENG AND CHIU, supra note
101 at 79-114; "Xisha Quandao Designated Restricted Military Zone," FBIS-cHI-82-225 (Nov. 22, 1982), at W5.
267. The rules were promulgated by the State Council on June 28,
1964.
An English translation is found in COHEN AND CHIU,
supra note 4, at 535-38 [hereafter QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULATIONS] ~aiguoji
fei
junyung chuanbo tongquo Qionqzhou
haixia guanli quize, reprinted in Gongan faqui huibian,
supra note 5, at 290.
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268. See PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204.
The recent promulgation by the PRC State Council of regulations governing foreign ships includes, inter alia, chapters on entering and
leaving a port, navigation, carriage of dangerous goods and
punishment for violations.
See "State Council Approves
Regulation on Foreign Ships,"~BIS-cHI-79-188 (Sept. 26,
1979), at Ll.
However, specific prov1s1ons were not
published, nor was any statement rade to the effect that
previous port regulations were thereby abrogated.
It is
presumed, therefore, that the Port Regulations are still
valid.
269. See RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, at 25.
270. See GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 25.
271. Among those ports open to foreign vessels are Shanghai,
Canton, Chankiang, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Chinquangtao and
Dairen.
Id., at 24.
More recently, with the increase in
PRC foreign trade relations, the Chinese have opened additional ports to foreign vessels, including ports along the
Yangtse and the port of Sw.atow.
See, ~· "Eight Chiang
Jiang Ports Opened to Foreign Trade,"
FBIS-CHI-80-077
(April 21, 1980), at L2; · "Wuhu Port Opens to Foreign
Trade," FBIS-CHI-80-091 (May 8, 1980), at A2; "PRC Port of
Swatow to be Designated International Zone," FBIS-CHI-79164 (Aug. 22, 1979), ~t AS.
272. RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, Art. 4.
273. Id., Art. 5; PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 8.
Cf., QIONGZHOU STR~IT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 4.
274. PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 4,6.
275. Id., Art. 6. See also VESSEL REGULATIONS, supra note 168.
276. GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 25 citing the S.S. Zagorsk
Incident. See also COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 4, at 571-72.
278. This is the wording of Article 13 of the RIVER REGULATIONS,
supra note 205.
THE PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204,
however, are somewhat more definitive. "Maritime problems"
along the Chinese cease must be reported within 48 hours.
"Problems" occurring in port must be immediately reported
(Art. 12).
279. QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 10; PORT
REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 7 ( 2); RIVER REGULATIONS,
supra note 205, Art. 8(2). Apparently, the PRC also recognized the common international practice of granting • safe
harbor" to vessels in distress.
See "China Protests Vietnamese Slander of Ship's Encroachment," FBIS-CHI-78-178
(Sept. 13, 1978), at Al2 (PRC Embassy protested the forcible confiscation· of the possessions of PRC fishing boats
which had docked at SRV ports during a typhoon.)
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280. QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 11: PORT
REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 10: RIVER REGULATIONS,
supra note 205, Art. 11.
281. QIONGZHOU STRAIT REGULATIONS, supra note 267, Art. 12.
282. Id.: PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 13: RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, Art. 14.
283. PORT REGULATIONS, supra note 204, Art. 13(1): RIVER REGULATIONS, supra note 205, Art. 14(1).
284. GREENFIELD, supra note 250, at 25, reported that the 1957
Port Regulations precluded seamen from coming ashore, except where necessary and only with prior permission.
The
recent US-PRC Agreement ·on Visas for Crew Members of Aircraft and Vessels, entered into force January 7, 1981,
T.I.A.S. No. 9965, indicatesthe change in the Chinese
position.
The latter agreement granted, gratis, to crew
members of airlines and vessels two-year multiple en tryand-exit visas (on a reciprocal basis).
285. See GREENFIELD, supra note 250,
supra note 4, at 528-87.

at 26-30: COHEN AND CHIU,

286. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 95, Arts. 24, 27(2): Consular Convention, supra note 108, Arts. 33, 35(2).
287. Article 36(2) reads:
The personal baggage of a diplomatic agent shall be
exempt from inspection, unless there are serious grounds
for presuming that it contains articles not covered by the
exemptions mentioned in paragraph 1 [articles for official
or personal use of diplomatic agents or dependents], or
articles the import or export of which is prohibited by the
law or controlled by the quarantine regulations of the
receiving stats • • • •
288. See note 115, supra.
289. Pursuant to Section 13 (f), representatives of members are
accorded the "same immunities and facilities in respect of
their personal baggage as are accorded to members of comparable rank of diplomatic missions.
Section 21 is
narrower in scope, stating that only
the executive head of eac;h specialized agency, including any official acting on his behalf during his absence from duty, shall be accorded in respect of himself, his spouse and minor children, the privileges and
immunities, exemptions and
facilities
accorded
to
diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international
law.
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Note also that, pursuant to the Annexes acceced to by the
PRC, experts of the various specialized agencies (as opposed to
representatives of members or officials) are also accorded similar privileges and immunities. But cf. Section 23 which reads:
Each specialized agency shall cooperate at all times
with the appropriate authorities of member States to
facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure
the observance of pol ice regulations and prevent the
occurrance of any abuses in connection with the privileges, immunities and fac i1 ities mentioned in this
Article.
290. But see Section 5 ·of the ON Convention on Privileges, supra
notell5, which· stipulates that
The property and assets of the specialized agencies,
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by
executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.
(emphasis added).
Where
the
inspectorate
is
an
international
organization, it would appear that both the inanimate cargo
and the means of transporting it--assuring inspectorate
ownership (note the issues arising out of • ownership")would be immunized.
291. ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 151.
292. PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 16, Arts. 79, 84.
See also •Airport Security Checks to be Effective 1 April,"
FBIS-cHI-81-061 (March 31, 1981), at L20 (weapons, explosives, radioactive materials and poisonous chemicals are
prohibited on board aircraft and those endangering public
safety will be turned over to local public security bureaus): •auangzhou Issues Notice. on Personal Weapons,"
FBIS-cHI-81-112 (June 11, 1981), at Pl (public security
organs will sieze personal lethal weapons).
293. See notes 177 and 178, supra.
294. Within the conventions cited, inviolability of the pouch
extends only to •diplomatic documents or articles intended
for official use,• which circumscribes its applicability to
inspectorate cargo.
See Diplomatic Convention, supra note
95, Art. 27(4): ConsUlar Convention, supra note 108, Art.
35(4).
The Consular
Convention's
provision
for
inviolability is not applicable, however, when there is
•serious reason to believe the bag contains something other
than the correspondence, documents or articles referred to
• (Art. 35(3)). .£!.· Diplomatic Convention, Art.
27 ( 4).
295. See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 12, at 152.
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PART III:

LEGAL PROBLEMS DIRECTLY CONFRONTING AN ARMS INSPECTORATE DURING THE COURSE OF VERIFICATION
PROCEDURES

Chapter 6. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
A.

Gathering Information in Light of Chinese Secrecy Laws

From a practical standpoint, Chinese secrecy laws and regulations probably cover almost all items in the PRC which may be
subject to inspection.
Circumvention of these rules will be a
formidable task for inspectorate personnel and one on which the
effectiveness of verification procedures may rest.
Chinese
secrecy laws are pervasive~ their coverage includes party documents, military information and hardware, and state secrets.
Moreover, secrecy laws are generally unavailable in specific
detail, making a thorough examination of their effect on the collection of information in the PRC rather difficult.
Nevertheless, some regulations provide a reference point for determining
the extent to which revision of Chinese secrecy laws is necessary
or the scope of privileges and immunities that inspectorate members would require in order to avoid conflict with the relevant
laws.
In essence, Chinese secrecy laws are embodied in a single
document -- the 1951 Provisional Regulations on Guarding State
Secrets
[hereafter
State
Secrets
Regulations],
which
was
republished in 1980.1 The Regulations emcompass broad categories
of information and are designed to "prevent domestic and foreign
spies, counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs from gathering intelligence, stealing and selling state secrets and [to] prevent all
kinds of personnel from leaking or losing state secrets" (Art.
1).
Article 2 provides a long list of what are referred to as
st~te secrets (guojia jimi), though, in actuality, the listing is
an amalgam of military, foreign diplomacy, economic and public
security secrets. The listing is not further· classified for purposes of handling~ that is, there is no official comment on
whether secret information falls into different security rankings
-- such as "top secret,• "classified," "for official use,• and
the like -- which would presumably be used to characterize the
nature of the information as well as to· determine the proper
sanction to be imposed for disclosing information of different
classifications.2 The Chinese employ the term guojia jimi (state
secrets) to denote various forms of classified government information.
Classification levels do exist, however, although it
appears that they are not publicly acknowledged.3
According
state secrets:

to

Article

2,

the

following

are classified

as

(1)

All national defense and military plans and construction measures~

(2)

Secret information on the authorized strength, destination, actual strength, equipment, stationing,
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movement and deployment of all armed forces units and
on logistics, ordnance, construction and so forth1
(3)

Foreign affairs secrets1

(4)

Public security secrets1

(5)

State financial ·plan, state budget estimate, budget
and final accounts and other financial secrets.

(6)

State banking, trade and customs' plans and banking,
tr.ade and customs' affairs secrets 1

(7)

Secret information about railways, transport, postal
and telecommunications se·rvices;

(8)

Secret information on the country's various economic
construction plans and undertakings1

(9)

Secret information on natural resource surveying,
geological prospecting, meteorological observation
and reporting, geographical surveying and mapping and
so forth1

(10)

Scientific inventions and discoveries, cultural,
educational, public health and medical secrets1

(11)

Secret information on legislative, judicial, procuratorial and control affairs1

(12)

Secret information on nationalities and Overseas Chinese affairs1

(13)

Internal and personnel secrets1

(14)

Files, cipher codes, official seals and all documents, telegrams, letters, data, statistics, figures,
charts,
books and periodicals concerning state
secrets;

(15)

All organs, establishments, warehouses, places and so
forth that have something to do with state secrets1

(16)

All state affairs which have not yet been decided
upon or which have been decided upon but have not yet
been made public1 and

(17)

All other state affairs which ·should be kept secret.

Documents pertaining to "any important meeting• may not be duplicated or kept in personal files without specific approval (Art.
8). Individuals are not permitted to take notes during meetings,
nor reveal what happened during them to outsiders,· including family members. 4 Moreover, the publicizing of conferences is entrusted to those who have received special training in keeping
- 224 -

secrets, and such reports are to· be strictly controlled. 5 Media
services may not publicize or broadcast information touching on
state secrets (Art. 11).
Though this list is hardly a circumscribed one, it has been
augmented by separate military regulations6 and ad hoc miscellaneous restr ictions7 which may prevent the publication of such
items as industrial statistical evidenceS or prevent access to
advanced technological inventions. 9 Foreigners are also effectively denied occasional
access to non-classified material
published in the PRc.lO A noteworthy example is the paucity of
Chinese legal materials that are systematically mailed abroad for
foreign reference.
The PRC also engages in various forms of disinformation:
economic statistics are often exaggerated and published reports
of criminal cases depict only the successes of public security
agencies in apprehending criminals or preventing criminal activity.ll Undoubtedly, these statistics also serve domestic political needs and ideological purposes.
The secrecy syndrome is pervasive in Chinese society, as
by the existence of separate contemporaneous regulations
governin~ the preservation and dissemination of Communist Party
secrets. 2 However, as some authors have indicated, "because of
the peculiar ties between the state and the Party, the two
theoretially distinct systems of secrecy may be treated as one
[under Party control) for many practical purposes.•l3
shown

There is not much publicized information outside China
about the administration of secrecy laws in the PRC, although
almost all PRC government employees and many ordinary Chinese
know of the existence of operative Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
organs which deal with internal security.
Apparently, there are
two CCP organs:
the Confidential Communication Bureau ( j iyaoi!:!.>and the General Office ( bangongting) which cooperate to administer state secrets and their affairs.
The former is mainly
responsible for the dissemination, control, and retrieval of
state secrets materials, while the latter possesses decisionmaking and administration responsibility.l4
There are also few data on the nature of any system of
security clearance for Chinese with access to classified information, although access to secret information depends, at least in
part, on government rank, profession, and loyalty.l5
Despite the lack of any apparent, authorized power to enforce Chinese secrecy laws, public security organs (gonganju)
maintain special operational sections in change of observation,
surveillance and counter-espionage activity.l6
Actually, an elaborate secret police system in the PRC is
superfluous.
There are several organizations which most 1 ikely
participate in intelligence activities, such as military, communications and intelligence depi'rtments within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of
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Public Security and the Ministry of National Defense. PLA forces
actively direct and control border frontier security. Moreover,
the Chinese have worked wonders with mass organizations: by virtue of such regulations as the Provisional Regulations Governing
the Organization of Public Security Committeesl7 special mass
organizations, such as residents' committees ( jumin weiyuanhui)
and the militia, have been established to assist public security
organs in. "preventing traitors, spies, thieves and arsonists and
in eliminating counter-revolutionaries in order to safeguard
state and public security.•lB They are expected to "keep watch
on, inform against • • . report on • . • arrest and turn in~l9
counterrevolutionaries and criminals.
All such intelligence and
quasi-intelligence organizations eventually answer
to Party
leadership.
Faced with numerous ~ntelligence-gathering groups with
overlapping functions, arms inspectorate personnel should probably be prepared for a significant degree of surveillance during
the course of their official operations and in their personal
lives. The extent to which the various committees, agencies and
organizations participate in monitoring inspectorate activities
will likely depend on how much sensitive information will be made
available to inspectorate personnel and how strong the Chines.e
commitment to effective arms inspection pol icy is.
The Soviet
Union· provides an interesting example of potential conflict
between foreigners and intelligence organizations.
Presumably,
official inspectorate functions, like official foreign diplomatic
functions in the Soviet Union, are monitored by official Soviet
military, communications and KGB representatives, often using
sophisticated equipment.
Additionally, the KGB engages in more
subtle forms of intelligence-gathering operations, including the
use of Soviet "plants" who are directed to monitor the more personal social activities of diplomatic agents, often entrapping
them into compromising situations which the Soviet eventually use
to discredit the agent and possibly the organization or country
he represents.20
The potentially analogous response of Chinese intelligence
organizations toward inspectorate personnel should not be anticipated. ·First, Chinese technology may not yet permit the kind of
close electronic surveillance of foreign operations usually associated with the KGB and the CIA.
Second, PRC intelligence
operations do not appear to be vested in a single agency with
overall control of security activities.
The number of Chinese
intelligence agencies involved in inspectorate operations will be
based on temporal factors and perceptions of intrusiveness:
inspectorate per·sonnel can expect to be monitored more closely
during the incipiency of arms inspection verification procedures
and at time when the scope of operations extends to the more
clandestine features of Chinese military and economic life.
Nevertheless, absent a pervasive paranoia of foreignintelligence operations in the PRC, it is unlikely that the PRC
would mobilize the full array of surveillance mechanisms to monitor inspectorate personnel.
Public security committees, for example, are mainly comprised of ordinary Chinese citizens who
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would probably not have access to inspectorate installations and
inspection sites. The Chinese authorities themselves would probably wish to limit the involvement of domestic security agents in
order to permit the expeditious and ,centralized handling of intelligence information on inspectorate personnel and to avoid
overlapping and continual surveillance that could make the entire
range of inspectorate operations dysfunctional.
The value of civilian security forces, if any, to the PRC
exists in their potential use to frustrate the aims of inspection
operations or to hinder verification procedures -- goals the Chinese are unlikely to strive for if they are truly committed to an
arms control arrangement.
Chinese secrecy legislation is very much the product of PRC
concern for the preservation and protection of its sovereignty.
Chinese protectiveness is conveyed in the PRC Criminal Code,
which provides for very broadly defined acts of counterrevolution, the category of Chinese criminal activity wich subsumes
crimes against the state. Pursuant to article 97:
Those committing espionage or supporting the
enemy in the following manner will be sentenced to impr isonrnent of no less than 10
'years or life imprisonment; in less serious
cases, they will be sentenced to fixed-term
imprisonment of not less than 5 and not more
than 10 years:
1.
2.
3.

Stealing, spying and supplying information to the enemy;
Supplying
arms
or other
military
materials to the enemy; and
Joining a secret service or espionage
organization or receiving orders from
the enemy.

This antiespionage provision is supplemented by Article 91:
Offenders colluding with foreign countries and conspiring to jeopardize the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the motherland will be sentenced to
life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not
less than 10 years.
Terms such as "espionage" and "colluding with foreign
countries" are never adequately defined elsewhere in the PRC
Criminal Code. Consequently, they are subject to the unilaterial
determination fo the PRC, a fact hardly advantageous to inspectoate operations.
Nevertheless, there are factors which tend to
mitigate the severity and applicability of these provisions on
inspection activities.
First, Article 91 addresses offenders who collude with foreign countries:
this provision would cover an adversary arms
inspectorate but may not be applicable to an arms inspectorate
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with the status of an international organization.
Since the PRC
has gone on record as recognizing that ~various kinds of international organizations • • • are a form of international cooperation,~21 an international inspectorate organization would not, by
definition, be considered to be a foreign country or an affiliate
of a foreign country. 22 In fact, Chinese participation in such
an international body would arguably preclude any consideration
that the inspectorate is even a foreign entity.
The second part of Article 91 may be argued away somewhat
more subtly. Conceivably, conspiring to threaten the motherland
may be regarded as a crime regardless of the status of the inspectorate.
But, reading the second clause in pari materia with
the first and according legal force to the conjunctive "and,•23
it would appear that the offender is guilty of a crime against
the state only to the extent· he both colludes with a foreign
country and conspires to jeopardize the PRC.
In effect, this
confines the applicability of Article 91 to agents of foreign
states and renders the provision nugatory when the arms control
arrangement calls for the collection of information on behalf of
a n0n-governmental international inspectorate.
The provisions of Article 97 are also somewhat narrowly
formulated, for they are addressed to the transfer of certain
types of information to the enemy ( diren).
By signing an arms
control agreement, the· Chinese do riOt necessarily relinquish
their right to perceive other parties to the agreement as enemies
in the ideological sense of the word, but it is hardly 1 ikel y
that the PRC would perceive the official acts of, inspectors -pursuant to an agreement voluntarily executed by the Chinese
government -- to be clandestine covers for parasitic deeds of
espionage, designed to transfer damaging information to enemy
forces.24
Article 97 also creates criminal responsibility for "stealing" and "spying."
However, information collected and transferred by inspectorate agents as part of their official operations would be disclosed by the PRC pursuant to self-executing
danestic legislation. As such, it would be ludicrous to associate official inspectorate acts with the more reprehensible notions of • stealing" and "spying."
"An inspector doing what is
permitted (and in fact required) under one portion of [Chinese]
law could hardly be convicted for spying under another portion of
the same law."25
Of course, the provisions of article 91 and 97 would be
applicable to the collection and transfer of information outside
the scope of the agreement. For this reason, inspectors would be
well-advised to keep abreast, where possible, of operative Chinese domestic legislation regarding secret information.
If, for
example, one assumes that later domestic legislation would overrule prior treaty law, the"n the potential for a scenario in which
inspectors are accused of collecting and transferring information
previously declassified but subsequently classified by a Chinese
legislative act increases dramatically.
·
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In order to suggest a sound approach to handling the collection and transfer of information by an inspectorate in ·1 ight
of Chinese secrecy and espionage laws, the more practical aspects
of Chinese protectiveness must be considered.
It is unlikely
that the PRC could be compelled to amend presently existing
secrecy laws and regulations to exclude official inspectorate
acts and it is unrealistic to assume that the PRC would refuse to
introduce subsequent domestic legislation taking certain types of
information out of the reach of inspectors.
Rather, the best
approach is to address the problem
in light of existing
circumstances.
Because it is essential to grant inspectorate personnel
sufficient protection from Chinese criminal jurisdiction in the
collection and transfer of information, the most appropriate
vehicle for accomplishing this would be to grant to an inspectorate a "privilege to gather in specified ways particular kinds of
information (traditionally, security information) essential to
the inspection mission •
. coupled with a full immunity from
arrest and criminal process.n26 This approach avoids the potential problems of a mere grant of full immunity from criminal process which insulates an inspector from liability for criminal
conduct but does not provide him with a privilege to engage in
any course of marginally criminal conduct.
Though this last
statement may ostensibly appear to be a semantic splitting of
hairs, its significance is not lost in the course of delicate
negotiations with the PRC on sensitive topics such as sovereignty
and espionage.
Essentially, a grant of immunity from liability
for criminal conduct would protect an inspector in the event he
violated criminal rules; it is in no way intended. to grant him
license routinely to engage in a course of conduct in direct contravention of applicable criminal statutes.
In this manner, the
grant of immunity would not preclude the PRC from taking preventive measures to impede, if not to halt, inspectorate operations
concerned with the collection of sensitive information where they
are considered to skirt the border of counterrevolutionary activity.
However, the grant of a privilege to engage in 1 imited
acts of information collection is an ·admission by the PRC that
certain activities fall outside the scope of criminal statutes
and are thereby permissible.
Naturally, the Chinese would be expected to maintain as
much control over the collection of information as possible and
to prevent inspectorate intrusions into areas of more sensitive,
classified materials.
Therefore, the PRC can be expected to
spell out the requisite privileges and immunities 1n careful
detail and to narrowly define permissible inspection procedures
in order to keep the collection and transfer of information
limited to appropriate declassified material and to prevent
verification techniques from falling within the ambit of culpable
counterrevolutionary (espionage) activity.
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B)

Observation by Direct Access, Photography and
Sampling Restrictions

Certain areas and faciliites in the PRC are off limits to
foreigners.27 Access to other installations is often restricted
and requires the direct permission of Chinese governmental organs
and a complement of official Chinese escorts before foreigners
will be permitted to visit these locations.
There do not exist
in the PRC any general regulations covering access to restricted
areas.
Rather, general guidelines are conveyed directly to foreign states through diplomatic channels, indirectly through press
releases of policy directives,2B or peripherally through provisions governing the entrance, exit and domestic travel restrictions of foreigners.
In their study of the Soviet Union, Zile, Sharlet and Love
published the more significant rules concerning frontier security
areas and the effect on inspectorate operations of, inter alia,
Soviet KGB background investigations of foreign visitors prior to
entry into these restricted areas.29 An examination of analogous
regulations in the PRC yields .less definitive conclusions on the
handling of foreign access to and through frontier security
areas.
First, although border belts exist in the PRC, Chinese
officials have acknowledged _that there are inconsistencies in
width among those belts, some of which are the result of ongoing
disagreements with India (in southwestern China) and with the
Soviet Union (in northeast China).30 There is currently no uniform specified width for restricted border belt areas, although
inspectorate personnel are advised that they do exist and that
traffic into and out of these areas is strictly regulated.
Available Chinese codified regulations do not indicate the existence of any restricted frontier areas which are absolutely inaccessible to foreigners, but they do exist, particularly in the
heavily industrialized northeast region borderng the Soviet
Union,31 which is likely to have many restricted installations.
Essentially, foreign access through frontier security areas
is re_qulated by the 1965 Act on the Frontier Defense Inspection,3"2 which, in its most general terms, requires personnel to
pass through frontier defense inspection stations, many of which
are manned by PLA trooops.33 The administration of this Act is
based largely on the Chinese passport/visa system, which permits
travel in and out of the PRC only with valid, stamped passports.
However, there is no indication in the Act whether different sectors may adopt different security measures, nor is there any
reference to specific penalties for violations of frontier
restrictions beyond a general provision calling for handling
violators "according to law" in light of the "actual circumstances of the matters involved."34
There is no provision which
would, in effect, prevent Chinese frontier inspection agents from
engaging in the type of time-consuming, disruptive security
checks on individual foreigners entering or leaving the PRC. 35
For this reason alone,
a specific grant of immunity from this
form of administrative jurisdiction for inspectors is essential
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in order to expedite inspection operations and prevent the possibility of splitting the inspectorate team at the border areas.
Once inside the PRC, access to spec i fie installations and
facilities becomes an entirely different matter.
There are no
specific published rules in the PRC which directly address this
issue.
Chinese practice, however, provides some indication of
what procedures are presently implemented.
The question of access to a particular Chinese facility may be a secondary issue.
The first priority may be for inspectors to obtain the proper
documents to visit the general locus of the installation.
That
is, certain cities, towns, and other areas are restricted; foreigners wishing to visit them are required to obtain the permission of appropriate (provincial) public security org_ans pursuant
to the Foreign National's Act discussed earlier. 36
Access to
installations within these areas would be handled separately and,
in many instances, by other departments.
Direct access into otherwise classified security facilities
may be obtained only with the permission of the Chinese government.
According to State Department sources, the most likely
installations requiring special permission are defense facil ities, factories, economic installations, scientific and research
institutes, government department and educational institutions.37
The procedure for obtaining special permission is initiated
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
However, permission is
often not received '.mless the visit has also been approved by
other cninistr ies and agencies.
The number of depart:."'llents involved and the problems of securing permission vary depending on
the nature of the visit.
An inspection of a classified industrial facility, for example, would require the permission of
-- at the very least -- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Ministry of National Defense and the machine building ministry
directly in charge of the installation.38
Effective inspection operations require a more streamlined
procedure.
From the standpoint of the PRC, the present procedure
of hierarchical approval would invariably preclude surprise inspection operations, though this is mitigated somewhat by the
likelihood that large-scale Chinese facilities "could not be hidden,
nor could
their
activities be
transformed
on short
notice.•39 The first step in ~ecuring an alternative procedure
requires
cooperation
among
inspectorate
personnel,
Chinese
governmental organs, and those directly in charge of the installations in question.
A reasonable suggestion might begin with a
careful examination of the facilities to be inspected and the
most feasible domestic routes to travel in order to reach them.
Prior arrangements can be made between the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and any other appropriate ministries and agencies and
local public security organs to expedite travel to the facility.
Permission to enter the facility might issue from the State Council, which, as the organ responsible for supervising PRC ministries, would thereby circumvent the present process of multiple
approval.
In order to protect Chinese interests in classified
security areas, permission to enter could perhaps "provide for
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conditional access to 'reasonable times' or with 'prior notification' • • • • n40 The key to a workable arrangement with respect
to inspectorate access to restricted PRC installations is to
forestall procedures which appear to the Chinese to be overly
disruptive, for at such times the Chinese can be expected to
muster a full array of legally justifiable bureaucratic impediments to interfere with or prevent proper inspection procedures.
Chinese restr icti.ons regarding photography are somewhat
less severe than those of the Soviet Union, but, at least in
principle, they extend to both aerial and ground photography.
With respect to aerial photography, the PRC Flight Rules Governing Foreign Civil Aircraft41 do not directly address the issue of
overflight photography at all.
However, the rules do stipulate
that passengers and crews must abide by Chinese laws, decrees and
regulations.
Though there are apparently no specific legal prohibitions against aerial photography, the PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs does communicate photography restrictions to foreign
governments.42 However, enforcement apparently varies, depending
on the nature of the flight and the air corridor used.
For example, Chinese officials at the PRC Embassy in Washington, D.C.
asserted that panoramic photographs of industrial cities are prohibited.43 Yet, a State Department official reported that he had
photographed Chinese territory from an airplane in flight over
Beijing (Peking).44
For national security reasons, it may be
assumed that overflight photographs of military installations,
fuel storage facilities, harbors, rail road and highway bridges,
large industrial enterprises, electric power stations, radio stations and telephone exchange complexes are forbidden.
However,
it is unlikely that inspectorate personnel would be faced with
many of the practices engaged in by the Soviet Union to inhibit
observation, such as seating foreigners in windowless sections of
airplanes, rerouting the airplane or conducting rough landings
and takeoffs. 45
Though the PRC has decried superpower contention in outer
space, 46 the Chinese have heretofore refrained from significant
participation in treaties and resolutions governing the law of
outer space. This is not to say that the PRC has not proffered a
position on the rules concerning activities in outer space.
In
fact, Chinese writer Liu Tse-yung has stated:
Although cosmic space does not belong to
the sovereignty of any State, international
law does not allow the breach of international
peace,
the
infringement of the
sovereignty
of
other
States
or
the
threatening of the security of other States
from any direction ( including space of any
altitude).
Cosmic space can only be used
for
peaceful
and
scientific
purposes;
otherwise regardless of whether or not a
State has prescribed the altitude of its
airspace, it has the right to take all
necessary measures for self defense against
any threat • . • • 47
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The PRC has recently participated in discussions of the UN
Outer Space Committee48 and has expresed its commitment to the
utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes,49 but it has
not actively supported the principles of Resolution 196250 or the
Outer Space Treaty.Sl Moreover, despite rabid Chinese denunciations of the Soviet handling of the Cosmos 954 crash in Canada,52
the PRC has also repudiated any obligations under the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects. 53
At the heart of the Chinese position on the use of outer
space is the issue of whether the PRC considers the activities of
intelligence-gathering satellites to be legally justifiable.
The Chinese do have a number of their own satellites in
orbit and others on the way,54 but their lauchings and purposes
are enveloped in secrecy. The PRC has neither denounced nor supported the use of satellites for the collection of intelligence
information over the territory of foreign nations, though it
would be advisable that an inspectorate not accept Chinese silence as the equivalent of acquiescence in such a principle.
Presumably, the most recent official Chinese statement, calling
for cooperation in the "peaceful utilization" of outer space,
would preclude PRC approval of the intelligence-gathering operations of the satellites of individual nations. The PRC is likely
to perceive such operations as unilateral efforts to obtain military advantages.
However, whether the Chinese would support the
collection of intelligence by inspectorate satellites -- particularly where the inspectorate was established as an international
organization-- or whether the PRC would sanction satellites use
for the collection of intelligence data by an adversary inspectorate -- when the purpose was to promote peace through compliance with a arms control agreement -- is simply a matter of
speculation. An inspectorate, therefore, is well-advised to formulate narrow inspection procedures and to require strict noninterference by Chinese authorities in aerial photography for
inspection purposes.
Ground photography in the PRC is a somewhat different matter though photographic restrictions are often erratically enforced. Ostensibly, ground photography restrictions are embodied in
provisions of statutes controlling the movement of foreigners in
the PRC.
The Oiongzhou Strait Re~ulations,SS the Port Regulations56 and the River RegulationsS all contain provisions prohibiting photographing or sketching while in restricted areas.58
It might be contended that the severity of these provisions has
been emasculated by time and by changes in Chinese attitudes toward forei~ners. The recently reissued 1957 Public Security Regulations,S
however, seem to breathe new life into domestic
photography restrictions. Article 7 of the Regulations calls for
detention of less than 3 days, a fine of under 6 yuan, or a warning to be meted out to anyone "taking pictures, surveying and
drawing maps in areas where picture-taking, surveying and mapdrawing are prohibited • . . • • Presumably, negatives or sketches
of restricted areas or installations will be confiscated, though
there are no explicit provisions to this effect.
Additionally,
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the PRC has recently denied foreigners the freedom to use 16mm.
cameras without special permission from the Ministry of Fore1gn
Affairs, or, if for commercial purposes, from the China Film
Corporation. GO
Since in spec tor ate photographic operations will pr ed om inantly cover military installations and equipment, and since
military installations and equipment are 1 ikely to be among the
items prohibited from being photographed, it would be advisable
for an inspectorate to obtain a special privilege granting it the
right to take ground photographs of structures and articles
within the scope of official inspection functions.
It may also
be feasible that the photographic privilege extend only to certain relevant inanimate objects.
The latter suggestion provides
the Chinese with two advantages.
First, it promotes justifiable
Chinese protectiveness of the identity of key military, scientific and technical personnel.
Second, by eliminating any peripheral landscape photography, the PRC is able to preserve the
concealed locations of its more secret installations (such as
those hidden in the mountainous regions of the northeast).
In addition to photographic restrictions, an inspectorate
should be aware of the potential for problems surrounding the
procurement of samples of natural resources or raw materials.
The issue is essentially a legal one, since in effect, acquisition of samples would constitute a taking cognizable under property law principles.
The issue is made a good deal simpler in
the PRC where most relevant property, including military, nuclear
and research facilities, is state-owned.
There are precedents for state ~takings" in Chinese law.
Under the 1982 PRC Constitution,Gl the state can, when in the
public interest, "take over land for its use in accordance with
the law" (Art. 10). Other statutes embellish on state authorized
"takings."
For example, the PRC Environmental Protection Law62
implicitly provides for the taking and sampling of food products
to ensure that sanitary standards are met. The 1979 Standardization Regulations63 provide, inter alia, for the "checking and
accepting of raw and other mater 1al s and i terns produced by
cooperating units [and) examination of semifinished and finished
products"
(Art.
20)
and
for "quality supervision"
through
"scheduled or unscheduled product quality inspections~ (Art. 27).
Moreover, the PRC has recently publicized the existence of a
draft food hygiene law64 and quarantine regulations,65 the provisions of which would presumably permit authorized government inspectors to
examine and/or
withdraw
inferior
or
infected
products.
Thus, it is simply a question of coupling a state-granted
privilege of access to such areas with a right to obtain samples
of property under state control.
This latter privilege should
probably be combined with an immunity from administrative,
economic, or even criminal liability that may result pursuant to
provisions of the 1979 PRC Environmental Protection Law66 and the
1979 Forestry Act. 67
The Environmental Protection Law encompasses, inter alia, the air, water, land, mineral resources,
234 -

forests, grasslands, wild plants and animals, acquatic life, and
scenic spots (Art. 3).
Each of these resources is to be protected from damage and rationally utilized (Art. 2; Arts. 10-15).
Relatively minor violations of these provisions may result
in administrative penalties as well as an obligation to compensate the state fo:: losses (Art. 32, par a. 1) •
Serious violations, including pollution or ecological damage, which cause personal injury, death or heavy resources loss, may result in administrative, economic or even criminal culpability (Art. 32,
para. 2).68 Moreover, Article 9 stipulates hat the Environmental
Protection Law, as well as other environmental regulations, apply
to "[a]ll foreign nationals and foreign aircraft, vessels, vehicles, materials and living beings entering or transiting the territorial land, waters and airspaces of China. .
"
The Forestry Act is, in effect, a more circumscribed environmental protection law, intended, inter alia, to protect
"damage to forest trees, roads, rivers or engineering facilities
which serve forestry . • • . "
(Art. 2l(a)).
Restitution for losses or fines (Art. 39) are among the penal ties for such violations as "entering forest areas without authorization to procure
lumber . • . "
(Art. 39(5)) or "illegally taking lumber or falling trees .
" (Art. 39 ( 6)).
Serious violations may create
criminal responsibility (Art. 40).69
Unquestionably, f ai lure to obtain an immunity from such
provisions would permit administrative or possibly physical
interference with inspectorate personnel and operations.
In
negotiating for such an immunity, the parties to an arms control
agreement must consider the historical protectiveness of the PRC
over its natural resources. 70
It is unlikely that the Chinese
will part easily with a full grant of immunity, particularly
where major environmental consequences may result.
However,
since sampling and testing procedures should not greatly interfere with the ecological balance or environmental resources, perhaps the only requirement would be recognition of, and sensitivity to, Chinese concern for natural resource protection.
In light
of this, a sensible approach may be to offer the PRC a quid 12.£.9.
~·
In return for such immunity, the arms control agreement may
formally stipulate procedures for, and amounts of, compensation?!
for ecological damage caused by sampling or testing or it may
even provide for restitution simply on the basis of the "taking"
principle
without
regard
for
any
possible damage
to
the
environment.
Chapter 7.

THE INTERROGATION OF ~FFICIAL AND PRIVATE CHINESE
CITIZENS AND THE PROCUREMENT OF EVIDENCE
A)

The Interrogation of Chinese Officials

There do not appear to be any authoritative regulations
restricting
contacts
between Chinese officials
and
foreign
citizens, 72 though, from a practical standpoint, such contacts
are inevitably linked to official functions and are usually initiated and executed only through circumscribed and carefully
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supervised channels.
In effect, these channels operate at almost
every level of Chinese life.
By virtue of pervasive state control, everything from social enterprises to high-level governmental organs are considered to be "official" state institutions.
The effect of this is twofold.
First, it creates a large number
of "official" personnel, whose dealings with foreigners will thus
be conducted through formal channels.
Second, the omnipresence
of official positions at every level of Chinese life reduces the
potential for personal, unsupervised contact. ~lthough this construction of officialdom is no doubt advantageous to the protection of PRC interests, the obstacles thereby created for foreign
interrogation procedures are considerable.
The need to interrogate Chinese officials to collect relevant data for inspection operations depends on the comprehensiveness of the arms control agreement.
It is 1 ikely, however, that
any inspection operation will generate the requirement of collecting information from oral statements and evidence provided by
Chinese authorities.
In this respect, inspectorate agents can
encounter two interrelated sets of problems.
The first involves
the issue of what may be termed "authoritative voice."
Certain
officials either refuse to speak on behalf of the Chinese government or are not empowered to do so.
In fact, the bureaucratic
chain of command in the PRC .is itself a obstructive force to inspectorate operations.
Bureaucratism in the PRC, in fact, fauses
shocking amounts of waste.
National politics and national
security are, of course, sensitive and serious matters, and it is
a recognized principle in both domestic and international relations that only certain persons speak with a sufficiently authoritative voice to communicate official government positions on
various issues.
Nevertheless, inspectorate personnel
should
realize that this principle applies strongly to the PRC.
As
such, formal interrogations of many PRC officials would be timeconsuming and potentially futile since the Chinese government
would not itself be bound by their statements and since these
officials may not in fact be competent to answer such inquiries.
The second problem is more formidable.
Simply stated, Chinese secrecy laws are so broad and so pervasive that they constitute the single most obstructive legal hindrance to effective
inspection operations.
In effect, they bar Chinese officials
from divulging many types of information, violations of which are
usually punishable as counterrevolutionary crimes73__ crimes
similar to treasonable activities in other countries. The secrecy laws do not convey the full array of disciplinary and criminal
penalties available to enforce those laws.
However equivocal
these provisions are by their textual ambiguities, they unmistakably punish improper conduct by state officials with respect to
state secrets.
The magnitude of this issue cannot be ignored.
The 1982 PRC Constitution, for example, refers to the obligation
to protect state secrets no less than four times. 74 Article 186
of the PRC Criminal Code declares that
In grave cases, any state functionary who
developed
important
state
secrets
in
violation of state security regulations
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will be sentenced to detention or impr isonment for not more than 7 years or subjected to deprivation of political rights.
In contrast with such provisions directly applicable to
those who divulge state secrets, there are also more oblique
clauses -- oblique in the sense that they do not directly punish
the communication of secrets.
Rather, they are designed to deter
verbal cooperation with those not privy to the same information.
For example, Article 131 of the PRC CRiminal Code protects "the
citizen's personal and democratic rights and other rights against
unlawful infringement." Article 146 punishes a state functionary
who "abuses his power."
Article 145 punishes anyone who
"seriously insults another person by force or other means . . . . "
Somewhat more peripherally, Article 138 states that " [ i) t is
strictly forbidden to bring false charges against the cadres and
masses by any means whatsoever.•75
In addition to criminal provisions, the military76 and Party regulations 7 7 enforce a system of disciplinary penalties ranging from demotion and dismissal to criminal punishment for
serious violations in communicating national secrets.
The purpose of these laws and regulations is not only to
Chinese protectiveness of its sovereignty and national
security but also to foster a sense of individual circumspection
in communicating official information in personal encounters with
foreign personages.
Although this will not make renegotiating
for broad inspectorate interrogatory powers any simpler, it at
least indicates the nature and historical roots of Chinese attitudes toward secrecy.
Foreign negotiators may thereby gain
greater sensitivity to Chinese thought and action.
Such sensitivity, in turn, may stretch a long way in securing PRC
concessions.
promot~

In their chapter on the interrogation of Soviet officials
by an arms inspectorate, Harold Berman and Peter Maggs78 examined
the scope of the questions that soviet officials were permitted
to answer.
Their analysis extended to the Soviet procedure for
letters rogatory, a recognized international practice which calls
for specific answers to questions posed by other countries. 79
Soviet procedure included the right not to respond to questions
that might "infringe upon the 'safety or security'
of the
USSR.•BO Similar limitations were found in the Soviet Civil Procedure Code, which stipulated that Soviet courts should execute
commissions of foreign judicial agencies except, inter alia,
where
they
threatened
the
security
or
contradicted ----rti"e
sovereignty of the Soviet Union.Bl
Significantly, there are no explicit equivalent Chinese
procedures or provisions.
In fact, the only available recent
information on the impact of foreign judicial decisions on Chinese entities is found in Chinese commercial trade practices.
It
has been reported that, although the PRC is not a member of
international conventions for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards, Chinese corporations will observe foreign arbitral awards
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"so long as they are fair
and policies." 82

and. not in violation of Chinese laws

As Zile, Sharlet and Love had indicated with respect to the
Soviet Union, domestic organs enjoy broad interrogatory powers,
within the limits of their competence, designed to facilitate
internal interests. 83 A number of Chinese agencies are accorded
such interrogatory powers.
For instance, under the 1982 PRC Constitution, special committees of inquiry appointed by the National People's Congress ( NPC) and its Standing Commit tee -- committees likely to be established to address extraordinary inspectorate issues -- have the power to secure the information necessary
for their investigations from "all organs of state, public organizations and citizens . . • . •84
Under the PRC Criminal Procedure Code,85 "each and every unit and individual has the duty
to surrender as required by a people's procuratorate or public
security organ, material and documentary evidence which may prove
the accused to be guilty or not guilty" (Art. 80). Article 86 of
the same Code requires a witness to "produce evidence and give
testimony.n86
In fact, a basic tenet of the Chinese criminal justice system -- leniency toward confessors and severity to those who resist87 -- presupposes the right of procuratorial organs to· secure
information tending to prove the guilt of an accused.
These broad powers have been extended to cover various
forms of interrogation of foreign entities by Chinese departments.
Under the Joint Venture Income Tax Law,88 for exa'llple,
t:~x authorities "have the right to investigate the financial affairs, account books and tax situations of any joint venture.
The joint vent~re must make reports according to the facts and
provide all relevant infor:nation and shall not conceal the facts
or refuse to cooperate" (Art. 12).
Implicitly, such interrogatory powers are granted to the PRC's Labor f1anagement Department
which~ pursuant to the Joint Venture regulations on Labor Management,i:l9 has the power to "supervise and inspect" the implementation of labor protection and safety regulations in joint venture
operations (Art. 13).90
To protect and preserve the objectives for which an inspection arrangement is implemented, an arms inspectorate would undoubtedly require Chinese officials to reveal needed information.
To circumvent PRC secrecy laws and potential criminal liability
for cooperative Chinese officials, an inspection arrangement
ought to stipulate for 1) declassification of certain types of
information or of all documents contained in a given zone, or 2)
adequate personal immunity from disciplinary and criminal penalties for Chinese officials divulging information for inspection
purposes.91
Though either alternative would be effective, it
would be less probable that the PRC would relinquish its control
over its own government agents through a grant of immunity,
since, despite the loyalty of its personnel, this choice may be
perceived as a license to engage in counterrevolutionary activity. The declassification alternative, on the other hand, permits
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greater Chinese control over the· type of information that may be
divulged and who may divulge it.
B)

The Interrogation of Chinese Civilians

Traditional orientation in the PRC has emphasized and encouraged official, organized contacts between PRC representatives
and foreigners.
Chinese authorities, until very recently, have
mistrusted thoroughly foreign influences on the rudiments of Chinese society. The pages of the Chinese press have been the forum
for articles calling on the Chinese to preserve their "national
dignity and prestige", to avoid "worshipping foreign things" and
to distinguish between • flagrant [sic) followers and poisonous
weeds."92 Complete freedom in dealing with foreigners is simply
not an aspect of private life in the PRC, and it appears that,
despite increased contacts with foreign countries, Chinese authorities do not seek actively to expunge the pervasive suspicion
of foreigners or to erase the sense of secrecy which they have so
carefully instilled in the Chinese people.
In light of this, it is hardly unusual that so great a segment of the PRC pouplation is precluded from substantial contact
with foreign individuals and so much international communication
is conducted through formal channels.
In the absence of any compelling reason for particular extraordinary instances of interrogation of private individuals, it is unlikely that an ar~s inspectorate need request specific procedures for ~ollecting information from private Chinese citizens.
As Zile, Sharlet and Love
have so succinctly stated with respect to the Soviet Union,
which, by virtue of similar forms of state control, is equally
applicable to the PRC:
The power to interrogate private individuals
should not be necessary •
. , nor should it be
requested.
It should not be necessary because,
in the absence of relevant private enterprise,
the role of the private individual as a source
of firsthand
information is negligible.
It
should not be sought because it implies a mistrust between the individual
. citizen and
his class state and would, ther·efore, be intolerable in the [Chinese] system.93
Private citizens communicating information to foreigners flirt
with criminal liability under the.articles pertaining to counterrevolutionary activity in the PRC Criminal Code. Though there is
no statistical evidence on how often this aspect of law is applied to private individuals, one recent celebrated case indicates the severity with which private acts of counterrevolution
are treated.
In 1979, political dissident Wei Jingsheng was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment and deprived of his political rights for an additional three years for having "betrayed the
country by supplying a foreigner with military intelligence,•94
including "the names of commanders of the Chinese units engaged
in the action [in the Chinese self-defense counterattack against
Vietnam in 1979], the number of troops, the developments of the
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battle and the number of casualties.95 Both the sentence imposed
on Wei and the publicity surrounding the trial96 may well have
been deliberately desiged to deter similar future activities.97
In addition to counterrevolutionaray provisions, Chinese
citizens are also subject to more oblique laws which reduce contacts with foreigners, such as those punishing violations of
monetary and foreign exchange regulations. 98
In the context of
these provisions and Chinese practice, it seems unreasonable to
assume that private individuals would be willing to cooperate, or
that they would be permitted to freely associate, with inspectorate personnel.· In view of Chinese procedures for handling foreign communications through official channels, however, private
contacts would be of marginal utility to inspectors.
C)

Legal Procedure Surrounding Interrogation

Since the decision to interrogate Chinese officials or private citizens, no matter how minimal such interrogation is, would
profoundly affect the system of secrecy in the PRC and the notion
of the exclusiveness of Chinese legal procedure, an arms control
arrangement must adequately describe the place and manner of
interrogating Chinese respondents.
interrogation procedures can be either informal or formal.
The former is probably more desirable, both from the standpoint
of minimal offensiveness to the autonomy of the Chinese judiciary
and in reducing the number of present legal obstacles to the formation of a separate and distinct inspectorate interrogatory
body.
However, informal interrogation has two distinct disadvantages.
First, informality breeds indifference.
For inspectorate operations, which will often be of limited duration in any
particular country, dispatch in the collection of information is
crucial. The lack of coercive legal tactics-- such as contempt
proceedings -- ·creates a risk that Chinese non-cooperation will
not result in serious consequences and may reduce interrogation
to a painstakingly futile and dilatory exercise. Second, effective informal interrogation procedures wuld require the complete
cooperation of Chinese respondents, an assumption which, in light
of secrecy laws and counterrevolutionary provisions of the PRC
Criminal Code, is probably unrealistic,
if not,
in fact,
incorrect.
Formal interrogation procedures face equally formidable
obstacles.
First, there is a question of the status of the inspectorate entity and its concomitant interrogatory powers. The
PRC 's latest disarmament proposal supports some form of international body that would monitor verification.99 Some authors contend that an international inspectorate with interrogatory powers
would be less objectionable than an adversary one.lOO
Though
this may be quite logical and somewhat self-evident, the larger
question is whether the Chinese would support any abdication of
sovereign power in favor of· an autonomous interrogatory body ..
From a practical standpoint, the question is almost rhetorical.
The most salient feature of the Chinese international position is
the concept of sovereignty and equality.lOl Almost any activity
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of an inspectorate may impinge bpon this sacred principle, and
undoubtedly any delegation of basic governmental powers (e.g.,
judicial
or
~uasi-judicial
powers)
would
add
to
the
offensiveness.lO
Although the 1982 PRC Constitution authorizes the establishment of special committees of inquiry at the behest of the
National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, there are
numerous legal impediments to the establishment of a separate
inspectorate interrogatory body with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers, though they are ostensibly not as extensive as those in
the Soviet Union.l1l3
By virtue of Article 104 of the 1982 PRC
Constitution, the Supreme People's Court, local people's courts,
military courts and other special people's courts exercise judicial authority, though the provision is couched in terms less
direct than those of the 1978 Constitution.l04
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Organic law of the People's
Courtsl05 [hereafter Organic Court Law) special courts include:
military courts,
railway transport courts, water
transport
courts, forestry courts and other special courts" (emphasis added).
In essence, therefore, assuming the non-objectionable nature of a separate inspectorate judicial body, the legal framework for establishing ~ parte inspectorate courts already exists.
Thus, the need for either amendments to present Chinese
law or the addition of lex specialis is eliminated.l06
A number of laws would conflict with the establishment of a
properly-structured special inspectorate court and would thereby
require amendment or abrogation. First, Article 3 of the Organic
Court Law provides that the functions of people's courts are,
inter alia, "to safeguard proletarian dictatorship, the socialist
legal system and socialist order •
. to guarantee the smooth
progress of the socialist revolution and socialist construction
[and to) devote all their activities to educating the
citizens in loyalty to their socialist motherland • • • • "107 A
special inspectorate court would not properly execute its obligations if it was to serve only the socialist interests of the PRC1
the provision must therefore be amended or made non-applicable to
inspectorate operations. Article 33 of the same law limits those
eligible to be judges to "citizens,• a rule which is obviously
inconsistent with the establishment of a separate, independent
and special non-Chinese inspectorate court.
The 1982 PRC Constitution also provides that "[a)ll cases
handled by the people's courts, except for those involving special circumstances as specified by law, shall be heard in public
(Art. 125).
Article 7 of the Organic Court Law elaborates on
this constitutional provision: "All cases in the people's courts
are to be heard in public exce9t those involving slate secrets,
personal shameful secrets and juvenile delinquents." 08
Technically,
inspectorate
interrogation procedures may
operate outside these provisions.
The Chinese term for "case•
(e.g., criminal case) as it is used in the Organic Court Law and
the 1982 PRC Constitution is anli, a term with a rather precise
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circumscribed definition; to wit, "a legal case [or) a crime."l09
Whether the term would apply to the quasi-legal interrogatory
procedure of an inspectorate, initiated for the purpose of
soliciting information and not necessarily for determining the
circumstances surrounding a crime, is unclear.
Moreover, even where the "public trial" guarantee would
seem to be applicable, the PRC government has administered ·it
somewhat erratically under its criminal law.llO This may indicate that the guarantee is not yet so entrenched in the Chinese
legal system that it is consistently employed, even where stcite
or personal, shameful secrets are not involved.
In light of its
erratic application under the PRC Criminal Code and the use of
the more sweeping term "special circumstances" under the 1982 PRC
Constitution -- which could easily encompass inspectorate procedure -- the "public trial" language would probably not even
need to be amended in order to permit closed sessions for all
inspectorate interrogation hearings.lll
There is also a potential obstacles posed by Article 6 of
the Organic Court Law which states:
Citizens of all nationalities have the
right to use their own spoken and written
languages in court proceedings.
The people's courts should provide interpreter
services to the parties concerned who do
not understand the local spoken and written languages.
In places where people of
a national minority reside or people of
many nationalities live together, the people's courts should issue written judgments,
public
announcements and
other
documents in local written languages.ll2
In one sense, the potential problems posited by this provision
can be argued away rather easily.
First, its application 1s
strictly reserved for people's courts; a special arms inspectorate court would not possess the same status.
In addition, the
likelihood that the Chinese government would assign to inspection
operations local officials who are fluent only in obscure indigenous dialects would be negligible unless the PRC was seeking
to display its displeasure with, or disapproval of, in~pectorate
activities.
As such, the necessity for providing interpreters
would seem to be diminished.
In another sense, the provision is sufficiently broad so as
to create potential practical problems for the collection of inspectorate information.
The time, effort and security precautions involved in providing for and using interpreters and
guaranteeing accurate instantaneous translationll3 would seem
prohibitive. With this in mind, a statutory amenpment to Article
6, exempting from its ambit all inspection proceedings, would be
required.
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The Chinese legal system operates mainly as a collegiate
system.
Restated, judicial process in the PRC involves the participation, "in initial trials, [of) a collegiate bench of judges
and assessors who are representatives of the masses . . . •114 A
colleriate court is usually composed of one judge and two assessors. 15
From the standpoint of confidentiality and security,
the participation of local citizens or numerus quasi-judicial
personnel in a judicial panel is obiously undesirable.
Though
the suggestion to eliminate assessors is probably appropriate,
the proper mechanisim for doing so, in light of the ambiguity of
PRC law, is uncertain.
The language of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code calls for
the application of the collegiate system in "[t)rials at basiclevel and intermediate people's courts of first instance, except
for cases of private prosecution and other minor criminal cases
which may be handled by a single judge.
"
(Art. 105).
To
extend further the ambiguities, the PRC Organic Court Law calls
for the use of the collegiate system "except in simple civil
cases, minor criminal cases and cases otherwise specified by law"
(Art. 16).
If either the Crimina! Procedure Code or Organic
Court Law was used, the most feasible suggestion would be to seek
a statutory amendment to exclude assessors from inspectorate proceedings.
However, it is possible that any change in the use of
the collegiate system may require a more cumbersome and significant procedure:
a statutory amendment.ll6
ro further confound
the issue, though, the recent Gang of Four trial was conducted
without assessors.
Chinese jurist Zhang Youyu justified this
deviation on the grounds that the establishment of a special
court permitted the use of special procedures.ll7
If such justification is cited by negotiators for an arms control agreement
and validated by Chinese authorities, then the mechanism for excluding assessors from an inspectorate judiciary already exists
and no domestic legal procedure would be required to sanction it.
As in the relevant Soviet codes and u.s. Constitution,ll8
Chinese legal provisions guarantee the right to counsel to "an
accused."
The 1982 PRC Constitution asserts, "Tne accused has
the right to defense" (Art. 125). Article 8 of the Organic Court
Law stipulates:
The accused has the right to defense.
Besides defending himself,the accused ·has
the right to delegate a lawyer to defend
him.
He can also be defended by a citizen
recommended by a people's organization or
the unit where the accused works, with the
approval of the people's court.
He can
also be defended by a close relative or
guardian..
If necessary,
the people's
court can appoint a defender for
the
accused.ll9
There are a number of issues posed by these provisions.
First, the right to counsel applies only to "the accused"; in the
case of interrogatory hearings a witness is not necessarily an
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naccused.n All parties concerned would likely desire legal rep-resentation. A statutory amendment granting witnesses the right
to counsel is suggested. Moreover, the parties may wish to address at this time the issue of legal representation in the PRC,
which, pursuant to the Provisional Regulations on La~ers, may
presently be reserved exclusively ·to Chinese counse1.12
Second, both the Organic Court Law (Art. 8) and the PRC
Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 26) permit persons outside the
practicing legal profession, such as guardians, relatives and
colleagues, to represent an accused in the PRC.
Lawyers in the PRC are expected to safeguard the legitimate
rights and interests of a client, pursuant to the equivalent of a
code of professional responsibility.l21 Though there is no language that explicitly creates an attorney-client privilege in the
Provisional Regulations on Lawyers, the protection of the legitimate rights of a client may be presumed to imply one. The real
problem, however, lies outside such an inference. Whether or not
an attorney-client privilege may be read into the lawyer's enumerated obligations, non-legal representation is definitely not
governed by any code of professional conduct.
As some authors
have already stated:
the presence of a lay representative
might unfavorably affect the confidential
nature of the proceedings before the arms
control court (should confidential handling
pe desired).l22
Since the right· to defense is constitutionally guaranteed,
a wholesale .elimination of legal representation before an arms
inspectorate court would appear to be a more difficult concession
to extract from the Chinese than a statutory amendment limiting
representation to legal, and not lay, counsel in inspectorate
proceedings.l23
The actual course of interrogation proceedings under Chinese law presents its own set of problems.
Though Chinese law
prohibits the acts of torture, threat, or other illegal means to
procure information, 124 the PRC Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that n [ a]ll those who have knowledge of a case shall have
the obligation to be witnessesn (Art. 37).
This obligation of
compulsory appearance seems to be ignored in some instances. Recent Chinese press reports have decried the practice of refusing
to °Come and give evidencea at the Gang of Four trials, asserting
that it was the nduty of everyone . • • to show a responsible
attitude towards the country and give evidence.nl25
There are also a number of other prov1s1ons in Chinese
criminal law which imply the right of appropriate legal organs to
summon persons to be interrogated or to provide evidence as witnesses.
For example, the PRC Criminal Procedure Code divides
evidence into six categories, one of which is designated 0 Witness
testimony• (Art. 31( 2)). Furthermore, under Article 32, a Judges,
procurators and investigators shall, in accordance with the legal
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process, collect various kinds of evidence to furnish proof as to
whether or not the accused is guilty.
"
There is even a
separate section in the PRC Crimina! Procedure Code devoted to
the inquiry of witnesses,126 one provision of which states:
"When an inquiry of a witness is conducted, he shall be notified
that he must produce evidence and give testimony strictly according to the facts and that he shall be legally responsible if he
commits perjury or withholds criminal evidence" (Art. 68).
Neither constitutional nor statutory provisions explicitly
recognizes any privileged situations with respect to the production of evidence or oral testimony, with the exception of those
who are mentally or physically impaired.l27
Chinese law does not recognize the privilege against selfincrimination.
According to Article 64 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code,
When an inquiry of the accused is conducted
by an investigator, the investigator shall
first ask the accused whether or not he is
guilty of a crime, allow him to state the
circumstances of his crime or to plead not
guilty, and then ask him other questions.
The accused shall answer the investigator's
questions strictly according to the facts,
but he has the right to refuse to answer
questions irrelevant to the case (emphasis
added).
The value of the right to refuse to answer irrelevant questions is dubious:
one wonders who has the final determination
during interrogation as to what questions are relevant and as to
when an accused is exercising his prerogative of silence or simply refusing to cooperate.
In any event, it is not the equivalent of a privilege against self-incrimination.
The recent Gang of Four trial offered further evidence that
the privilege is foreign to Chinese law.
According to a
published Renmin ribao report,128 the PRC "law of criminal procedure does not mention the defendant's right to remain silent.•l29 Yet, in one specific instance -- that of Zhang Chunquao during the Gang of Four trial -- the lack of insistence by
the Special Court that the defendant answer questions was deemed
"right and proper. A defendant's silence, on the one hand, indicates that he gives up his right to defense. On the other hand,
it shows that he refused to admit the charges brought against
him.•l30 The Renmin ribao report then noted that the defendant's
silence, in 1 ight of the plethora of damning evidence, • did not
intefere with the regular progress of the tria1.•131
In the unlikely instance that PRC prosecutors need to
secure oral evidence from a Chinese defendant during trial in
order to obtain a conviction, the report leaves unanswered the
question of what consequences would flow from the defendant's
silence.
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The PRC Criminal Procedure Code may also be read to sanction the use of polygraph tests and truth serums.
According to
Article 78,
An investigative test, when necessary and
with the approval of the publ ic security
bureau director, may be conducted in order
to find out the truth of a case.
In conducting an investigative test it is forbidden to take any action which may cause
danger, subject' anyone's personality to
humiliation or harm -public morals.
However, there have been no reported cases of the administration
of such tests and no Chinese authorities contacted by the author
would confirm their use.
The absence of a civil code leaves uncertain the existence,
or P.Xtent of civil contempt powers in the PRC, but there are
three criminal provisions punishing false testimony and the concealment of evidence.
Article 148 of the PRC Criminal Code
states:
Any witness, appraiser, recorder or interpreter who intentionally makes false identification, appraisal, recording or interpretation on major links of a case in the
course of investigation and trial to frame
another per son or conceal evidence will be
sentenced to detention or imprisonment for
not more than 12 years.
In grave cases, the
offender will be sentenced to imprisonment
for not less than 2 years and not more than
7 •.

Article 162 provides, inter alia, that
Anyone who gives shelter to or gives false
testimony to harbor counterrevolutionaries
will be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than 3 years, detention or surveillance.
In grave cases, the offender will
be sentenced to imprisonment for not less
than 3 years and not more than 10.
Anyone who gives shelter to or gives false
testimony to harbor other criminals will be
sentenced to irnpr isonment for not more than
2 years, detention or surveillance.
In
grave cases, the offender will be sentenced
to imprisonment for not less than 2 years
and not more than 7. •
·
Article 115 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code stipulates, inter
alia:
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When questioning a witness, the judicial
personnel and the public prosecutor should
instruct the witness to give truthful testimony and explain that if he intentionally gives
false
evidence or
withholds
evidence he is legally liable. •
132
Together,
these three provisions provide an effective
mechanism for a Chinese court's ability to obtain truthful statements from those who testify at trial.
Unfortunately, their effectiveness is only as good as their relevance.
A slight variation of the justification that Zhang Youyu made with respect to
the absence of assessors at the Gang of Four trial; to wit, a
special court may adopt special proceduresl33 -- could be used by
the Chinese to deny the use of criminal sanctions by a special
inspectorate court against interrogated Chinese officials. Moreover, an inspectorate court set up outside the purview of Chinese
laws may be, absent special provisions to the contrary, equally
helpless to apply Chinese criminal sanctions-for false testimony.
Finally, even in the event that an inspectorate court were granted the power to pronounce appropriate sanctions for false testimony, one must also consider the proper enforcement organ.
Without the creation of a separate inspectorate procuracy -- and
here one must once again consider conflict with PRC constitutional provisionsl34__ enforcement would be entrusted to Chinese
procuratorial organs.
Independent inspectorate authority would
thereby be denied.
In essence, the effectiveness of the interrogataory and enforcement organs, absent absolute independence,
will depend on the degree of Chinese willingness to cooperate
with inspectorate personnel.
The protection of cooperative Chinese citizens in the form
of a grant of immunity from prosecution would seem to be offensive to the Chinese system.
Coercive apparatus in the PRC is so
pervasivel35 __ extending from the informal administrative sanctions meted out by people's mediation committees to the formal
criminal sanctions imposed by public security and procuratorate
organs -- that the entire concept of immunity as it is known in
Western domestic criminal systems is alien to the Chinese. Demotions, dismissals, labor reduction, imprisonment and execution,
as well as the more voluntary forms of social control, including
self-criticism and denunciation, extend the influence of rule
enforcement in the PRC to cover all form of deviant behavior. As
such, the equivalent of a full exemption from liability in return
for information would likely be unacceptable to the Chinese.
Moreover, one must keep in mind that most of the Chinese citizens
who have contact with an inspectorate will have connection to the
CCP apparatus.
Therefore, the promise of immunity from criminal
sanctions, for example, would not preclude the imposition of separately enforced Party sanctions. The possibility of securing a
sufficiently broad grant of immunity for cooperative Chinese
which would cover legal and extralegal punitive or deterrent measures would appear close to impossible without a fundamental
change in Chinese philosophy.
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A second, perhaps less offensive, form of protection for
cooperative Chinese, is to permit informers to emigrate fr'om
their country.l36 The Chinese position on emigration, however,
reflects a reluctance to freely extend such privileges to Chinese
nationals.
As Chinese authorities explained to the author,l37
the PRC is fairly receptive to extending visa permits for temporary travel privileges to Chinese nationals with relatives in
foreign countries.
Applications for exit are filed with local
public security organs.l38 The waiting period for approval or
rejection of the application for passports and visas -- the
necessary documents for exit from the PRC -- may range up to one
year. In addition, visitation rights are restricted in time.
Permanent emigration, however, seemingly has not met with
wide approval in the PRC.
In fact, if one accepts as fact the
above rules applicable to the visitation of foreign relatives, it
would appear that emigration per se is not routinely recognized,
a policy that may be responsible for a number of recent sensitive
and publicized defections of Chinese personages to the West.l39
Chinese press reports occasionally publish articles on illegal
emigration,l40 which may imply the possibility of legal emigraton
procedures, but provincial regulations on the subject of illegal
emigration are so significantly harshl41 as to raise the spectre
of Chinese governmental disapproval of the entire notion. Though
the author could not obtain hard evidence as to Chinese permissiveness in extending travel privileges to governmental personnel
with access to sensitive or classified information, it is reasonable to assume that such privileges would be granted only
under extraordinary circumstances and would undoubtedly require a
promise to return.
In fact, it is quite conceivable that a
refusal to return to the PRC would constitute an act of counterrevolution within the ambit of the PRC Criminal Code. Article 94
provides, inter alia, that "[t)hose defecting and turning traitor
1.rill be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 3
and not more than 10 years.n
Though this provision does not
necessarily equate a deliberate refusal to return to the PRC with
"defecting and turning traitor," the latter phrase is nonetheless
susceptible of subjective interpretation.
Moreover, it at least
impliedly evinces a reluctance on the part of the PRC to permit
freedom of travel abroad. Since no right to travel abroad exists
and since Chinese practice frowns on permanent emigration, the
chances of securing a permit for an informer to leave the PRC are
probably minimal.
In summation, the establishment and existence ·of a separate
interrogating arm of an inspectorate is encumbered with numerous
legal obstacles.
In 1 ight of these obstacles, complete autonomy
seems unlikely.
Rather, the parties to an arms control arrangement should be prepared for a number of compromises.
First, the
most significant legal impediments to independence apply to the
establishment by PRC judicial authorities of a special inspectorate court. Therefore, the creation of this form of an inspectorate interrogating body should receive low priority, and the
parties may wish to negotiate some form of informal judicial organ which operates flexibly within the framework of Chinese law.
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Second, a separate, independently structured interrogation
organ established outside Chinese law will probably be considered
too offensive to Chinese concepts of sovereignty to be permitted.
As such, the parties may utilize Chinese interrogation organs,
but ought to obtain broad interrogatory powers and possible
privileges for interrogating personnel in order to ensure effective cooperation for inspection operations.
The most realistic alternative envisions limited inspectorate autonomy and the significant cooperation of Chinese authorities.
The creation of some form of hybrid interrogating organ
should incorporate a number of principles such as the elimination
of assessors and the rejection of legal representation exclusively by Chinese counsel, which tend to deny strict Chinese control
over interrogation procedure. At the same time, the arrangement
will undoubtedly fail without active Chinese participation, particularly with respect to judicial decision-making and procuratorial enforcement of sanctions.
The most likely approach, therefore, will be to require the promulgation of new laws and the
amendment of existing ones.
D)

Production and Procurement of Documents and Property

The most rational suggestion is this area of arms inspectorate functions is probably to permit inspectors to order documents and real evidence to be t:.~rned over to the inspectorate
interrogating
organ
in
connection with
interrogation
procedures,l42 particularly in the case of the appearance of witnesses.
This method appears to be the least offensive to the
PRC.
It lacks a number of problems which might arise through the
use of other means of securing documents or evidence, such as
personal body searches or the direction examination of files and
materials pursuant to inspection of physical premises.
Zile, Sharlet and Love suggested that, under Soviet law,
inspectors could conduct a bodily search of individuals for
evidence on their persons, though such searches would probably be
unnecessary.l43 Chinese law also admits this possibility.
Although the 1982 PRC Constitution guarantees unequivocal inviolability of the "freedom of person" of Chinese citizens (Art.
27), the PRC Criminal Code prohibits only unlawful searches of a
person (Art. 144).
Lawful searches are, at least in part, defined in the PRC Criminal Procedure Code:
Investigators may search the person of an
accused
and
the
body,
belongings
and
residence of a per son who may be hiding a
criminal or criminal evidence as well as
other relevant locations, in order to collect criminal evidence and track down the
criminal (Art. 79) .144
The powers enumerated by this provision are too 1 imited to
be readily transferred to inspectors.
First, it is applicable
only to •an accused• or a person who hides a criminal or criminal
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evidence.
Information collected for routine inspection operations will rarely be furnished by "an accused," nor is such information likely to fall within the ambit of criminal evidence.
Second, by virtue of a subsequent PRC Criminal Procedure Code
provision, the right of personal search is accorded only to "investigators" from Chinese legal organs (Art. 62).
Article 10 of the 1979 Arrest and Detention Regulationsl45
is at least as explicit as the search provision of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Under Article 10,
At the time of arrest or detention, in
looking for criminal evidence, the public
security organ may carry out a search of
the criminal's body, his property, his
residence or other places concerned.
If
it suspects any other person of hiding the
criminal or concealing criminal evidence,
it may also carry out a search of his
body, property, residence or other places
concerned.
Except for in emergencies, the
public security organ should present a
search warrant in case of such a search.
In case of a search, a neighbor or any
·other
witness
and
the
person
to
be
searched or members of his family should
be present.
After the search, a record
should be made of the results of the
search and
of
any
criminal
evidence
seized.
Again, it is apparent that the search is to be conducted
only by the appropriate PRC public security organ and only of a
"criminal."
When these provisions are read in conjunction with the provisions of the 1982 PRC Constitution stipulating that the
citizens' "freedom of person" (Art. 37) and sanctity of the home
(Art. 39) are inviolable,l46 it would seem that the PRC has refused, at least on paper, to recognize carte blanche search
powers.l47 Body searches in the PRC would appear to be confined
to narrowly-defined instances involving criminal activity and are
relegated only to Chinese legal organs.
In practice, of course,
the letter of the law has often been ignored by Chinese authorities: nevertheless, a request for personal search powers for inspectors is likely to be perceived as overly intrusive and hence
unacceptable.
In fact, Chinese authorities would be likely to
invoke Article 3 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Code, which reads:
The public security organ is in charge of
investigation,
provisional
apprehension
and inquiry in cases involving criminal
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offenses.
The people's procuratorate approves arrests and procuratorial proceedings (including investigation)
and
institutes prosecution.
The people's court
is responsible for trying cases. No other
government O!:gan, institution, organization or oer son has the right to exercise
such powers (emphasis added).l48
A third alternative -- direct examination of files and
other rna ter ial s during the inspection of physical premises under
broad rights of accessl49 __ is so thoroughly reprehensible to
Chinese secrecy laws as to be totally unacceptable.
Ordering the production of evidence in connection with
interrogation procedures and the examination of witnesses lacks
the more nefarious qualities of personal body searches and avoids
the potential infringement of secrecy laws.
It is a right which
would be granted in connection with a set of interrogatory powers
that, assuming Chinese participation in the interrogating organ,
are shared by PRC personnel.
Moreover, and perhaps most impoctantly, there are pervasive precedents in the present Chinese
legal system for demanding the production of relevant documents
to facilitate investigation.
Many of these precedents have already been discussed in connection with the existing interrogatory powers of various Chinese legal organs.
For example, under
the PRC Criminal Procedure Code, "[e] ach and every unit and individual has the duty to surrender
. material and documentary
evidence which may prove the accused to be guilty or not guilty"
(Art. 80).
Although such material is not sent directly to the
court, it is surrendered to a people's procuratorate or public
security organ which, in turn, submits it to a judicial body.
Criminal subpoena powers are broad, ex tending to objects, doc uments, mails and telegrams relevant to a particular case.l50
They have also extended to other areas of Chinese law, such as
tax regulationsl51 and quality standard rules.
These ample subpoena powers of Chinese governmental agencies concerned with the
administration of law may serve as an excellent model on which to
pattern inspectorate interrogatory powers.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

See Provisional Regulations on Keeping State Secrets
[Baoshou guojia jimi zhanxing tiaoli), in Gongan fagui huipian 1950-79 ([Collection of Public Security Laws) [Department of Public Security, Beijing, 1980) ), at 472-76, passed
June 1, 1951 by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress at its 87th meeting and promulgated on June
8, 1951 [hereafter State Secrets Regulations].
For an English translation of the text, see "Xinhua Publishes Regulations on Guarding State Secrets," Foreign Broadcast Information Service on China [hereafter FBIS-cHI) No. 0731980 [hereafter cited by year and number, e.g., 80-073)
April 14, 1980, at L7.
Many laws promulgated in the early
1950s have subsequently been revalidated. See Gongan fagui
huibian at 447-48 citing the NPC Standing Committee Decision on the question of the validity of laws and decrees
enacted since the founding of the PRC, passed on Nov. 29,
1979.

2.

For an explanation of the dual level classification system
as it applies to the Soviet Union, see z. ZILE, R. SHARLET
AND J. LOVE, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYTEM AND ARMS INSPECTION: A
CASE
STUDY
IN
POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
221-22
(1972)
[hereafter ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE).
For an explanation of
the document classification scheme in the PRC, see K.
LIEBERTHAL, CENTRAL DOCUMENTS AND POLITBURO POLITICS IN
CHINA (1978).

3.

It is possible that the PRC intended to avoid mention of
any classification scheme in order not to create a public
impression that the consequences of some secrets were not
nearly as severe as those of others.
This would have had
the effect of promoting generally consistent public apprehension of Chinese-enforced legal sanctions· at a time
when PRC state and Party officials sought to offset somewhat the mass fascination with foreign goods and the influx
of foreign visitors.
See also "State Council Revises Invention Reward RegulatiOii'S,;;----psiS-cHI-79-013 (Jan. 18, 1979), at El5.
The
Regulations called for State Scientific Commission approval
of "classified inventions" before the particulars are supplied to foreigners.
However, no distinct security classifications were posited.
On
Central
one of
tional
CHINA:

4.

the other hand, Fox Butterfield discovered that CCP
Committee documents are numbered and labeled with
3 security level classifications: secret, institusecret, or absolutely secret.
See F. BUTTERFIELD,
ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 382 (1982).

See State Secrets Regulations, supra note 1, Art. 8.
See
also China News Analysis, No. 1182 (Jun 6, 1980), at 2.~
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Guangyi, a correspondent for Zhongguo Caimao Sao (China
Finance and Trade News) was recently convicted of divulging
to foreigners the time, place and agenda of the Sixth Plenary session of the 11th Party Central Committee, in violation of the 1951 State Secrets Regulations and the PRC
Criminal Code, Art. 186.
See Crime of Betraying State
Secrets, Beijing Review, No. 20 (May 17, 1982) at 3; "Li
Guangyi Loses Appeal in 'State Secrets' Leak," FBIS-CHI-82060 (March 29, 1982), at Kl.
5.

See China News Anaylsis, No. 1182 (June 6, 1980), at 2.

6.

See, ~, "Provisional Regulations on Military Offenses,"
FBIS-cHI-81-113 (June 12, 1981), at Kl, ~· Art. 4; "Explanation of Regulations," id., at K4; "Anhui Military
Court on New Military Law,-.- FBIS-CHI-81-133 (July 13,
1981), at 01; "Military Commission Issues Documents on
Security,• FBIS-CHI-78-099 (May 22, 1978), at El.
(This
was a report of some of the rules contained in the Regulation on PLA Safeguarding of State and Military Secrets,
published by the Military Commission of the CCP Central
Committee.
The Military Regulations included a long list
of vague and nebulous rules, such as "Never ask questions
about secrets you shouldn't know," which are enough to instill mortal fear into PLA soldiers and thereby limit foreign access to military information.) See also "Army Paper
Stresses
Vigilance Against
Espionage,"
FBIS-CHI-82-141
(July 22, 1982), at Kl.

7.

See generally "Text of New PRC Constitution Published,"
FBIS-CHI-82-235
(Dec.
7, 1982), at Kl, ~· Art.
53
("Citizens of the [PRC) must . • . keep state secrets") and
Art. 54 (citizens must "safeguard the security . • • of the
motherland" [note the significance of incorporating two
similar articles in the Constitution); "Regulations on
Studying Abroad Approved," FBIS-CHI-82-147 (July 30, 1982),
at K9; "State Council Publishes Personnel Regulations,"
FBIS-CHI-82-132 (July 9, 1982), at Kl, ~· para. 10 (State
Council personnel must "strictly guard state secrets

. . . ." )

8.

For example, though the PRC is a party to the 1944 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S 295, it has not yet published
any civil aviation statistics as mandated by Article 67 of
the Conventio.n.
J. GREENFIELD, CHINA AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA, AIR AND ENVIRONMENT 193 (1979).

9.

A recent Renmin ribao editorial called for the creation of
a patent system which would permit the PRC to "refuse
requests from foreigners to see [Chinese) advanced technological inventions on the grounds that they are patented
[and thereby protected by) international practice."
See
"Renmin Ribao Calls for Creation of Patent System" FBISCHI-80-133 (July 9, 1980), at Lll.
See also China's Draft
Patent Law, 8 CHINA BUS. REV. 39 (No.-r, May-June 19Sl).
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10.

Fox Butterfield discovered four layers of internal bulletins, designated neibu, which have restricted circulaton in
the PRC:
1) Reference News, which reprints articles from
foreign press agents on international and domestic events;
2) Reference Material, which is a more detailed account of
foreign news articles and is available to Party members and
cadres through their danwei, or work unit; 3)
neican or
"internal reference" reports, which are circulated only to
officials above grade 12 on the 24-grade Party-rank scale;
and 4)
Cable News, which is a bulletin of major PRC and
international events for the eyes of CCP Central Committee
personages and military commanders only.
See BUTTERFIELD,
supra note 3, at 389-92. According to Philip Short, at the
very highest level there are secret bulletins of domestic
political intelligence, published by an elite department of
the People's Daily (Renmin ribao) for Politburo members
only. SeeP. SHORT, THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR 139 (1982).

11.

The exhaustive examination done by this author of Chinese
press reports on domestic law enforcement activity did not
reveal a single instance in which the media reported on the
failure of public security agencies or judicial bureas to
prosecute criminal perpetrators.
But cf. "Nei Monggol
Cracks Armed Criminal Case,"
FBIS-CHI-82-103
(May 27,
1982), at Rl (one of three gang leaders in crime spree
still at large).

12.

The Regulations on PLA Safeguarding of State and Military
Secrets, supra note 6, called on Party Committees to establish and implement their own security commissions. This
is not unusual in 1 ight of the fact that many books and
documents are
published
only for
upper-echelon Party
leaders.
See China News Analysis, No. ll82 (June 6 180),
at 2.
Seeaiso "Deng Yingchao on Guarding Party Secrets,"
FBIS-CHI-82-128 (July 2, 1982), at Kl.
"Yunnan Rally
Reveals Case of Stolen Party, State Secrets," FBIS-CHI-78094 (May 15, 1978), at J3.
The articles implied the existence of separate Party sanctions for violations of Party
secrecy.
In addition to the potential for criminal sanctions, violators in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are
often dismissed from their posts.
See "Criminal Vice
Minister Yang Yibang Punished ,• FBIS-CHI-82-145 (July 28,
1982), at K4.
Cf. "Radio Delineates Between Gang's Party,
State Crimes," FBIS-CHI-80-227 (Nov. 21, 1980), at Ll.
Chinese press reports have stated that the abolition
of the "Sida" (Four Bigs of the 1978 PRC Constitution) was
due, inter-alia, to their tendency to permit communication
of Party and state secrets.
See Important Resolutions of
N.P.C. Standing Committee, Beijing Review, No. 17 (April
28, 1980), at 3.

13.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 229.
often

The application of Chinese secrecy legislation is
as capricious as its provisions are ambiguous, the
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result of the interplay of concepts of sovereignty and the
political current of the time.
See note 73 infra.
A few
examples will illustrate.
------In 1980, a Soviet national was imprisoned for 7 years
for violating the PRC 1951 State Secrets Regulations - this
at a time when PRC-USSR relations were almost non-existent.
See "Soviet Spy 'Imprisoned,' Chinese National Sentenced to
Death," FBIS-CHI-80-141 (July 21, 1980), at Cl.
Moreover,
Chinese nationals have been punished for colluding with the
Soviets.
See, ~· "PRC Vice Foreign Minister's Daughter
Said Arrested," FBIS-cHI-82-087 (May 5, 1982), at VI (Taiwan report of the arrest of the daughter of Vice Foreign
Minister HoYing, for spying for the KGB).
As US-PRC relations deteriorated in late 1981 and early 1982 over the issue of the u.s. arms sales to Taiwan before the August 1982 US-PRC communique was issued - the
Chinese used the 1951 State Secrets Regulations to expel an
American teacher for obtaining agricultural secrets .and to
detain a Hong Kong newspaper editor suspected of "selling
information to the Americans."
See "American Expelled for
'Stealing China's Secrets',"
FBIS-cHI-82-107
(June 3,
1982), at Bl; "Hsin Wan Pao Editor 'Detained' in Beijing,"
FBIS-cHI-82-14 7 (July 30, 1982), at W2; "Cheng Ming on PRC
Detention of Hong Kong Editor," FBIS-CHI-82-194 (Oct. 6,
1982), at W5; "Detention of Hong Kong Citizen by PRC Confirmed ,• FBIS-CHI-82-217 (Nov. 9, 1982), at W2 (the editor,
Pai Zhen, was eventually sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for leaking secrets.
See Woodruff, China Deals
Harshly with Unauthorized News Leaks, Balto. Sun, Jan. 7,
1983, at Al.
An earlier PRC state secrecy law - the 1951 Act for
the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries (obsoleted by the
1979 PRC Criminal Code) was invoked in 1979 in punishing
Wei Jingsheng as part of a PRC crackdown on dissidents.
See,~· "Renmin Ribao Report on Beijing Trial
of Wei
Jingsheng ," FBIS-cHI-79-207 (Oct. 24, 1979), at Ll; "Beijing Municipal Court Rejects Wei Jingsheng's Appeal," FBISCHI-79-217 (Nov. 7, 1979), at Ll.
See ~ notes 93-96
infra.
Vigilance against secrecy leaks are occasionally used
as grounds for the detention of Chinese citizens who maintain frequent or close contact with foreigners.
See, ~,
"Police Arrest Chinese Fiance of Italian Lecturer,• FBISCHI-81-229 (Nov. 30, 1981), at G2; "AFP:
Chinese Girl
'Forced' from Diplomat's Car," FBIS-cHI-82-201 (Oct. 18,
1982), at Kl3.
14.

The information on these CCP organs, as well as their existence, was imparted to the author by a former, high-level
PRC government employee in December 1982, whose wish to
remain anonymous will be respected.
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15.

Rank in Party or goverrunent organs is the most important
factor in access to classified information.
It also symbolizes those cadres' positions in a privileged society.
All secret materials are clearly identified to the extent
to which they can be disseminated (~., level of county
and regiment, prefecture and division, province and army,
and so forth) .
In terms of profession, access to classified information is usually 1 im i ted to professionals whose work relates
to it.
Access to highly sensitive information (~., intelligence and counter-intelligence) requires special background investigations to ensure loyalty to the CCP and to
the state. Clearance will depend on numerous factors, including an appropriate personal and behavioral record, a
good family history, and satisfactory marital and social
relationships.
See note 14, id., for obtainment of this information.
BERNSTEIN, FROM THE CENTER OF THE EARTH 19
(1982).

~ generally R.

16.

The CCP's Central Investigation Department, under the Party·
Central Committee, is supposedly in charge of covert foreign-intelligence operations.
The Public Security Ministry, allegedly divided into 13 bureaus, is the agency in
charge of domestic traffic cops, plainclothes officers, and
agents monitoring foreign activities in the PRC.
See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 3, at 334-35. The Ministry also-maintains a crack PLA contingent, which serves as a "secret
service" force to guard PRC leaders.
In this respect (as a
secret service force), it replaces the old 8341 unit, earlier considered to be the military detachment in charge of
protecting Chinese leaders. ~ generally, R. DEACON, THE
CHINESE SECRET SERVICE (1974).
Public security organs have been known to employ 1 iumang, or toughs, to exercise surveillance of the general
populace and enforce limited physical sanctions when necessary.
See J. FRASER, THE CHINESE:
PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE
318-33 (1980).
Most of these incidents, though, were conducted by so-called rebel factions ( zaofanpai) during the
Cultural Revolution.
These incidents are rare today and
such conduct is not an offshoot of official goverrunent
policy. See note 14 supra.

17.

Adopted by the PRC Goverrunent Administration Council on
June 27, 1952 and reintroduced by the NPC in 1980 as part
of a set of four regulations repromulgated in order to establish a pre-Cultural Revolution surveillance network.
The regulations also include the reintroduction of People's
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Mediation Committees, Subdistrict Offices and Urban Neighborhood Committees.
Texts of these regulations are reprinted in "Central Press Publishes NPC Regulations on Local Organizations," FBIS-cHI-80-017 (Jan. 24, 1980), at L2.
18.

See the "Temporary Organic Regulations of the Social Order
and Security Committee" in id., Art. I.

19.

Id., Art. VI.
See also Zhongqonq yan zhuofang sudian jianu
ming bubai zhiyuan (Communists claim "hotel incident";
Canadian woman declares her innocence.)
World Journal,
Sept. 10, 1982, p. 1.
In this case, public security officials detained a female Canadian citizen of Chinese extraction who was a guest of an American news correspondent in
his hotel room.
For not following PRC regulations by not
reporting her visit, he was fined 140 renminbi (=$90 at
that time).
These committees operate on the fringes of the law
and, technically, need not respect provisions of PRC laws
regarding search and seizure, surveillance, and conceivably, detention. The committees are considered representatives of the masses and not the police.
Surveillance may
be so comprehensive that street committees, the lowest
level governmental subdivision, may monitor the menstrual
cycles of young women to ensure compliance with population
control directives of the PRC.
For an account of certain
street committee activities, ~BUTTERFIELD, supra note 3,
at 325-28.

20.

An excellent account of KGB operations vis-a-vis foreign
diplomatic agents is found in J. BARRON, THE KGB ( 1974).
See also "KGB-Agency of Fascist Repression, Spying, Subversion," Survey of China's Mainland Press [hereafter SCMP],
no. 5969 (Nov. 6, 1975), at 231; "Renmin Ribao Calls for
Vigilance Against KGB," FBIS-cHI-82-032 (Feb. 17, 1982), at
Cl.

21.

This was a statement made by PRC writer K'ung Meng in 1960
in an article criticizing bourgeoise concepts of international law, cited in Chiu, The United Nations, reprinted in
LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (Leng and Chiu,
ed., 1972) [hereafter LENG AND CHIU].
Query the argument
that international organizations, though not indigenous to
one nation, are still alien or foreign organizations to the
PRC?

22.

Under a strictly literal interpretation of international
law and in accord with international practice, an international organization should not be regarded as a foreign
entity in the country in which it operates, especially
where that country is a member of that organization.
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In the PRC, however, the Chinese have long considered
all outside personnel and outside interests not under direct PRC control to be foreign entities.
This is the
result of the long-term unbridgeable chasm between the PRC
and the outside world, as perceived under the ideology of
the isolated Chinese totalitarian system.
The PRC continues to conduct its political relationships pursuant to
the phrase nei wai you bie (literally: "the inside and the
outside are different.")
2 3.

Notice the obvious distinction between Ar tiel e 91 in its
present .form and an Article 91 which· might be amended to
read, "Offenders colluding with foreign countries or otherwise • • • • " (emphasis added).

24.

This argument may misgauge the force behind PRC concern for
preventing intrusions of foreign agents and protecting Chinese mainland sovereignty.
For example, Taiwan -- the object of PRC efforts at reunification but certainly not an
enemy of the mainland in the literal sense
is occasionally rebuked for its acts of espionage against the
PRC.
See, ~· "Xinhua Scores Activities of Taiwan Secret
Service," FBIS-cHI-82-094 (May 14, 1982), at "Kuomintang
Secret Agents Arrested in Changsha," FBIS-cHI-81-047 (March
11, 1981), at
K2;
"KMT
'Special
Agent'· Arrested
in
Guangzhou~· FBIS-CHI-81-115 (June 16, 1981), at U1; "Yunnan
Court Sentences Three 'KMT Spies, ... FBIS-CHI-81-163 (Aug.
24, 1981), at 02; "Xinhua Scores Activities of Taiwan
Secret Service," FBIS-CHI-82-094 (May 14, 1982), at Ul.

25.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 235.

26 .

.!.£.,

27.

See, ~, "Xisha Quandao Designated Restricted Military
Zone," FBIS-cHI-82-225 (Nov. 22, 1982), at W5 (noting that
no civil ian access was permitted to Paracel Islands and
their 12-mile terr itoria1 waters); "USSR-PRC Rift Said to
Hold Apart Two Mongol ias," FBIS-cHI-82-212 (Nov. 2, 1982),
at ·C2 (noting that a 100-mile border area between Inner and
Outer Mongolia is a restricted military zone).

28.

See, ~, "Plans Made to Open More Areas to Foreign
Tourists," FBIS-cHI-78-114 (June 13, 1978), at Ell; "Formalities Simplified For Foreign Tourists,• FBIS-Cffi-82-205
(Oct. 22, 1982), at Kl3.

29.

See ZILE, ·SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 241-44.

30.

This information was provided to the author by a cultural
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., on June
26, 1981. See also "Soviet Leadership Reneged on 1969 Border Agreement,"~IS-cHI-78-069 (April 10, ·1978), at A6;
"NCNA Refutes Soviet Claims to Disputed Territory," FBISCHI-78-099 (May 22, 1978), at AS; "Soviet Violations of ·PRC
Border Reported," FBIS-cHI-79-168 (Aug. 28, 1979), at Cl.

at 237.
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31.

See note 27 supra.

32.

Promulgated by the State Council on April 30, 1965.
The
Act has been translated and reprinted in J. COHEN AND H.
CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY
STUDY 516-18 (2 Vols. 1974) [hereafter COHEN AND CHIU).

33.

See, ~· "Kirin Border Guard Captures
teur," FBIS-CHI-78-025 (Feb. 6, 1978), at
Morning Post Says China Tightening Border
CHI-79-124 (June 26, 1979), at Ll4; "Hsin
on China Border Security," FBIS-cHI-79-124
at Ul.

34.

See the 1965 Act on the Frontier Defense Inspection, supra
note 32, Art. 11.

35.

In fact, these security checks may be irnpl icitly warranted
by Article 10 of the 1965 Act on the Frontier Defense Inspection, supra note 32, which requires that all those in
charge of "means of communication" such as "vessels, airplanes, trains [and) automobiles" which pass into or out of
the PRC "carrying persons seeking to cross the national
boundary secretly or goods endangering the security of China" to report immediately to frontier inspection stations
and "await disposition."

36.

For an English translation of the text, see COHEN AND CHIU,
supra note 32, at 510-13.
See generally Gongan fagui huipian, supra note 1.

37.

This information was provided to the author by anonymous
sources at the U.S. State Department, June 25, 1981.

38.

This information was provided to the author by Mr. Jeffrey
Buczacki, China Division, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. in an interview on June 26, 1981.

39.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 253.

40.

1.2.·

41.

The Rules are reprinted in English Translation in COHEN AND
CHIU, supra note 32, at 596-7.

42.

This information was provided to the author by a military
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D. C., June
25, 1981.

43.

This information was provided to the author by a cultural
attache of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D. C., July
28, 1981.

44.

This information was provided to the author by a U.S. State
Department official, July 28, 1981.
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Suspected SaboLl; "South China
Security," FBISWan Pao Reports
(June 26, 1979),

45.

See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 249-50.

46.

See, ~, "Renmin Ribao on U.s., Soviet Military Satellites," FBIS-cHI-82-158 (Aug. 16, 1982), at Al; "People's
Daily Views US-USSR Contention in Space," FBIS-CHI-78-111
(June 8, 1978), at Al; "Jen-mir'l Jih-pao Article: Competition in Space, Hardship on Earth," SCMP no. 5906 (July 31,
1975), at 139.

47.

Liu Tse-yung, "The Question of the Legal Status of Cosmic
Space," Kuo-chi wen-'ti yen-chiu (Studies in International
Problems) no •. 8:
45-57 (1959) cited in GREENFIELD, supra
note 8, at 195. ~ also COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 32, at
499-501.

48.

See "PRC Delegate Speaks at UN Space Committee Session,"
FBIS-CHI-80-132 (July 8, 1980), at A2 (the PRC attended as
an observer); "PRC to Join UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space," FBIS-cHI-80-214 (Nov. 3, 1980), at Al; "Zhao
Ziyang Sends Greetings to UN Space Conference," FBIS-CHI82-154 (Aug. 10, 1982), at A2; "Delegate to UN Meeting
Enunciates Space Policy," FBIS-CHI-82-156 (Aug. 12, 1982),
at Al.

49.

See id.

50.

17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 13,
1963).

51.

The official title of the document is the "Treaty on Principles Governing- the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies of January 27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
See generally
Chiu, The Law of Outer Space, in LENG AND CHIU, supra note
21, at 115-21.

52.

See •soviet Satellite Crashes in Canada,• FBIS-CHI-78-017
(Jan. 25, 1978), at Al3; "Ta Kung Pao Comments on Crash of
Soviet Satellite,• FBIS-cHI-78-024 (Feb. 3, 1978), at Nl.

53.

March 29, 1972, [1973] 24 U.S.T. 2389, T. I.A.S.
See GREENFIELD, supra note 8, at 195.

54.

See, ~· Doyle, Reentering Space Objects:
Facts and
Fiction, 6 J. OF SPACE LAW 107, 108 (Nov. 2, 1978); "AFP
Reports Space Program Outlined at Conference," FBIS-CHI-82153 (Aug. 9, 1982), at K4 (noting that PRC had already sent
11 "scientific and technological testing satellites" into
orbit and would launch its first communications satellite
in 1983 or 1984.

55.

These
regulations were promulgated
on June 28,
1964
[hereafter Chiungehow Strait Regulations].
See COHEN AND
CHIU, supra note 32, at 535-38.
See also Gongan fagui
huibian, supra note 1, at 290 for the Chinese text.
- 260 -

No.

7762.

56.

The full title of the regulations is the Measures Governing
Foreign Vessels Entering and Leaving Port, promulgated on
March 14, 1957 [hereafter Port Regulations], reprinted in
COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 32, at 559-61.
See also Gongan
fagui huibian, supra note 1, at 287 for the Chinese text.

57.

The full title of the regulations is the Measures Governing
Foreign Vessels on Bordering Rivers, promulgated on April
19, 1966 [hereafter River Regulations], reprinted in COHEN
AND CHIU, supra note 32, at 567-70.
See also Gongan fagui
huibian, supra note 1, at 293 for the Chinese text.

58.

Article 11 of the Qiongzhou Strait Regulations, supra note
55, reads:
When passing through the Qiongzhou Strait, foreign
nonmilitary vessels are not allowed to take pictures,
to make surveys, or to engage in conduct that violates
the laws and decrees of the PRC.
Article 10 of the Port Regulations, supra note 56, reads:
Passengers and crew of a foreign vessel shall not be
allowed to engage in photographing or sketching in
port.
Article 11 of the River Regulations, supra note 57, reads,
inter alia:
A foreign vessel entering port on a bordering river or
a river reaching a foreign country, together with its
crew and passengers on board, is forbidden to do the
following:
(1) Photographing and sketching . . .

59.

See "1957 Security Regulations Published,"
(Feb. 26, 1980), at LS-15.

60.

Officials at both the U.S. State Department and the Chinese
Embassy in Washington, D. C., confirmed this restriction.
It apparently stemmed from the recent use by a foreigner of
16 mm. photography to film an unflattering movie of the
PRC.

61.

For the text of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, see "Text of New
PRC Constitution Published,"
FBIS-cHI-82-235
(Dec.
7,
1982), at Kl-28.
The Constitution was promulgabed on Dec.
4, 1982.
See also 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, id., Art. 10;
"Discipline Commission on Illegal Housebuilding,• FBIS-CHI81-193 (Oct. 6, 1981), at KG (calling for halt to illegal
building of private homes by cadres) "Guangxi Notice Prohibits Unlawful
Acquisition of Land,"
FBIS-cHI-80-060
(March 26, 1980), at Pl (calling for "serious treatment" of
those who violate state policy on land acquisition and purchase land for unauthorized use, such as the construction
of private residences); "Hainan Daily Cites Case of Corrupt
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FBIS-cHI-80-039

Truck Drivers," FBIS-CHI-78-098 (May 19, 1978), at H7
(publicizing acts which cause serious damage to property in
the PRC),
But see Article 82 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE,
infra note 6~which recognizes certain legitimate forms of
private property such as income, savings and other means of
livelihood as well as private· plots, livestock and trees
near the house.
Accord 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note
61, Art. 13.
In addition, the PRC has recently been much more
liberal in permitting private operation (i.e., sanziyibao)
of agricultural activities.
See Prybyla, Readjustment and
Reform in the Chinese Economy, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS
SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., No. 2-1981(39), at 25-27.
See also "Renmin Ribao Commentator on Expanding Private
Plot~FBIS-CHI-81-122 (June 25, 1981), at Kl;
"Private
Run Industry Seen as Indispensable," FBIS-CHI-82-186 (Sept.
24, 1982), at K3.
62.

See "Text of Law on Environmental Protection," FBIS-CHI-79182 (Sept. 18, 1979), at Ll.
Article 25 states:
"Pollution of foods in the course of production, processing,
packing,
transporting,
storing and
selling should be
strictly prevented.
Examination should be strengthened
and those foods that do not meet the sanitary standards of
the state should be strictly prohibited from being sold,
exported and imported."

63.

See "State Council Issues Standardization
FBIS-CHI-79-158 (Aug. 14, 1979), at Ll.

64.

See "Further on· NPC Standing Committee Meeting:
'Hygiene
Law Discussed'," FBIS-CHI-82-220 (Nov. 15, 1982), at K3.
See also "Wang Wei Explains New Food Hygiene Law," FBISCHI-82-227 (Nov. 24, 1982), at K2.

65.

See "Export-Import Quarantine Regulations
CHI-82-122 (June 24, 1982), at K5.

66.

See "Text of Law on Environmental Protection," FBIS-CHI-79182 (Sept. 18, 1979), at Ll.
See also "Provisional Norms
on Sea Pollution Issued," FBIS-CHI-80-050 (March 12, 1980),
at L6 n PLA Issues Environmental Protect ion Regulations I "
FBIS-CHI-82-079 (April 23, 1982), at K8.
Cf., "Tough
Environmental Laws Urged at Taiyuan Meeting," FBIS-CHI-80050 (March 12, 1980), at L5; "Article Urges Formulation of
Energy Law,• FBIS-CHI-82-097 (May 19, 1982), at Kll. China
Draws tire Over Environment, Balto. Sun, Oct. 4, 1982, at
A8.

67.

See "Text of New Forestry Act Recently Adopted by NPC,"
FBIS-CHI-79-043 (March 2, 1979), at El. Cf., "Anhui Official Arrested for Violating Forestry Law,n-FBIS-CHI-80-246
(Dec. 19, 1980), at 03.
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Regulations,"

Issued,"

FBIS-

68.

The PRC CRI!UNAL CODE was passed on July 1, 1979 at the
Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and
entered into force on January 1, 1980.
See Gongan fagui
huibian, supra note 1, at 4-33.
For the English text of
the Code, see "Seven PRC Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second
Session," FBIS-cHI-79-146 (July 27, 1979) PART I:
Supp.
No. 019 [hereafter Supp. No. 019)), at 33-62.
Article 129
of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE provides in pertinent part that
" [ t) hose guilty of the serious viol at ion of the
resources protection law • . • will be sentenced to fixed
term imprisonment of not more than 2 years, detention or
fines."
Article 129 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE connects a
number of violations (i.e., violation of the resources protection law; violation of the acquatic product law; and,
using forbidden tools to catch acquatic products) with the
conjunctive "and."
It is not clear whether the accused
must therefore violate all the elements of the provision or
whether violation of a single element (i.e., the resources
protection law) is sufficient for criminal responsibility.
Cf., Articles 5, 8, 15 of the 1957 Public Security Regulations, supra note 59, punishing, inter alia "soiling scenic
sports (sic) [or) historical sites . . • or wilfully damaging flowers, grass and trees in parks and along streets."
See also "State Council Decision on Environmental Protection;"FBIS-cHI-81-049 (March 13, 1981), at L2; 1982 PRC
CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, Arts. 9, 12, and 26.

69.

Article 128 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, id., provides in pertinent part that "[t)hose guilty of the serious violation
of the forest protection law .
will be sentenced to
fixed term imprisonment of not more than 3 years or detention and can concurrently or exclusively be sentenced [sic)
fines."
Cf. Articles 5, 8, 15 of the 1957 Public Security
Regulations, note 59, supra.

70.

Ar tiel es in the Chinese press on PRC sovereignty over its
natural resources abound.
The PRC has been particularly
vehement in this respect at the United Nations in recent
negotiations for a new law of the sea regime.
See ~'
"Delegates Address Sea Law Treaty Conference:
"Han Xu:
PRC to Sign Treaty,• FBIS-cHI-82-238 (Dec. 10, 1982), at
A3; "Issues at UN Law of Sea Conference Viewed," FBIS-cHI82-050 (March 15, 1982), at Al; "PRC Representative Speaks
at Law of Sea Conference," FBIS-cHI-80-173 (Sept. 4, 1980),
at A2; "Foreign Ministry Warns USSR, SRV Against Oil Prospecting [in South China Sea)," FBIS-CHI-80-141 (July 21,
1980), at El; "UN Sea Conference on New Law Continues
'Heated Debate' ,• FBIS-cP.I-78-079 (April 24, 1978), at A2;
"PRC Representative Addresses UN ESCAP Conference," FBISCHI-78-048 (March 10, 1978), at AlO.

71.

PRC recognition of a sovereign right to compensation for
damages was explicitly stated in 1982 in a Chinese demand
for compensation for cargo lost when a u.s. submarine sank
a Japanese freighter in the East China Sea in April 1981.
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See "China Daily on Suit Against U.S.
CHI-82-104 (May 28, 1982), at Bl.

Over Cargo,"

FBIS-

Prior to this, Chinese recognition of a sovereign
right to compensation for damages was i:npl ied in a Xinhua
commentary on the Soviet MIG which landed in Japan.
See
"Hsinhua Correspondent: Who Should Pay Compensation?" SCMP
no. 6333 (May 5, 1977), at 219.
Compensation is also required under the PRC CRIMINAL
Article 31 states: "Apart from sancCODE, supra note 68.
tions according to law, an offender guilty of an offense
resulting in financial losses to a victim should also be
sentenced to make reparations [peichang] in the light of
the condition."
See also Art. 41 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note61;--wilich asserts that "[c]itizens who
have suffered losses through infringement of their civic
rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to
compensation. . . . •
72.

There are, however, pubicized directives admonishing Chinese citizens to appropriately conduct themselves in their
relations with foreigners.
One recent government/CCP campaign
stressed
the
slogan
"five
stresses
and
four
beauties," requiring Chinese to "be warm and friendly
.civilized and courteous and be neither supercilious
nor obseqious."
See, ~· "Ban Yue Tan on Dealings with
Foreigners," FBIS-cHI-81-238 (Dec. 11, 1981), at K9.
See
also "Yangcheng Wanbao Discusses Foreign Influences," FBISCHI-82-037 (Feb. 23, 1982), at K5.
See also note 92,
infra.
-- ---

73.

Article 13 of the
note 1, provides:

1951

State

Secrets

Regulations,

supra

Any person who behaves in one of the following ways
shall be found guilty of being a counterrevolutionary and
shall be punished according [to] the regulations for the
punishment of cou.nterrevolutionar ies:
1) Any person who
sells state secrets to enemies at home and abroad; 2) any
person who deliberately divulges state secrets to enemies
at home and abroad; and, 3) any person who sells state
secrets to domestic and foreign profiteers.
A good example of the capriciousness of 'state secrecy
laws in the PRC was provided by a secret directive issued
by the CCP, making it a criminal offense to trace Mao
Zedong's writings back to their original versions. As such
Mao's writings could be revised, without mass knowledge of
the changes, to reflect "each new twist of the political
line." See SHORT, supra note 10, at 149.
74.

See Articles 28, 53, 54, and 76.
Note also that the 1982
PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, included prov1S1ons insulating deputies of the National People's Congress (NPC)
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from legal accountability for comments made at NPC meetings.
See Arts. 74 and 75.
Though this might appear
ostensibly as a form of immunity from prosecution for
acts performed reasonably within the scope of official
functions, no NPC deputy or other state functionary is
authorized to reveal any form of classified information.
Under all circumstances divulging unpublicized information,
even where the act appears to conform with NPC legislative
enactments, would be tantamount to violating state secrecy
laws and punishable as ultra vires activity.
Cf. "Renmin
Ribao on Whether Speeches Can Be Crimes," FBIS-cHI-82-140
(July 21, 1982), at K2; note 7, supra.
75.

For an example of PRC treatment of those who levy false
charges, ~· ~· Self-Correction by the Party, Beijing
Review, No. 16 (April 21, 1980), at 5; "Kansu Prefecture
Announces Arrest of 'Archcriminal' ," FBIS-CHI-78-176 (Sept.
11, 1978), at M2.
A recent article noted that those who
falsely accuse others of being enemy agents are 1 iable to
life imprisonment.
See "Legislator Comments on Penalties
in Gang Trial," FBIS-CHI-81-013 (Jan. 21, 1981), at L3.

76.

See note 6 supra.

77.

See note 12 supra.
See also Guiding Principles for Inner
Party Political Life, Beijing Review, No. 13 ( i1arch 31,
1980), at 3.
Note also that Chinese press reports stated
that the abolition of the "Sida" (Four Bigs of the 1978 PRC
Constitution) was due, inter alia, to their tendency to
permit communication of Party and state secrets.
See Important Resolutions of N.P.C. Standing Committee, Beijing
Review, No. 17 (April 28, 1980), at 3.

78.

H. BE~~AN AND P. MAGGS, DISARM~~ENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET
LAW 35-7 (1967) [hereafter BERMAN AND MAGGS].

79.

Id., at 36.

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

Ellis and Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in
the People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 155,
159 n.22 (Nov. 2, 1981).

83.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 288.

84.

Actually, the language is written in the converse, stating
that "all organs of state,
public
organizations and
citizens concerned are obliged to supply the necessary information to those committees of inquiry when they conduct
investigations."
See 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 61,
Art. 71. See also Art. 73.
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85.

The PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE was passed on July 1, 1979
at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980.
See Gongan
fagui huibian, supra note 1, at 34-65.
For the English
text of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, see "Seven PRC
Laws Adopted at Fifth NPC Second Session," FBIS-CHI-79-146
(July 27, 1979) PART II:
Supp. No. 020 [hereafter Supp.
No. 020].

86.

For an overview of PRC laws applicable for noncooperation,
see "Article Discusses Concealing Criminal Behavior," FBISCHI-82-054 (March 19, 1982), at K8.
Cf. Article 73 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra
note 6I, which requires ·officials of the State Council and
its subordinate organs to "answer the questions [of NPC and
NPC Standing Committee deputies] in a responsible manner."

87.

See "Leniency for Those Who Confess Crimes Advocated,"
FBIS-CHI-82-066 (April 6, 1982), at K4; "Renmin Ribao on
Criminal Law Leniency, Severity," FBIS-CHI-81-234 (Dec. 7,
1981) at K24.
Chiu, Structural Changes in the Organization
and Operation of China's Criminal Justice System, ocCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD.,
No. 1-1981(38), at 4 and 18 n.30.
See also "Renmin Ribao
Urges Leniency Toward Cadres Who Made tiiTStakes in Past ,•
FBIS-CHI-79-056 (March 21, 1979), at Ll5; "Shanghai Case of
Shielding Murderer Handled According to Law," FBIS-CHI-79155 (Aug. 9, 1979), at 02; "Jiefang Ribao Comments on Maintaining Social Order," FBIS-cHI-80-002 (Jan. 3, 1980), at
06.

88.

See The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China
Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment, Beijing Review, No. 40 (Oct. 6, 1980), a 18.

89.

See Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment, 7 CHINA BUS. REV. 43 (No.
6, Nov.-Dec. 1980).

90.

Supervision and inspection would also appear to apply to
the implementation of the PRC Quarantine Regulations, supra
note 65, and the PRC Food Hygiene Law, supra note 64, the
drafts of which are currently being revised for formal
enactment.

91.

See BERMAN AND MAGGS, supra note 78, at 36;
AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 285.

92.

ZILE,

SHARLET

See "Shanghai Radio Urges Proper Attitudes Toward ForeignFBIS-cHI-79-084 (April 30, 1979), at 02.
See ~
note 72, supra; "Guangming Ribao Discusses Proper Approach
to Foreign Things," FBIS-CHI-79-091 (May 9, 1979), at LlO;
"AFP:
Restrictions Placed on Chinese Contacts with Foreigners," FBIS-CHI-79-105 (May 30, 1979), at L2; "State
Council Publishes Decision of Gifts," FBIS-cHI-80-225 (Nov.

ers,"
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19, 1980), at Ll (noting that, according to a State Council
decision, no Chinese are allowed to accept gifts in dealing
with foreign nationals and organizations without the approval of appropriate authorities).
93.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 289.

94.

See "Political Dissident Sentenced to 15 Years
ment," FBIS-CHI-79-201 (Oct. 16, 1979), at Ll.
note 13, supra.

95.

"Remmin Ribao Report on Beijing Trial of Wei Jingsheng,"
FBIS-cHI-79-207 (Oct. 24, 1979), at Ll.
Wei was actually
convicted of a number of crimes.
In addition to supplying
information to a foreigner, Wei was convicted of carrying
out revolutionary propaganda and agitation and damaging the
vital interests of the state and the people.
Id.
Though
they were all counterrevolutionary crimes, there was no
indication given by the Beijing Municipal People's Court as
to what punishment was meted out for each crime, or whether
the crimes were even separately considered.
Since Wei's
crimes were committed prior to the promulgation of the 1979
PRC CRIMINAL CODE, he was convicted under the 1951 Act for
the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries of the PRC.
Cf.,
Chiu, China's New Legal System, 79 CURRENT HISTORY 29 (No.
4 58, Sept • 19 8 0 ) .

96.

See "Further Reportage on Trial of Wei Jingsheng," FBISCHI-79-202 (Oct. 17, 1979), at Ll; "Additional Reportage on
Trial of Dissident Wei Jingsheng" FBIS-CHI-79-204 (Oct. 19,
1979), at Ll; "Beijing Ribao Comments on Wei Jingsheng
Case," FBIS-cHI-79-208 (Oct. 25, 1979), at Rl; "Beijing
Municipal Court Rejects Wei Jingsheng' s Appeal," FBIS-CHI79-217 (Nov. 7, 1979), at Ll; "Further Reportage on Dissident Wei Jingsheng," FBIS-CHI-79-220 (Nov. 13, 1979), at
Ll; "Beijing Ribao Condemns Wei Jingsheng' s Crimes," FBISCHI-79-233 (Dec. 3, 1979), at L2; "Lawyers Discuss Dissident's Trial in Beijing Ribao," FBIS-CHI-80-241 (Dec. 12,
1980), atL7.

97.

See, ~,
"Henan
Sentences Man
for
'Appealing'
Wei
Jingsheng Case," FBIS-cHI-79-252 (Dec. 31, 1979), at Pl.

98.

Article 117 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 68, provides for up to three years imprisonment, fines and confiscation of property for violating "financial, toreign exchange, gold and silver and commercial control laws" and
for practicing "speculation and manipulation."
See also
"Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control Issued," FBIS-CHI82-005 (Jan. 8, 1982), at K7; "Regulations Ban Domestic
Sale of Export Goods,• FBIS-cHI-82-183 (Sept. 21, 1982), at
KlB; "Shanghai Reader Calls for Stop to Illegal Transactions," FBIS-cHI-79-231 (Nov. 29, 1979), at 04; "Guangzhou
Cracks Down on Illegal Foreign Currency Exchanges," FBISCHI-79-232 (Nov. 30, 1979), at Pl;
"Hsin Wan Pao on

-
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ImprisonSee also

Guangzhou Restricting Use of Foreign Currency,•
79-242 (Dec. 14, 1979), at Ul.

FBIS-cHI-

ll.ccord ZILE, SHARLET !~.NO LOVE, supra note 2, at 291
observing the same conditions for private individuals in
the Soviet Union.
99.

See The UN:
China's Disarmament Proposal, Beijing Review,
No. 28 (July 12, 1982), at 11: "Text of PRC Proposal at UN
Disarmament Session," FBIS-CHI-82-127 (July 1, 1982), at
11.1. ~generally PART I, Chapter 2(B)4.
!~.NO

100.

See ZILE, SHARLET

101.

See S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 414
(1979). See generally PART I, Chapter I.

102.

See ZILE, SHARLET

103.

See id., at 293-96.

104.

The 1978 PRC CONSTITUTION provided that the "Supreme People's Court, local people's courts· at various levels and
special people's courts exercise judicial authority" (Art.
41).
See "Text of Newly Adopted Constitution,• FBIS-cHI78-045 (March 7, 1978), at 039.

!~.NO

LOVE, supra note 2, at 293.

LOVE, supra note 2, at 293.

The 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, states in
Article 123 that "people's .courts •
• are the judicial
organs of the state."
ll.rticle 124 notes that the PRC establishes the Supreme People's Court, the local people's
courts, and special courts, including military courts.
Nowhere does the language of the Constitution confer independent and exclusive judicial authority on the courts,
although this does not necessarily lead to an inference of
deliberate modification.
105.

The PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S COURTS was passed on July
1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980
[hereafter PRC ORGANIC COURT LAW].
~ Gongan
fagui
huibian, supra note 1, at 449-57.
The English text of the
PRC ORGANIC COURT LAW may be found in Supp. no. 019, supra
note 68, at 20-27.

106.

Compare ZILE, SHALET

107.

See also "Further Coverage of Fifth Session
Fifth NPC:
'Resolution on Supreme Court' ,• FBIS-cHI-82-239 (Dec. 13,
1982), at K8 (calling on courts and procuratorates .of the
PRC to "protect the rights and interests of the state • • •
and safeguard the successful development of socialist
modernization. n

108.

!~.NO

LOVE, supra note 2, at 293.

of

See also PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 85, Arts.

'l!";"""l

r:--
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109.

See A NEW PRACTICAL CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Book Co., Ltd., Hong Kong, i974).

110.

See, ~' Chiu, China's New Legal System, 79 CURRENT HISTORY 29, 32 (No. 458, Sept. 1980).
Chiu noted that Wei
Jingsheng's trial had initially been designated as open to
the public although none of Wei's family or relatives was
permitted to enter.
Moreover, at least one of those Chinese who did attend received a ticket at work and had been
instructed to be present.
See also Butterfield, Leading
Chinese Dissident Gets 15-Year Prison Term, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1979, at A3.

111.

The only remaining obligation would appear to be called for
under Article 11 of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra
note 85, which states that "[t]he reason for not hearing a
case in public should be announced by the court."
This
provision can be easily complied with by the PRC without
compromising the confidential nature of the interrogation.

112.

See also
134.

113.

This problem may
CODE, supra note
to frame another
by up to 7 years

114.

PRC ORGANIC COURT LAW, supra note 105, Art. 10.
See also
PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 85, Art. 105.

the

1982 PRC CONSTITUTION,

supra note

(Far

61,

East

Art.

be somewhat mitigated by the PRC CRIMINAL
68.
Intentional mistranslation in order
person or conceal evidence is punishable
under Article 148 of the CODE.

People's assessors are unlike jurors as we know them
in the United States.
But cf. "Shanghai Districts Elect,
Train People's Court JurieS." FBIS-CHI-80-154 (Aug. 7,
1980), at 03.
(This article was probably mistranslated,
incorrecty substituting "juries" for "assessors."
There
are no juries in the PRC.)
First, the assessors are usually intimately familiar with the facts of the defendant's
case before trial.
Most often, they are chosen from the
defendant's danwei or workplace, and have an unfavorable
predisposition toward the defendant's action.
This is in
keeping with the Chinese principles of isolation and confrontation: singling out the accused, confronting him with
his acts, and securing his confessions and repentance,
usually in the form of self-criticism.
Assessors serve
only in tl:!e court of first instance.
At t.he appellate
level, there are 3 judges and no assessors.
Second, there are no legal devices such as voir dire
with its attendant rights of dismissal for cause or-peremptory challenges as Western legal systems know them.
But
cf. Yanling, China's Law of Civil Procedure, Beijing Re='
view, No. 33 (Aug. 16, 1982), at 20 [hereafter Yanling]
(noting that the law of civil procedure - implemented in
the PRC on a trial basis in October 1982 - requires a judge
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to disqualify himself in instances where he is the litigant, has some close relationship to him, or is personally
interested in the case.
This is the first such instance of
self-disqualification in current PRC law.)
Assessors, once appointed (ostensibly, they are to be
elected by the people, although they are often selected by
local officials) are expected to serve; no lawyer will
challenge their presence, neither with cause nor without.
See, ~· "Hunan's Use of People's Assessor Proves Effec-.
tive," FBIS-cHI-80-205 (Oct. 21, 1980), at L7 (noting that
Hunan assessors were "chosen" for 3-year terms and may be
removed at any time for incompetence or negligence).
Cf.
"Jiefangjun Bao on System
of Assessors for
Military
Courts," FBIS-cHI-80-197 (Oct. 8, 1980), at LB.
115.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 85, Art. 105.

116.

Judging from the dispatch with which the Four Bigs (Sida)
were abolished from the 197 8 PRC CONSTITUTION, Art. 4 5, in
1980, i t is quite possible that the difficulty of procuring
a statutory amendment is minimal.
See, ~· "Further
Reportage on NPC Closing Session:
Constitution Revision
Committee Resolution," FBIS-cHI-80-178 (Sept. 11, 1980), at
L4.

117.

See "Reportage on Gang of Four Trial Continues:
Xinhua
Interviews Jurist," FBIS-CHI-80-228 (Nov. 24, 1980), at L2.
See also Chiu, Certain Leaal Aspects of the Recent Peking
Trials of the "Gang of Four" and Others, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/
REPRINTS IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES, No. 3-1981 (40),
Chapter II, at 27-39.

118.

See ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE,
CONST. amend. VI.

119.

supra

note

2,

at

295;

See also PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 85,

a,-2r.-

U.S.
Arts.

120.

See Article 8 of the Provisional Regulations, cited in
"Text of Provisional Regulations on Lawyers," FBIS-cHI-80169 (Aug. 28, 1980), at L6.
See also Peking Restricts Foreign Legal Firms, Dealing Setback to Some u.s. Lawyers,
Asian Wall St. Journal, Jan. 1, 1980, p. 6; "Xinhua Discusses Role of Lawyers in Beijing," FBIS-CHI-82-077 (April
21, 1982), at Rl.
See generally Ellis and Shea, Foreign
Commercial Dispute Settlement in the People's Republic of
~~ 6 !NT 'L TRADE L. J. 155 (Nov. 2, 1981).

121.

See "Text of Provisional Regulations on Lawyers," id.,
Arts. 5, 6.
See also "Renmin Ribao Discusses RegulatiOns
for Lawyers,"-"fBIS-cHI-82-011 (Jan. 18, 1982), at Kl6;
"Xinhua Discusses Role of Lawyers in Beijing," FBIS-CHI-ij20 77 (Apr il 21 , 19 8 2 ) , at Rl •

122.

ZILE, SHARLET AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 295.
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123.

The author makes a major· assumption with regard to this
particular alternative:
the practical utility of counsel
in PRC legal proceedings.
An examination of the Gang of
Four trial, for example, revealed that the defendants' attorneys were not advocates, ~ se; for the most part,
their services were limited to pleading for leniency for
their clients.
This aspect of practical Chinese law attenuates the role of defense counsel in legal proceedings
and raises the question of whether legal representation -particularly where limited to Chinese attorneys -- would
not be a worthless and time-consuming exercise.

124.

PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 85, Art. 32; PRC
CRIIUNAL CODE, supra note 68, Art. 136.
See also Article 7
of the PRC ORGANIC LAW FOR PEOPLE'S PROC:URATORATES, passed
on July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress and entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980,
in Gong an fagui huibian, supra note 1, at 458-64.
For the
English text, see Supp. No. 019, supra note 68, at 27-33.
See also "Leg isla tor Comments on Penal ties in Gang Trial,"
FBIS-CHI-91-013 (Jan. 21, 1981), at L3; "Guangming Ribao on
Crimina! Offenses, Legal Terms," FBIS-CHI-80-251 (Dec. 29,
1980), at L20.
Pre-1979 practices were considerably different.
See
Chiu, Socialist Legalism:
Reform and Continuity of Post=
Mao Communist China, 17 ISSUES & ST!JD. 45, 56-7 (~o. 11,
No. 1981); SHORT, supra note 10, 154-66.

125.

See, ~· "Guangming Ribao Hints at Refusals to Give
Evidence," FBIS-cHI-80-247 (Dec. 22, 1980), at Lll.
See
also "Heilongjiang:
Obstacles in Criminal Cases Viewed,"
FBIS-cHI-82-103 (May 27, 1982), at Sl (calling on legal and
public security organs to remove "obstacles,"
such as
giving "false evidence," in cracking down on crime); 1982
PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, Art. 38 (guaranteeing the
personal dignity of Chinese citizens and protecting them
from "false charge or frame-up").

126.

See Part 2, Section 2 of the PRC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE,
supra note 85, Arts. 67-70.

127.

Article 15 of the PRC CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 68, exempts
from punishment "mental patients who cannot understand or
control their actions."
However, Article 15 may charge the
family members of such patients with legal accountability
for the latter's acts where the former do not keep "close
watch over them." Article 16 provides lighter or mitigated
penal ties or even exemption from punishment for "a deafmute or blind person."
Cf., 1957 Public Security Regulations, supra note 59, Art-.-37.
These statutory provisions admit a form of unconditional "insanity defense."
A recent article on a Shanghai
trial of an accomlice of the "Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique" indicated that criminal proceedings might be
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suspended where "temporary" mental illness prevents an accused -- in this case Ma Tianshui, who was suffering from
"psychosis," as diagnosed by a judicial medical exa~iner at
the time of trial - f.ron\ defending himself.
In truth, this
appears similar to the Amer lean legal concept of "incompetency to stand trial," rather than "insanity,• which
would preclude a finding of guilt.
See "Shanghai Courts
Sentence Jiang Qing Followers," FBIS-CHI-82-168 (Aug. 30,
1982), at 04.
128.

"Renmin Ribao on Questions About Lin-Jiang Trial ,•
CHI-81-027 (Feb. 10, 1981), at LlO.

FBIS-

129.

1.2.·,

130.

Id.

131.

Id.

132.

See

133.

See note 117 supra and accompanying text.

134.

Article 133 of the 1982 PRC CONSTITUTION, supra note 61,
requires .all procuratorial organs to answer strictly to the
organs of state power at the corresponding levels which
created them (presumably, people's congresses), an obviouply intolerable condition vis-a-vis inspectorate operations.

135.

For an excellent discussion of Chinese rule enforcement and
coercive apparatus, see J. TOWNSEND, POLITICS IN CHINA 32027 (1980).
See also notes 1-20 supra and accompanying
text.

136.

See BERMAN AND MAGGS, supra note 78, at 43; ZILE,
AND LOVE, supra note 2, at 302-06.

137.

Interview conducted by the author with a cultural attache
of the PRC Embassy in Washington, D.C. on August 14, 1981.

138.

The PRC attache cited id. would not explicitly enumerate
formal application procedures and the author is uncertain
of what steps are taken by Chinese governmental organs to
ensure the authenticity of familial ties between Chinese
nationals and relatives abroad.
Cf. "Fujian Ribao on
Abuses in Securing Exit Permits," FBIS-cHI-82-039 (Feb. 26,
1982), a.t 03.
(This article reported on a Fuj ian Communist
Party Committee prohibition on party (CCP) cadres securing
"exit permits" for their families, relatives, and friends
through "connections" or quanxi.
These exit permits are
not specifically discussed and it is more likely that they
are internal permits allowing inter-province travel in the
PRC, rather than emigration permits.)
·

at Lll.

~

note 125 supra.
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SHARLET

139.

See, ~· Bernstein, Peking is Troubled by Rise in Defections to West, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1982, at A22; "AFP Reports Envoy, Spokesman on Hu Na Defection," FBIS-CHI-82-150
(Aug. 4, 1982), at Bl; "AFP: Chai Zemin Wants U.S. toReturn Defector," FBIS-cHI-82-152 (Aug. 6, 1982), at Bl;
"AFP:
PRC Air Force Major Defects with Plane,• FBIS-cHI82-201 (Oct. 18, 1982), at Kl2; "PRC Diplomat Granted
Political Asylum in France," FBIS-cHI-82-222 (Nov. 17,
1982), at Vl; "Paper Reports Defection of Mainland Physicist," FBIS-cHI-82-222 (Nov. 17, 1982), at Vl. Cf. "PRC on
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Deten-

Conclusion
Chinese perceptions of international law issues, including
the recognition of international organizations and individuals,
have varied with broadly-defined domestic goals.
For example,
the PRC's previous hard-line position on refusing to recognize
international organizations as juridical personalities has yielded to a more flexible posture, most recently illustrated by Chinese accession to the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, participation in the UN Disarmament Committee, ratification of the UN Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons with a statement noting among the Convention's inadequacies the absence of adequate verification measures,! and recommendation of nuclear disarmament verifiable by
an international inspectorate body.2
Nevertheless, these PRC
acts cannot be wantonly paraded before the international community as a weathervane of future PRC commitment to the operation of
any ACD agency on PRC territory.
Chinese positions are palpably inconsistent, frequently ambiguous, and legally duplicitous. The PRC, for example, may have
ratified the UN Specialized Agency Convention, but it has not
ratified the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, which grants juridical status to the United
Nations and would appear to be the logical precursor to recognition of UN agencies. The Chinese have also refused to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
Despite its participation in the UN Disarmament Committee and its
recent ratification of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, the PRC has not exhibited any tangible interest in
cooperating in multilateral disarmament talks: rather, its position is noticeably noncommittal pending primary disarmament measures first implemented by the superpowers.
Moreover, the suggestion that disarmament on a multilateral scale is a function of
bilateral initiation gives the Chinese the justification they
require to increase their military expenditures and develop newer
and more sophisticated weapons systems in the interim.
It has
also served as the rationale for PRC recalcitrance in refusing to
ratify existing ACD treaties such as the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Even the PRC 's
laudable 1982 disarmament proposal, including provisions for
verification by an international inspectorate under UN authority,
is sufficiently nebulous to permit the Chinese the luxury of opposing verification measures unilaterally deemed overly intrusive
or otherwise found unsatisfactory.
In short, PRC perceptions of international law, international organizations and individuals, and ACD verification measures have always been formed and followed within the context of
the Chinese commitment to the
inviolable nature of state
sovereignty. Arguably, the idea of arms control and arms inspection runs counter to such a concept.
Chinese reluctance might
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reasonably be manifested at the negotiating table, PRC representatives claiming that the constraints of arms control and intrusiveness of arms inspection constitute an undue interference into
the sovereign affairs of the PRC.
Undoubtedly, Chinese receptiveness to an arms control agreement and concomitant inspection
provisions will remain a function of PRC perceptions of the
international law principles of sovereignty and noninterference
in the internal affairs of a state, and, perhaps, the degree to
which other parties to the agreement reconcile arms control arrangements with their own views of such principles.
International l:aw principles aside, there are fundamental
Chinese domestic concerns which would influence the execution of
arms control provisions within the PRC or determine the willingness of other nuclear powers to secure Chinese cooperation in
their implementation.
Systematic re:froductions of legislative
and judicial pronouncements are few.
To some extent, this is
the result of the relative infancy of operation of Chinese legal
codes: to a larger degree, the lack of information is part and
parcel to the Chinese tradition of mistrust of foreign elements
and the tendency to envelop the operational aspect of formal Chinese government in secrecy. Chinese xenophobia is an extremely
sensitive concern, particularly where potential verification procedures envision the creation of a non-Chinese inspectorate body.
The PRC has been extremely assiduous in insulating Chinese
society from foreign influence.
Despite apparent attempts to
reconcile its mistrust of foreigners with its constitutionallyexpressed goal of achieving the four modernizations by the onset
of the twenty-first century, the PRC has set in motion formallysanctioned procedures for foreign contact, some of which inhibit,
rather than promote, bilateral association.
The relative euphoria enveloping the exposure of Chinese and American society to
each other following normalization of relations in 1979 has been
tempered by the rather loose interpretation of Chinese secrecy
laws to activities engaged in between Chinese nationals and
Americans. Party, military, state and seemingly innocuous forms
of information are subject to PRC secrecy laws, and the Chinese
have simply broadened or narrowed their application to reflect
shifts in political relations. Thus an arms inspectorate might
be faced with significant obstructive PRC practices that result
from the vagaries and caprices of what constitutes secret information.
Undoubtedly, effective inspection operations would require either drastic revisions in the drafting of, or exemptions
from, existing secrecy laws in the PRC.
Secrecy laws are not, of course, the only legal impendiments
to effective inspectorate operations in the PRC. Relevant provisions of the PRC Constitution, Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure
Code, Arrest and Detention Regulations, Entry, Exit and Transit
regulations, and local decrees and regulations are worded sufficiently ambiguously as to create uncertainty as to their application at any given time. The result is an unequivocal conclusion
that an inspectorate can operate in the PRC only insofar as revisions in, or exemptions from, numerous Chinese laws are
extensive.
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The decision to accept and implement verification procedures
rests mainly with the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP has such
pervasive influence over each and every aspect of Chinese 1 ife
that it remains unquestionably the single, most dominant force in
creating an environment which facilitates or inhibits arms inspection.
Where arms inspection procedures were considered
tolerable within the PRC system, Party support as policy-maker
and pol icy-executor would likely ensure full compliance with an
arms inspection pol icy.
The gover mnen tal system, despite its
ostensible role in the pol icy-making and pol icy-execution processes as laid down in the recent legal codes, appears to exert
only a marginal influence.
Party control of governmental units
and basic-level societal units (through public supervisory organizations such as people's mediation committees) would seem to
preclude the possibility of official opposition to a CCPsupported arms inspection policy, though the exact strength and
independent function of intra-Party factions cannot be gauged
with sufficient certainty to determine their role in inspection
operations.
Despite the CCP's dissemination of the 1979-80 legal codes
to the Chinese masses and the Party's emphasis on socialist
legality, the entire legislative and administrative machinery
rem a ins subordinate to the CCP at every 1 evel.
The Party'!; monopoly on the pol icy-making and pol icy-execution processes permits CCP-initiated directives to be immediately implement-:d by
governmental authorities.
Moreover, such enactments are 1 ikely
to be binding on all cadres and individuals, regardless of their
advice and consent. Though such a centralized process can readily facilitate the operation of an inspectorate in the PRC, Party
control can cut both ways.
It can be used just as readily as an
obstructive factor in inspection operations, the more so because
the CCP leadership has at its disposal all the necessary means to
influence civic attitudes towards the inspection process.
By
publicizing or propagandizing an arms inspection policy through
the communications media, mass organizations and mass campaigns,
the Party has the power to highlight incidents of intrusiveness
and to otherwise create an at:nosphere of significant adverse
publicity for inspection operations.
Despite the apparent power of legal and quasi-legal organs
in the PRC, the CCP can expect no serious threat to its control.
First, the procuracy and the judiciary are composed of CCP cadres, whose task is, first and foremost, to strengthen Party
leadership over the masses.
Second, the judiciary in the PRC
does not exercise the power of judicial review as it is known in
.the West. Any challenge to the validity of implementing legislation is expected to issue from the procuracy, though there has
yet to appear an instance in which the procuracy has challenged
any Party-initiated decrees on constitutional or other legal
grounds. CCP-initiated implementing legislation in support of an
arms inspection policy is therefore unlikely to be opposed by PRC
legal organs, in spite of constant calls in the media for the
exercise of independent legal authority.
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Undoubtedly, there is the opportunity for a more positive
association among the Party, Chinese legal organs and an inspectorate. Where the CCP supports an arms inspection policy, a full
array of legal and quasi-legal organizations can help to facil itate compliance.
The procuracy might utilize its extensive investigative powers to expedite the procurement of inspectorate
information and to ensure cooperation from local authorities.
The more informal dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation and arbitration, might s~rve to create an environment conducive to effective, expeditious and harmonious dispute resolution.
The courts -- in the event it became necessary to resort
to them -- could be used as a forum for the construction of broad
legal principles that facilitate inspection operations.
In most
instances, however, an inspectorate should recognize the PRC
aversion to formal judicial procdure and the 1 ikel ihood that resort to the judiciary may itself indicate Chinese unhappiness
with inspection activities.
Quasi-public and mass organizations can be used to indoctrinate the Chinese masses with positive attitudes toward inspection
functions.
Moreover, the Party can facilitate the molding of
such attitudes by tailoring Chinese Communist ideological constructs to meet the goals of effective inspection operations.
Assuming the conclusion of an arms control agreement, there
are numerous legal and administrative safeguards that an inspec.torate would require in order to carry out its operations in the
PRC.
First, verification procedures must be made operative
within PRC territory.
Though the Chinese appear to be particularly attentive to their treaty obligations because of their belief that treaties are the most unequivocal expression of state
consent,
verification
arrangements
would
probably
require
specific incorporation into Chinese municipal law.
To this end,
the most effective means of facilitating inspection operations
would probably be to incorporate the carefully-outlined powers of
an inspectorate in a statute promulgated by the NPC and its
Standing Committee.
Since lower-level legislatures exercise
mostly subordinate, rather than concurrent, powers, the enactment
of a statute at the NPC level would bind provincial and lowerlevel law-making bodies and facilitate inspection operations.
Obviously, PRC enabling legislation is, by itself, insufficient for effective verification operations. The Chinese must be
required to provide an inspectorate with a continuous flow of
information on national and local laws.
Moreover, an inspectorate is well-advised to engage in political monitoring -- through
the examination of media pronouncements -- in order to observe
potential changes in the internal functioning of CCP leadership
that may impact on inspectorate legislation and operations.
Most importantly, effective, unimpeded inspection operations
will require a relatively broad grant of privileges and immunities from Chinese
substantive and
procedural
jurisdiction.
Privileges and immunities would be required regardless of whether
the form of the inspectorate were adversar ial or international in
character.
Arguably, the Chinese appear most willing to part
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with sovereign jurisdiction where the inspectorate is international in character.
An adversary inspectorate would, inter
alia, require the Chinese to undertake a significant resocialization process, particularly with respect to the Soviet Union,
which has been accused consistently of using diplomatic privileges as a cover for covert ac tiv i ties.
The par tic ipa tion of
Chinese nationals on the inspectorate team, despite the obvious
advantages it offers the PRC in keeping inspection operations
supervision to some extent • in-house," suffers from the potentially more severe repercussions which might accompany the ultra
vires conduct of Chinese personnel, including the possible conflict between a grant of privileges and immunities and the imposition of severe criminal penal ties for counterrevolutionary
activity.
In many instances, an international inspectorate -- particularly in the event its members were from Third World nations -would not suffer from the same infirmities.
First, the PRC considers itself ideologically, socially, and economically compatible with many Third World countries.
Second, Chinese authorities rarely ascribe to Third World nations the more obnoxious features of the superpowers, such as blatant acts of
espionage or competitive escalation of the arms race.
There
would simply be less distrust of Third World members' intentions
than those of, say, the Soviet Union.
Finally, the PRC is already on record as supporting an international body to "carry out
effective verification", a choice of words that, despite their
potential, offer nothing more than support for the collection of
data by an international body.
Nevertheless, despite its dissimilarity to support. for on-site verification by an international inspectorate, the PRC's proposal is still a step in the direction of mutual, observable compliance with ACD measures.
An inspectorate, in addition to a grant of broad privileges
and immunities, would also require certain exemptions from Chinese restrictions, particularly as they apply to the freedom of
movement of personnel, equipment and supplies in the PRC.
Obviously, the novelty and untested procedures of inspectorate
operations will create a significant degree of suspicion, and it
seems almost tautological to assert that the more specific and
narrowly-focused the requisite privileges, immunities and exemptions, the greater the likelihood of their acceptance by the Chinese.
Inspectorate operations should be limited to the collection of relevant data and the examination of appropriate facilities and should result in only marginal contact with the everyday
aspects of Chinese life, thus reducing any latent fear of the
effects of any perceived, pernicious, outside influence on Chinese society.
For the most part, the insulation of Chinese society from
inspectorate operations should make it desirable for the inspectorate to operate its own means of communication and transportation and to secure separate accommodations and personal services.
Not only would this limit any foreign influence on the masses and
more readily permit Chinese monitoring of inspection activities,
but it would also protect the inspectorate from the potential
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harassment of mass organizations, street committees and the like
and facilitate operations, since all inspectorate functions .would
proceed through special channels.
Because of the Chinese penchant for secrecy and control, the
consolidation of the supervision of inspectorate operations in
the PRC in a newly-created special Chinese agency (or agencies)
or commission would seem to be a realistic and plausible consideration.
The establishment of such entities within the PRC
should pose no legal obstacles to the Chinese, assuming, of
course, Chinese Communist Party approval for its creation. The
PRC has, for example, set up a Legislative Affairs Commission
under the NPC Standing Committee4 to draft and revise legislation
and~ Discipline Inspection Committee under the Chinese Communist
Par ty5 to investigate and discipline CCP cad res for legal and
ethical violations.
A commission combining these types of functions (i.e., legislative, investigative and prosecutorial) would
be an excellent prototype for an ACD supervisory body.A special
PRC organ to oversee inspectorate operations and handle inspectorate requests would, as is perhaps true of most totalitarian
regimes, reduce bureaucratic red tape, provide a single forum
from which and through which to channel complaints, ensure insulation of the masses from inspectorate activities, guarantee
compliance with PRC national security, minimize the number of
personnel involved in verification, and legitimize inspectorate
operations by introducing government involvement in the entire
process. To these ends, the CCP could .simply create a new ministry or agency to oversee inspectorate operations and report directly to the Party's Central Committee or it could put a highlevel Party official directly in charge of the ministry or agency.
In either case, the CCP would be 1 ikel y to assume more or
less direct control of inspectorate operations.
At the heart of the entire process of on-site inspection in
the PRC is not only Chinese willingness to participate in ACD
measures but perceptions within the international community that
PRC participation is relevant.
Evidence of the former continues
to accumulate. Despite apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies,
there are promising indications offerred by the mere fact that
the Chinese have taken affirmative steps to provide their own ACD
proposals.
In both 1979 and 1982, PRC formal pronouncements on
disarmament have indicated growing Chinese concern for stemming
the arms race, and its 1982 proposal calling for effective
verification by an international body is as progressive a disarmament measure as has been offerred in any international forum by
any nuclear power.
Chinese participation in the UN Disarmament
Commission, the resurgence of international law study in the PRC,
Chinese military potency, weapons modernization programs, and the
recent promulgation of numerous major legal codes are cumulative
evidence of the Chinese calculus of cooperation and interdependence underlying effective implementation of ACD measures.
The reaction of the international community to these PRC
actions has, however, been mixed. The current absence of sophisticated nuclear weapons delivery systems, the general language of
PRC disarmament proposals, and th.e tendency of the Chinese to go
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long on rhetoric and short on hard-nosed negotiation have thus
far resulted in an essentially bilateral !US-USSRl quality to ACD
negotiations.
Nevertheless, the growing nuclear weapons freeze
movement, the initiation of bilateral USSR-PRC normalization
talks,6 US-PRC normalization, and US-PRC negotiations on a
nuclear accord? suggest formally unacknowledged but nevertheless
systematic attempts to incorporate Chinese behavior as a significant variable in foreign policy strategies in general and in ACD
proposals in particular.B There may be many controversial and as
yet unanswerable questions concerning PRC involvement in ACD issues, but its importance and relevance to those ought not be
among them.
The degree to which the PRC would be willing to fulfill its
obligations under the requirements of ACD verification procedures
will depend greatly on the careful preparation of the agreement,
the reciprocal obligations of its provisions, and the negotiation
of all terms by highly qualified and tactful personnel who can
demonstrate the significant competence and serious intentions of
all parties.
In the final
analysis, arms control, disarmament, and
verification are issues that are important not merely in theory
and not only to the United States and the Soviet Union.
Because
of the messianic urge of each to deliver the earth from the
threat of nuclear war posed by the other, American and Soviet
negotiators lose sight of the whole.
And the danger of ignoring
the more general implications is not that ACD and verification
will become insignificant, but that they will thereby become
irrelevant.
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Falu jiben zhishi jianghua (Talks on basic knowledge of law).
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falu jiben zhishi jianghua
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qianmen ru hu houmen jinlang

~ I'J.tE /% Fo ,· 1JJi XR
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"repel the tiger at the front
gate and the wolf sneaks in
the back door"

qianzheng /.:;:-!til

visa

ruj ing )..._ ~i.J

entry

.>

sanziyibao _3.-

0 __.. 2J

more plots for private use, more
free markets, more enterprises
with sole responsibility for
their own profit or loss, and
fixing output quotas on a household basis.

shanyu yulai fengmanlou

"the wind sweeping through the
tower heralds a rainstorm"

shehui zhuyi tixi guojifa

socialist system of international
law
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world law
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tiaoyue huibian

declared to be null and void
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secretary
"all under heaven"
treaty
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Provisional Rules Governing
Travel of Foreigners
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Rules Regulating the Passage of
Foreign Non-Military Yessels
Through the Qiongzhou Strait
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Act Regulating the Entry, Exit,
Transit, Residence, and Travel
of Foreign Nationals
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five principles {of peaceful
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rebel factions
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branch committee

Zhizhun zhouguan fanghuo
buzhun baixing diandeng

"Magistrates are allowed to set
fires, while common people are
forbidden even to light lamps"

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui
waiguoji chuanbo jinchu
gangkouu&tlanli ban fa
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Measures Governing Foreign
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PRC National Border Regulations
Regarding Health and Immunization
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Reference Materials on Chinese
Communists
Bulletin of the Central Peoples
Government's Division of Public
Safety
China
sovereignty
major
self-criticism
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access to facilities in the PRC, 231-232
Act on Frontier Defense Inspection, 160
Act Regulating Entry, Exit, Transit, Residence and
Fore~gn Nationals, 23, 142, 159-160, 171-172, 276

Travel of

Aircraft Regulations, 160
analogy (leisi), 150
anti-Soviet propaganda, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55-56
Arms control (distinguished from disarmament) , 1, 48
Arrest and Detention Regulations, 46-47, 145, 250, 276
ASEAN,

155

Biological Warfare Convention, 51
border· belts, 230
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 174-175
China Film Corporation, 234
China Travel Service, 169-171
Chinese Communist ideology, 34-36
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 25-34, 38-39, 227, (Advisory
Commission), 29; (Central Committee), 29; (Central Investigation Department), 32; (Control of quasi-legal organizations),
29-34;
(policy-execution),
29;
(policy-making),
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(Politburo), 29; (secrecy regulations), 237
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Chinese political principles, 35, 49
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Chinese press, 33-34
Chinese transportation, 172-173
CIA, 226
Civil Aircraft Regulations, 175, 232
Civil Aviation Administ.ration, 173
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Collection of information in the PRC, 223-235
Communications, 164-168, 279
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 2, 51, 53-54
Confidential Communication Bureau, 225
Consular privileges and immunities, 154-156
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons,
including
Diplomatic
Agents, 19, 155
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 157
Convention on Road Traffic, 174
Cosmos crash, 233
Counterrevolutionary activity, 143, 149-151, 227-229, 236
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customs regulations, 160-162
diplomatic privileges and immunities
(PRC reactions to), 156-158
Disarmament, (generally), 2, 47-58;
verification), 3, 55, 57, 240
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(and sovereignty), 54;

Disarmament proposal of 1982 (PRC), 54-55, 279
Discipline Inspection Committee (of the CCP), 280
EEC, 9
Egyptian-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty, 9
emigration from the PRC, 248
E~OD,
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entry and exit (PRC), 159-160
Environmental Protection Law of the PRC, 234-235
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Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 10, 54
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food hygiene regulations, 234
foreign nationals (status of), 142-152
Forestry Act (of the PRC), 234, 235
Four Bigs, 32
Frontier Defense Inspection Act, 230
Gang of Four trial, 45-46, 145, 146, 245, 247
General Office, 225
Geneva Committee on Disarmament, 2, 52-53
Geneva Protocol on Chemical weapons, 51
governmental system of the PRC, 36-47
ground photography, 233-234
Hijacking Conventions, 175
Housing, accommodation and services, 162-164
immunity from criminal process, 229, 247
Individuals (as subjects of international law), 13
informal social control of inspectorates, 151-152, 278
inspectorate composition, 147-148, 156-158, 278-279, 280
inspectorate transportation, 173-177
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) , 1
International Court of Justice, 12, 155, 157 (statute of), 14
International law; (PRC perceptions of), 9-47, 275 (relationship
with municipal law), 18-19;· (sources of), 13-18
·International Law Commission, 12
Internat1onal organizations, (PRC attitudes toward), 11-13
International Telecommunications Convention, 166
interrogation of Chinese Civilians, 239-240
interrogation of Chinese officials, 235-239
interrogation procedures, 240-249
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interrogatory powers, 238-239
Iranian hostage situation, 18
Joint Venture Income Tax Law, 238
joint venture organizations (in the PRC), 164
K6B, 226, 230
Labor Management regulations, 238
law schools and legal research in the PRC, 147
legal codes (generally), 40-41
Legislative Affairs Commission, 280
legislative process and arms inspection, 38Lex ferenda, 17
Lex posterior derogat priori, 24
local legislation, 23-24 (organic laws), 39-40, 276
local people's congresses, 23
local people's courts, 241
Maoist thought, 34-36; (criticism of), 57
Marxism-Leninism (on law), 14-15; (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism),
36
Mediation committees (provisional regulations), 44
Military courts, 241
Military secrecy regulations, 237
Ministry of Communications, 165
Ministry of Electronics Industry, 165
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 160, 161, 170, 225, 231
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 170, 225
Ministry of Justice, 42
Ministry of National Defense, 226, 231
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, 165
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Ministry of Public Security, 226
Ministry of Radio and Television, 165
Movement of personnel, equipment and supplies· in the PRC, 168-179
National People's Congress (NPC), 21, 26, 37, 142, 144, 167, 238,
278 (NPC Standing Committee), 21-22, 37-38, 39, 145, 238, 278
no-first-use principle, 49, 53, 55
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 17, 50, 275
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), 17, 49, 50, 275
nuclear testing, 51
nullum crimen sine lege, 150
Observation by direct access, 230-235
On-site inspection· (generally), 1-3
Organic Court Law, 43-45, 241-242, 243, 244
Organic Procuratorate Law, 42-43
organs of state power of the PRC, 36-38
Outer Space Committee, 233
Outer Space law, 232-233
Outer Space Treaty, 51, 233
ov:rflight photography, 232
Pacta sunt
------

sevanda, 16, 23, 24

Par in paren .!!2!! habet im12erium, 11
Paris Agreements, 9
People's assessors, 146, 243
People's Liberation Army (PLA), 30-21, 151, 230
175
12ersona

~

grata procedures, 156-158

Photography restrictions, 230-235
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PRC Constitution (1978), 26, 30
PRC Constitution (1982), 18, 21-22, 23-25, 37, 38, 46, 142, 144,
167, 168, 234, 236-237, 238, 241, 243, 247, 249, 250, 276
PRC Civil Code, 142-143, 146
PRC Civil Procedure Code, 18, 146
PRC Criminal Law Code, 23; (application to foreign nationals),
143-144, 148-151, 153, 167, 174, 175, 227-229, 236, 241-242,
246, 248, 249-250, 276
PRC Criminal Procedure Code (application to foreign nationals),
144-146, 153, 167, 178, 238, 243, 244-245, 246, 247, 250-251,
276
PRC-USSR Normalization Talks, 2
People's courts, 43polygraph tests in the PRC, 246
Port Regulations, 166-167, 176-177, 233
President (of the PRC), 21-22
privileges and immunities, (generally) 152-158,
party organizations and entities), 155

279

(of

third

Procuracy, 42-43
Production of real evidence "(in the PRC), 249-251
Provisional Regulations on Guarding State Secrets, 143, 149, 153,
168, 223
Provisional Regulations on Lawyers, 146, 244
Public security committees, 226
Public security organs, 46-47, 170, 173, 225
Public Security Regulations, 173-174, 233
quarantine regulations, 234
quasi-public mass organizations, 33-34, 151, 278
Qiongzhou Strait Regulations, 176-177, 233
Radio transmissions (from PRC), 166
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Railway Regulations, 160
Resolution 1962, 233
River Regulations, 166-167, 176, 177, 233
Sampling restrictions in the PRC, 230-235
Seabed Treaty, 51
Secrecy law, 233-229, 276
Secret legislation, 41
Security:
General
Unit, 31

Office of

the Central

Self-defense and disarmament, 47-48, 49, 51
severability, 40
Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, 23
SALT, 50
Sovereignty, (PRC concept of), 9-11, 240-241
Soviet procedure for letters rogatory, 237
Special people's courts, 45, 241
Standardization Regulations, 234
State Council (of the PRC), 21, 22, 38, 163
START, 1
Supreme People's Court, 44-45, 241.
Taiwan issue, 53
tax regulations (_in the PRC) , 251
telephone service (in PRC), 165
territory of PRC (definition of), 144, 176
Three Worlds Theory, 9-10
Tlatelolco Treaty, 52
traffic regulations (of PRC), 173
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transportation of inanimate cargo, 178-179, 279
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